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1. Military Innovation and Defense Transformation
To Alice’s question, “Would you tell me, please, which way I ought to go 
from here?” the Cheshire cat responded, “That depends a good deal on where 
you want to get to.”
Lewis Carroll, Alice in Wonderland
When students of American defense policy asked at the end of the Cold War, ‘Where 
should U.S. armed forces go from here?’ the response, generally, was building on 
‘revolutionary’ capabilities attributed to U.S. forces during the 1991 Gulf War.  Since 
then, U.S. strategic planning and military thought have been inundated with arguments 
that U.S. armed forces exhibit a significant, discontinuous increase in military 
effectiveness, “the process by which armed forces convert resources into fighting 
power.”1  Talk of an emergent American-led military technical revolution (MTR) first 
gained prominence in the late 1980s.  MTRs involved the “simultaneous change in 
military organization and doctrine as a result of technological advances.”2  The term was 
short-lived, deemed too focused on technology over operational and organizational 
factors.  Defense planners subsequently embraced the term revolution in military affairs 
(RMA) in the 1990s.3
Long-range precision strike, stealth technology, air-ground operations, Global 
Positioning System applications, night vision capabilities to ‘own the night,’ the advent 
of a knowledge enabled professional force, and other factors were labeled revolutionary 
in the early 1990s partly because their operational debut coincided with unexpected 
changes in the global military balance.  At the millennium, the U.S. defense policy 
lexicon shifted again.  Analysts and policy makers invoked the term ‘transformation’ as 
an umbrella term for multifaceted initiatives building on the ongoing American-led 
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RMA.  RMA-associated concepts like network centric warfare, battlespace dominance, 
shock and awe, and rapid decisive operations continue to dominate U.S. military thought.  
A wellspring of RMA studies and prolific media references to ‘revolutionary’ 
warfighting capabilities emerged following the 1991 Gulf War.  By the end of the decade, 
they cohered into what this study terms an American RMA thesis.  This thesis argues that 
a revolutionary shift in U.S. military power had occurred based on the synergy of 
advanced intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities, automated 
target identification systems, information-enabled weapons, superior education and 
training, and joint warfighting capabilities.  
A generation of security studies scholars and military theorists had lived through the 
turbulent post-Vietnam period under the intellectual yoke of the illogic of nuclear 
deterrence.  Military theory, as chapter 3 argues, struggled to fill the gap between 
deterrence theory and insurgency.  The paradox inherent in theories of nuclear strategy 
and deterrence grew more problematic for international relations theorists attempting to 
expand their own explanatory frameworks beyond power politics models.  To paraphrase 
Jacques Barzun’s observation about the sixteenth century Reformation, emancipation is 
an immediate appeal of all revolutionary moments.4
This is one of the reasons, arguably, for what this study terms a lexical turn in 
American military though and defense discourse at the end of the Cold War.  That is, a 
fundamental shift in the terms and images of military thought and defense planning away 
from Cold War, nuclear-centric discourse to one dominated by a lexicon of information 
theory, rapid dominance, and jointness – all oriented on advanced conventional forces.
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Defense readiness and intelligence reform became a key issue during the 2000 
presidential elections.  Questions about how innovation could be identified and fostered 
resurfaced in 2001 when incoming president George W. Bush asked the ‘where do you 
want to get to’ question again.  No clear answer emerged.  As the U.S. continues its 
Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), U.S. defense transformation strategy aims to change 
“the nature of military competition,” further exploit and sustain U.S. military advantages, 
and “facilitate a culture of change and innovation in order to maintain competitive 
advantage in the information age.”5
Ideas and concepts associated with RMAs continued to define the intellectual core of 
transformation thinking.  Government transformation initiatives, meanwhile, reflect a 
policy agenda to accelerate programs, reinforce policies, adapt operational concepts, and 
refine visions of future capabilities.  They reflect a desire to further evolve thinking about 
RMAs into transformation processes conducive to the emergence, maturation, and 
adoption of additional military innovations to sustain America’s military superiority.
Underscoring this study is the view that, after a decade of arguments and rhetoric, 
too little analysis exists on the innovations anteceding current U.S. military capabilities.  
It seems disingenuous and epistemologically unsound for students of U.S. defense policy 
and military thought to proceed headlong into assessments of the current defense reform 
period without some degree of perspective – historically and intellectually – on the 
origins and evolution of the nexus of capabilities and technologies giving rise to the 
American RMA.   
Notwithstanding excellent studies of RMAs as historical phenomena, in the 1990s 
little thought was given to fully understanding and documenting the technological, 
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operational, and organizational innovations observers identified as RMA-like.  
Throughout the 1990s, furthermore, RMA rhetoric outpaced actual changes in 
organizations, operational concepts, and the integration of information technology across 
the military services.    
Technologies and concepts associated with a new American way of warfare 
anteceded RMA terms and images. For RMA thought-leader Admiral Bill Owens 
(retired), former Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Owens, the capabilities 
labeled RMA-like in the early 1990s derived from operational approaches and systems 
“engineered and acquired in the late 1970s through the late 1980s” that “made the allied 
victory inevitable and our historically small loss of life probable.”6  Nonnuclear strategic 
capabilities, for example, suggested an altogether different ends-means relationship to 
defend American interests.  During this period, Institute for Defense Analyses researchers 
Richard Van Atta and Michael Lippitz posit, “the ability to exercise military control 
[shifted] from forces with the best or the most individual weapon systems toward forces 
with better information and greater ability to plan, coordinate, and accurately attack.”7
This statement, and its unspoken centering of information technology at the center of 
changes in military effectiveness, is admittedly pedestrian after a decade of information-
centric RMA discourse.  It would have been quite revolutionary from the perspective of 
the 1970s, but not because military thinkers suddenly stumbled onto the need for 
information on the battlefield.  This has always been the case.  
What was new was how commanders and weapons developers thought about 
information systems and decision technologies that demonstrated an unparalleled 
capacity for situational awareness.  Information technology led to operations being lethal 
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over greater distances with fewer forces.  A new language of warfare reflected the 
prevailing social-economic disruptions associated with the information/knowledge 
revolution. Despite the potential for building on these developments to truly enable the 
potential of the technologies labeled RMA-like, Owens concludes that the “Pentagon was 
not interested in embracing” the full promise of the RMA.  In 1991, he laments, “instead 
of a revolution we had a summer of Desert Storm victory parades, and our domestic 
agenda focused on economic issues rather than national defense.”8
Defense modernization stalled during the 1990s; defense spending decreased and the 
pace of operations increased.  As a new era of defense transformation thinking begins, 
students of U.S. defense transformation will benefit from insights into how and why 
RMA arguments arose in the early 1990s and from an exploration of how the RMA thesis 
effects U.S. military thought and defense policy.  Thinking about transformation 
strategies and processes will also benefit from additional insights into military innovation 
behavior.  Finally, current thinking about defense transformation will benefit from 
investigations of the origins of current military capabilities and how they evolved into a 
new American way of warfare after the conditions impelling their creation, political-
military confrontation with the Soviet Union, dissolved.  
Two objectives are pursued in the following chapters.  The first is documenting key 
elements of the origins of the American RMA from late 1970s through the mid-1980s.  
Accordingly, this study distills important historical, conceptual, and doctrinal factors 
central to the evolution of U.S. defense policy and military thought during the last three 
decades.  A synthetic approach summarizes key themes and events, providing context and 
perspective. In doing so, the study explores the widespread perception that advanced U.S. 
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warfighting capabilities became suddenly available in the early 1990s, a perception that 
skewed defense policy discourse at a time when a more balanced understanding of 
historical factors was sorely needed.      
The second objective is expanding military innovation literature for students of the 
political and military sciences.  Although research objectives guiding military innovation 
works vary – descriptive, prescriptive, or a mix of both, findings and conclusions are 
increasingly surfaced in policy discourse, including public policy journals, official 
reports, and dialogue among policy makers themselves.  Insights into innovation 
phenomena aid understanding of the origins and core elements of recent U.S. advances in 
areas such as battlefield surveillance and reconnaissance, long-range precision strike, 
stealth technology, and end-to-end information and knowledge capabilities.  
Within policy communities, military innovation studies offer additional insights into 
ways to think about major military changes involving new, novel, and breakthrough 
changes by unpacking complex innovation processes into discrete and analyzable 
historical narratives.  In doing so, they locate decision makers in past innovation milieus 
that may differ widely in scope and scale – but not necessarily in kind – from 
contemporary ones.  
I contend that a military innovation framework is the most appropriate conceptual 
approach for building an understanding of the origins of the American RMA and then 
using this understanding to inform current transformation decisions.  The wide and varied 
field of defense policy studies will benefit from scholarly frameworks that refract the 
lessons of previous cases of significant military change through lenses attuned to today’s 
strategic and operational challenges.  Innovation studies are well positioned to draw on 
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the theoretical, historical, and policy dimensions of previous works on discontinuous 
changes in military effectiveness; they also provide ample room for focusing on 
continuities across periods of change – an important area of study often overlooked in 
RMA-focused works.  
The innovation framework presented in chapter 2 and discussed in chapter 6 
provides one conceptual template for further consideration of the management of 
innovation diffusion and adoption activities, a subject that students of U.S. national 
security should pursue more systematically with the intent of informing policy 
discussions. Additional work in this area is needed if the arguments and assumptions 
central to the 1990s RMA debate and associated military effectiveness studies are to be 
rendered more useful to policy making.  
The remainder of this introductory chapter sets the stage for a study of military 
innovation and the origins of the American RMA.  The section immediately below 
reviews the rise of the RMA thesis in U.S. defense planning discourse.  Next, the 
emergence of transformation language in post-Cold War defense planning discourse 
conveys a sense of the evolution from a defense modernization strategy based loosely on 
RMA theory to one aiming to institutionalize innovation and achieve specific 
transformation objectives.  Another section outlines the innovation period reviewed in 
later chapters and argues its utility to students of defense transformation.
On the RMA Thesis and the Evolving Discourse of Military Change
What constitutes an RMA?  The U.S. Office of Net Assessment, an organization 
within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, defines one as “a major change in the 
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nature of warfare brought about by the innovative application of new technologies which, 
combined with dramatic changes in military doctrine and operational concepts, 
fundamentally alter the character and conduct of military operations.”9  Prominent figures 
in the evolution of U.S. RMA thinking in the early 1990s included Andrew Marshall, 
Director of Net Assessment, and his then military assistant, Andrew Krepinevich, who 
has since become a leading defense consultant and military analyst.  For Krepinevich, an 
RMA “occurs when the application of new technologies into a significant number of 
military systems combines with innovative operational concepts and organizational 
adaptation in a way that fundamentally alters the character and conduct of conflict.  It 
does so by producing a dramatic increase — often an order of magnitude or greater — in 
the combat potential and military effectiveness of armed forces.”10
Paul Van Riper and F. G. Hoffman suggest a more succinct definition, positing that 
that RMAs occur “when a significant discontinuous increase in military capability is 
created by the innovative interaction of new technologies, operational concepts, and 
organizational structures."11  James Fitz-Simonds and Jan van Tol add that “the essence 
of an RMA” is “not the rapidity of the change in military effectiveness relative to 
opponents” but “the magnitude of the change compared with preexisting military 
capabilities.”12
RAND Corporation defense analyst Richard O. Hundley takes another approach.  He 
observes two characteristics common to RMAs that may occur simultaneously: 1) a new 
capability “renders obsolete or irrelevant one or more core competencies of a dominant 
player”; 2) a new operational reality “creates one or more core competencies” involving 
“some new dimension of warfare.”13
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Talk about revolutionary advances in U.S. military power appeared in 1991.  That 
year, Marshall assigned Krepinevich the task of assessing the pace and scope of changes 
to warfare.  Strategic management questions motivated his study, completed in 1992, 
which also examined Soviet observations about changes in warfare.   Areas of emphasis 
included assessing the overall discourse of change, much of it emanating from Soviet 
military theorists, discerning what really was new and different in terms of available 
capabilities, and locating shifts in military effectiveness in historical context.  
Krepinevich also suggested what such shifts implied for the future.  
Throughout the early 1990s, the Office of Net Assessment sponsored studies and 
facilitated discussions to develop an intellectual framework suitable for policy-relevant 
thinking about changes in military affairs.  The intent was informing post-Cold War 
defense modernization activities with knowledge about military revolutions and the 
emerging technologies most likely to sustain a U.S. military advantage.   
Political scientist James Der Derian noted that the American RMA thesis was “only 
an idea in the wind” in 1993 when Andrew Marshall circulated an eight-page memo 
entitled “Some Thoughts on Military Revolutions.”14  By 1994, at least five Pentagon 
task forces were exploring RMAs.15  Strategic analysts Steven Metz and James Kievit 
noted that a “heady vision” associated with the evolving RMA thesis “aroused 
tremendous excitement among American defense planners” by 1995 and that, for many, 
the RMA’s promise of “increased effectiveness at reduced cost” was “an obsession.”16  A 
year later, military historian Dennis Showalter observed that the term RMA had 
“replaced TQM [Total Quality Management] as the acronym of choice in the U.S. Armed 
Forces.”17
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At the turn of the century, military historians Williamson Murray and MacGregor 
Knox introduced their survey, The Dynamics of Military Revolution, 1300-2050, with the 
observation that the RMA thesis constituted “the heart of debates within the Pentagon 
over future strategy.”18  Aspects of the RMA thesis appeared in the Secretary of 
Defense’s Annual Report to the President and Congress, in a series of new joint 
warfighting publications, and in Service modernization roadmaps.  Public statements by 
senior military and civilian leaders embraced the central tenets of the RMA thesis.  
Increased awareness to RMA theory and language stemmed from studies and conferences 
organized around case studies on, theoretical debates over, and historical arguments 
about significant military change.  Studies sponsored by the Office of Net Assessment 
informed RMA discussions in the 1990s and shaped the cognitive landscape.  By mid-
decade references to the RMA were ubiquitous.
National security scholar Stephen Biddle argues that the RMA thesis evolved "from 
exposition to consideration for implementation as a U.S. government policy” so quickly 
that it “outpaced the ability of scholarship to examine its underlying premises and 
evidence.”19  Much of RMAizing of defense policy devolved into empty rhetoric.  
With the defense budget in decline and force reductions a political priority, few 
senior leaders wanted to risk identifying programs as inappropriate investments for the 
new security situation.  Doing so would leave their programs vulnerable for cuts; it also 
risked alienating congressional representatives with districts affected by cuts in terms of 
lost revenue.  As chapter 6 argues, it was also difficult to argue that additional change 
was needed in light of apparent U.S. military prowess.  RMA debates, in the end, failed 
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to crystallize into a policy-focused modernization debate in the 1990s or spark significant 
changes in Service core capabilities.  
In many areas, however, a healthy dose of reality underwrote and carried the 
essential ideas of the RMA thesis forward.  The potential did exist for additional, 
significant changes to the core missions of military organizations.  Chapter 6 discusses 
why the 1990s witnessed a relatively small magnitude of change in terms of what seems 
to have transpired during the 1980s and what is being proposed in the 2000s.  This study 
interlaces a review of tangible developments in military affairs with discussion of the 
ideas, operational concepts, and theories of success associated with advanced 
conventional warfighting capabilities.
As the RMA thesis ascended in national security discourse, historical analogies were 
invoked first to explain the concept in general terms and then to place the American 
experience in a direct historical comparison. Because Andrew Marshall hypothesized that 
the immediate post-Cold War period was analogous to the interwar period between 
World War I and II, many of the Office of Net Assessment’s studies on military change 
focused on the events and processes leading to interwar shifts in military effectiveness.  
Mechanized forces, submarine warfare, air defenses, carrier aviation, and other mission 
areas were scrutinized. 
Fiftieth anniversary reflections on the epochal events of World War II, including 
blockbuster movies and best- selling histories, rendered interwar military innovations and 
their World War II operational manifestations familiar touchstones for late 1990 thinking 
about military change.  
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Interwar military effectiveness studies surfaced historical patterns and the 
representative examples of innovation at a time when little was known about RMA 
phenomena.  What is interesting in retrospect, and indeed a motivation for this study, is 
the lack of analysis on the period that gave rise to capabilities deemed RMA-like despite
so many deliberate, detailed analyses of decades-long trends and development processes 
during the interwar period.  
Barry Watts and Murray ascribe the “motivation” underlying interwar studies to a 
“hypothesis that” the U.S. was “in the early stages of a period in which advances in 
precision weaponry, sensing and surveillance, computational and information-processing 
capabilities, and related systems will trigger substantial changes” in military capabilities 
“as profound and far reaching as the combined-systems ‘revolutions’ of the interwar 
period.” 20
Chief among interwar references used to frame the American experience was the 
German combined-arms armored capabilities popularly known as blitzkrieg or 
“lightening war.” For Williamson Murray, the German’s 1940  “breakthrough on the 
Meuse” in northern France “and its explosive exploitation . . . was so crushing, so 
convincing, that it has served as the shining exemplar of the revolution in military affairs 
of the mid-twentieth century.”21
Parallels emerged in the way the German and American RMAs were defined, the 
former lending images and concepts to the latter.  Both involved relative advances in 
command and control of distributed forces.  Blitzkrieg was described as a combined-
systems RMA consisting of radio communications, tanks, tactical air cover, doctrine, and 
operational practices; the American RMA became known as a “system-of-systems” 
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revolution defined primarily by advanced surveillance, information warfare, stealth, long-
range precision strike, and joint warfighting doctrine.  
Former Secretary of Defense William Perry (1994 through 1997), an early proponent 
of a system-of-systems approach and father of key RMA-related capabilities, describes 
the underlying philosophy of systems-of-systems thinking as “links in the chain of 
effectiveness.”  If “any one of these had been removed, the overall effectiveness of the 
chain would have been significantly diminished.”22  Crucial to keeping these links, as 
later chapters argue, was the co-evolution of doctrine and technology.  
The U.S. experience differed from the German interwar in one important respect.  It 
included the emergence of what Israeli military historian Shimon Naveh terms an 
‘operational cognition’ (discussed below) in the last decades of the Cold War.  In the 
planning domain, this involved thinking of mission packages in which all the required 
aspects of an operational capability were developed and fielded together, with sub-
elements integrated into an enterprise.  Discursive and organizational parallels to this 
operational cognition included a range of images and activities associated with different 
forms or archetypes of integration.  Enterprises, networks, network-centric operational 
concepts, common operating pictures, joint organizations and doctrine, and other terms 
were evoked to describe idealized behaviors and conditions all concerned with 
synergistic, emergent capabilities of the Services acting in concert.  
Exposure to RMA discourse and references to discontinuous shifts in military 
effectiveness across historical periods, often compared to American performance in the 
1991 Gulf War, sensitized the defense planning establishment to theories about, and cases 
of, military change.  Historical studies of how, when, and why some military 
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organizations successfully increase their military effectiveness underscored a lexical shift 
from the terms MTR to RMA to transformation.  Military effectiveness and innovation 
works disaggregated specific, mostly interwar shifts to examine the multifaceted reasons 
for success or failure.  
Until the late 1990s and early 2000s, however, it appears that the majority of these 
efforts remained distant from policy decisions in terms of conjoining theories of change 
with specific modernization initiatives.  One reason for this, perhaps, was the lack of an 
empowered, official voice for transformation.  An important government conduit for 
applying military effectiveness studies to defense policy decisions, the Office of Net 
Assessment, was marginalized for much of the 1990s.  No single office was charged with 
championing innovation; warfighting labs and joint experimentation activities were under 
funded and largely existed on the margins of decision-making.  
A turning point in came in the national debate over defense preparedness occurred in 
1997 when the National Defense Panel called for a new defense strategy to transform the 
military.  It argued for initiatives to fully leverage information technology and develop 
additional space-based capabilities to accelerate modernization.  Another event was the 
intelligence community’s failure to predict nuclear weapons testing by India and 
Pakistan, which highlighted difficulties identifying and monitoring foreign military 
developments.  Could the U.S. sustain its military advantage and prevent technological 
surprise?  
The context of national security strategy shifted in the early 2000s when multifaceted 
‘change’ arguments again dominated defense-planning discussions among scholars and 
policy makers.  Senior members of the George W. Bush administration refocused 
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attention on transformation visions, revisited alternate force structure initiatives, and 
rekindled discussion of national security strategy.  Transformation was characterized as 
either enabling or leveraging an RMA  
The Office of Net Assessment returned to the forefront of historical studies and 
analysis of transformation options.  Joint experimentation and exercise activities received 
senior leadership support, additional funding, and achieved greater prominence in Service 
force structure discussions.  Lessons from operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, exercises, and 
more realistic joint experiments informed thinking about the future of warfare.  Key 
aspects of the 1990s RMA thesis were reexamined and refined in light of operational 
experience.  
Historical Threads in the Evolution of the New American Way of Warfare
An opportunity exists for scholarly studies to increase knowledge of military 
innovation and effectiveness and to inform policy discussions of defense transformation.  
A suitable place to start is to revisit arguments made about the appearance of and 
historical underpinnings for the American RMA, what observers have called the new 
American war of warfare.  This section briefly introduces four historical threads woven 
through the following chapters: the need to rethink the interwar period as the RMA 
exemplar informing U.S. defense studies; the evolution of systems engineering; the 
information revolution; and the writings of Soviet military theorists. 
As discussed above, interwar analogies helped facilitate greater appreciation for 
historical aspects of military change but failed to focus attention on how the American 
RMA differed from previous cases.  Initial discussion of these differences introduces 
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arguments made in later chapters.  Sketching their historical underpinnings accentuates 
differences between the interwar period and the developments discussed in chapters 4 and 
5.  The interwar period was the one most frequently identified with the post-Cold War 
American RMA while the one discussed in chapters 4 and 5 appears to be the more 
applicable period for informing transformation.  
Military innovation studies tend to partition theories of military change into 
peacetime and wartime categories.  A preponderance of the interwar studies aiming to 
inform defense policy in the 1990s viewed the interwar period from the perspective of a 
peacetime context for innovation. At the end of the Cold War, the natural strategic 
condition or historical parallel seemed to warrant peacetime analogies.
With the U.S. simultaneously prosecuting a global war on terrorism and pursuing 
defense transformation, however, the historical periods informing innovation activities 
cannot be confined to tidy peacetime or wartime analogies.  Theories of change that 
speak to only peacetime contexts cannot be easily adapted to the current situation in 
which U.S. defense planners are attempting to transform military forces while 
simultaneously engaged in high-intensity, global military activities.  The Cold War 
period studied in later chapters falls between classic definitions of peace and war in terms 
of military spending, defense research and development, and doctrinal change.  
A thread running through the initial rise and continued evolution of American 
military power was the above-mentioned emergence of an operational cognition in 
American military thought.  For Naveh, it is the first true systems approach to military 
planning in the West because it includes a cognitive orientation, a schema, conditioned to 
think about military operations in a systems-theoretic fashion.  Strategic objectives, 
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campaign plans, and tactics are linked.23  Arguably, this remains the case in military 
operations against other militaries.  Yet to be determined is the applicability of the 
operational cognition associated with the American RMA with the travails of insurgency 
warfare in Iraq and a global campaign against terrorism.
Naveh raises an important difference between the German interwar army and the 
U.S. military in the period giving rise to the American RMA.  Where German military 
leaders failed to develop an operational cognition during the interwar period, American 
commanders did in the 1970s and 1980s.  
The Germans certainly achieved tactical excellence.  Operational excellence, 
including theater-level planning and an ability to coordinate operational maneuver, was 
lacking.  Barry Watts and Williamson Murray concluded that Germany were able to 
demonstrate revolutionary capabilities because they “evolved sound concepts for mobile, 
combined-arm warfare and had trained their army to execute those concepts.”24
But at the operational and strategic level, Naveh faults Germany for “deep 
operational ignorance” in the conduct of World War II and, during major campaigns, 
adhering to a “strategic framework” that “completely disregarded the existence of depth, 
space, fighting resources and operational trends.”25  Above the tactical level, “Blitzkrieg
not only lacked operational coherence but . . . [in] its actual formation dictated 
relinquishing a systemic approach to military conduct.”26  The German Army lost its 
ability to think operationally in the late 1930s largely because Hitler severely weakened 
the German staff school and crushed the effectiveness of a core group of military thinkers 
that appeared unsympathetic to Nazi ideology.  The training of military officers thereafter 
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“centered on the levels of the brigade and the division and only rarely touched on 
problems related to the operating of corps.”27
During the 1980s, as part of a larger reawakening of American military thought, the 
operational level of war became a key focus of study and an important consideration in 
defense planning.  A larger integration theme co-evolved with the emerging information 
technology sector, leading to network centric warfare and other concepts.   
Indeed, integration emerges as an important part of the rise of the American RMA.  
An American operational cognition, later chapter argue, is in fact of part of a larger
approach to solving complicated problems that involves integration in both technological 
and organizational domains.  
This is part of the story of the thirty-year transformation in U.S. defense planning 
overlooked in many RMA studies, one that involves the maturation of systems 
engineering and integration skills.  Modern system engineering capabilities evolved from 
the work of Brigadier General Bernard Schriever in the 1950s.  He “introduced a systems 
approach to long-range planning that involved the analysis of potential military threats to 
the United States and a design for Air Force responses using advanced technology.28
Another key figure was Simon Ramo, who “made an original contribution to the 
development of systems engineering by creating an organization dedicated to scheduling 
and coordinating the activities of a large number of contractors engaged in research and 
development and in testing the components and subsystems that are eventually assembled 
into a coherent system.”29
Developed in the 1950s and 1960s, systems engineering and integration practices 
were created to manage large, Cold War projects like the SAGE (Semi-automatic Ground 
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Environment) air defense project, the Atlas intercontinental ballistic missile, and the 
Polaris submarine launched missile.  The Atlas Project of the 1950s was indeed a 
watershed, leading to a new “mode of management” that “changed the complexion of 
both the Cold War and the aerospace industry.”30  Where the Soviet Union failed to 
perfect skills needed to develop, field, and integrate complex weapons systems, “America 
avoided the same fate because it was more efficient . . .in combining complex 
technologies into weapon systems and integrating advanced weapons systems into its 
fielded forces.”31
Experience creating, evolving, and adapting systems engineering and integration 
capabilities as a discipline facilitated the emergence of processes to help leaders identify 
where new technology was needed.  It also positioned the U.S. to mature the information 
revolution within military organizations as new information-enabled capabilities emerged 
during the 1980s. The operational cognition mentioned above co-evolved with 
perceptions for, and expectations about, information technology applied to battlefield 
problems.  
Underscoring all of the technologies and doctrinal facets of the American RMA are 
systems, organizational behavior, and operational concepts brought together through 
information technology.  Owens posits in Lifting the Fog of War that, “the computer 
revolution, if correctly applied, presents us with a unique opportunity to transform the 
U.S. military.”32   For him, the computer revolution “is the American Revolution in 
Military Affairs,” one that will yield perceived increases in effectiveness only if the 
Defense Department succeeds in “creating a synergy in new weapons, sensors, and 
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communications” through the successful integration of “technological applications with 
an information-age military organization.”33
The dawn of the current computing age occurred in 1943 when ten “Colossus” 
machines were built by the British to facilitate the breaking of German Enigma code.  
Three years later the Electronic Numerical Integrator and Calculator (ENIAC) was 
activated in Pennsylvania.  An unrelated event occurred about the same time.  As the 
1947 National Security Act was being considered, scientists at Bell Laboratories 
discovered the transistor effect: a small piece of wire with germanium contacts could be 
fashioned to produce an amplifying effect.34  After the 1959 creation of silicon wafer 
transistors (integrated circuits) prices for microelectronics “brains” dropping thirty 
percent a year while their sophistication doubled at the same rate.35
In the late 1970s, digital systems replaced antiquated and clumsy electromechanical
ones. Such systems are faster, cheaper, more efficient, and able to carry more 
information.  They also carry different kinds of information: telecommunications and data 
processing could move over the same system.  This encouraged developments in the 
formative period of the American RMA.
Another trend evolved after IBM’s 1969 decision to market hardware and software 
separately.  The development of the graphic user interface in the late 1970s and the 
subsequent development of personal computers with user-friendly cognitive and physical 
interfaces (e.g., visualization tools, the mouse, touch screens) changed the course of 
technology history, military science, and society.  Military operations followed, as did the 
focus of military innovations in weapons, training, doctrine, business processes, and other 
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aspects of organizational behavior. An explosion in personal computing and network 
software created a billion dollar industry in the 1980s.   
A benchmark in the computer revolution occurred in 1985 when the National 
Science Foundation required universities requesting funding to provide Internet access to 
all qualified users and mandated application of standard Internet protocols.  By the end of 
the decade, vastly expanded usage brought further innovations in digital communications, 
including routing and delivery capabilities.
Add satellite communication to the fray – and then consider that all of these areas of 
technology came to rely on semiconductors and microchips – and the maturation of the 
American RMA begins to take form.  These were the basic technological components, or 
building blocks, for the information revolution that underwrote the information-centric 
components of the American RMA.  Doctrinal and organizational developments were 
closely intertwined with technological ones.   
The revolutions fed on one another.  Better hardware meant more sophisticated 
software; new software created demand for faster processors; faster processes meant 
faster external devices and telecomputing; faster systems demanded quicker links 
between them – and on and on.  All of these, in light of the merging of the “revolutions” 
mentioned above, characterize the basic technological infrastructure of the late twentieth 
century’s computer information revolution.  Spatial and temporal distance no longer 
determined communication parameters, a critical factor for a military contemplating 
long-range precision strike and dynamic re-targeting of nuclear missiles.
The 1970s witnessed important advances in the development and integration of 
complex information systems and the adaptation of digital information technology for 
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military purposes.  The 1980s brought experiments and exercises demonstrating the 
utility of leveraging information technology to offset Soviet superiority in Europe.  From 
this period emerged key operational, technological, and organizational capabilities later 
identified as an RMA.  Key U.S. military innovations involved recognition that 
information technology could be leveraged to attenuate specific strategic and operational 
military challenges.  For these and other reasons discussed below, this period warrants 
additional consideration when using examples of twentieth century military change to 
inform defense transformation.
Central to this part of the larger computer information revolution was a decrease in 
the cost of storing information.  According to one estimate of the military innovation 
period studied here, “The cost of storing a single digital unit of data in a memory chip fell 
from one-tenth of a cent in 1976 to one-thousandth of a cent in 1986, and it will keep 
dropping by about 35 percent per annum.”36  It is the decline in the cost of computing 
power over this pivotal decade, along with the integration of low-cost computational 
technology into all aspects of American society, that helped create the world’s first truly 
information-based culture and made many elements of the RMA possible. RMA 
discussions borrowed terminology and ideas from the world of information technology.  
In the rush to adopt RMA language and imagery, however, many seemingly glossed 
over the ironic origins of the RMA terms and arguments.  Initial thinking on RMAs 
evolved within Soviet military thought over several decades to describe multifaceted 
developments associated with a nuclear RMA.  Former Under Secretary of Defense for 
Strategy and Threat Reduction Ted Warner, for example, notes that U.S. views of the 
RMA were “heavily based on Russian or Soviet conceptions.”37  As discussed in chapter 
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4, discussions of troop dispersion, command and control requirements, and compressed 
decision making timelines within the nuclear RMA migrated to a conventional variant 
that remained linked to nuclear warfare in Soviet military theory.  
Owens is among those attributing early recognition of the potential for information 
technology to underwrite an RMA to Soviet observers.  Soviet “technocrats,” he posits, 
first recognized “that computers, space surveillance, and long-range missiles were 
merging into a new level of military technology, significant enough to shift the balance of 
power in Europe in favor of the United States and NATO” (North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization).38    Soviet analysts, in fact, argued in the late 1970s and early 1980s that 
American conventional forces were developing precision strike capabilities able to 
achieve battle effects similar to tactical nuclear weapons (e.g., impede armor formation 
movement; disruption of command and control), thereby creating a conventional 
deterrent.  Marshal Nikolai V. Orgarkov, for example, claimed in 1984 that U.S. 
conventional forces would soon “make it possible to sharply increase (by at least an order 
of magnitude) the destructive potential of conventional weapons, bringing them closer, so 
to speak, to weapons of mass destruction in terms of effectiveness.”39  Advances in the 
effectiveness of conventional long-range precision strike systems provided both the point 
of departure from and link to the larger body of nuclear RMA thought.  
Soviet perceptions of American conventional developments in the late 1970s and 
early 1980s had an amplifying effect on subsequent U.S. defense modernization 
decisions.  Marshall relates that, upon learning of Soviet concerns about “reconnaissance-
strike” initiatives in the late 1970s and early 1980s, U.S. defense planners “concluded 
that it would be useful to intensify those concerns by further investment” in conventional 
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precision strike.40  “Warsaw Pact defense ministers,” Christian Nunlist learned from 
Soviet archives, “saw developments in conventional armaments in the early 1980s as 
even more ominous than the strategic change” wrought from nuclear weapons 
developments because they came with the “revitalization” and “redesigning” of U.S. and 
NATO conventional doctrine.41
Among the most important reconnaissance-strike programs was the then classified 
Assault Breaker concept demonstration geared to “rip the heart out of” the Soviet Army’s 
armored and mechanized strengths.”42  “To the Soviets,” Norman Friedman aptly states, 
realizing the capabilities suggested by the concept demonstration would be “a disaster” 
because of their ability to blunt Soviet armor.43  Assault Breaker was, arguably, part of a 
larger vision for using information technology in what today’s defense analysts call a 
“system-of-systems”; it was the original plan for linking systems with other systems 
using information technology.
Studies sponsored by the Office of Net Assessment figured prominently in the initial 
surge of RMA language and concepts.  In general, reports on the origins of the RMA in 
the 1990s were motivated by a broader question.  “Looking back over the military history 
of the twentieth century, what were the fundamental technological, conceptual, 
operational, and organizational factors that, during times of peace, gave rise to 
fundamental changes in how military organizations would fight future wars?”44  This 
question also retains currency in the early 2000s.  
Although important insights into military change emerged, many innovation studies 
aiming to answer this question excluded an important period giving rise to fundamental 
changes in military effectiveness.  More detailed assessments of U.S. military innovations 
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in the 1970s and 1980s, including cases where marginalized programs evolved into 
critical capabilities, might have focused defense modernization discourse on continuities 
and discontinuities in the strategic environment, force structure, and separate Service 
modernization plans.  
Arguably, additional studies should have built on Krepinevich’s 1991 study, the 
above-mentioned Office of Net Assessment post-Cold War examination of RMA 
arguments.  This study returns to a central theme of that seminal report.  Informed by 
Soviet assessments of American innovations, drawing on broad understanding of military 
history, and guided by theories of military change, the study attempted to answer several 
strategic management questions at the center of defense modernization debates today:  
“How to identify appropriate innovations? and “How to foster innovation?”45  Identifying 
and fostering innovations were not a focus of the majority of the 1990s RMA works; 
innovation dynamics received too little attention in official defense planning discussions.    
Study Overview
In his What is History?  E. H. Carr posited that, “Nothing in history is inevitable 
except in the formal sense that, for it to have happened otherwise, the antecedent causes 
would have had to be different.”46  True enough.  It was certainly not inevitable that late 
1970s and early 1980s defense initiatives would underwrite the American RMA thesis in 
the 1990s as the Cold War ended peacefully, perhaps anti-climatically.  
What antecedent events and processes set the course toward the RMA?  What factors 
facilitated the material and conceptual turn from the dominant narrative of nuclear 
strategy?  What processes, trends, and developments provided the conceptual and 
 © Robert Tomes 4/30/ 2004 4:08 AM
26
material basis for the resident military capabilities on which the lexical turn in defense 
discourse hinged?  What events and processes catalyzed the shift from the nuclear 
narrative of defense discourse? 
A mix of antecedent causes converged serendipitously.  A number of evolutionary 
threads converged.  Much continuity in military thought and operational practice 
remained, but the dominant narrative of nuclear thought was irreversibly changed. 
Contingent factors affecting the language of military change included the Warsaw Pact’s 
demise, a pervasive disposition toward “revolutionary change” discourse across the 
government, the widespread influence of technology-driven socio-economic changes on 
perceptions of the future, and a desire to shed references to nuclear weapons or doctrine 
in U.S. military thought.  Deliberate planning and, from hindsight, seemingly prescient 
forethought about the capabilities of emerging technology merged with historical 
contingency to create a situation conducive to the ascension of the RMA thesis.
Contingency is an unsatisfactory explanation for those seeking insights into the 
evolution of discourse and the emergence of disruptive military capabilities. More 
important to understanding the capabilities inherent in the RMA thesis are technological, 
organizational, and operational innovations that cohered into a new American way of 
war.
For much of the post-Cold War period a preponderance of defense planners and 
military theorists framed strategic management questions, as well as the general “where 
you want get to” question posed at the top of this chapter, with visions related to the 
1990s RMA thesis.  Reoccurring themes were superior ISR, a seamless air-land-sea-
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space command and control structure, long-range precision strike weapons able to 
destroy mobile targets, improved stealth, and information warfare.  
Addressing historical, technical, and defense policy issues related to the American 
RMA in Lifting the Fog of War, Owens opined that, “if one has to affix a date to the 
beginning of the present [RMA] it is 1977, when three key Pentagon officials – Harold 
Brown, Andrew Marshall, and William Perry – began to think in concert about the 
application of technology to military affairs.”47  They did so, arguably, because they were 
acutely aware of the Soviet threat in Europe and generally informed of research and 
development activities to meet it. 
Of course, a specific date for the gestation and birth of the current American RMA 
do not exist.  It is impossible to disassociate the invention of the computer, the impact of 
nuclear weapons, early satellite navigation systems, the advent of radar, or other 
antecedent factors from the chain of events leading to the emergence of ‘revolutionary’ 
military capabilities.  That said, and historical contingency aside, it is possible to delimit 
the period in which decisions were made to fund specific programs and develop certain 
capabilities that, in time, gave rise to forces exhibiting a discontinuous increase in 
military effectiveness.  Key decisions, inflection points, cognitive and doctrinal 
turnabouts, technological developments, and innovation activities cohered to create 
capabilities that altered calculations of strategic effectiveness and how military 
organizations measured their readiness.
1977 nonetheless emerges as a pivotal year.  The Defense Advanced Research 
Project Agency aligned its budget to address conventional theater challenges. Lockheed 
flew a technology demonstration airplane leading to a F-117 stealth bomber.  Signals for 
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what became a space-based Global Positioning System (GPS) were proven adequate for 
ground navigation and maneuver.  The Air Force’s Airborne Warning and Control 
System (AWACS) and other battlefield remote sensing systems entered operational 
service and redefined the notion of tactical reconnaissance by enabling theater 
surveillance.  A new space-borne reconnaissance capability for remote sensing entered 
operational use, eventually linking national (strategic) remote sensing and warning tools 
directly to military operations.  President Jimmy Carter’s national security adviser 
Zbigniew Brzezinski proposed a security strategy for the Persian Gulf region, including a 
rapid deployment force; and Carter directed Harold Brown to create Delta Force, the first 
strategic unit trained and equipped to combat terrorism.  
Another 1977 event warrants mention.  William Perry became the Director of 
Defense Research and Engineering and assisted Secretary of Defense Harold Brown’s 
articulation of a new research and development strategy, known as the “an offset 
strategy.”48  Perry himself argued that the post-Cold War advances in U.S. military 
effectiveness descended from this strategy, named for technologies (e.g., sensors, 
precision-guided weapons, and stealth technologies) that “would give qualitative 
advantages to American forces to offset the quantitative advantage the Soviet forces 
enjoyed.”49  Capabilities and technologies associated with the offset strategy later 
“achieved the status of a ‘revolution in military affairs.”50
This study reviews the events leading to innovations – technological, doctrinal, and 
operational – aiming to reduce the threat of Soviet military power in Europe and Soviet 
military influence in strategically important peripheral regions.  It then examines how 
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discussions of these capabilities evolved after the fall of the Soviet Union and the 1991 
Gulf War.  
Chapter 2 surveys military innovation theory and proposes a framework for studying 
innovation processes.  This is not an attempt to develop and prove a new theory 
explaining all cases of military innovation across all periods of military affairs.  As 
chapter 2 introduces and later chapters revisit, a single causal theory accounting for or 
explaining all cases of successful or failed military innovation is unobtainable because of 
the complex and contingent nature of innovation in general.  The type of theoretical rigor 
desired to explain or predict all reoccurring events or behavior – or to prescribe specific 
policies – is unobtainable.  That said, there are general patterns and expectations about 
behavior, drawn from historical cases and studies of innovation practices, which define 
parameters of options that are likely to promote successful innovations.  
Chapter 3 reviews Cold War American military thought and defense planning.  It 
concludes that a dominant narrative of nuclear strategy in defense policy discourse, 
military thought, and doctrine evolved within American national security policy, one that 
constrained thinking about conventional warfighting capabilities (termed ‘general 
purpose’ forces in contemporary writings).  Reviewing Cold War nuclear strategy, 
particularly deterrence strategy and nuclear targeting developments instills appreciation
for later changes in American military doctrine and defense planning.  These changes, 
traceable to developments in the 1970s and early 1980s, are best understood from the 
perspective of what was overturned in military thought and doctrine by the centering of 
the RMA thesis.  
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In this study, the antecedents to the American RMA are divided into two periods: 
chapter 4 addressed the formative phase (1973 through 1980) and chapter 5 the 
maturation phase (1981 to 1986).   The period discussed in these two chapters witnessed 
the first movements away from nuclear-centric military theory; the emergence of 
conventional deterrence theory and its policy adjuncts; the ascension of joint warfighting; 
a training and doctrine revolution; and the ascent of information technology on the 
battlefield.  Each of these developments relates to the offset strategy, as does the creation 
of rapid reaction forces. Specific technological innovations included long-range precision 
strike capabilities drawing on GPS, theater reconnaissance assets, and information-
enabled, integrated weapons platforms.  GPS alone created an innovation stream that 
revolutionized numerous aspects of operations, including maneuver, logistics, and 
precision targeting from unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).  
Referring to chapters 4 and 5 as the formative and maturation phases of the RMA 
does not imply that precision strike, stealth, knowledge capabilities, and other 
developments subsumed within the RMA fully matured by the late 1980s.  The dates 
bounding these chapters do, however, provide useful historical benchmarks.  They also 
parallel the formative and maturation years of the computer information revolution, the 
post-Vietnam evolution of new degrees of cooperation between air and ground forces, 
and the evolution of key space-based capabilities like GPS.    
The formative period spans roughly from American disengagement in Vietnam to 
reversals in the Carter administration’s defense and foreign policy planning after the 1979 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.  In addition to including the range of 1977 developments 
 © Robert Tomes 4/30/ 2004 4:08 AM
31
mentioned above, the formative period included changes in the context within which 
national security decisions were made.  
Inflation reached fourteen percent.  Gas rationing was imposed as long lines 
appeared at filling stations.  Millions cancelled their vacations.  In 1979, with American 
hostages still in Iran, Carter kept the national Christmas tree dark – a symbolic move that 
defined the national mood.  Shifting strategic realities and pressing operational challenges 
created a milieu ripe for multidimensional innovations.  The Carter Doctrine extended 
U.S. military power to defend the Persian Gulf from Soviet expansion; the failed April 
1980 Iran hostage rescue mission had a ripple effect on contingency planning and 
readiness; and a presidential directive brought the largest U.S. arms build-up in three 
decades. Important innovations originating during this period included stealth technology 
and the Assault Breaker program.  
Meanwhile, the commercialization and diffusion of computing capabilities and 
associated information technology began to influence defense planning and military 
capabilities.  Computers themselves were only part of an important shift in technology 
underlying military effectiveness.  A more subtle change was the rise of what Steven 
Johnson termed an “interface culture” after Apple’s revolutionary incorporation of a 
graphic user interface in its desktop operating system.51  Thereafter, interfaces evolved 
into a revolutionary way to think about and exploit operator-machine linkages, which 
became as important as the hardware and software to efficiency.  The military 
implications of these and other developments for aggregating, correlating, visualizing, 
and leveraging information for decision making and action taking are central to the story 
of the American RMA.  
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The seeds of the maturation period of the American RMA began with the late 1970s 
reversal in defense spending, budded in the early 1980s, and ended around 1986 with the 
signing of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, the Army’s publication of a revised AirLand 
Battle doctrine, and Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev’s consolidation of power.  U.S. 
defense spending nearly tripled during this period.  As the 1980s closed, the narrative of 
nuclear strategy no longer dominated defense discourse and the key elements of the 
information-enabled precision reconnaissance-strike system were under development or 
already in service.  A vision for the future of warfare, therefore, existed before the Cold 
War ended and the RMA thesis ascended in U.S. defense planning.  
Building on preliminary discussions in chapter 4, chapter 5 reviews U.S. Army 
doctrine, the rediscovery of operational art, and ground support missions assigned to the 
U.S. Air Force.  Focus is on developments related to defending NATO from a Soviet 
attack and retaining deterrence stability in Europe.  Key operational concepts, core 
technologies, and general agreement on the vision for future conventional warfighting 
forces solidified during the early 1980s.  In some cases, first generation systems that 
demonstrated potential in the late 1970s helped shape thinking about the application of 
new technology and the need for new operational concepts.  Technology, concepts, 
organizational changes, and other developments conjoined in the 1980s, setting the stage 
for the more robust capabilities in use today.  
Developments associated with the evolution of AirLand Battle doctrine in Europe 
and the advent of light forces for rapid deployments to the Persian Gulf provide a better 
conceptual and historical “fit” for a study of innovations anteceding the American RMA.  
Owens, a career naval office, argues the advent of “new technology and a shift toward 
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different operational concepts” in the 1970s “was most prominent in the U.S. Army”; the 
Army “began to develop a much greater capacity to see and track events at greater 
distances and attack with longer-range, precision weapons.”52 For sure, the Marine Corps 
and Navy undertook innovations during this period as well, and the Navy was responsible 
for important developments in guidance systems and targeting.  Navy work on network 
centric warfare was almost adopted wholesale into American military thought in the early 
2000s.  As much as possible, Navy and Marine Corps innovations are incorporated.  Still, 
they figured less prominently in the origins of the American RMA than Army, Air Force, 
and Department-wide innovations.
Chapter 6 reviews the post-Cold War defense policy discourse, including a critical 
review of the so-called RMA debate.  It examines the effects of the end of the Cold War 
on American military thought, and reviews post-Cold War defense modernization.  It also 
sketches the role of the information revolution in the evolution of the American RMA 
and on current defense transformation visions.  Chapter 7 concludes the study, revisiting 
the military innovation framework discussed in chapter 2 from the perspective of 
historical information presented in chapters 4 and 5.  
Chapter Conclusion 
This is only one of many studies needed to expand our understanding of the events, 
innovations, and cultural shifts giving rise to the American RMA.  Students of U.S. 
defense transformation thirsting for information placing current programs and operational 
requirements in historical context should drink deeply from the period spanning 1973 
through 1986.  These are, arguably, the years witnessing the formative stage of the 
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American RMA and its maturation.  The years since have been in some ways 
anticlimactic in terms of concepts, doctrine, and technology if one considers the 
magnitude of change present in earlier decades.  
Newfound interest in defense transformation, and a renewed quest for innovations to 
catalyze transformation, suggests that military innovation studies are posed to provide 
historical cases, theories, and other insights into the hows and whys of innovation-
transformation processes.  Indeed, transformation discussions can benefit from insights 
and lessons learned from the study of military innovation periods precisely because their 
commonalties promote comparative research and analysis into the underlying processes 
and variables targeted by transformation initiatives. 
Criticizing RMA theory does not mean the RMA thesis is a fiction, that RMA-like 
changes in warfare are wholly illusory, or that no benefit comes from continuing to evoke 
RMA language and arguments in defense transformation discussions.  RMA visions and 
rhetoric about information superiority, decision superiority, full-spectrum dominance, 
and rapid decisive operations altered the discourse of defense planning and did shift how 
Services discussed their priorities.  
RMA studies, arguably, only inform defense transformation when they convey an 
understanding of military innovation processes in a fashion conducive to thinking about 
the business of transformation.  Innovation is the underlying organizational behavior 
giving rise to RMAs transformations, or other academic framework purporting to explain 
“big change” in the history of warfare.  So if the objective is to do more than merely 
explain, to attempt deliberate about change, then studies on innovation strategy, 
processes, and associated management approaches are needed.  
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Arguably, underlying the turn to defense transformation activities within Defense 
Department is a quest for policy utility in the discourse of change and more decision 
relevant theories of how changes in military effectiveness transpire.  That is, lexical 
resources more suited to discussions of the process of reform and the specific areas of 
“revolutionary” change required.  
A final comment about the idea of “rapid change” is important.  Students of military 
innovation cannot take the image of ‘rapid change’ in defense planning too literally as 
significant change requires decades.   It typically takes some fifteen years to develop and 
field new systems.  GPS, for example, evolved over several decades before being 
integrated into systems and operations.  Cruise missiles were also in the arsenal for 
decades before strategic and operational needs, together with new navigation capabilities, 
impelled their widespread use.  Accelerating the process of innovation is difficult.  
Jacques Gansler, a scholar of defense acquisition processes as well as a policy 
practitioner, argues that “cultural change (with fierce resistance)” rather than technology 
challenges are responsible for long lead times required for transformation.53
It is important, in this context, that the revolution implied in the RMA thesis 
concerned the relative change in effectiveness from on period to the next rather than a 
sense of sudden, rapid change.  The emerging language of transformation, on the other 
hand, implies a sense of where one is going, how fast, and to what end.  
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2. On Military Innovation
Several scholars have explored why, how, and to what end nations make major 
innovations in the way they organize, equip, and employ military forces.1  Historians and 
political scientists analyze military innovations to describe why and how they take root, 
to theorize about their manifestation in the form of operational capabilities or altered 
security relations, and to assess how civil, military, or other factors found within 
innovation processes affect outcomes.  Some aim to develop or bolster new or existing 
theoretical frameworks to explain the conditions accounting for successful innovations; a 
few do so specifically to suggest how these conditions might be replicated.  Others study 
details of specific innovation cases aiming to enhance military effectiveness.  Military 
historians exploring and documenting unique innovation cases seek to understand how 
states either succeed or fail to transform their military forces and, consequently, to defeat 
their opponents or to suffer defeat themselves.2
Historians and military innovation scholars Barry Watts and Williamson Murray 
view the “underlying purpose” for innovation studies as “helping decision makers to 
think creatively about changes in the nature of war that may occur in coming decades,” 
not merely examining “historical episodes for their own sakes.”3  Furthermore, and 
despite their own significant contributions to RMA scholarship, they contend that 
“without some attention to antecedents and subsequent effectiveness” it is “impossible to 
draw political lessons and implications” from history to inform current defense reform 
discussions.4  Understanding the ebbs and flows of previous innovations, Murray argues 
elsewhere, illuminates “how military institutions innovate” in generalized terms, which 
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for contemporary policy makers suggests how innovation and transformation initiatives 
might alter “performance on the battlefields of the twenty-first century.”5
Military innovation studies are fundamentally and epistemologically about 
understanding and describing qualitative improvements in military effectiveness that 
yield a comparative advantage over other militaries, creating opportunities for increasing 
a nation’s overall strategic effectiveness.  For Colin S. Gray, strategic effectiveness 
involves the “the net (i.e. with the adversary dimension factored in) effectiveness of 
grand strategic performance, which is to say of behavior relevant to the threat or actual 
use of force.”6  Chapter 1 cited Allan Millet, Williamson Murray, and Kenneth Watman’s 
definition of military effectiveness as the processes “by which armed forces convert 
resources into fighting power.”7
Social scientists often define the relationship between military and strategic 
effectiveness in terms of correlations between a militarily decisive increase in one 
nation’s military capabilities, exhibited by a significant relative shift in dominance over 
others, and the corresponding change in a regional or international ‘power’ balance due to 
that nation’s ability to influence the behavior of others.  Identifying and assessing the 
magnitude of historically important shifts in military capabilities is the general domain of 
military scientists studying RMAs.  This relationship involves numerous factors, 
including chance.  Interdisciplinary military innovation studies are less concerned with 
the magnitude of an historical shift in grand strategic importance than the underlying 
processes involving the mobilization of resources to achieve dominance. 
Although numerous factors contribute, specific military innovations associated with 
significant advances in effectiveness often trace their origins to necessity wrought from 
the strategic, operational, or tactical challenges facing military organizations.  These 
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challenges can be immediate, in the form of an existing battlefield problem, or perceived.   
As military historian Allan Millet observes, the “essence of justifiable innovation” stems 
from “strategic calculation and the analysis of perceived threat.”8  Williamson Murray 
similarly concludes that, although not an absolute in every case, “one precondition for 
significant military innovation” seems to be “a concrete problem which the military 
institutions involved have vital interests in solving.”9  His observations are born out in 
chapters 4 and 5, which discuss strategic and operational challenges facing U.S. forces in 
Central Europe.
Although different degrees of innovation exist, what frequently matters to those 
interested in engendering a discontinuous increase in strategic effectiveness are 
significant military innovations that diverge from standard practices or prevailing ways of 
warfare.  They often involve some mix of untried, disruptive technological, operational, 
and organizational change.  
Major military innovations, or major periods of innovation in military affairs, are 
about large-scale, historically notable change over time.  Differentiating between lesser 
innovations and historically noteworthy ones is difficult given the widely disparate 
contextual factors subsuming innovation activities across time, cultures, and socio-
technical domains.  A single theoretical bent is unlikely to capture the richness of the 
underlying behavior.  Analytically, it remains useful to differentiate historically 
momentous examples of military innovation from the more routine march of military 
science.  Even major military innovations are not necessarily harbingers of military 
revolution or revolutions in military affairs, although neither seems possible without one 
or more innovations.   Perhaps it is more appropriate to argue that major innovations are 
necessary but not sufficient for the emergence of an RMA.  Leaving this issue for later 
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chapters, here it suffices to propose that historically novel or noteworthy modernization 
paths that pursue discontinuous innovations are more likely to shift military theory, 
operational art, a specific combat arm, doctrine, or other factor – alone or in combination 
– to alter the course of military history.  Such changes shift the correlation of forces and 
the fortunes of armies due to the successful application of innovations on the battlefield. 
Like warfare, military innovation is a social activity hinging, in this case, upon 
pockets of cooperative behavior (often in the face of stern opposition) aiming to alter 
organizational missions and activities in response to some strategic or operational need.  
This frequently occurs to correct a real or perceived, existential or anticipated, specific or 
general, performance gap that has strategic implications.  During periods of “great 
historical challenges” or “at times of crisis,” military historian and philosopher Azar Gat 
opines, new ideas emerge expressing “human effort to come to grips with new 
developments and integrate them within meaningful intellectual frameworks.”10
Within an organization, innovators may perceive themselves as zealots on a mission, 
viewing their work as saving the organization by redefining identities and mapping an 
organization’s core values to emerging or future operational realities.  Success, from a 
leadership perspective, depends on some mix of disciples, champions, and organizational 
discipline.  Innovations, then, usually require some type of external or high-level 
sponsorship to achieve successful implementation and diffusion.  Innovations also tend to 
disrupt organizations by causing a change in business processes or a change in how the 
organization measures strategic effectiveness.  Examples include German Stormtrooper
tactics, the development of amphibious landing capabilities in the U.S. Navy and Marine 
Corps, the Air Force’s turn to long-range strategic bombing after the Munich Pact, and 
Israel’s development of an offensive doctrine.  
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Chapter Overview
This study is primarily about the cognitive, material, and organizational antecedents 
to the intellectual framework – with associated material capabilities – that evolved in the 
late 1970s and 1980s to capture multi-faceted changes in warfare and prescribe a 
modernization path for U.S. forces.  
In order to understand these changes, the study mines military innovation theory 
(which addresses the diffusion and adoption of innovations) to construct a framework 
useful for thinking about the context for and processes associated with significant 
increases in military effectiveness. This does not mean that studies in military innovation 
or military effectiveness are the only sources of insight into significant advances in 
combat power available to analysts.  To paraphrase Eugene Gholz, however, they are “a 
crucial independent variable in good theories of victory.”11
Activities that contribute to significant changes in a nation’s strategic effectiveness 
are admittedly contingent, constructed by conjoining social, political, organizational, 
technological, and other factors within a security environment characterized by strategic 
or operational challenges to military organizations.  Such environments are uncertain and 
complex.  So-called emergent properties or unexpected outcomes associated with major 
innovations that significantly alter the course of military history are infrequently 
discerned beforehand.  Predicting whether a major innovation will indeed provide a 
qualitative advantage in warfare is difficult at best.  Antipodal to military innovation 
studies, therefore, are those works investigating unexpected military failures and 
operational blunders.   
Military innovations are of growing interest to scholars concerned with war studies, 
power transitions, and a myriad of other international security issues involving qualitative 
45
shifts in force correlations between or among competitors.  Such shifts draw 
interdisciplinary interest because they relate to other aspects of global politics and 
security.  They also illuminate how specific organizational and political processes affect 
later security arrangements and war outcomes.  Likewise, because they provide fertile 
ground for theory building and hypothesis testing, innovation cases are employed to 
polish theoretical lenses attuned to issues as diverse as threat perception, offensive-
defensive theory, deterrence theory, arms control, and technology diffusion.
Theo Ferrell and Terry Terriff argue that studies of major military change concern 
three essential types of organizational behavior:  innovation, adaptation, and emulation.12
Change through innovation derives from “new military technologies, tactics, strategies, 
and structures”; adaptation involves “adjusting existing military means and methods”; 
emulation concerns the imitation of others.13  Each type warrants investigation.  Each 
offers insights into defense policy and force structure decisions. 
Our primary concern here is significant military innovation pursuant to the sustaining 
or increasing of strategic effectiveness, which involves a range of challenges quite 
different from those encountered in adaptations and emulations.  As discussed below, this 
study employs a military innovation framework sensitive to incremental innovations, 
pursued through both divergent and convergent activities, intended to foster 
discontinuous increases in organizational effectiveness.  Of primary interest are 
proactive, anticipatory innovation processes, although it seems important to note that 
most successful military innovations are in some way reactive in that they are attuned to a 
real (or perceived) strategic or operational challenge.
Early innovation literature discussed disruptive change from the perspective of 
technology, a concept articulated by Joseph Schumpeter in his 1942 Capitalism, 
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Socialism and Democracy.  More recently, discussions of disruptive change have adopted 
more comprehensive, sophisticated concepts addressing all aspects of organizational life.  
This chapter addresses several questions.  What is innovation?  What types of studies 
inform the military innovation sub-field within political science?  Are current theories 
and cases on U.S. military innovation positioned to inform ongoing transformation 
discussions?  If not, what revisions or innovation cases are required? 
The intent is sketching, with broad strokes, the outlines of innovation as a 
phenomenon distinct academically, epistemologically, and organizationally from other 
behavior.  Additional sections address the issue of technology innovations and review 
business and management innovation studies.  This sets the stage for a section outlining a 
four-fold categorization of military innovation works informing this study.  A chapter 
conclusion touches on measurement issues before proposing an alternative framework for 
approaching military innovation studies.
Coming to Terms with Military Innovation
This section paints with admittedly broad strokes the parameters of what the study 
views as military innovation phenomena.  Long ago vox populi observed that necessity is 
‘the mother of invention’; for those unwilling to accept invention’s maternity, necessity is 
at least invention’s midwife.  Invention – of a thing or an idea – is antecedent to 
innovation, which is the outcome of applied invention or inventions mixed with 
opportunity and will to attempt change.  
Innovation is not invention, although the invention of a thing, idea, or concept often 
antecedes the articulation and diffusion of an innovative application of technology or new 
approach to warfare.  The key to successful innovation lies in the health and welfare of 
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the diffusion and adoption process.  In this study, innovation subsumes diffusion and 
adoption: there can be no successful innovation if the advantage proffered by the 
proposed new capability never enters service.  Indeed, military innovation studies are 
partly about the efficacy of processes stewarding new capabilities with the potential to 
increase effectiveness.  The anteceding discovery-invention process is often a solitary 
one, focused on the development of something new.  The innovation, diffusion, adoption 
process is focused on maximizing the outcome of ideas, technology, or processes in terms 
of performance, either in an organization, on behavior, or within a market. 
Perhaps necessity is the grandmother of innovation, with necessity here being a 
strategic challenge or opportunity (or operational one having strategic implications) 
involving military effectiveness.  Retired Vice Admiral Arthur Cebrowski, Director of 
the U.S. Office of Force Transformation in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, would 
certainly agree that the urgency and necessity underscoring the imperative for accelerated 
transformation heightens the need for invention (e.g., research and development) and 
innovation (e.g., experimentation, prototypes, advanced concept technology 
demonstrations).  Necessity figures in chapters 4 and 5 in terms of strategic and 
operational challenges related to the converging of a Soviet nuclear and conventional 
threat in the late 1970s.  
It is more difficult to effect change when no clear, existential strategic threat exists, 
arguably a problem military reformers farced in the early and mid-1990s.  Of course, 
even when necessity does exist, nations often pursue the wrong innovations or cannot 
capitalize on a key capability when conflict does occur.  The study conclusion revisits the 
problem of understanding strategic necessity.  
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Innovations are applied within and through organizations to achieve significantly 
better or qualitatively different military outcomes.  They involve some mix of 
opportunity and necessity; interests and values; calculated determination and sheer luck.  
Ultimately a teleological enterprise, successfully diffusing a major innovation involves 
disruption, displacement, and divergent thinking; innovators, by definition, rub against 
the accepted order of things and are exemplars of entrepreneurial activism. 
Military innovations of interest to this study manifest themselves in some mix of 
technological, operational, doctrinal, or other changes that significantly increase military 
effectiveness.  They change the parameters by which one measures how resources are 
converted into fighting power.  Often they alter the definition of fighting power by 
altering the core competency of a military organization.  Significant innovations are 
discontinuous primarily in affect, although some degree of antecedent discontinuous or 
disruptive behavior usually occurs before an innovation takes root and matures within an 
organization.  Above all, innovations change organizational outcomes in terms of how 
resources are mustered to accomplish objectives and missions.  Moreover, they change 
intra-organizational dynamics, sometimes bringing conflict between organizations, an 
important element of innovation behavior returned to in later chapters.   
Innovation definitions vary.   Organizational theorists consider innovation to be 
simply “the creation and implementation of a new idea” so “long as the idea is perceived 
as new and entails novel change for the actors involved.”14  Political scientist and student 
of military doctrine Barry Posen defines innovation as “large change” originating from 
organizational failure, external pressures, or an organization’s expansionist policy.15
James Q. Wilson views innovations as new programs or technologies that “involve the 
performance of new tasks or a significant alteration in the way in which existing tasks are 
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performed.”16  For Wilson, “[r]eal innovations are those that alter core tasks,” a 
conclusion that resonates in the realm of military innovation where Service roles and 
missions are indeed organized around key military tasks.17  At the basic level, these tasks 
are divided into aerospace, land, sea, and littoral warfare domains.  
Stephen Peter Rosen defines a “major innovation” in similar terms.  They involve “a 
change that forces one of the primary combat arms of a service to change its concepts of 
operation and its relation to other combat arms, and to abandon or downgrade traditional 
missions.”  Overall, he concludes, significant military innovations “involve changes in 
critical tasks, the tasks around which warplans revolve.”18
In the burgeoning business management literature on innovation, strategic and 
operational necessity relates to organizational performance, with innovation often driven 
by current or emerging performance gaps, market changes, or shifts in customer 
expectations.19  Legendary management theorist Peter Drucker simply defines innovation 
as “‘change that creates a new dimension of performance.’”20 In his classic The 
Comparative Advantage of Nations, Michael E. Porter sees innovation as an outcome of 
“unusual effort” to embolden “new or improved ways of competing” designed to 
overcome “pressure, necessity, or even adversity.”  For Porter, furthermore, “fear of loss 
often proves more powerful than the hope of gain,” an insight applicable to the 
innovation period studies in later chapters.21
Drawing on Wilson, Rosen, and others, defining aspects of military innovation for 
this study include an understanding of an organization’s core tasks, the relationship 
between tasks and war plans, changes in the strategic (or operational) environment, war 
plan viability given such changes, and how efficiently organizations accommodate 
adjustments in missions or tasks required by the new capability.
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Contextualizing Innovation
In the early 2000s, senior U.S. officials professed renewed new sense of urgency for 
defense transformation, arguing that the global war on terrorism and other challenges 
demanded accelerated change.   Context, as well as interdependent aspects of both 
structure and agency (or the behavior of specific actors), is a reoccurring issue in military 
innovation studies that warrants additional attention.  For Williamson Murray and 
MacGregor Knox, “revolutions in military affairs always occur within the context of 
politics and strategy – and that context is everything.”22
For political scientists, the strategic and socio-political environments together define 
the strategic and operational context.  In this larger context, organizations and leaders 
define and pursue objectives, missions, and tasks.  Although the theories and findings of 
business management scholars do not always lend themselves to military innovation 
studies, a point discussed below, their increasing focus on contextual factors within 
which significant change occur, including case studies, illuminates the critical role of 
environmental factors in success or failure.  Such factors range from perceptions, 
leadership support, the degree of urgency underlying pursuit of change, and qualities of 
the organization's culture.  
“Strategic innovation,” which is really the domain of military innovations pursuant 
to transformational changes, is, as Richard Betts concludes, dependant “on the social and 
political milieu.”23  Drawing on Betts, this study evokes the term innovation milieu to 
describe the nexus of challenges and opportunities within which military innovations 
occur.  Here, the innovation milieu framework subsumes interaction effects of both 
structure and agency, the primary elements of innovation systems, processes, and actors 
that exist in specific moments within specific organizational settings.  A French term, a 
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milieu is a point or coordinate in space and time that includes both the middle and its 
surroundings.  Conceptually it has no beginning or end, more a nexus of connections, 
relationships, and potential influence pathways.  In the world of innovation, it is a useful 
image to capture how organizations and systems interact with their environments – in 
both contextual and ideational terms – such that over time certain relationships and 
influence paths evolve profoundly, sometimes revolutionary, change.  
Retired Admiral William Owens posits that new technology and concepts originating 
in the 1970s, many of which became central to the American RMA, appeared after “new 
generations of nuclear and conventional weapons required novel approaches by the Army 
and Air Force to maintain the credibility of deterrence in Europe.”24  “It was in this 
milieu,” he continues, “that technologies and operational concepts arose that would be 
central to the” American RMA.25  Such military innovations as radar, the Norden bomb 
sight, amphibious assault technology and doctrine, the German blitzkrieg, nuclear 
weapons, and stealth technology emerged from specific strategic and operational milieus 
characterized by necessity and focused ingenuity.  
In these cases and others, the innovation milieu took root in a context of strategic and 
operational challenges that pushed military or defense organizations toward new ideas 
and ways of accomplishing military tasks.  In this sense, the innovation milieu construct 
follows Secretary Emeritus of the Smithsonian Institution Robert McC. Adams’ 
observation that “innovations are better understood less as independent events that 
unleashed new sequences of change in their own right than as periodically emergent 
outcomes of wider, interactive systems.”26  Such interactive systems are the domain of 
military innovation studies.27
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Williamson Murray adopts a parallel approach, urging readers to “remember that the 
strategic arena, as well as political and military assessments of the strategic framework, is 
[sic] an essential prerequisite to successful innovation.”28   Concerning processes, Murray 
further opines that, those “broad innovations either undertaken or neglected by military 
institutions often depend on the political guidance and strategic framework within which 
those institutions operate.29
Generally, the contextual elements of an innovation milieu can be identified as 
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Chapter 6 revisits this framework, using it to unpack major aspects of the history of the 
American RMA to suggest how students of defense transformation may benefit from a 
reinvigoration of military innovation studies.  
Contextual factors, to reinforce the point, are vital for the maturation and success of 
innovation, which “occur in organizational contexts that both enable and motivate 
innovation.”30  Conversely, of course, context can act as a barrier, preventing the coming 
together of an innovation milieu ripe for the type and degree of innovation behavior of 
interest to students of major military innovation.31
Murray discusses another important aspect of context.  “Military innovations that 
have the greatest influence are those that change the context within which wars take 
place.”32  This suggests two sides to the analytic problem of contextualizing military 
innovations: understanding the contextual antecedents and conditions that shape an 
innovation milieu ripe for significant changes in military effectiveness and then 
understanding how military innovations themselves alter or otherwise influence military 
affairs.  For policy makers pursuing transformative changes in their military services, it is 
often the details of the former that are of greatest import; for students of military history 
it is frequently the effect of military innovations that draws the greatest interest.  Here, 
attention is given to both. 
Economist Nathan Rosenberg adds that that innovation “involves extremely complex 
relations among sets of key variables,” including “inventions, innovations, diffusion 
paths, and investment activity,” and further concludes that “innovation and diffusion 
rates” are “powerfully shaped by expectation patterns.” 33  Innovations, moreover, depend 
“upon an entire supporting infrastructure.”34  In other words, context counts, perception 
matters, and technology is not the final arbiter of technology innovation.  His analysis 
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also emphasizes the role of systems and social networks in innovation, both of which 
concern organizational expectations about missions and performance.  Rosenberg 
differentiates between innovations and major innovations, the latter providing “a 
framework for a large number of subsequent innovations, each of which is dependent 
upon, or complementary to, the original one.”  They “constitute new building blocks 
which provide a basis for subsequent technologies.”35
Students of military innovation explore four levels or areas of context.  The first 
concerns the strategic environment in which an organization is nested, including its larger 
political setting, what this study refers to as strategic dynamics.  The second are those 
factors intrinsic to how innovation in perceived in light of the security environment.  This 
includes how the organization is socially and materially constructed as a functional unit 
serving some larger societal purpose (e.g., national defense).  The third level of context 
involves what this study terms enablers, which included resource alignment.  Finally, 
innovation is contextualized within the organization itself as a discrete entity.  
These levels of context are explored in chapters 4, 5, and 6.  Although some argue 
for the primacy of variables common only to one or two of these levels, this study finds 
that all are important, as are interactions among levels – a point returned to in the 
conclusion.  The process of translating strategic imperatives into required organizational 
capabilities (or outcomes) requires some understanding of the new measures of 
effectiveness required.  Innovation scholars seeking to understand such processes cannot 
adequately assess innovation strategies, processes, or changes in effectiveness without 
first understanding the underlying rationale to pursue significant change.
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Military Innovation Studies: A Sketch of Resources 
What resources from traditional political and military science schools of thought 
inform military innovation studies?   This section suggests four categories of works from 
history and political science that tend to be more accessible and familiar to students of 
defense analysis, military science, and international security.  They inform this study of 
innovation.  The first and second are primary and secondary works on innovation cases 
and periods, many from outside the formal discipline of political science; the 
preponderance of these are historical studies, essays, and memoirs.  The second two 
include political science and international relations works addressing doctrinal 
innovations and other multi-faceted approaches to military innovation.  
Collapsing a rich and diverse spectrum of works into categories is undoubtedly 
problematic; some will surely object to the categories themselves.  One benefit of 
considering the range of available sources is providing a more inclusive survey of works 
than found in current studies, most of which attempt no dissection of the universe of 
existing resources.  Additionally, the categorization of sources informing this study is 
structured to differentiate, generally, the types of studies available.  It also identifies those 
this study most resembles.  That said, the categorization is not presented as the standard 
for others nor does it claim to be comprehensive.  Instead, it represents a general guide to 
understanding sources, with an admitted bias toward U.S. defense studies. 
This first category of studies helps sketch the topography and contextual nuances of 
military cultures, institutions, and other characteristics of military organizations learned 
through direct experience or association.  As the broadest, it includes memoirs, 
autobiographies, and select analytical essays on the U.S. defense establishment.  In 
additional to conceptual and historical analysis, included here are essays and writings by 
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military reform participants and policy makers that discuss, describe, or otherwise 
provide insight into decisions undertaken before and during periods of innovation or 
organizational change.  Among these are Carl Builder’s The Masks of War: American 
Military Styles in Strategy, a classic work on American military culture and Service 
identities.  Builder informs military innovation studies by helping students of military 
organizations understand decisions concerning roles and missions, the procurement of 
new weapons systems and combat platforms, and the effect of organizational culture 
influences on innovation choices.  Others include two biographies of John Boyd (one by 
Grant Hammond, the other by Robert Coram) that discuss the culture of defense reform 
in the 1970s, James Burton’s memoir on defense reform, and Kenneth Adelman and 
Norman Augustine’s analysis of technological and geopolitical influences on U.S. 
defense policy.36  These works provide insights into the culture of change inside defense 
organizations. 
The second category explores military innovation and modernization process, 
focusing on specific cases or technologies.  To distinguish these from the third and fourth 
categories, works in the first and second categories generally do not engage in theory 
building.  This does not mean they demure from offering theoretical insights or 
observations to inform contemporary innovation processes.  Their focus tends toward 
unpacking the complexity and nuances of innovation cases by rendering aspects of 
innovation processes and outcomes more accessible.  They do so, generally, as fairly 
straightforward narratives concerned with conveying insights along historical dimensions 
rather than through theories, frameworks, and policy-focused analysis. 
Representative of these works are Robert Buderi’s history of radar, aptly entitled The 
Invention that Changed the World and Harvey Sapolsky’s The Polaris System 
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Development: Bureaucratic and Programmatic Success in Government.37  Other variants 
focus on historical processes that yield conclusions about the phenomena of military 
innovation for specific historical cases, often embedded within a particular context.  
Nicholas A. Lambert’s Sir John Fisher’s Naval Revolution, which documents innovations 
in British naval defense in the period before World War I, carefully dissects the 
interaction among strategic and technological changes, organizational reforms, political 
pressures, and the role of leaders (e.g., Winston Churchill) in bringing doctrinal and other 
innovations to fruition.  
Another multifaceted account is Frank Winter’s history of rocket technology in the 
nineteenth century, The First Golden Age of Rocketry, which documents how innovations 
by William Congrave and William Hale affected military technology, whaling, torpedoes, 
and other areas.  A classic study in this category is Elting E. Morrison’s chapter on 
innovations in naval gunfire at sea in Men, Machines and Modern Times, which
demonstrates that organizational identity and personality factors are sometimes more 
important to innovations than technological and doctrinal changes alone.  Bruce 
Gudmundsson’s Stormtrooper Tactics: Innovation in the German Army, 1914-1918, 
documents the German innovations in infantry tactics during World War I that spurred 
the transformation of German military thought and doctrine.  Gudmundsson attributes 
German innovation to the decentralized nature of German military organizations, a 
proclivity for self-education within German culture, an early start toward change 
compared to other nations, and innovations in operational art.  William Odom, in After 
the Trenches: The Transformation of U.S. Army Doctrine, 1918-1939, concludes that 
successful modernization requires “procurement of enough equipment for 
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experimentation”; an adept foreign intelligence organization; and, “an organization 
dedicated to monitoring and accommodating change.”38
Also included here are studies of specific systems not focused on innovation 
processes or innovative technologies per se.  Richard Betts’ edited volume Cruise 
Missiles: Technologies, Strategy, Politics is representative of similar works that touch on 
aspects of innovation in larger studies of weapons or technologies.39 Allan R. Millet and 
Williamson Murray’s three-volume series on military effectiveness are additional 
examples.40  Among the noteworthy aspects of the edited volumes is their collective 
treatment of strategic measures of effectiveness.  Although significant military innovation 
is not necessary to achieve superior military effectiveness, and although military 
effectiveness often increases when organizations perfect established procedures or 
technologies (not innovative ones), effectiveness studies remain important sources of 
insight into military change.  
MacGregor Knox and Williamson Murray’s edited volume The Dynamics of Military 
Revolution, 1300-2050 contains a number of important chapters for current students of 
military innovation.41  In addition to offering a comprehensive historical framework that 
nicely distinguishes large, epochal changes in warfare (e.g., creation of modern nation 
state, French revolution, industrial revolution) with specific RMAs (e.g., steamships, 
combined arms tactics, submarine warfare, radar, nuclear-armed missiles, stealth, 
precision strike), the volume yields important insights into specific innovation periods.  
Notable is Jonathan A. Bailey’s “The First World War and the Birth of Modern 
Warfare,” which outlines the advent of modern warfare from the perspective of a new, 
three-dimensional approach.  It involved the emergence of “artillery indirect fire as the 
foundation of planning at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of war” during 
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World War I and subsequent “style” of warfare from which “the following ideal-type 
characteristics” evolved:
• It covers extended theaters and is three-dimensional.
• Time is of critical importance, in the sense of tempo – relative rate of 
activity – and simultaneity.
• Intelligence is the key to targeting and maneuver.
• Available hardware can engage high-value targets accurately 
throughout the enemy’s space, either separate from or synchronized 
with ground contact.
• Commanders can calibrate the application of firepower to achieve 
specific types of effect.
• Command, control, communications (C3) systems and styles of 
command that fuse the characteristics above can break the enemy’s 
cohesion and will with catastrophic consequences.42
World War I experiences with indirect fire led to profound changes in how planners and 
commanders conceptualized the battlefield, including an appreciation for simultaneous 
operations extending into the enemy’s rear.  
The three dimensional style of warfare influenced the birth of aerial reconnaissance, 
which matured coordination between air and ground units, advances in precision 
targeting through surveys, new mapping and registration capabilities to provide unwarned 
barrages, and new photographic techniques (i.e., overcoming distorted images, deriving 
coordinates from imagery).  It also pushed near-real time command and control to adjust 
fire, led to interception of enemy command and control communications, and a new 
appreciation for the relationship between fire and maneuver.  Overall, warfare in the third 
dimension co-evolved with, and significantly reinforced the need for, C3 capabilities.  
During this process, as training, planning, and actual operations extended into three 
physical dimensions while time (the fourth dimension) was increasingly compressed, the 
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lexicon of military thought became increasingly linked to technology underwriting C3 
innovations. 
The third category informing this study includes works addressing the sources of 
doctrinal innovation.  Frequent foci of these studies are the external influences on 
military doctrine during the period between World Wars I and II and, more generally, on 
internal processes causing or impeding the development of successful, innovative 
military doctrines.  Of chief concern are influences on the emergence of particular 
doctrines, specifically what factors lead to offensive or defensive doctrines.  Although 
these studies are organized around military doctrine, they tend to address all of the 
elements of military organizations and national strategy.  They also tend to study the 
relationship between doctrine and performance in a specific armed conflict.  Notable 
examples are Jack Synder’s The Ideology of the Offensive: Military Decision Making and 
the Disasters of 1914, Barry R. Posen’s The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, 
Britain, and Germany Between the World Wars, and Elizabeth Kier’s Imagining War: 
French and British Military Doctrine Between the Wars.43
Relative to the first two categories, military doctrine studies are viewed as core 
works in the military innovation sub-field.  They self-consciously and deliberately 
explore, document, and assess military processes and outcomes in order to dissect 
doctrinal innovations that affect military effectiveness.  Such studies usually engage in 
theory building and theory-testing, seeking to develop explanatory models about 
influences on military doctrine.  They address the role of civilians in doctrinal innovation 
and the affect of organizational dynamics within military decision making processes 
concerning the development of doctrine. 
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Both Synder and Posen found that civilian intervention in the formation of military 
doctrine has a positive effect when it accurately aligns military doctrine with grand 
strategy or other foreign policy objectives.  Their agreement stems, in part, from their 
belief that civilian intervention to induce military change proceeds only from accurate 
knowledge about military affairs, or from a more developed understanding of the security 
environment.  They also agree that organizational factors, including resources, prestige, 
and institutional autonomy, lead military organizations to pursue offensive doctrines.  
Posen treats military doctrine as a “subcomponent of grand strategy that deals 
explicitly with military means” that concerns two questions:  “What means shall be 
employed? and How shall they be employed?”44 Using balance of power theory and 
organizational theory to analyze military doctrine, Posen ascribed a preponderance of 
influence for doctrinal innovation to civilian intervention, with civilian influence 
sometimes requiring military “mavericks” to be effective.  Drawing primarily from the 
case of the British Royal Air Force’s (RAF) decision to pursue air defense capabilities in 
the 1930s, he argues that British civilians were responsible for innovations in RAF air 
defense systems that later staved off and won the Battle of Britain during World War II.45
Kier disagrees with explanatory frameworks ascribing causality for doctrinal 
innovations to external, structural factors alone.  Arguing that structural factors used by 
Posen, Synder, and others are empirically indeterminate, and therefore inconclusive for 
theory-building, Kier turns instead to domestic politics and organizational culture for the 
source of doctrinal innovation.  She further takes issue with organizational approaches 
assuming that roles and missions already performed by military organizations determine 
their decisions about war fighting concepts and doctrine in the future.  “Deducing 
organizational interests from functional needs,” she argues, “is too general and too 
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imprecise.”46  Accordingly, she develops her own explanatory framework that locates 
answers to questions about doctrinal innovations “in domestic political battles, not 
foreign threats.” 47  Kier maintains that civilian intervention responds to domestic, not 
international, politics.  
In the case of the origins of the American RMA, both internal and external factors 
are important.  Although Kier is right in arguing for the inclusion of domestic politics, 
she understates the degree to which domestic political battles are conditioned and shaped 
by changes in strategic context.  Overall, in military innovation studies – including 
doctrinal innovation – the idea of an innovation milieu seems a more helpful construct for 
discussing internal and external influences on military innovation because it does not 
attempt to compartmentalize or partition motivations or other influences contributing to 
innovation behavior.  Later chapters explore the question of civilian intervention and 
revisit doctrinal innovation, addressing whether doctrinal or other ideational variant of 
innovation is really a distinct sub-field of military innovation studies or merely another 
route to synthesizing complex organizational behavior.  
A final category of works informing military innovation studies include those 
attuned to the diverse factors increasing or decreasing the effectiveness of military 
organizations within specific strategic environments.  What differentiates them are their 
methods, scope, and case selection, which are generally more sensitive to the 
indeterminacy and contingency of military innovation phenomena than the other 
categories.  This fourth category focuses quite self-consciously on military innovation as 
a form of social behavior  – successful or unsuccessful –so that lessons, insights, or 
patterns might inform more contemporary policy decisions.  At times sacrificing the 
richness of historical narrative and the objectivity of deeper case studies, these studies 
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attempt to organize processes and behavior within specific frameworks to tease out 
variables and other artifacts for discussion.    
Recent examples include Millet and Murray’s volume on military innovation in the 
interwar period and Theo Farrall and Terry Terriff’s before mentioned The Sources of 
Military Change: Culture, Politics, Technology.48  Among the earliest examples, Edward 
L. Katzenbach’s essay  “The Horse Cavalry in the Twentieth Century: A Study in Policy 
Response,” originally published in 1958, remains an interesting study of the politics of 
military change.49  Michael Armacost’s The Politics of Weapons Innovation: The Thor-
Jupiter Controversy stands as a landmark study in the role of interservice politics and 
service lobbying for weapons systems, documenting how both uniformed and civilian 
interest groups respond to international and institutional changes when arguing for 
weapons innovations.50
In this category is also the chief work on military innovation within political science, 
the work on which this study aims to build: Stephen Peter Rosen’s Wining the Next War: 
Innovation and the Modern Military.51   Rosen’s seminal work remains the most 
comprehensive attempt to assess a diverse range of innovation cases (American and 
British) to inform post-Cold War defense modernization and transformation discussions.  
Building on the underlying academic question, “When and why do military organizations 
make major innovations in the way they fight,” Rosen investigates “how the United 
States can and should prepare for the military problems it faces”52 and aims to inform 
“Americans concerned with the possible need for military innovation.”53  Rosen analyzes 
twenty-one cases of successful military innovation using a three-fold typology of 
American and British innovation cases spanning the years 1905 through 1967.  
64
His three types of innovation include peacetime, wartime, and technological 
innovation:
Peacetime military innovation may be explainable in terms of how 
military communities evaluate the future character of war, and how they 
effect change in the senior officer corps.  Wartime innovation is related to 
the development of new measures of strategic effectiveness, effective 
intelligence collection, and an organization able to implement the 
innovation within the relatively short time of the war’s duration. 
Technological innovation is strongly characterized by the need to develop 
strategies for managing uncertainty.54
Problems occur when applying the categories to more contemporary innovation cases.  
Binning military innovation into these three categories leads one into intellectual cul-de-
sacs when contemplating what his cases might mean for innovation activities writ large. 
Generalizing from his case studies to others is therefore more difficult than necessary. In 
an era where information technology is both ubiquitous and a primary factor in advancing 
military effectiveness, and after a decade of unprecedented operational tempo, Rosen’s 
suggestion that each of his innovation types derive from “distinct sets of intellectual and 
practical problems” risks transferring false boundaries and unhelpful analytic distinctions 
to today’s innovation scholars and defense analysts. 
Some of the innovations discussed in chapters 4 and 5, moreover, are likely to fall 
into Rosen’s definition of technological innovation but seem to support arguments from 
the other innovation categories.  It warrants restating an important analytic caution.  The 
importance of technology, especially information technology, to peacetime and wartime 
innovations during the last several decades warrants against making this a distinct 
category.  “Peacetime and wartime organizational innovation,” as Rosen defines them, 
involves “social innovation, with changing the way men and women in organizations 
behave. Technological innovation is concerned with building machines.”55 This 
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distinction seems to trivialize the social dynamics involved in technological innovation 
or, at the very least, conflates invention and discovery with the application of new 
technology to operational problems and diffusion through an organization.  The latter are 
profoundly social.    
Excellent case studies notwithstanding, his framework for analysis complicates 
extrapolation of findings about leadership, organizational dynamics, role of knowledge 
about threats, and other insightful conclusions to similar situations.   For him, the 
emergence of new measures of military effectiveness follows from “process of rethinking 
how operations lead to victory and devising new ways to measure how military 
capabilities relate to strategic effectiveness.”56  But his discussions of military 
effectiveness are primarily limited to wartime innovation.  Cold war developments 
discussed in later chapters, not to mention 2000s defense transformation initiatives while 
fighting a war on terrorism, do not fit neatly into Rosen’s peacetime and wartime 
categories.    
Rosen’s treatment of intelligence is also problematic for defense transformation 
scholars in the 2000s, for which intelligence is a key concern.  Rosen concludes that 
“intelligence about the behavior and capabilities of the enemy has been only loosely 
connected to American military innovation.”57  This is certainly not true for the period 
studied here, nor is it the case for planners making decisions about future force structure 
needs.  
Despite organizational and theoretical problems, however, Wining the Next War 
retains currency as a cornerstone of the evolving military innovation sub-field, ostensibly 
because in offers a foundation amenable to revision and adaptation ten years after its 
1991 publication.  
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On Innovation for Profit
Chapter 1 briefly discussed similarities between the evolution of 1990s defense 
planning discourse and ‘change management’ frameworks in business management 
studies.  In both, a pro-revolution zeitgeist gave way to more circumspect discussions of 
processes and the exigencies of organizational transformation.58
John D. Wolpert of IBM’s Extreme Blue, an innovation incubation activity, 
summarizes corporate views of innovation derived from Industrial Research Institute 
surveys.  In the “late 1980s,” Wolpert relates, “most executives reported little interest in 
innovation” and, “in the early 1990s, innovation didn’t rate among the top five corporate 
priorities.”  This changed by the end of 1990s, when innovation emerged “at the top of 
the list.”59 The business and management studies flagship journal, the Harvard Business
Review, recently documented that innovation emerged as a top management priority only 
at the end of the 1990s after nearly a decade as a tertiary—at best – item on the business 
management agenda.60  Thomas Kuczmarski, Arthur Middlebrooks, and Jeffrey 
Swaddling found in Innovating the Corporation that “quality” emerged as the core 
corporate concern in the 1980s in response to “the threat of foreign competitors offering 
higher quality products”; “reengineering” captured boardrooms in the early 1990s; and in 
the early 2000s, organizations “are beginning to publicly declare innovation as a top 
priority.”61
Another shift in management theory is also being mirrored in defense modernization 
discussions. Early 1990s attention on reengineering within businesses and market 
segments has been replaced by a focus on integration and collaboration across them.  
Exemplifying the change in thinking is James Champy’s shift from writing on 
reengineering the early 1990s to “X-Engineering” in the early 2000s.  “Whereas 
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reengineering showed managers how to organize work around processes inside a 
company,” Champy argues, “X-engineering argues that the company must now extend its 
processes outside” to achieve “vast improvements in operations across organizations.”62
The shift from revolutionary, “hard right turn” management strategies to ones 
attuned to innovation theories and processes is arguably part of a larger drive to 
understand and successfully lead change in large, complex organizations operating in 
uncertain times.  Innovation for profit theories, case studies, frameworks, and 
management tools are widely read and followed in the business world.  
U.S. defense transformation evolved in the 2000s as a strategic management concern 
for an administration that entered office with a pledge to reform the military and 
throughout its first term assured the nation that the war on terrorism would not forestall 
meaningful change.  Official ‘strategic plans’ outlined transformation objectives.  Social 
scientists aiming to inform defense transformation cannot expect defense planners, or for 
that matter the larger cohort of defense transformation interlocutors, to adapt academic 
frameworks to their policy needs.  
Political scientists interested in informing this important policy arena, for example, 
should not expect to achieve policy relevance unless findings are communicated in ways 
policy makers can readily understand.  Military innovation scholars should pursue 
theoretical frameworks that yield conclusions decision makers can place in context with 
today’s problems.  RMA scholars succeeded in socializing their work within the defense 
policy community because, in the early 1990s, this community was highly receptive to, 
and indeed thirsted for, frameworks able to place seemingly revolutionary changes in 
military effectiveness in some historical perspective.   Meanwhile, planners welcomed 
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new concepts and theories into military thought as nuclear-centric thinking about defense 
planning lost its relevance.  
Ten years later, arguably, these same planners no longer required insights into the 
historical dimensions of military change.  Nor were they wanting for theories, concepts, 
or new ways of thinking about warfare.  Instead, transformation planners require insights 
into the strategic management of military innovations pursuant to additional leaps in 
military effectiveness.  This suggests an avenue for social scientists to further draw upon 
management and business school research.  The earlier presentation of four military 
innovation categories informing this study did not include this research because it is not a 
traditional source for military innovation scholars. 
There may be good reason for not including management theory on innovation into 
military innovation studies.  By the late 1990s, the use of the term innovation was so 
widespread in business literature and management theories that Paul C. Light concluded 
it was “one of the most overused, underdefined [sic] terms in organizational life.  No one 
seems to be sure just what the word means.”63  Strongly associated with innovation in the 
business world are novelty, newness, uniqueness, significant change, performance leaps, 
new market niches, new product creation, and the sense of more efficient resource 
utilization or increased value for customers.  
John Kao, economist and founder of the Idea Factory, argues that the turn toward the 
language of innovation stems from the “imperatives of the new economy,” including 
“speed, pushing new forms of winner-take-all competitive dynamics, introducing new 
business models that involve the creation of standards,” and “the accelerated 
transformation of technology.”64 As does Light, Kao laments that innovation “is so 
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important that the word itself is groaning under the weight of expectations placed on it.  
Yet as a systemic practice, it remains obscure.”65
One sees the same befuddlement in discussions of defense transformation, a domain 
where more serious and systematic approaches to innovation are needed.  But the field is 
rich in case studies and planning strategies offering frameworks for other scholars to 
utilize. 
Clayton M. Christensen’s The Innovator’s Dilemma is one example of how the 
innovation for profit literature can inform military innovation studies.  The dilemma 
central to his work is the historical fact that “logical, competent decisions of management 
that are critical to the success of their companies are also the reasons why they lose their 
position of leadership” in the market.66  “Disruptive technologies,” he argues, “bring to 
market a very different value proposition than had been available previously.  Generally, 
disruptive technologies underperform established products in mainstream markets.”67
The point, also applicable to early stages of military innovation, is that major innovations 
that truly depart from established practices or capabilities should not be assessed against 
currently available capabilities because, “by definition,” the disruptive technology (or 
other type of change) must measure different attributes of performance than those 
relevant to in established” contexts of strategic effectiveness.68
Not all arguments and concepts from the innovation for profit literature fit with 
organizational dynamics and cultural attributes of military services. As Light, Peter 
Drucker, and others point out, important differences exist in their application in the 
private versus public sectors.  Drucker, for example, highlights differences in degrees of 
change characterized as innovative or noteworthy.  “In any institution other than the 
federal government,” he argues, “the changes being trumpeted as reinventions would not 
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even be announced, except perhaps on the bulletin board in the hallway.”69  Here, the 
comparison is primarily based on organizational processes and other internal changes 
rather than on wholesale shifts in mission, customer bases, and markets.  Arguably, one 
reason for the diverse, and sometimes contradictory, range of definitions in the business 
management domain is the sheer diversity of analytic interests involved.  There exists a 
broader range of organizational, technological, and philosophical issues discussed and a 
wider range of motivations for innovation, spanning a variety of measurements and 
conceptions for what constitutes significant increases in “value” for the firm.  Moreover, 
many studies on innovation for profit are wedded to existing management philosophies or 
business schools.    
Unlike the business management domain, defense planning and military thought 
remain saturated with RMA and transformation discussions.  Although a danger exists 
that innovation will also be overused and rendered meaningless as a term and perhaps 
process, military innovation studies can benefit from some of the language and ideas of 
those seeking innovation for profit.  The diversity of leadership philosophies, change 
management frameworks, and corporate cultures supports, perhaps, too many innovation 
constructs.  For those leading change, on the other hand, because successfully 
implementing a strategic plan is as important as the plan itself, leaders often benefit from 
a wide range of analytic tools and processes to bolster organizational change.  
All of this begs the question of how to leverage insights for military innovation 
students.  One area where business management studies are relevant concerns the 
innovation milieu itself, what Kao discusses as “the importance of physical environments 
that support innovation, that make innovation processes concrete, that support and 
generate persistence around knowledge creation processes.”70  Within the construct of an 
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innovation milieu, moreover, business innovation case studies provide ample data on the 
importance of strategy and processes, aligning future needs and performance gaps with 
new technology, doctrine, and unit tasks.  Select lessons from business management case 
study literature are returned to in later chapters in discussions of processes and 
leadership. 
Although this study does not comprehensively document or exploit the innovation 
for profit literature it remains an important sector of innovation knowledge that needs to 
be periodically scanned for insights into aspects of innovation common across types of 
organizations.  One important area concerns organizational dynamics associated with 
diffusion and insertion processes.  Here, the focus is on leading and executing innovation 
processes, whether they involve aligning organizations to succeed at new tasks or 
missions, closing critical performance gaps by implementing doctrine or other ideational 
change in processes or operations, or merging organizational cultures to overcome biases 
and barriers impeding innovation diffusion.  
Learning from the Military Revolution in Early Modern Europe
Students of military innovation can tap another source for insights into the historical 
dimensions of changes in warfare.  The historiography of military revolutions originated 
in 1956 when Clifford Roberts published The Military Revolution, 1560-1660, which 
initiated an ongoing debate among historians.71  Roberts’ general field of study was early 
modern Sweden and his focus was Gustavus Adolphus, a focus in part derived from his 
biographical work on the eighteenth century Swedish king.  Examining the 
transformation of European warfare during the period 1560-1660, Roberts suggested four 
major changes to warfare in Early Modern Europe.  First, there was a shift in tactics from 
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the classic square of the Spanish tercio to linear formations.  Thereafter, tactics based on 
lines of forces dominated Western warfare until well into the Industrial Revolution.  
Second, traditional weapons, including the lance and pike, were displaced by new 
weapons, including arrows and then firearms.  Third, the size of armies supported by 
political entities increased dramatically.  Finally, the overall impact of warfare and war 
on society grew.72  The general argument made by Roberts was that this period witnessed 
a revolution in tactics, which was based on the increased size of well-drilled armies (that 
fought in linear formations) and which significantly increased war’s impact on society.
Twenty years after Roberts published his work on the military revolution in Early 
Modern Europe, Geoffrey Parker expanded its foci with The Military Revolution: 
Military Innovation and the Rise of the West, 1500-1800.73  Parker critically assessed 
Roberts’ thesis, finding it plausible yet incomplete, and his work became the intellectual 
center of an expanding debate among historians.  He concluded that Roberts’ thesis was 
insensitive to changes in naval and siege warfare, overlooked military education, and 
ignored the codification of certain laws of war.  Parker’s military revolution had a wider 
scope, one explored through the question,  “Just how did the West, initially so small and 
so deficient in most natural resources, become able to compensate for what it lacked 
through superior military and naval power?”  Much of his answer to this question 
revolved around the theme of action-reaction in the relationship between the offensive 
and defensive aspects of warfare, a relationship modulated by the introduction and rise of 
cannon and their effect on fortification technology.  Essentially, the military revolution 
was linked to the development and proliferation of bastion-style fortification technology, 
otherwise known as the trace italienne.
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Brian M. Downing further expanded the military revolution debate among historians 
with The Military Revolution and Political Change: Origins of Democracy and 
Autocracy in Early Modern Europe.74  For Downing, “[t]he ‘military revolution’ or 
‘military modernization’ refers to the process whereby small, decentralized, self-
equipped feudal hosts were replaced by increasingly large, centrally financed and 
supplied armies that equipped themselves with ever more sophisticated and expensive 
weaponry.  The expense of the military revolution led to financial and constitutional 
strain, as parsimonious and parochial estates refused to approve the requisite taxes.”75
Downing’s military revolution is political, rather than military, in its consequences and 
definition, and he argued more forcefully for thinking of weapons and armaments as only 
a small part of a military revolution.  For him, a military revolution involved more than a 
single combat arm or technology issue, an argument he made by exploring the complex 
politico-military changes transpiring in the 16th and 17th centuries.  His version of the 
military revolution focused on the social and political conditions wrought by war changed 
some constitutionalist societies in European to “military-bureaucratic absolutist” states 
while others developed into liberal democracies.  Generally, states that did not have to 
deal with high domestic pressures to mobilize and support war avoided the need to 
develop highly centralized, absolutist governments.  
Clifford Rogers is another influential voice in the historical debate on military 
revolutions. He argues that a “focus on the centuries after 1500 obscures the importance 
of the period in which the most dramatic, most truly revolutionary changes in European 
military affairs took place: the period, roughly, of the Hundred Years’ War (1337-
1453).”76 During the Hundred Years’ War, he contends, European war was 
revolutionized twice, first by an infantry revolution (which matured in the middle of the 
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14th century) and second by an artillery one (which occurred in the first third of the 15th 
century).  Clifford states that his two revolutions were followed in later centuries by two 
other military revolutions in Early Modern Europe.  A fortification technology 
revolution, which was the centerpiece of Parker’s military revolution was followed by a 
revolution in administration, which was a focus of Roberts’ military revolution.  
Rogers’ conclusion informed thinking about the American RMA.  After stating the 
obvious — that the “concept of ‘revolution’ in history is a flexible one” — he restated his 
observation that not one but a series of military revolutions occurred between 1300 and 
1800.  All four of the above mentioned revolutions were “synergistically combined to 
create the Western military superiority of the eighteenth century.”77  The identification of 
four military revolutions in close historical proximity led Rogers to ponder whether the 
period was actually one of long evolution rather than four distinct revolutions.  
Suspecting that the overall theory of military revolutions might be impeding our 
understanding of natural order of things, he borrowed the concept of “punctuated 
equilibrium evolution” from biology.  
Punctuated equilibrium, he argued, might be applicable to the history and theory of 
warfare.  Under such an approach, evolution is characterized by short periods of rapid 
alteration followed by long periods of “near stasis” in which only slow, incremental 
changes occur.  Indeed, it appears that the processes of innovation and transformation, 
which antecede RMAs, adhere more to the model of punctuated equilibrium than to the 
idealized revolutionary construct implied in much RMA literature.
Noteworthy in the historical debate over the true boundaries and features of the 
military revolution in early modern Europe is the lack of quibbling over definitions and 
the general aloofness from the question, “What’s in a name?”  Each of these military 
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historians, only a few of which are discussed above, produced a well-researched, 
painstakingly argued, and historically accurate argument that bounds a particular research 
question within a certain analytical context.  The methodology employed by each follows 
a traditional historical method, although Downing’s is more a comparative political 
history.  
Studies of the military revolution in early modern Europe do not offer insights into 
organizational behavior or political processes directly transferable to today’s 
transformation discussions.  These works inform students of the American RMA and 
provide insights into the utility of academic debate over the unfolding of history. Each of 
the above works clearly articulate the image or definition of the military revolution under 
consideration, with caveats about the merits and demerits of the analysis.  Each also 
displays deep interest in social, political, organizational, economic, and other “non-
technological” aspects of warfare.  Finally, these works demonstrate sensitivity to the 
nature of fundamental change from one period of history to the next.  
A more noteworthy aspect of these studies concerns Rogers’ reflection on the 
approach to military revolutions.  Parenthetically, it appears that he and other historians 
were intellectually compelled to engage in the historical military revolution debate 
established within the discipline by luminaries such as Roberts and Parker.  Indeed, 
Rogers steps back from his argument to consider the greater issues of what he is studying 
and attempts to give an alternate perspective for the theory of military revolutions, a 
perspective drawn from biology’s theory of punctuated equilibrium.  In doing so he all 
but admits that he has to call his focus of analysis a “military revolution” to be accepted 
within the discipline even though his study does not align with others.  He is forced to fit 
his argument within the discourse on military revolutions despite the fact that, 
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presumably, he finds the approach lacking because it treats military revolutions as 
discrete, temporally if not causally.  
This is a syndrome students of U.S. defense transformation need to avoid, one that 
appears to have infected post-Cold War defense policy discussions.  By turning to a 
military innovation framework, which is amenable to unlimited adaptation to facilitate 
explorations of innovation variables, students of U.S. defense transformation can avoid 
the intellectual cul de sac Rogers decried.
Chapter Conclusion
Defense modernization planning in the early 2000s seemingly returned full circle to 
the 1990s when Andrew Krepinevich assessed perceived changes in warfare and 
contributed to the intellectual foundation for the RMA thesis.  Meanwhile, defense 
discourse continued to evolve from RMA frameworks to transformation management 
strategies.  Innovation, and its importance as a means to sustain U.S. superiority, emerged 
as a more important area of study for students of defense policy and military thought.  
Important differences distinguish most RMA works from military innovation studies.  
With some exceptions, the 1990s RMA debate focused on grand changes in warfare, on 
technologies likely to dominate twenty-first century conflicts, and on whether or not 
emerging capabilities deserved the label ‘revolutionary.’  Conversely, military innovation 
studies tend to start with grand challenges to strategy (or smaller ones to tactics) and then 
relate how organizations overcame them in ways that significantly changed a military 
force’s ability to fight and win in combat.  
Military innovation studies, consisting largely of historical case studies organized 
around specific theoretical frameworks, provide policy makers and analysts with insights 
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into past innovation processes and outcomes.  Students of military innovations describe 
and analyze the conditions common to successful innovation processes to suggest how 
others might replicate them.  Although certainly not sufficient, such innovation processes 
and outcomes are necessary antecedents to successful military transformations.
Military innovation is not merely concerned with technological change. Innovation 
activities must be informed by an understanding of strategic history, how such changes 
come about and why.  This also clarifies one’s current strategic context and direction, if 
the contextual parameters and operational constructs embedded in the innovation studies 
are appropriate for the strategic landscape.  RMA studies, therefore, can be used to 
inform innovation studies.        
Williamson Murray is right that the very “concept” of an RMA “is a useful way to 
think about the possibilities” of military change.78  Grand tours through military history 
and specific cases are both excellent sources of insight, examples, and even analogies.  
Mining of the interwar period for cases such as German innovation anteceding the famed 
blitzkrieg, the rise of submarine warfare, the advent of carrier-based aviation, and a 
narrow range of other was the mainstay of RMA scholarship.  These studies helped 
inform post-Cold War strategic studies and military thought by placing the idea of 
military change in perspective.  
One contribution of the military effectiveness literature emerging from studies of 
interwar RMAs is greater appreciation for visions of the future, their relationship to 
military capabilities, and the importance of testing them empirically in full view of 
military leaders.  During this process, appreciation for changes in the strategic landscape 
and an understanding of future warfare requirements, key features of the strategic 
context, are also important.  Along with vision, deep knowledge of the origins for 
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existing and proposed technology, doctrine, and operational practices helps decision 
makers and planners grapple with transformation decisions.  
Historical awareness is, for sure, crucial to navigating arguments for and against 
military change.  Murray points out that “no example in history” exists “where military 
organizations have successfully jumped into the future without a compass from the past 
to suggest how they might best incorporate technology into a larger framework.”79  Just 
as business leaders carefully select cases and theories applicable to their needs, so too 
should defense transformation scholars focus on applicable historical cases.  
After a decade of discussions about adapting the U.S. military to a new strategic 
environment, the question remains whether students of defense policy are being presented 
with a diverse enough range of cases to think creatively about today’s defense planning 
challenges.
Recognizing that numerous definitions and typologies of innovation are possible, I’m 
persuaded that, for military innovations aiming toward discontinuous changes in military 
effectiveness (e.g., transformation), a relatively straightforward innovation framework 
can be employed to guide military innovation scholars.  Understanding the types of 
change suggested by an innovation is a key factor when using the innovation framework 
as an aid to thinking.  This process is analytically accomplished by first posing some 
basic questions about the intent and essence of potential change.  
• First, does the acceptance and diffusion of the innovation require 
incremental or discontinuous shifts in the organization?  
• Second, do the required policy, organizational, technological, or other 
types of changes required lead to the sustaining of current policies or 
technologies (adapting or extending them) or their disruption?80
• Finally, from an organizational culture and leadership perspective, does 
change promote a convergence of the old and new or a divergence?  
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In some cases, convergence involves merely the integration of something old and new; in 
others it involves an innovative integration or fusion of existing capabilities or 
technologies.  Integration, for example, is central to the story of the Assault Breaker 
program, which included a joint information fusion element, and to the evolution of the 
AirLand Battle doctrine, which sought to integrate air and ground capabilities.  But the 
aggregate capabilities represented by the offset strategy represented a divergence from 
previous capabilities.  These arguments are revisited in later chapters.
The study conclusion returns the figure 2-2 (below), which depicts a notional 
organizational “space” relating different types of change behavior; it also includes a 
proposed “zone” for innovation studies that specifically aim to inform national security 
transformation discussions.  It is an operational view of the innovation milieu from figure 
2-1, one that attempts to deconstruct how a case-specific assessment of military 
innovation might move from analysis of contextual and organizational factors to a mix of 
innovation activities.  Conceptually, this is one representation of what a reformer or 
advocate for an innovation might need to consider when leading change.  
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Lesser-order changes are not a chief concern of this study.  Nor are they a prominent 
focus of military innovation studies, a distinction important for delimiting cases, periods, 
and examples.  Adaptation, for example, is a fundamentally different phenomenon from 
organizational and technological perspectives.  This does not mean that adaptation is not 
important, an argument returned to below in a discussion of interaction effects within 
organizations and what business and organizational studies discuss as “institutionalizing 
innovation.”  
Adaptations, as defined here, concern a better fit between an entity and its 
environment without effecting core tasks or organizational identity.  They are, 
nonetheless, important components within what students of innovation for profit describe 
as ‘innovation streams.  Of course, both adaptations and significant innovations affect 
organizational thinking and operations through contagion effects.  The difference, 
arguably, is that innovation roils an organization by changing its constitutive nature in 
some fashion or form.  
It is for this reason that major innovations are associated with disruptive or 
discontinuous outcomes.  Reformers seeking profound leaps in efficiency rarely seek 
adaptations or mere incremental change.  Although adaptations may also stem from 
necessity or opportunity, they tend toward convergent thinking, incremental change, and 
sustaining technology or policies that do not lead to alterations in core tasks or missions.  
Before leaving this chapter, a brief discussion of measurement issues in innovation 
studies is warranted.  Measurement in the realm of military innovation is neither elegant 
nor refined, and comparative studies of different innovation cases do not easily succumb 
to methodological rigor or the aesthetics of metrics-based marketing research.  Impacts 
on the environment are decidedly non-linear, knowable only by virtue of the promise of, 
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and potential for, ameliorating the challenges and problems inherent in the strategic or 
operational necessity driving the impetus to innovate.  As one organizational theorist 
concluded, there cannot be “one best way to innovate because the innovation process is 
inherently probabilistic and because there are myriad forms and kinds of innovations.”81
Others argue, “observed processes cannot be reduced to a simple sequence of stages or 
phases as most process models in the literature [of innovation] suggest.”82
Of course, generalizations about innovation processes have been proposed, primarily 
through the auspices of organizations and research centers focusing on innovation 
phenomena in the marketplace, government, and business endeavors.  An example is 
Everett Rogers’ study of some 3100 organizational innovation studies – or the diffusion 
of technology innovations, which remains among the most systematic works on 
innovation across nations.  Rogers also documented the rise of innovation studies, tracing 
the field to early 1900s analyses of French, British, and German innovation diffusion 
processes.  North American anthropologists entered the field in the 1920s; American 
sociologists and political scientists began addressing innovation issues in the 1960s.83
His work on the diffusion of innovations, revisited in the study conclusion, provides 
important insights into specific aspects of innovation and organizational life.  
Innovation students are cautioned that no theory of innovation applies across all 
organizations, issues, or disciplines. Finding “little progress” toward “developing theories 
of innovation,” James Q. Wilson found that “innovations differ so greatly in character 
that trying to find one theory to explain them all is like trying to find one medical theory 
to explain all diseases.”84  “In this regard,” he continues, “the study of innovation in 
government agencies is not very different from its study in business firms,” where it is 
almost impossible to predict with any degree of certainty from where or from whom 
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innovations arise.85 In their study of military effectiveness, which address the processes 
and outcomes of military innovations, Allan Millet, Williamson Murray, and Kenneth 
Watman similarly conclude that the “basic characteristics of military effectiveness cannot 
be measures with precision.  Instead, any examination must rely on more concrete 
indicators of effectiveness at the political, strategic, operational, and tactical levels.”86
True enough.  The challenge is avoiding overly simplistic generalizations and 
extrapolations, a problem that befell RMA scholars in the 1990s.  In sum, a single 
innovation theory explaining all cases remains unobtainable.  As a body of work, 
innovation studies generally reinforce the approach taken here: the need to understand 
and focus on the innovation milieu within which each innovation case is nested.  
Moreover, they reinforce the need for an organizing theoretical framework that leaves 
sufficient room for incorporating disparate theoretical resources attuned to different 
elements of innovation existing across innovation cases and periods.87
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3.  Toward the Narrative of U.S. Nuclear Strategy
For much of the Cold War, Colin S. Gray concludes, “the central thread in the 
history” of U.S. military thought and defense strategy stemmed from “the problem of 
extending nuclear deterrence over distant allies in the face of increasingly robust Soviet 
nuclear capabilities.”1  Deterrence theory took shape in the Truman and Eisenhower years 
(1945-1960) and coalesced in the late 1960s when civilian strategic theorists and their 
deterrence models became entrenched within U.S. defense discourse and planning.  
During this time, conventional force modernization suffered.  The narrative of U.S. grand 
strategy was largely the narrative of U.S. nuclear strategy.  
U.S. grand strategy, of course, always addressed conventional military power.  
Conventional warfighting theory struggled for resources of the margins.  During the late 
1970s, however, the role of conventional forces in achieving national security policy 
ascended due to changes in the domestic and international political contexts and 
technological developments.  By the 1980s, a conventional renaissance inhered that 
brought conventional issues from the margins to center stage.  Thirty years after the 
nuclear revolution in military affairs (RMA) shattered perceptions of military force, a 
new period of military transformation emerged.  This chapter provides conceptual and 
historical background to characterize this shift.
Why the historical data presented in this chapter?  First, it is important for current 
students of defense policy to understand, or at least get some sense of, the evolution of 
American strategic thought from the end of World War II.  Second, it was during this 
period that defense planners would first develop their approaches to dealing with nuclear 
deterrence as a national strategy, which conditioned approaches to conventional 
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deterrence in the late 1970s and early 1980s.  Additionally, differences between the U.S. 
and the Soviet Union at the end of World War II led to asymmetric balancing strategies –
the U.S. had atomic weapons while the Soviets had territory (proximity) to Western 
Allies and massive ground forces.  These asymmetries created successive balancing 
periods that reached a tenuous equilibrium in the 1970s after the Soviets achieved nuclear 
parity.  Subsequently, attention turned toward Soviet ground forces, leading to a new 
period of balancing that focused on advanced conventional operations.  Another reason 
for starting with the following sketch of early Cold War defense planning is to place the 
evolution of force structure decisions in perspective.  
The origins of post-World War II U.S. military planning were, in hindsight, 
inauspicious from a military perspective.2  For historian David Alan Rosenberg, the 
“foundations of postwar nuclear strategy established in the Truman years were 
characterized by ambiguity.”3 In his We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History, John 
Lewis Gaddis broadens the argument, concluding that President Harry S. Truman “and 
his advisers were as uncertain about what they could actually do with nuclear weapons 
when they left office in 1953 as they had been in 1949.”4  Henry Kissinger, doyen of 
American national security analysts and archetypal foreign policy adviser, adds a third 
perspective:  “The gap between military and national power was complete.” 5  In part, he 
contends, this was “because we added the atomic bomb to our arsenal without integrating 
its implications into our thinking.”6
What was the overall effect?  Military historian Russell F. Weigley aptly 
characterizes the essence of the long-term impact on U.S. security strategy.  In his classic, 
The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy, he 
labels the entire postwar period as “American Strategy in Perplexity.”7  Building on this 
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theme, later chapters argue that part of the antecedent conditions to the emergence of an 
American RMA was a resurrection of strategic thought in terms of moving away from 
what this chapter calls the dominant narrative of nuclear strategy.      
Chapter Overview 
Because the impetus for military innovation often derives from exigencies in the 
security environment, much of the background information presented below establishes 
relationships among these events, arsenal decisions, and the primary doctrinal threads 
within U.S. defense discourse.8  A synthetic approach is taken, summarizing key themes 
or events, providing context and perspective framing later discussions.   
One important theme in post-World War II strategy was the increasing role of 
technology.  As the chapter conclusion argues, one negative outcome on the reliance on 
nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles was a strategic outlook dominated by nuclear 
targeting and deterrence theory, a development that centered deterrence theory in 
American military thought and defense planning to the detriment of convention military 
thought.  As what this study calls the narrative of nuclear strategy was de-emphasized in 
the 1980s a conventional renaissance occurred, one that occurred within a larger context 
of a systems approach to defense planning and military operations.  This approach, which 
included the emergence of operational art as a key aspect of U.S. war planning and 
theater-level operations, derived much of its intellectual rigor from systems planning and 
integration approaches that co-evolved with large-scale Cold War defense projects.  Most 
of these involved information technology in one form or another, including command and 
control, early warning, intelligence, and targeting data. The systems approach to war 
planning and operational art that emerged at the end of the Cold War evolved with 
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applied information technology as a cornerstone, materially and intellectually, of an 
American theory of maneuver warfare.  Again, although people remained central, grand 
strategy after the Cold War was also closely wedded to technology. 
Interestingly, as chapter 6 argues, a thread linking the post-War II and post-Cold War 
periods in terms of the evolution of a central facet of American military thought and 
defense planning was first articulated by Army scientist and Director of the Office of 
Scientific Research Development Vannevar Bush in a 1945 Atlantic Monthly article. 9
His “As We May Think” imagined information tools strikingly similar to the personal 
computer, including the ability to automatically link content, and what many consider the 
first expression of the idea that became hypertext.  Doug Engelbart read the article 
awaiting his return to the U.S. following World War II.  Twenty-three years after Bush 
published his article, Engelbart, who attributes some of his ideas to Bush, demonstrated 
an information management capability at a conference in San Francisco that helped spark 
a revolution.  In addition to inventing the mouse as an interface for a user to manipulate 
information, Engelbart actually invented direct manipulation of data within the confines 
of the computer.  He invented the computer-human interface construct that forms the core 
of the current digital information revolution.  In large part, he based his insights on 
Bush’s visionary concept for a data-rich infostructure where associations and links 
empowered individuals.10
Underneath all of the Cold War politics, nuclear strategy, and other background 
information discussed in this chapter is the simmering story of how this information 
revolution occurred, a story that is very much intertwined with U.S. defense planning, 
research and development, and strategic command and control.  It is very much 
concerned with the technological underpinnings of grand strategy.        
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This chapter outlines the narrative of U.S. Cold War national security strategy 
anteceding the 1970s emergence of intellectual, doctrinal, and programmatic innovations 
that later converged into the American RMA  thesis.  Information technology, including 
the ability to identify, target, and deliver weapons, was part of this process.  In part, this 
study argues, one factor rendering the RMA thesis so attractive to defense policy 
interlocutors was the very promise of demystifying national security strategic and 
national military strategy by returning conventional military readiness to center stage.  In 
other words, the conventional renaissance reconnected military thought to its historical 
roots, detaching it from the abstract and senseless canon of nuclear strategy.
The chapter culminates with the solidification of American strategic thought in the 
late 1960s that, once entrenched, crystallized along several theoretical threads that 
influenced force structure decisions and doctrine.  Several developments or processes 
beginning in the historical period discussed below are best introduced in later chapters 
discussing their impact on the emergence of advanced conventional capabilities.  They 
include: the digital computer revolution; geo-positioning and navigation technologies; 
and, the creation of the Advanced Research Project Agency (ARPA), later renamed the 
Defense Advanced Research Project Agency (DARPA).  
The Collapse of the Grand Alliance and the Postwar Security Environment 
Of paramount concern in the immediate post-World War II period was the 
unraveling of the Grand Alliance between the United States, Great Britain, and Russia 
(the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, USSR).  A singular common interest during the 
war, defeating the Axis powers, engendered broad political and military alignment among 
the Big Three until Japan’s August 1945 surrender removed the impetus for further 
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cooperation.  Complicity for decreased cooperation has been assigned to each of the Big 
Three.11  For U.S. observers, Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov’s actions at 
the September 1945 London Conference of Foreign Ministers foreshadowed the Grand 
Alliance’s demise.  A conference to collaborate on postwar settlement issues was notable 
for common antipathies more than common interests.  In London, Molotov demanded 
that Soviet troops be allowed to occupy Japan and successfully pressured the U.S. and 
Great Britain to accept Soviet versions of peace settlements in Europe.  Soon thereafter, 
Russia unsuccessfully pressured Turkey to grant passages to Soviet warships navigating 
the straits of the Bosporus and the Dardanelles and began pressuring Iran to grant oil 
concessions.  
Joseph Stalin’s new five-year economic program further dashed optimism in 
Washington concerning postwar relations with the Soviets.12  Announced on 9 February 
1946, Stalin described its intent as preparing the Soviet Union for the impending (and 
anticipated) conflict with the capitalist world.  His declaration corresponded with 
initiatives to expand the Soviet sphere of influence by coercion, including sponsoring 
communist activities abroad.  
The strategic context was indeed changing. Defining events in the history of the Cold 
War unfolded apace.  As they did, American military thought crystallized, laying the 
foundations for Cold War strategy and doctrine.  It is important for students of U.S. 
defense policy to grasp the unfolding of these events and their effect on defense planning.  
On February 22, 1946 George Kennan sent his 8,000 word “Long Telegram” to the 
State Department from his posting as the senior diplomat at the U.S. embassy in Moscow.  
The cable, a landmark in the documentary history of the Cold War, provided forceful 
insight into Soviet motives, social and economic circumstances, and the historical factors 
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bearing on policy making within the Kremlin.13  Kennan argued against the inevitability 
of conflict with the Soviet Union, predicting that Soviet leaders would seek to expand its 
influence wherever possible but would moderate their policies in the face of firm 
opposition.  Widely circulated in Washington, the cable summarized and gave cogency to 
emerging views of Soviet animus, providing detailed analysis and a sense of structural 
coherence to what many perceived as dangerously erratic Soviet behavior.  Kennan also 
suggested a policy course.  He argued that America and its Allies would become 
frustrated if they expected Soviet behavior to conform with emerging Western visions of 
behavior grounded in reason and moderation.  To counter the Soviet’s power politics, 
Kennan prescribed patient and firm containment consisting of political and economic 
measures to offset or blunt expansionist behavior.14  Within a year, containment would be 
redefined in more military terms and thenceforward provide the organizing principle of 
Cold War American policy toward the Soviet Union.15
Six days after Kennan’s cable was received in Washington, on 28 February 1946, 
U.S. Secretary of State James Byrnes gave public voice to critics of Soviet behavior, 
arguing, “we cannot allow aggression to be accomplished by coercion, or pressure, or 
subterfuges, such as political infiltration.”16  On his mind, perhaps, was the upcoming 2 
March deadline for Soviet troops to be withdrawn from Iran; indeed, Moscow announced 
its intent to keep its troops in place.  Facing strong pressure from the United States and 
Great Britain, and believing that a joint Soviet-Iranian oil agreement was forthcoming 
(Iran later abrogated the deal), Stalin agreed to a withdrawal by mid-May.  That he 
conceded in the face of such pressure only confirmed Kennan’s arguments for a patient 
and firm approach to Soviet expansionism.  Another notable speech occurred on 5 March 
at a Fulton, Missouri commencement ceremony.  With Truman sitting on the dais behind 
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him, Winston Churchill lamented, “From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, 
an Iron Curtain has descended across the [European] continent.”17  Churchill denounced 
the Soviet Union, essentially called for a formal end to the Grand Alliance, and suggested 
a new Anglo-American concert of power to prevent the emergence of another Hitler – in  
Stalin – and the onslaught of another world war.18
What about the Soviet military, the “on the ground” manifestation of the Iron 
Curtain?  In the immediate aftermath of World War II, Stalin mandated that Soviet 
ground forces reconstitute and modernize concurrently with post-World War II 
demobilization.  Some eight million men left active service by 1948, providing ample 
stockpiles of weapons and equipment for the three million remaining in uniform.  Nearly 
eighty percent of these served in ground forces.  Stalin also channeled a preponderance of 
available industrial resources toward defense preparedness, including research and 
development.  A variety of armored vehicles followed, including the T-54 and T-55 main 
battle tanks.  Battlefield missile systems were fielded in 1947.  Entire sectors of industry 
were focused on advanced electronics and other military support systems.  In 1946, 
ground, air, and naval forces merged into a unified Ministry of the Armed Forces, a 
similar but arguably more effective reorganization than the U.S. National Security Act of 
1947.  Overall, Soviet ground forces posed a strategic threat to NATO and the U.S. by 
sustaining Soviet occupation of Eastern Europe and threatening areas such as the Middle 
East.  
On “Carrying a Twig”: The Travail of Postwar Defense Planning
Contrasting U.S. defense preparedness at the end of 1945 with emerging security 
concerns overseas, addressing the possibility of conflict with the Soviet Union, and 
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cognizant of the relative strength of Soviet conventional forces, Byrnes turned a phrase 
attributed to former president Theodore Roosevelt.  Where Roosevelt posited, “‘Uncle 
Sam should speak softly and carry a big stick,’” Brynes lamented that reduced defense 
spending and demobilization left him to “speak loudly and carry a twig.”19 “Some of the 
people who yelled the loudest for me to adopt a firm attitude toward Russia,” Brynes later 
observed, “yelled even louder for the rapid demobilization of the Army.”20  There was 
truth in his rhetoric.  Stephen Ambrose captured the fundamental problem.  “The Truman 
administration’s military and foreign policies were now rushing forward but in exactly 
the opposite directions, so that the gap between them increased daily.”21  This trend 
continued well into the 1970s when, in a twist of policy, the Carter administration 
increased defense spending and set in motion a multifaceted conventional weapon 
development program.
In the post-World War II period, national security planners grappled with vexing
domestic issues as they reinvented the nation’s role in global politics.  Not the least of 
these were transitioning the economy off wartime price controls, managing post-World 
War II demobilization, and retaining military preparedness as defense spending declined.  
The pace and scope of some re-conversion policies drew domestic opposition from 
labor unions in Spring 1946.  Some one third of all nonagricultural workers in the United 
States belonged to unions.  Their collective bargaining power was politically decisive; 
their concerns had to be addressed. Unions sought more favorable wages as the 
government relaxed wage and price controls, leading to disagreements over the pace and 
scope of re-conversion policies and, eventually, to strikes.  Strikes were countered by 
increased government involvement, which in turn drew further political opposition.  
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Demobilization proceeded concurrently with government plans to re-convert the 
economy from wartime price controls, regulations, and labor policies to peacetime
conditions. Continued military engagement abroad was unpopular at home, as were 
proposals to maintain high levels of defense spending.  Overseas, servicemen rioted 
against demobilization delays, leading to their expedited return home and into civilian 
life.  Personnel strength declined by some ten and a half million between 30 June 1945 
and 30 June 1947, as depicted in Table 3-122
30 June 1945    30 June 1946   30 June 1947
 Army (less Army Air Corps) 5,984,114           1,434,175         683,837
Army Air Force    2,282,259              455,515         305,827
Navy    3,377,840              951,930         477,384
Marine Corps         476,709         155,592         92,222
      12,120,922            2,997,212     1,559,270
Table 3-1: Armed Forces Strength
The situation worsened when inflation reached ten percent. Truman’s approval rating 
declined from eighty percent to nearly thirty.  Fiscal and political conservatives from 
across the political spectrum criticized Truman’s domestic policies, leading to a 
Republican victory in the November 1946 Congressional elections.  Republicans, running 
against FDR’s legacy as much as against Truman, won both the House (winning 245 
seats to the Democrat’s 188) and Senate (51 to 45).  Military considerations 
notwithstanding, and despite Republican politicking that the Administration should be 
tougher in negotiations with the Soviets, the domestic political environment left little 
room for increased defense spending.  
Throughout the Cold War, defense planning was complicated by inter-service 
rivalries over funding, roles, missions, and by further changes in the structure of national 
security decision making, important aspects of the period well documented in other 
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studies.23  Then as now, force structure and military doctrine decisions reflect higher-
order national security policy making, a process involving internal (e.g., political, 
organizational, and psychological) and external (e.g., Alliance relations, threats) factors.  
Uncertainty, confusion, or ambiguity at the national policy level is often amplified at 
the level of force planning and doctrine within the military services.  This aptly describes 
the situation at the dawn of the atomic age as protean changes in U.S. national security 
decision making gave rise to a new planning system, formally enacted by the National 
Security Act of 1947.  The Act gave rise to the so-called National Military Establishment 
(NME) consisting of a new Department of Defense that incorporated the Army, Navy, 
Marine Corps, and a new Air Force.  The Act also created the Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA) and a federal research and development program, both of which matured 
during the Cold War to become important elements of U.S. military innovation activities.  
After a number of adaptations, the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense 
Reorganization Act of 1986 legislated fixes to counter inter-service competition and 
planning deficiencies, a topic revisited in chapter 5.
In the foreign policy arena, the 1946 Congressional elections did coincide with – or 
wrought, depending on one’s perspective – changes in Truman’s policies toward the 
Soviet Union.  A period of bipartisan foreign policy emerged, either because 
Congressional supporters agreed with Truman’s tougher stance toward the Soviet Union 
or because Truman adopted such a stance to avoid continued clashes with Congressional 
Republicans over U.S. foreign policy.  
Recognizing the growing imbalance between emerging defense requirements 
internationally and preparedness to meet them, and increasingly conscious of the 
domestic political situation, Truman requested an assessment of the U.S. military 
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situation relative to Soviet activities.  The task fell to Clark Clifford, Special Counsel to 
the President, who assigned the task to his assistant George Elsey.  Input for the final 
report came from across the government.24  Upon receiving it September, the President 
immediately impounded the remaining copies, summoning Clifford to the White House 
to surrender them.25  The report was too pessimistic and politically sensitive at a time 
when the Truman administration faced domestic opposition.26  Overall, he remained 
cautiously optimistic that U.S.-Soviet relations might improve, although recent work 
suggests that by this time Truman had already decided that a “get tough” attitude was the 
only viable approach toward Moscow.
A month later, recognizing that logistics planning could not proceed without 
strategic plans and an understanding of requirements (e.g., munitions needs), the JCS 
began developing a joint strategic concept and plans to guide mobilization.  With 
hindsight, military planning appears to have proceeded within a context that constrained 
the emergence of a coordinated and integrated approach to defense policy making.  Such 
constraints took the form of intellectual as well as organizational barriers.  In the case of 
the former, coordination and learning stagnated from the extreme secrecy surrounding the 
state of the atomic arsenal, which compartmented knowledge of the effects of atomic 
bombing at the very moment when such knowledge – limited as it was – should have 
been shared.  Organizationally, Services continued to disagree over roles and missions, a 
persisting problem that realized important, though only partial, resolution in the mid-
1970s before becoming subsumed within the larger issue of joint warfighting in the 
1980s.27  Other barriers to integrated defense planning included Truman’s tendency to 
view atomic bombs as terror weapons, prohibitions against official atomic planning, and 
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technological issues limiting the rate of bomb production (what would be known as the 
“scarcity problem”).  
The Evolving Context for Strategic Thought, the Bomb, and the Baruch Plan
Overshadowing these and other barriers to more integrated planning in the early 
atomic era were troublesome questions about the future of international atomic energy 
and weapons, an issue attenuating national security decision making throughout 1946 and 
early 1947.  Noteworthy in this formative period was the U.S. transfer of custody of 
atomic energy and atomic weapons to the newly created U.S. Atomic Energy 
Commission.  Done in 1946, this temporarily ended the War Department’s stewardship of 
America’s fledgling atomic arsenal.  Counterintuitive to most students of the period who 
associate nuclear weapons only with the Department of Defense (which replaced the War 
Department in 1947), the move reflected larger objectives of forestalling the further 
nucleariztion of international relations. Strategically, atomic energy was subsumed within 
a national security strategy of promoting peaceful atomic energy use worldwide, with an 
objective of moderating and controlling atomic energy to forestall its further 
militarization.  
Early attempts to control atomic energy engendered what later statesmen fashioned 
into a strategic imperative: limiting or otherwise controlling the spread of nuclear 
weapons.  A theme revisited in later chapters concerns the subsequent emergence of a 
strategic nuclear arms limitations regime to stabilize deterrence and, in the late 1970s and 
1980s, further stabilization initiatives regarding general purpose forces and regional 
confidence building measures.
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Ambiguity surrounding the utility and use of atomic weapons in the late 1940s 
derived from the uncertain international security climate, lack of intelligence about Soviet 
military capabilities and intentions, and the relatively immature state of atomic weapons 
and associated delivery means.  As late as the early 1950s, even as uncertainty about the 
security environment evolved to an acknowledged U.S.-Soviet rivalry, ambiguity 
concerning defense planning persisted, in part because the atomic arsenal was growing 
without comprehensive planning for their use or integration into general purpose forces.  
Uncertainty also existed about when atomic weapons might be employed, what effect 
they might have on diplomacy and efforts to prevent a wider conflict, and their very 
battlefield utility compared to other capabilities. 
As stated earlier, Truman maintained that atomic bombs where a weapon of terror to 
be used only as a last resort throughout 1946 and 1947.  During a 21 July 1948 oval 
office discussion, at the height of the Berlin Blockade (discussed below), Truman 
reiterated his views on the military utility of atomic bombs, a view that gelled shortly 
after their August 1945 use on the Japanese towns of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.  With the 
Berlin Airlift ongoing, Truman declared that atomic bombs were decidedly not “a 
military weapon.”  Perhaps reflecting nostalgia for a bygone era when war was more 
limited in scope, and because they were “used to wipe out women and children and 
unarmed people,” Truman affirmed that atomic bombs were “not for military uses,” to be 
treated “differently from rifles and cannon and ordinary things like that.”28  Furthermore, 
he did not think the American public would approve of using atomic weapons in any 
situation other than an all-out war.  
Already stated was the lack of information sharing about the bomb. A closely 
guarded secret, Truman himself remained unaware of the exact size of the arsenal until 
103
early April 1947.29   Only pieces of two weapons were available in 1945, a number 
reaching thirteen in July 1947 and fifty a year later.  At the time, the arsenal was ill-
prepared for use in a crisis.  Only a small number of bombs existed, a limiting factor in 
the calculus of their military utility in the opening months of any war over Berlin.  
Moreover, they were stored disassembled – readying them took some forty men nearly 
two days.30  Trained assembly personnel – the scientists responsible for creating the 
bomb and most knowledgeable about their use, had dispersed following the war along
with their uniformed compatriots.  Instituting a training program was therefore difficult 
simply because the military did not have access to bomb components, not to mention 
limited institutional knowledge to facilitate training.  Planning for their use was also 
difficult.  That the arsenal was in such a state at all reflects, perhaps, the tradition of 
demobilization following wars and the belief on behalf of the scientists that produced the 
bombs that their job ended with the war.  Military planners, furthermore, were uncertain 
what effect the bombs would have on Soviet war making potential, political will, and war 
termination.  “Until well into 1947, Lawrence Freedman observed, these and other 
“limitations of the bomb governed U.S. strategy.”31  Delivery options, or the lack thereof, 
remained an issue.  Only a few dozen B-29 bombers were modified to carry the bombs, 
and they remained vulnerable to enemy defenses.  In sum, military options for the atomic 
bomb were limited politically, operationally, and cognitively.  
Truman’s approach to atomic weapons custody, or who controlled them within the 
United States government, were linked to plans for international control of atomic energy 
and the prevention of an atomic arms race with the increasingly uncooperative Soviet 
Union.  American visions of limiting atomic warfare to peaceful uses through global 
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agreements and control mechanisms culminated a month following the Iran crisis and 
Churchill’s “Iron Curtail” speech.  
In June 1946, the Baruch Plan was presented at the United Nations and promptly 
rejected by Moscow.  Indeed, Soviet negotiators quickly proposed an alternative.  Named 
for Bernard M. Baruch, the American special representative to the United Nations 
Atomic Energy Commission, the U.S. plan outlined a system for inspection measures and 
international controls to impede covert development of atomic weapons.  After suitable 
international inspection measures were in place, the United States would surrender 
atomic weapons to an International Atomic Development Authority, share technical 
knowledge about atomic energy, and forestall further atomic bomb development.  
Conversely, Moscow wanted the U.S. to share its knowledge about the bomb, surrender 
its weapons, and, rather than an international inspection regime, preferred a self-policing 
agreement. 
The Baruch Plan arrived stillborn.  Neither the Soviet Union nor the United States 
seemed prepared to cease work on atomic weapons without guarantees that another 
power would not secretly develop them.  In July, the U.S. proceeded with its second test 
of an atomic bomb on the Bikini Atoll, reinforcing Soviet doubts about America’s stated 
vision of peaceful uses for atomic energy and international control of atomic weapons.  A 
month later Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko all but buried further discussions of 
international control of atomic energy (or weapons) by stating that the Baruch Plan’s 
inspection provisions were incompatible with state sovereignty.
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The Truman Doctrine and Shifts in Strategic Planning
Political sovereignty and issues related to it, including the status of colonial 
possessions, the solidification of “spheres of influence,” and the formalization of 
American containment doctrine, shaped the evolving security environment.  In this case, 
an antecedent cause involved the natural environment.  The 1946 harvest in Europe was 
uniformly terrible, the 1946-1947 winter the most severe in a generation, and, in Great 
Britain, a series of blizzards in late January 1947 froze the winter wheat crop.  America’s 
staunchest ally was already struggling economically.  Electricity rationing limited some 
households to a few hours of availability per day.  Unemployment reached six million, 
double the rate at the height of the 1930s depression.  Burdened by domestic economic 
ills, London reduced commitments abroad.  On 21 February 1947, Britain notified the 
U.S. State Department that their economic and military aid to Greece and Turkey would 
end within six months.  India’s independence would come within a year and the British 
mandate in Palestine would be transferred to the United Nations.  
The CIA concluded that the “poverty and underprivileged position of the population” 
of these and other colonial areas, along with “the existence of leftist elements within 
them,” rendered “them peculiarly susceptible to Soviet penetration.”32  Truman, 
anticipating the vacuum Britain’s withdrawals created in terms of opportunities for Soviet 
expansionism, approached Congress for funding to prevent the potential loss of Greece to 
communist insurgents and the expansion of Soviet influence into Turkey.  Press accounts 
dubbed his 12 March 1947 speech to Congress requesting aid the “Truman Doctrine.”  
Addressing a Harvard commencement a month later, Secretary of State George Marshall, 
who replaced Byrnes, unveiled the European Recovery Plan, thenceforward known as the 
Marshall Plan.  It aimed to underwrite Europe’s economic recovery and postwar 
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reconstruction to prevent the conditions analysts considered inducements to communist 
ideology and enticements for Soviet political subversion (e.g., hunger, poverty, 
unemployment).  The Marshall Plan was initially unpopular among those preferring a 
focus on domestic economic issues and accelerated postwar re-conversion – it would 
require over ten percent of the federal budget to implement.  Still, there was widespread 
support for the new global economic strategy and for the expansion of U.S. involvement 
abroad as Americans recognized the interdependencies linking foreign and domestic 
economic conditions. Debates about further involvement in European recovery continued 
until the 1948 Soviet-orchestrated ‘coup in Czechoslovakia provided prima-facie 
evidence that the Marshall Plan was needed to stave off additional losses in Europe.
Subsequently, the issue of defense preparedness was subordinated to aid for 
economic reconstruction in Europe while defense planning continued to be constrained 
by Truman’s objectives for international control of atomic weapons.  Although defense 
planners sought increased defense spending, they generally acquiesced on the issue of 
prioritizing aid for European reconstruction higher than U.S. defense spending.  As 
Melvyn P. Leffler documents in A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the 
Truman Administration, and the Cold War, while few believed Moscow would engage in 
military aggression, many believed economic problems threatened “the long-termed 
balance of power” in Europe.33  Influencing this perception was a March 1948 estimate 
by a Joint Ad Hoc Committee of representatives from the Central Intelligence Agency 
and the intelligence arms of the Department of State, Army, Navy, and Air Force.  It 
concluded “that the USSR will not resort to direct military action during 1948.”34
Moscow would, intelligence analysts posited, seek greater influence in Europe and other 
strategically important regions, by exploiting and, if warranted, fomenting, political-
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economic crises.  “Rearmament,” therefore, “remained subordinate to reconstruction 
because defense analysts did not expect Soviet aggression.”35
Such sensitivity to the importance of international economic conditions in national 
security discussions was a relatively new phenomenon, at least in terms of cross-cutting 
agreement among diplomats, defense officials, and others that U.S. economic aid was 
both necessary and appropriate.  Indeed, the pursuit of national economic security 
through overseas commitments, aid, and alliances evolved as a core theme in Cold War 
security discussions.  Similarly, two further themes evolved during this period: the 
emergence of an American approach to global intelligence collection and analysis; and 
widespread support for peacetime defense research and development at historically 
unprecedented levels.  Both are discussed in later chapters; each served as the basis for 
important military innovations.
Crisis, Opportunity, and Strategic Change
During summer 1947, U.S. military planners grappling with the conceptual and 
operational exigencies of atomic-era warfare operations set about developing the first 
targeting plan for the limited atomic arsenal.36 Initial operational plans for the atomic 
arsenal reflected World War II experience with strategic bombing. Dubbed ‘city busting’ 
attacks by some, the objective was attacking and destroying an enemy’s industrial base –
frequently associated with population centers – to undercut industrial support to opposing 
armies with the aim of rendering them militarily ineffective.  Soviet industrial centers, 
therefore, encompassed the targeting base for the future atomic arsenal and B-36 
bombers, just then coming into service, became the delivery vehicles for atomic 
warfighting.  Under Truman, air power, which for all intensive purposes meant the newly 
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created Department of the Air Force, ascended to the pinnacle of strategic planning 
because it was the sole means for delivering atomic weapons.  At the time air power was 
an undeveloped and poorly integrated element of military power.  Nonetheless, because 
of the atomic-centric nature of national security strategy in the late 1940s and early 
1950s, its political importance was already supreme.  
Planning for atomic warfare was constrained by the barriers mentioned above and by 
the scarcity of atomic weapons.  There were simply too few weapons (and bombers) to 
destroy all the targets required to truly cripple Soviet war making capabilities.  And not 
all available weapons were likely to hit their mark because of the vulnerability of 
bombers and difficulties locating targets.  “Because of limited capability and inadequate 
intelligence,” Rosenberg concluded, “bomber crews could only hope to penetrate to their 
targets under cover of darkness and bad weather” to “locate precise aim points” – a task 
made more difficult over “often snow-covered targets.”37  Strategists, moreover, 
considered it likely that limited atomic attacks that left the industrial capability intact 
without utterly crippling an adversary’s social-economic infrastructure would only 
embolden an adversary’s will to persevere.38
Political developments would soon change the context for military planning.  The 
focal point for the next crisis involved what later generations of Cold Warriors called the 
“inter-German fault line,” the inner-German border.  Later chapters revisit the challenges 
of this border, including the development of U.S. and NATO doctrine to address the 
operational exigencies of defending West German territory using a forward defense (a 
defense that aimed to stop an assault at the most forward line of defense possible rather 
than using tactical or theater depth to absorb and attach and then counter it).  Postwar 
agreements partitioned Germany into four occupation zones, one for each of the Big 
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Three and a fourth for France.  In June 1948, the Soviet Union barred the United States, 
France, and Britain from access to Berlin, a so-called “open-city” within the Soviet-
controlled occupation zone.  Eleven months later, in May 1949, the blockade ended.  The 
United States, avoiding direct confrontation on the ground – which might lead to war –
staged an airlift to prevent starvation and signal continued political commitment to 
Berlin’s open city status.  At the height of the Berlin Airlift, which ran continuously for 
324 days, American aircrews delivered 13,000 tons of supplies a day.  Berlin remained an 
important issue throughout the Cold War.
The Berlin Blockade changed attitudes in Washington, leading to new levels and 
types of military planning, particularly atomic war planning, although defense spending 
remained stable.  It also reinforced the utility of air power.  Although no atomic bombs 
were deployed, Truman’s decision to deploy atomic-capable bombers in Britain during 
the crisis was interpreted as a successful show of strength and resolve.  Finally, the crisis 
over Berlin added further impetus to arguments calling for an alliance structure formally 
linking Western Europe to the United States.  Each of these – crisis-driven military 
planning, the strategic utility of air power, and American-Western European security 
arrangements – became important components of national security throughout the Cold 
War.  
The context for military planning changed on 16 September 1948 when Truman 
signed a National Security Council policy statement, NSC-30, on the use of atomic 
weapons.  Originating as an Air Force policy paper drafted in response to planning 
deficiencies raised during the Berlin Blockade, NSC-30 “recognized that the military 
‘must be ready to utilize promptly and effectively all appropriate means available, 
including atomic weapons.’”  Atomic weapons employment decisions were reserved for 
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the President alone.39  NSC-30 sanctioned official planning for atomic weapons use, 
including more detailed operational planning and targeting scenarios, and remained the 
sole national document outlining atomic (later nuclear) weapons employment policies 
until 1959.40  Two months later another document, NSC-20/4, proscribed general aims of 
a war with the Soviet Union.  “The goal in a general war,” David Allen Rosenberg 
concludes, “would be to reduce or eliminate Soviet or ‘bolshevik’ control inside and 
outside the Soviet Union.”41
Although NSC-30 and NSC-20/4 represented a change in policy by sanctioning 
atomic war planning and highlighting readiness issues they did little to clarify important 
policy and operational questions about how, when, where, and why “the bomb” might be 
used.  These issues would be left unresolved until the Eisenhower administration.  The 
primary influence of these memoranda during the Truman administration was to 
accelerate atomic production, a decision that coincided with Truman’s forgoing of 
international atomic energy control and his decision to approve more efficient bomb 
production technologies.  For military planners, this promised to remove the scarcity 
issue in targeting and facilitated revised operational planning.  It also established a stream 
of innovations in weapons development that would lead to tactical nuclear weapons 
entering the arsenal in the mid-1950s.  
The Berlin Blockade raised concerns about military preparedness in both the United 
States and Western Europe.  Underscoring such concerns were questions about the U.S. 
commitment to defend Western Europe should the Soviets attack.  Given the relatively 
poor state of conventional preparedness, the crucial issue became the deterrence value of 
America’s atomic arsenal.  If East-West relations deteriorated into outright war, 
conventional wisdom held that Western Europe would be overrun unless America’s 
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atomic arsenal was formally linked to its defense.  Discussed in 1947 and declared in 
1948, this emerging political-military strategy committed the U.S. to using the atomic 
bomb to defend Western Europe against Soviet aggression.  Defined some years later as 
“extended deterrence,” this was the first U.S. strategic nuclear posture and the foundation 
for what became a dominant thread in the narrative of American military thought. The 
extended deterrence pledge was formally institutionalized in April of 1948 with the 
creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).  A related thread, the 
security and stability of the periphery, evolved from aid to Greece and Turkey, the 
Truman doctrine, and preventing Moscow from maintaining a presence in Iran. 
Subsequently, military innovation during the Cold War generally derived from three 
sources: perceived imbalances in global nuclear deterrence, operational challenges arising 
in peripheral regions that had the potential to escalate into U.S.-Soviet crises, and specific 
threats to European stability.  As later chapters argue, the origins of the American RMA 
involved necessity wrought from operational challenges in all three sources.
The H-bomb and NSC-68
In June 1949 the Soviet Union tested its first atomic bomb.  Communists won China 
later that December.  The CIA concluded that, “Soviet possession of atomic weapons has 
increased the military and political capabilities of the USSR and the possibility of war” 
and that “the security of the United States is in increasing jeopardy.”42  The loss of China 
raised the specter of a Sino-Soviet pact against the West.  These and other changes in the 
international security environment spurred a period of innovation in U.S. national 
security planning, one decidedly nuclear-centric in character and derived from more 
pessimistic assessments of the likelihood of armed conflict with the Soviet Union.  
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Changes in targeting strategy ensued.  NATO defense planning requirements and the 
a fall 1949 Joint Chiefs of Staff study had already pointed toward new targeting priorities 
for the U.S. Strategic Air Command.  The study, led by Air Force Lieutenant General 
H.R. Harmon (known as the Harmon Report), concluded that early use of atomic 
weapons remained crucial to damaging Soviet war-making capabilities but might also 
bolster Soviet will to continue fighting.  In layman’s terms, hitting the Soviets with only a 
few nukes might solidify the enemy’s will.   Because there remained too few atomic 
weapons to destroy all targets, and because the U.S. was now responsible for defending 
Western Europe, the Strategic Air Command was assigned the new task of retarding
Soviet forces rather than strategic bombing of war-making capabilities.43
President Truman expanded the atomic arsenal, beginning with increased weapons 
testing and development programs.  He formally approved development of the hydrogen 
bomb.  Theoretical work on hydrogen bombs began during the war but many scientists 
and policy makers saw its operational development as unnecessary once the war ended.  
The decision to proceed with development was controversial and sparked debate along 
two axes: the morality of using a hydrogen bomb and its operational utility (Was a bigger 
bang better?).  Several committees proved unable to provide Truman with a decisive 
answer to the question, Should the U.S. build the H-bomb?  The more important question 
to Truman was whether the Soviet Union could or would be able to build one.  An 
affirmative answer mooted all opposition.  Truman formally approved the decision to 
build a hydrogen bomb in January 1950, although recent studies suggest he had privately 
made the decision much earlier.44
Whereas the explosion of an atomic bomb involved splitting uranium or plutonium 
atoms, the more powerful hydrogen bomb worked by fusing lighter weight atoms –
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hydrogen or tritium.45 Because hydrogen bombs worked through thermonuclear 
explosions, this shifted the lexicon of strategic warfare from atomic bombs to nuclear 
ones.  For Marc Trachtenberg, “the new conditions of warfare. . .emerging from the early 
1950s” represented a “‘nuclear revolution.’”46 Indeed, the early 1950s marked the origins 
of nuclear strategy, a field of national security affairs that remained highly theoretical at 
the same time that it provided the framework for force structure decisions and doctrine.  
Part of the revolution stemmed from the creation of a fusion device, which made 
intercontinental ballistic missiles more feasible.  Fission devices had relatively small 
yields, requiring greater accuracy.  They were also heavy.  Bombers were required to 
ensure a bomb of significant yield detonated close enough to the intended target to 
destroy it.  Hydrogen weapons, on the other hand, had yields large enough that they could 
miss most targets by miles.  They also packed destructive power in smaller warheads.  
Missiles were thereafter more feasible. 
Increasingly, U.S. arsenal decisions during the Cold War would be driven by 
perceptions of Soviet military capability.  “After 1945,” Gray observes, “fear of what the 
USSR might choose to do with its increasingly formidable military power drove” U.S. 
defense planning’; it was “not a factor helping to define the purposes of U.S. policy, 
grand strategy, and military strategy.  It was the factor.”47
On the same day, Truman approved the H-bomb he directed the Secretaries of State 
and Defense to reexamine likely objectives in both peace and war and how such 
objectives related to strategic plans.  The response came in February from the State 
Department’s Policy Planning Staff, led by Paul Nitze, in the form of National Security 
Council memorandum 68 (NSC-68).  It served as an ideological and conceptual 
justification for the H-bomb decision, providing a further pessimistic image of the Soviet 
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Union, predicted continued deterioration of U.S.-Soviet relations, and urged the adoption 
of containment as a strategy backed by increased defense spending.  
NSC-68 was the first comprehensive national security document of the Cold War 
directly relating international security conditions with specific defense spending and 
force structure proposals.  Neither Kennan’s long telegram nor Clifford’s report made the 
causal arguments rendered in Nitze’s memorandum.  Among its policy recommendations 
was a massive U.S. arms buildup. Another noteworthy aspect of NSC-68 was the 
rejection of a declared no first-use policy concerning atomic weapons.  “In our present 
situation of relative unpreparedness in conventional weapons,” NSC-68 posited, the 
Soviets would view a no-first use policy “as an admission of great weakness” and by 
America’s allies “as a clear indication that we intended to abandon them.’”48 From then 
on, the logic of U.S. nuclear deterrence rested on projecting a credible threat of “going 
nuke” in response to any Soviet thrust into Western Europe.  
As later chapters show, when the credibility of nuclear employment options became 
questionable, conventional weapons innovations were pursued to raise the threshold at 
which going nuclear was the only viable option to defend U.S. Allies in Europe.  
At the time of its drafting, however, it appeared unlikely that NSC-68’s principal 
recommendations would be implemented because political conditions barred increased 
defense spending.  NSC- 68’s prospects for implementation seemed to change when North 
Korea crossed the thirty-eighth parallel into South Korea in June 1950.  Certainly, 
proponents of increased defense spending argued, the deplorable state of readiness left 
the Army and other Services critically ill prepared for war.  
The 8th Army in Japan, for example, was undermanned and resource poor when it 
mobilized in response to the North Korean invasion.  At that time, nine of ten existing 
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divisions were under-strength (the exception being the 82nd Airborne Division).  Regular 
infantry divisions retained their World War II structure of three infantry regiments and 
one artillery regiment; each infantry regiment had three infantry battalions.  Because each 
division lacked one infantry regiment, with the remaining two regiments lacking a rifle 
company apiece, each infantry division was short over a dozen rifle companies.  
Additionally, artillery battalions lacked one artillery battery, leaving divisions without a 
battalion of tubes.  Training was also seriously below standards, a problem that continued 
into the late 1970s when a training revolution occurred.  A general ammunition shortage 
existed across the Army for all types of weapons.  Ammunition conservation was 
imposed during the opening battles of the Korean War, a conflict that saw U.S. 
conventional warfighting capabilities only marginally improve.  
Many assumed the communist North was being directed, or at least aided, by 
Moscow, an assumption that galvanized newfound support for defense spending.  Fears 
of Soviet expansionism in Asia were already widespread, in part based on a 1949 report, 
NSC-48-1.  It concluded that the Soviet Union sought to dominate all of Asia, fueling 
fears of a “domino effect” whereby other regimes in the region would fall to communism.  
For many, the Korean War confirmed NSC-68’s argument for a tougher stance toward 
Moscow and increased defense spending to offset Soviet forces.  Thereafter, the notion of 
containment would be viewed through a lens attuned to military power more than the 
economic and political aspects Kennan initially proposed.  
Nuclear targeting received greater attention in the aftermath of Korea conflict than 
innovations to improve the readiness of conventional force.  At the beginning of the war, 
in August 1950, fearing Soviet interference and the threat of a Soviet atomic attack, first 
priority for nuclear targeting was assigned to Soviet atomic weapons capabilities.  This 
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included delivery vehicles, which at the time meant airbases.  The top three priorities for 
nuclear forces, thereafter, were “blunting” Soviet atomic capabilities, “retarding” Soviet 
forces in any attack on Allies, and “disrupting or destroying” Soviet war making 
capabilities (e.g., fuel, power, and atomic industries).49
Although boots on the ground held the back the tide of communist forces, the war 
affirmed the role of nuclear weapons and the viability of a nuclear-centric national 
security policy.  Eisenhower, who assumed office in 1953, believed that their threatened 
use impelled North Korean to sign an armistice ending hostilities in July 1953.  Strategic 
thought, thereafter, developed in an entirely new direction, leading to the first genuinely 
American strain of military thought.  “Until the unpleasant and confusing experience in 
Korea,” Gray posits, “American society and its military experts had little experience 
dealing with conflicts that required high-order strategic skills.”50  Arguably, the 
international politics of nuclear warfare and the emerging paradigm of nuclear deterrence 
gave great impetus for the development of such skills.  
Soviet military science during this period stagnated under Stalin’s political and 
ideological restrictions.51  Military thought suffered the intellectual tyranny of Stalin’s 
proscribed “permanently operating factors,” which supplanted other defense planning 
activities and reduced official military thought to a series of simplistic formulas.    
Permanently operating factors were in retrospect simple concepts meant to circumscribe 
thinking about warfare.  Less refined than doctrine, they included attention to armaments, 
the role of social factors (ideology) in warfare, the need for rear area security, and some 
strategic factors (i.e., an Eastern Europe presence).  While simplicity aided in achieving 
broad understanding about leadership vision, in this case the rigidity of the Soviet system 
restricted debate and discussion about the permanently operating factors and their 
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relationship to Soviet modernization.  Debate about the effects of nuclear weapons was 
also curtailed.  Publicly, nuclear weapons were denied any revolutionary impact on the 
outcome of future wars.  Why the facade?  Strategically, downplaying the importance of 
nuclear weapons to marginalize or gloss over the coercive characteristics of massive 
retaliation remained the only viable option until the Soviets possessed their own nuclear 
weapons and delivery capabilities.
The New Look and Massive Retaliation
Eisenhower, who was Supreme Allied Commander of NATO forces from 1950-
1952, understood as well as anyone the emerging role nuclear weapons might play in 
European stability.  While commanding NATO, he encouraged the development of plans 
for using nuclear weapons to defeat numerically superior Soviet forces.  As president, he 
faced political pressure to curb rising defense spending and to reverse the economic 
militarization process that came with the Korean War.  He also understood the political 
downside of increasing military spending without a clear popular mandate for doing so.  
Realizing that neither the resources nor the will existed for continued rises in defense 
outlays, and drawing on his experience in NATO, Eisenhower proposed a “New Look” 
defense policy to align fiscal realities with security challenges. It aimed to balance the 
budget, reduce defense spending, cut manpower, and improve the nuclear arsenal.  
Admiral Arthur W. Radford, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, characterized the 
policy as “providing a sturdy military posture which can be maintained over an extended 
period of uneasy peace, rather than peaking forces at greater costs for a particular period 
of tension.”52
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The New Look had three basic thrusts.  First, it sought to shift the burden of 
conventional defense spending to allies and security partners around the world.  A series 
of alliances and security treaties implicitly linked the U.S. nuclear deterrent to the 
defense of other areas and regions (including Europe).  The Southeast Asia Treaty 
Organization (SEATO) was formed with South Korea and Nationalist China (Taiwan), 
the Baghdad Pact was established (later becoming the Central Treaty Organization, 
CENTO), and the Administration signed agreements with some 150 nations.  U.S. 
military planners could, theoretically, incorporate indigenous forces into regional defense 
schemes, reducing the burden on American forces.  Accordingly, the U.S. could keep 
defense spending down – the second thrust.  The goal of reducing defense spending had 
the effect of reinforcing the Administration’s focus on nuclear weapons: nuclear weapons 
were less expensive than maintaining conventional forces.  Spending on strategic nuclear 
forces rose steadily while the overall growth of defense spending declined.  Of course, 
this strategy left scant room for the U.S. to honor its treaty commitments to deter the 
possibility of Communist aggression with means other than nuclear weapons.  Soviet 
observers, it was hoped, would view the relative weakness of U.S. conventional forces as 
a sign that, if pressed, Washington would indeed employ nuclear weapons to defend itself 
as well as its allies.  The third thrust involved the idea of preventive war. American 
policy makers would not declare a “no first use” posture concerning nuclear weapons 
because this would delimit preventive war options.
Evolving views of nuclear weapons and their utility underscored the New Look’s 
strategic dimensions.  The Truman administration’s weapons initiatives were integrated 
into the armed forces by 1953 and emerging options to use new weapons became central 
to national security planning soon thereafter.  Technological developments provided a 
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wider range of yields and further expanded targeting options from large “city busters” to 
tactical weapons designed to disrupt conventional ground attacks.  Such technological 
advances offered different courses of military means to achieve strategic (or political) 
ends, a dynamic that became an important and persisting adjunct to overall national 
security policy decisions.  Weapons innovations wrought smaller, more reliable bombs 
with increased yields – as well as tactical weapons with smaller yields – that could be 
used across a range of military and strategic targets, including conventional forces
preparing for or mounting an attack. 
Concerning military planning, Eisenhower likened nuclear weapons employment 
decisions to conventional ones.  “Where these things are used on strictly military targets 
and for strictly military purposes,” he opined, “I see no reason why they shouldn’t be 
used exactly as you would use a bullet or anything else.”53  The New Look’s top secret 
planning document, NSC 162/2: “Basic National Security Policy” was signed in late 
October 1953.  It maintained that, if conflict occurred with either Russia or China, U.S. 
nuclear weapons would “be as available for use as other munitions.”54 This view of 
nuclear weapons stimulated the first true U.S. nuclear strategy declaration – massive 
retaliation – to be fully coordinated with force structure decisions, which favored air 
power and nuclear deterrence over conventional defense capabilities. U.S. forces adopted 
a massive retaliation planning assumption in 1953 and the Administration publicly 
declared the policy in 1954.  
The implication for would-be aggressors was simple.  Massive retaliation left open 
the possibility that the U.S. might meet any aggression or threats to its interests with a 
devastating nuclear attack.  Capitalizing on the inherent ambiguity in a policy implying 
massive nuclear retaliation, the policy left Moscow to determine whether any aggressive 
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move on its part would be met with a nuclear response.  Underlying the policy was 
singular objective.  That is, preserving the right to choose when and how to retaliate, 
thereby retaining initiative within a large rhythm of strategic interaction. 
In 1955, the American nuclear arsenal was further diversified when President 
Eisenhower approved the development of the Thor and Atlas missiles. Thor was 
America’s first intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM).  Atlas, the first U.S. 
intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), became operational in 1959.  The second 
ICBM, the Minuteman, was approved for development a year later and supplanted the 
bomber as the centerpiece of the nation’s nuclear arsenal in the 1960s.  The coming of 
nuclear armed missiles changed the underlying premises of massive retaliation by 
creating a situation later labeled “mutually assured destruction” MAD.  By 1960, the U.S. 
nuclear arsenal would grow to some 18,000 weapons, with some ninety percent of them 
under military control – an outcome of Eisenhower’s treatment of nuclear weapons as 
any other item in the military stockpile.55
Eisenhower’s New Look proscribed the integration of conventional and nuclear 
planning under the umbrella of nuclear deterrence – that is, within the doctrinal construct 
of massive retaliation.  But as Henry Kissinger’s previously cited observation attests, the 
integration of nuclear weapons into defense planning occurred without fully appraising 
their implications or limitations.  Although the decision to integrate nuclear weapons into 
the arsenal to “be used exactly like a bullet or anything else” may have bolstered the 
credibility of massive retaliation, it seems to have crippled the overall development of 
military thought.  Under the New Look, as chapter 4 explores in greater depth, the “future 
prospects for the army were grim: fewer roles and missions would be entrusted to it, and 
its strength would be reduced to the point of impotence.”56   In other words, while nuclear 
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forces underwent a period of innovation in terms of weapons and delivery vehicles, the 
evolution of U.S. conventional ground forces stagnated.  
With scant resources for new weapons development, little attention was paid to 
modernizing the U.S. Army in the early 1950s.  World War II stockpiles remained the 
primary source of equipment and supply.  The Air Force increased in personnel, procured 
additional bomber and fighter aircraft wings, and received an increasingly larger 
percentage of the total defense budget.  The Army, on the other hand, suffered a decline 
in manpower, divisions, and funding.  The Navy suffered as well, but emerged from the 
period with new aircraft carriers, bombers capable of carrying nuclear weapons, and a 
ballistic submarine initiative.  Organizationally, the Strategic Air Command (SAC) was 
the largest beneficiary of new funding.  
Scrambling to assure itself a role in the nation’s growing nuclear arsenal, Army 
priorities in the early 1950s were maintaining occupation forces and performing civil 
defense duties – hardly tasks promoting the maturation of military thought and 
warfighting doctrine.  Miniaturization and other technological developments provided for 
smaller, lower-yield tactical nuclear weapons that spurred the Army to pursue nuclear 
artillery and landmines.  In time, because they brought the Army into the strategic 
defense domain, tactical nukes became more important than was justified by their 
operational utility.  Army leadership, struggling to reinvent the organization, 
fundamentally restructured its divisions in 1956 (the Pentomic Division) and again in 
1961 (the Reorganized Objectives Army Division, or ROAD).  Such reorganizations 
masked persisting challenges in doctrine and other areas.  
Meanwhile, reoccurring defense patterns were reinforced in the 1960s.  Conventional 
strategy suffered in the shadows of strategic nuclear theory; conventional training was 
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virtually non-existent; the morale of general purposes forces plummeted.  Notably 
deficient were refinements in operations planning with the Air Force, serious 
consideration of prolonged conventional battles in a nuclear environment, and coherent 
approaches to maintaining operational control over dispersed forces.  All of these trends 
continued into the 1970s when, in the shadow of Vietnam, the Army struggled to redefine 
itself, reclaim its identity, and revitalize its role in U.S. national security.  
On the other side of Iron Curtain, although Stalin retained a firm grip on conceptual 
and ideological aspects of the armed forces until his 1953 death from a heart attack, the 
armed forces did undertake reforms based on detailed studies of the Great Patriotic War 
(World War II).  Soviet theorists and planners gleaned the value of mechanized units and 
combined arms integration from the crucial battles along the Eastern Front, themes that 
subsequently underscored force structure planning.  Rifle corps evolved into more robust 
combined arms organizations capable of projecting seven or more times the firepower of 
their World War II predecessors.  Mechanization was aggressively pursued, although 
self-propelled artillery capabilities were not developed until much later.  As maneuver 
forces gained organic firepower they realized greater mobility that, in turn, enabled their 
commanders more operational autonomy to exploit enemy weaknesses.  
Discussion of U.S. Army conventional force developments during this period is 
deferred until chapter four, which reviews ground forces doctrine beginning with the 
1954 version of the Army Field Manual (FM) 100-5, Operations, the official statement of 
Army warfighting doctrine.  Important here is the fact that, “[b]y the beginning of the 
1957-58 academic year at the Command and General Staff College,” the Army’s premier 
planning school for its brightest officers, “the previous emphasis on the conventional 
battlefield had been completely reversed in favor of the atomic battlefield.”57  So, while 
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Soviet planners were modernizing their equipment and tactics, despite the fact that Soviet 
military thought was also nuclear-centric, a growing disparity in U.S. and Soviet 
conventional capabilities existed.  This disparity would be addressed more aggressively 
in the late 1970s within the context of deterrence stability. 
Also in 1958, the Department of Defense Reorganization Act established the 
Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) to oversee the consolidation of defense 
research and associated engineering activities, including the myriad activities with the 
military services.   Twenty years later, ARPA became DARPA and refocused on 
conventional warfare.  
Further Evolution of Deterrence Strategy
Lawrence Freedman argues that the underlying strategic foundation of the New Look 
was a signal to Soviet leadership that the “West would not reply in kind to an Eastern 
invasion but raise the stakes of war” with nuclear weapons.  “Thereafter,” he continues in 
his classic The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, “Western strategy would depend on 
convincing the Soviet leaders that it had the nerve to do this.  This problem would 
become progressively more difficult as the Soviet capabilities to fight at the new level 
increased.” 58 Indeed, it became more difficult still after Soviet capabilities increased in 
both the nuclear and conventional domains.  As Soviet capabilities in both areas 
increased through the late 1960s and 1970s, Soviet leaders seemingly had two trumps to 
the West’s sole nuclear threat, their own nukes and the Red Army.59  This situation, as 
chapter 5 discusses, eventually spurred U.S. defense planners to respond with a large 
conventional modernization program in the late 1970s and early 1980s, a program wholly 
concerned with stabilizing deterrence stability in central Europe.
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Military forces deter in several ways.  Their very existence presents obstacles to an 
aggressor, in political or military terms (or both), increasing the uncertainty inherent in 
cost-benefit projections figuring in decisions to attack.  This was, of course, the notion 
underscoring the presence of U.S. forces in Berlin.  Another way forces contribute to 
deterrence is the implied threat of retaliation in kind or through escalation, the deterrent 
contribution assigned to nuclear weapons.  The key is holding at risk something an 
adversary so values that its possible destruction makes any attack too costly to pursue.  
The classic example is threatening to retaliate against an adversary’s population centers 
to deter an attack.  Military forces specifically arrayed in a defensive posture deter by 
raising the possibility that an attack might fail or, at the very least, raise the cost of 
succeeding.  Because the defense might succeed, the attacker must commit, and therefore 
risk, more forces in the opening attack.  This is what U.S. and NATO military planners 
sought though advanced conventional forces to offset Soviet numerical, and in some 
areas qualitative, advantages in Europe, the subject of chapters 4 and 5.
Like the U.S. deterrent underscoring it, NATO’s collective deterrent against a Soviet 
attack in Europe rested, or so it seemed, on NATO’s ability to communicate a credible
deterrent threat, one that conveyed the Allies commitment to use nuclear weapons.  The 
continuing need to cultivate stability in Europe impelled a new logic of nuclear 
deterrence.  For historian Frank Ninkovich, “an abiding obsession with credibility” would 
become central to U.S. foreign policy during the Cold War.60  Increasingly, for the time 
being at least, credibility was associated with strategic and tactical nuclear weapons, not 
conventional capabilities.  
The operational details of the deterrence scenario important to later chapters involve 
the threat of Soviet conventional forces attacking into NATO territory.  If things went 
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badly for NATO during the opening moments of the war, which seemed likely given 
Soviet numerical advantages, NATO’s only recourse (other than conceding territory and 
perhaps the ensuing war) was to go nuclear.  The threat of this response, presumably, 
would be sufficient to deter such an attack from occurring.  Going nuclear first with large 
yield weapons, however, might not deter the Soviet Union from electing to initiate their 
own full-scale escalation to destroy as many U.S. nuclear weapons as possible (and to 
prevent theirs from being destroyed before launched or airborne).  If the only option was 
an opening move with such weapons, moreover, no subsequent deterrent existed to 
dissuade Soviet retaliation in kind once they possessed nuclear forces as well, which 
meant both would be obliterated.  Therefore, if the Soviets expected the U.S. to employ 
massive retaliation for any attack, there seemed little incentive for Moscow to begin with 
only a limited strike against NATO.  It would surely mean a larger retaliation that might 
destroy Soviet nuclear capabilities, suggesting that they should be employed to the fullest 
extent possible in the initial attack.  Deterring further nuclear escalation by the Soviet 
Union after NATO had already gone nuclear emerged as a complicating issue, one that 
had no easy resolution.  
Another facet of deterrence stability concerned the reasonable threshold for going 
nuclear in the first place.  Here the above logic seemed to falter.  Small acts of 
aggression, which may or may not foreshadow a larger attack, seemed less amenable to 
deterrence by the threat of an all-out nuclear strike (e.g., the North Korean attack).  This 
required deterrence options commensurate with the requirement to defeat both minor and 
massive ground attacks.  Nonetheless, to respond to both, the U.S. sought to make 
massive retaliation doctrine more credible in 1953 by stationing tactical nuclear weapons 
with U.S. forces in Europe. A year later, in December 1954, tactical weapons were 
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integrated into NATO’s war planning, with NATO’s conventional forces serving as a 
“tripwire defense” to trigger their use.  Tactical weapons, which included nuclear artillery 
(cannons), missiles, and landmines, became the centerpiece of NATO’s defense plans 
against any potential Soviet conventional attack.  Raising the threshold for their use 
remained an issue throughout the Cold War, eventually leading to discussions about 
conventional force modernization and advanced strike capabilities. 
The foundation of the Cold War deterrence regime remained the underlying logic of 
massive retaliation, which depended in part on the belief that the U.S. retaliatory 
capability was invulnerable to attack.  As the Soviet arsenal grew in size, proportionally 
less was known about it.  This raised uncertainty about the utility of threatening to attack 
Soviet population centers or industrial targets because Moscow now possessed their own 
retaliatory capability.  Soviet bombers in the 1950s could only strike at the U.S. if they 
flew one-way suicide missions, but by the early 1960s the threat of Soviet missile attacks 
rendered deterrence relationships more complex.  No longer did it make sense to threaten 
a massive retaliation because any U.S. attack would surely bring a Soviet strike on the 
continental United States.
Memories of Pearl Harbor and Korea combined with the development of missiles 
able to strike anywhere in the globe within thirty minutes to fuel fears of surprise attacks.  
Preparing for a surprise attack became a central facet of American defense planning.  
Several programs emerged to increase U.S. intelligence collection behind the Iron 
Curtain and illuminate Soviet capabilities as well as intentions.  Understanding Soviet 
military developments and assessing their impact on deterrence became an overriding 
national security priority, rivaled only by the issue of protecting U.S. retaliatory forces 
from being destroyed in a so-called “bolt-from-the-blue” attack.61  Of particular concern 
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in the early 1950s was assessing the state of operational Soviet missiles.  A 1954 
intelligence estimate reported “a large and active research and development program” 
but, without “firm current intelligence” on what the USSR was developing or had 
deployed, concluded that the surprise attack threat could not be assessed.62
The 1957 Sputnik space mission demonstrated the advanced state of Soviet rockets, 
delivered a blow to American pride, and reinforced fears of Soviet ICBMs being used to 
deter U.S. retaliation against the Soviet Union attacking Western Europe.  Soviet rocketry 
advances further raised the issue of a “missile gap,” an issue John F. Kennedy later 
exploited in his successful 1960 presidential campaign against Eisenhower’s Vice 
President, Richard Nixon.  
The coming of Soviet missiles had led the Eisenhower administration to adapt its 
deterrence posture from massive retaliation to what became known as “graduated 
deterrence.”  As then Secretary of State John Foster Dulles wrote in an October 1957 
issue Foreign Affairs, this recognized a turn toward “less reliance upon deterrence of vast 
retaliatory power.” 63  In other words, limited war without immediate escalation.  In fact, 
Eisenhower himself came to question the logic of a massive retaliation doctrine as early 
as 1955, concluding that it provided “‘no defense against the losses we incur through the 
enemy’s political and military nibbling.  So long as he abstains from doing anything that 
he believes would provide the free world to an open declaration of major war, he need 
not fear’” the deterrent power of America’s nuclear arsenal.64
At the end of the Eisenhower administration, in August 1960, then Secretary of 
Defense Thomas Gates directed the formation of a full time staff to perform two primary 
tasks: maintain data on all targets warranting attack in a U.S. nuclear strike (the National 
Strategic Target List, NSTL) and to prepare target assignments for all U.S. nuclear forces 
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(the Single Integrated Operational Plan, SIOP).  He charged the new Joint Strategic 
Targeting Planning Staff with finishing both by December.  The complete list included 
over 2,000 targets in the Soviet Union and China, ranging from ICBM bases to command 
and control centers to at least 131 urban centers.  Targeting, planners subsequently 
argued, “should involve a series of ‘sequential options,’ consisting of such targets sets as 
‘central strategic systems, theater threats, and countervalue targets’ [economic and 
industrial targets, including cities].”65  The groundwork was thus set for a change in 
targeting.
Programs such as the U-2 reconnaissance plane and space-borne intelligence 
collection from Corona spy satellites became central to defense planning and to the 
building of targeting capabilities, leading to American preeminence in technical 
intelligence gathering.  
Toward a More Flexible Response
Early 1960s revisions in U.S. nuclear strategy were in part derived from the before 
mentioned development of intercontinental ballistic missiles able to reach the United 
States.  Although there was no bomber gap, and intelligence concluded that no missile 
gap existed, many feared that U.S. vulnerability to Soviet missiles meant that a declared 
strategy of immediate nuclear retaliation would only assure a nuclear exchange if conflict 
emerged.  Missiles changed the parameters of strategic warning, truncating decision-
making time for responding to an attack. Missiles also required different types of 
strategic planning and targeting in preparation for an attack.  Technological advances 
evolved to locate potential targets in a global reference system and to ensure missiles and 
bombers reached intended targets.    
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Kennedy was among the critics of Eisenhower’s massive retaliation policy in the 
1950s.  He was not alone.  Others included Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army Lieutenant 
General James M. Gavin and Chief of Staff of the Army General Maxwell D. Taylor.
Both retired in the last years of the Eisenhower administration and wrote critical books 
that greatly influenced a national debate on defense policy.  Gavin’s War and Peace in 
the Space Age argued for greater Army efforts in the fields of missiles, the development 
of air mobility, and the pursuit of tactical nuclear weapons.66  Taylor’s book, The 
Uncertain Trumpet, was more influential – he introduced the term “flexible response” 
into the defense lexicon.  The underlying concepts originated in Britain during the 1950s 
within the larger framework of “graduated deterrence.”  Taylor was recalled to active 
duty by Kennedy as a special military advisor and then as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff. 
Rejection of the Eisenhower administration’s massive retaliation policy meant a 
rejection of its nuclear targeting plans.  When the Kennedy administration came to office 
the current SIOP (SIOP-62) was a single-threaded plan: as soon as nuclear war was 
initiated with the Soviet Union launch all U.S. strategic weapons at pre-designated 
targets.  No weapons were to be withheld.  Expected Soviet (and Chinese) casualty 
estimates approached half a billion.67  The fatalism of the plan, its inherent rejection of 
other escalatory options, and the revelation that “whatever happened, some portion of the 
admittedly inferior Soviet long-range force would survive to strike America,” led the 
administration to reject SIOP-62 and build on the work Gates initiated.68
The Cuban Missile Crisis, the Berlin crisis, Third World proxy wars, and an overall 
deterioration in U.S.-Soviet relations reinforced the search for a new nuclear strategy, one 
that would “match the potential range of challenge with a correspondingly broad range of 
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options.”69  The Berlin Crisis, in particular, led to a reconsideration of conventional 
readiness.  Kennedy thought that the weaknesses of U.S. and NATO conventional forces 
limited his options for dealing with the Soviets, forcing him to rely on somewhat 
incredulous threats to use nuclear weapons.  So, one element of the new strategy was 
greater appreciation of, and ability to response to, non-nuclear conflicts, which among 
other developments spurred increased funding for special operational (unconventional) 
forces.  Kennedy subsequently doubled the ships in the Navy, increased tactical Air Force 
squadrons, and created five new Army divisions.  Many of these new units would see 
their first action in Vietnam.  The first U.S. combat forces departed for what would 
become America’s longest war in May 1965.  As later chapters discuss, Vietnam derailed 
plans for conventional modernization.
Another factor encouraged change.  Massive retaliation was conceived at a time 
when the U.S. enjoyed a monopoly in nuclear weapon delivery systems; by the early 
1960s the Soviet Union had amassed a huge arsenal, including some ICBMs.  The nature 
of the deterrence game shifted in 1963, which Mark Trachtenberg terms “a watershed 
year” in part because the Soviet Union achieved rough parity in nuclear weapons, helping 
change the Cold War into “a different type of conflict” altogether.70  Now, for example, 
there was a greater possibility of intrawar deterrence, meaning that some targets should 
not be attacked in the initial stages of war, allowing the other side to reconsider continued 
escalation.  
When Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara formally declared a “flexible 
response” strategy in February 1962, the underlying focus was on nuclear strategy, 
primarily on refining the nuclear dimensions of national deterrence strategy.71  It also 
announced to the world a reduced reliance on nuclear weapons and to national security 
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planners a requirement for greater internal flexibility in the U.S. military.  As a planning 
factor, as stated above, this did lead to increased spending on conventional forces (the 
army grew by six division, the navy doubled its number of ships, the air force gained 
seven new fighter squadrons).  And as a warfighting strategy, it emphasized the use of 
conventional forces to fight other conventional forces while retaining the capability to use 
nuclear weapons in any scenario that warranted it – including first use (warfighting 
capabilities were diversified and improved, including the development of special 
operations forces).  Force structure became more diverse.  In reality, however, flexible 
response did little to diversify nuclear-centric national security strategy and subordinate 
military doctrine.  Even tactical airpower doctrine remained focused on nuclear missions.  
For example, training manuals for the F-100 tactical fighter-bomber instructed pilots that 
“nuclear training will in every instance take precedence over non-nuclear” training and 
pilot qualification.72
Among the Kennedy Administration’s earliest and most significant changes to 
strategic planning was a reexamination of the Soviet threat to NATO, leading to 
adaptations in U.S., and then NATO, strategic postures.  Some of these changes can be 
attributed to Kennedy’s personal views about nuclear weapons, others to differences in 
defense philosophy, still others to notions of how the U.S. should conduct its 
international affairs.  Concerning Soviet military capabilities, the administration “found 
that roughly half of the Soviet divisions deployed in the Soviet Union itself were, in 
effect, low-readiness reserves with only 10 percent of the total manpower assigned to 
them in peacetime [and that] the fighting power of a U.S. Army division was about three 
times that of a Soviet division.”73
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This seemed to challenge a premise of massive retaliation.  That is, that Soviet 
conventional forces were so superior in numbers that the only way to prevail in a future 
European war was to go nuclear at the first sign of attack.  It now appeared that NATO 
conventional forces might effectively counter initial Soviet echelons in time for full 
mobilization, effectively delaying the escalation to full-scale nuclear war.  Underlying 
questions about the rationale for increasing conventional force spending, including their 
ability to deter numerically superior Soviet conventional forces, persisted throughout the 
Cold War.  
The real focus of flexible response, nuclear warfighting strategy, involved a more 
flexible SIOP, one that would allow “controlled response and negotiating pauses in the 
event of thermonuclear war.”74  Flexibility before and within nuclear warfighting 
scenarios meant more elongated escalation processes before all-out nuclear war.  This 
meant more options and entry points for nuclear weapons in overall deterrence policy.  
This is a key concept: flexible retaliation preserves deterrence at all levels and types of 
conflicts, an important characteristic for national security planners facing uncertainty.  
For planners in 1960 it added a range of conventional deterrence options to what was 
then a relatively short list of the pre-nuclear ones. Flexible response might also promote 
the development of “rules” (or expected behavior) concerning nuclear use.  Declaring 
that nuclear weapons will be used in any situation, however, correlates to using them in 
all situations – a poor rule to utilize in diverse, rapidly changing, and uncertain situations.  
At the time national security planners welcomed “rules” or at least common 
understanding of how deterrence threats could be better adjusted during a crisis.  The 
Cuban Missile crisis, for example, had taught a lesson: negotiating pauses could be 
critical to the diffusion of tensions. 
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Flexible response was adopted by NATO in 1967 and remained the overarching 
NATO nuclear strategy for the period concerning this study.  As later chapters will 
discuss, when military planners turned to conventional weapons innovations in the 1970s 
and 1980s to reclaim the deterrence stability achieved during the earlier periods, they 
proceeded along the same basic arguments outlined in flexible response doctrine.  In fact, 
many of the innovations anteceding the American RMA were partly conceived to bolster 
the conventional options inherent in a flexible response strategy.  
Motivating the creation of flexible response strategy was a quest to move away from 
the limiting, and morally uncomfortable, reliance on massive retaliation as the linchpin of 
deterrence.  This required not only more flexible nuclear targeting and employment 
options to control the conceptual ladder of escalation, but also robust conventional 
capabilities.  Because NATO did not increase its conventional capabilities commensurate 
with the Soviet threat, the flexible response strategy left few real options other than using 
nuclear weapons unless the U.S. committed additional resources.  That is, men and 
material to bolster the Alliance’s nonnuclear posture.  Nixon’s realistic deterrence 
strategy placed the majority of the burden for deterring conventional aggression on 
Allies.  Declining U.S. defense spending seemed to leave few options other than theater 
nuclear capabilities.  A Soviet no-first use declaration placed additional pressure on 
NATO to develop conventional capabilities to blunt Soviet aggression.  Not increasing 
conventional capabilities, leaders discovered, meant the continuing Soviet buildup would 
increase reliance on early nuclear use at a time when political pressure against the very 
existence of tactical nuclear weapons was building.
Political scientist Samuel Huntington distilled the evolving deterrence relationships 
among nuclear and conventional forces into graphical form.  Adapted in Figure 3-1 
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below, the evolution of planning realities bounding NATO’s “four possible means of 
deterring Soviet aggression” are depicted as “defense with conventional or nuclear forces 
and retaliation by conventional or nuclear forces.”75
Defense planners realized early in the 1970s that the execution of flexible response 
strategy was itself being limited.  In the face of a Soviet conventional attack, the only 
realistic option was politically unpalatable: a limited direct defense with clearly 
threadbare conventional forces (1), a calculated escalation to a nuclear defense to prevent 
loss of NATO territory (3), and if Moscow chose to retaliate in kind, a more general and 
destructive nuclear retaliation (4).  In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the aim was to 
strengthen NATO’s conventional defense and develop conventional retaliatory 
capabilities to hold at risk Soviet targets without having to employ nuclear weapons.  
 1.  Original Flexible Response
 Mission Nuclear Forces Conventional Forces
 Defense 3 1
 Retaliation 4 2
 2.  Deteriorated Flexible Response
 Mission Nuclear Forces Conventional Forces
 Defense 3 1
 Retaliation 4 2
 3.  Reconstituted Flexible Response
 Mission Nuclear Forces Conventional Forces
 Defense 3 1
 Retaliation 4  2
Figure 3-1: Huntington’s Flexible Response Planning 
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Soviet reactions to the new doctrine, specifically to its attempt to control escalation 
from conventional defense to increasingly more severe nuclear strikes, reinforced the 
action-reaction relationship between NATO and Warsaw Pact doctrine and force 
structure.  As defense analyst Steven Canby concluded in a 1973 report for the Defense 
Advanced Research Projects Agency, flexible response “tends to invite an enemy strategy 
of lightening invasion, against which NATO is least prepared to defend, and subsequent 
negotiation in order to fragment an alliance under stress.”76  Indeed, this is how Soviet 
strategy evolved, a development addressed in the next two chapters.  
A lightening armored strike into NATO territory, even for a limited gain from which 
to improve negotiations, increased concern among NATO defense intellectuals that 
Soviet forces would strike before nuclear weapons could be employed.  Some analysts 
predicted it would take as long as a week to finalize a decision to use tactical nuclear 
weapons to defend NATO, adding the need for conventional options.  Conventional 
retaliation options, made credible by more capable and ready forces, would allow NATO 
field commanders to simultaneously defend NATO’s front lines and attack advancing 
Soviet forces.  
Proponents of conventional modernization contended NATO decision processes for 
conventional defense and retaliation were nowhere near as cumbersome or prolonged as 
were those for battlefield nuclear weapons.  Additionally, ambiguities in the NATO 
document adopting flexible response, MC 14/3, reinforced intra-Alliance disagreements 
on the aims of flexible response.  European interpretations generally favored readiness to 
prosecute only a limited conventional defense that quickly escalated to nuclear use.  In 
this view, conventional forces were meant to deter conventional attacks for limited gains 
and delay all-out attacks long enough for nuclear weapons release decisions to be made.  
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The European view derived from a belief that greater emphasis on conventional 
capabilities would be perceived as diminishing confidence in NATO’s willingness to use 
nukes.  U.S. planners preferred a more robust conventional phase.
Final Thoughts on Targeting 
Although other nuclear warfighting strategies followed flexible response, none 
replaced it as the general theme underlying U.S. strategic posture.  Renaming and 
reshaping strategic doctrine was seen as a way of placing the imprimatur of new 
administrations on defense strategy.  A decade after McNamara’s speech announcing the 
need for flexible response, another defense secretary, Melvin R. Laird, outlined a new 
strategic doctrine of “realistic deterrence,” essentially a variant of flexible response.77
Speaking on the island of Guam in 1969, Nixon outlined the elements of realistic 
deterrence, which drew heavily on policies conceived during Nixon’s tenure as 
Eisenhower’s vice president.  It reinforced American treaty commitments.  Allies and 
important nations would be defended.  In key regions the U.S. would intervene to block 
direct attacks by a nuclear power (meaning primarily the Soviets).  Where the Soviets did 
not directly intervene, military and economic assistance – but not troops – would be 
provided.  Nations threatened by nonnuclear powers would have to provide their own 
manpower.78  For the viability of the ideal of flexible response, this last element was a 
major policy shift.  
Limited nuclear options, countervailing strategies, and the so-called Schlesinger 
Doctrine – all proposed during the 1970s – were in part based on more flexible targeting 
theory developed in early 1960s but never codified in planning documents.  The 
mismatch between flexible response strategy and planning guidance for controlling 
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escalation during a conflict received presidential attention in the late 1960s and early 
1970s.  Indeed, incoming Nixon administration Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford laid 
out two priorities to correct “the lack of complete plans and data processing centers for 
selective responses”: (1) providing pre-planned options for the National Command 
Authority (NCA) for additional selected responses against military and industrial targets 
(for example, strategic strikes for support of NATO); and (2) providing the procedures, 
data processing equipment, and computer programs for planning new, selective responses 
on a timely basis during the crises.”79
From one perspective, the basic elements of the SIOP changed very little during the 
Cold War, merely becoming more complex as types of targets and their priority evolved 
(industry, cities, military).  Scenarios were added, but once they existed they tended to be 
complemented with new ones, not replaced.  
From another perspective, changes in the late 1960s and early 1970s represented a 
significant adaptation in targets selected and their prioritization.  This argument is 
bolstered by 1970s targeting doctrine changes to provide retargeting capabilities, 
including attacking Soviet conventional forces during a conflict.  SIOP-5, implemented in 
1976, included planning guidance and targeting directives representing a clear evolution 
from assured destruction, spasm-planning in which thousands of targets were attacked.   
Changes in targeting doctrine derived both from strategic and technological 
developments, the latter including vastly improved missile accuracy.  More accurate 
missiles combined with warheads designed to penetrate and destroy “hardened” bunkers 
and missile silos re-opened debates about the destabilizing effect of first-strike weapons.  
They seemingly encouraged early launching of weapons to prevent their destruction.     
Politically, the development of targeting scenarios to support “controlled escalation” 
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from conventional to theater nuclear war to global war prevented criticism that U.S. 
nuclear strategy was “decoupled” from NATO.  Command and control initiatives to 
develop such capabilities included “Command Data Buffers,” begun in 1973 with an 
objective of achieving full operational capability in 1978.  It “allowed prompt remote-
control retargeting of missiles (presumably to switch back and forth between limited and 
massive options).”80  Other developments in the 1970s pursuant to an invigorated flexible 
response capability included improving reconnaissance, surveillance, and warning 
systems.  
New national technical means – classified satellites – were developed, including 
accurate targeting maps and navigation charts produced by a new Defense Mapping 
Agency (DMA).  Among the reasons for creating DMA was the need to create a single, 
standard geodetic control system for navigation and targeting – one able to make use of 
global positioning satellites under development.  Among the drivers for new geodetic 
controls was the idea of putting ICBMs on trains to preserve a U.S. second strike 
capability.  This required “a capability that used inertial technology to carry ICBMs to 
launch positions with an inertial platform that would be updated on the move from 
geodetic positions along the railroad tracks.”81 Other uses for geospatial data included 
simulation, modeling, and training.  Flight training, for example, became an important 
part of the military’s foray into computers and digital databases.  
New data processing and exploitation capabilities were required to handle the 
imagery, signals, and other intelligence data provided by new systems. Research and 
development efforts were launched to provide automated systems in preparation for new 
satellites that would yield massive electronic intercepts and mapping data over areas for 
which no maps or targeting references existed.  An entire, critically important subculture 
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within national security decision making evolved around classified strategic 
reconnaissance capabilities, considered by many the essential tool to understand the state 
of Soviet force readiness.  Strategic reconnaissance, in conjunction with other 
intelligence sources, provided insights into Soviet military capabilities.  In the late 1970s 
and early 1980s, as later chapters argue, strategic reconnaissance capabilities were 
deemed insufficient to monitor Soviet force posture in the European theater.  Especially 
after the 1981 Polish crisis, discussed in chapter 5, theater surveillance became a strategic 
necessity.
Because flexible response assumed, even required, the political and military leaders 
would be able to communicate during crises and after the initial nuclear exchanges, 
command and control became a necessity for achieving national strategic.  Strategic and 
operational success required new means and methods for communication of situation 
updates and monitory the status of remaining forces as well as preparing for and 
launching additional strikes.  Furthermore, because the underlying assumption of flexible 
response was that escalation could be prevented as negotiations occurred and intra-war 
deterrence relationships gelled, both military and civilian leadership considered 
communications capabilities the highest priority for research and development.  Strategic 
and operational necessity drove the application of “packet switching,” breaking 
communications into small pieces and later reassembled, and later capabilities laying the 
foundation for the Internet.
Refinements in thinking about escalation in the face of Soviet conventional 
superiority spawned arguments for “escalation dominance” planning – an extreme 
variation on the concept of flexible response.  Central to the logic of escalation control 
was a re-articulation of the logic underlying the massive retaliation doctrine.  As 
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progressively more destructive and wide-ranging nuclear strikes were exchanged, at some 
point the devastation reached a state where both belligerents were destroyed.  The 
concept was dubbed “mutual assured destruction” (MAD).  Both flexible response, which 
facilitated planning for conventional and nuclear escalation, and MAD persisted.  
The last evolution in nuclear targeting warranting mention here was Carter’s July 
1980 Presidential Directive (PD) 59.  Desmond Ball summarizes its five notable 
attributes: greater attention was devoted to military targets; the role of targeting in 
deterrence was reinforced in terms of making transparent the consequences of escalation; 
approaches to targeting were diversified to include Major Attack Option, Selected Attack 
Options, Limited Nuclear Options, and Regional Nuclear Options; more flexible targeting 
options were prescribed, including the ability to adapt targeting during a conflict (which 
required more advanced, dynamic retargeting capabilities); and, command, control, and 
communications had to be improved to assure that more flexible approaches to targeting 
could be executed.82  Important here, PD-59  “emphasized that the preplanned target 
packages in the SIOP should be supplemented by the ability to find new targets and 
destroy them during the course of a nuclear exchange.”83   New targeting guidance also 
emphasized the destruction of military targets that previously not assigned high priority 
for initial strikes.  Dubbed “counterforce” targeting, new guidance established 
requirements to attack both fixed and mobile targets. 
Among other requirements, this added a new military operations dimension to 
arguments promoting near-real time reconnaissance and surveillance systems able to 
provide flexible targeting information on Soviet forces.  These capabilities were later 
refined to support strategic nonnuclear strikes.
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In terms of command and control, the primary acquisition recommendation from the 
1978 Nuclear Targeting Policy Review (NTPR) was improving command, control, 
communications, and intelligence capabilities.  Subsequent research and development 
stressed flexibility, retargeting, and other advances within the notion that stepwise 
escalation and targeting scenarios would be feasible.  At the same time, as chapter 4 
argues, many of the advances sought within the larger concept of flexible nuclear strategy 
were later applicable to conventional operations.
Chapter Conclusion
Three themes emerged from the period explored in this chapter.    The first directly 
follows from the centering of nuclear strategy, nuclear doctrine, and nuclear targeting 
policy (terms that were virtually synonymous) within U.S. defense discourse.  This 
meant, among other things, that the business of preparing for nuclear war was highly 
privileged within the military services.  Because national security strategy rested 
primarily on nuclear deterrence, Services placed high priority on their respective nuclear-
related missions in doctrine, leadership selection, and the cultivation of corporate 
identities.  Of course, other capabilities, including special operations forces, air 
superiority, and air defenses were not completely ignored during this period.  Many 
important innovations ensued, including helicopters, the mechanization of the U.S. Army, 
nuclear-power aircraft carriers, and submarine launched ballistic missiles. Still, nuclear 
doctrine and warfare, which included conventional operations on a nuclear battlefield, 
were the most prominent features of military thought and achieved a canonical status in 
advanced professional military education.  
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Because of this, and compared to the focus on nuclear weapons, little attention was 
given to the overall art of conventional warfare within the U.S.  Inattention was reflected 
in the relatively few significant conventional warfighting innovations pursued.  “By 
worrying about strategic weapons,” former CIA Director William Colby argued in 1977, 
“we will indeed be fighting the wrong war” by failing to address conventional, economic, 
and political components required “to meet the threat.”84
The expansion of U.S. nuclear capabilities during the Kennedy and Johnson 
administrations far exceeded the above mentioned conventional modernization initiatives.  
Airmobile operations using helicopters in Southeast Asia and computer-aided fire support 
technology are among the exceptions.  Compared to Soviet developments in the late 
1960s and early 1970s, U.S. conventional modernization appears decidedly lackluster.  
Of course, developments in nuclear strategy and targeting certainly involved innovations 
that would later be applied to conventional warfighting.  Among the examples of 
inattention to conventional warfare was Air Force’s reluctance to pursue innovative air 
dropped munitions.  A 1970 RAND study concluded, “the conscious decision made in 
1947 and again in 1961 to rely on Army and Navy ordnance developers and industry and 
to forego in-house capability may have stifled new ordnance developments.”85
A second theme concerns the legacy of nuclear strategy on overall military thought.  
From one perspective, the emergence of nuclear strategy and policy-making based on 
deterrence calculations extended and expanded U.S. strategic thought, giving it a more 
global perspective.  Perhaps it also squared defense policy decisions with economic, 
social, and political factors, helping nurture an intellectual approach to understanding 
causal relationship within strategic processes.  Actual progress in the realm of strategy, 
however, was illusory from the warfighter’s point of view, especially considering the 
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political objective of deterrence – never having to use the weapons on which the strategy 
rested.  “Whereas traditional strategy had been associated with war, much of nuclear 
strategy operated only in peace and, indeed, was specifically designed to preserve it.”86
The only successful strategy for nuclear war remains not engaging in one.  
Few made this point as elegantly or persuasively as did Bernard Brodie in the 1946 
volume The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order.87 Just months after 
Hiroshima, Brodie argued, “Thus far the chief purpose of our military establishment has 
been to win wars.  From now on its chief purpose must be to avert them.  It can have 
almost no other useful purpose.”88 In time, nuclear weapons were increasingly seen as 
useful deterrents solely against other nuclear powers (and in some cases against 
opponents armed with biological weapons).  
Others reinforced the essence of Brodie’s early thoughts on the military dimensions 
of nuclear arsenals, including those articulated in an October 1955 Harper’s article 
entitled, “Strategy Hits a Dead End.”  Lawrence Freedman bemoans the very idea of 
nuclear “strategy” in the traditional connotation of the term, concluding in his seminal 
work on nuclear strategy, “C’est magnifique, mais ce n’est pas stratégie.”  Writing at the 
end of the Cold War, Freedman found that “the position we have reached is one where 
stability depends on something that is more the antithesis of strategy than its apotheosis –
on threats that will get out of hand, that we might act irrationally, that possibly through 
inadvertence we could set in motion a process that in its development and conclusion 
would be beyond human control and comprehension.” 89
For Martin van Creveld, the continuity of military thought seemed in danger.  For 
him, the evolution of military strategy was in fact “splintered” by nuclear weapons into 
“nuclear strategy, conventional strategy, grand strategy, theater strategy, economic 
144
strategy, and other types too numerous to mention.”90  Van Creveld further laments that 
the term “strategy” was itself rendered virtually meaningless, ostensibly because its 
original connotation concerning relationships between ends and means in national policy 
became obscured.  The very term “strategy,” he continues, “became one of the buzzwords 
of the age, meaning the methodical use of resources to achieve any goal, from selling 
consumer goods to winning a woman.  In the process, it lost most of its connections with 
the conduct of large-scale war.”91
Among the effects on strategic planning was a dilution of military planning expertise 
at the highest levels.  “In Washington,” Derek Leebaert opines, “civilian NSC staffers 
debating force deployments had no idea how many troops constituted a battalion.”92  In 
his 1965 classic Military Concepts and Philosophy, Rear Admiral (retired) Henry Eccles 
observed that “the lack of an accepted body of military theory and principle leaves a void 
in the basic philosophy that should guide people in distinguishing between cause and 
effect, between the trivial and the important, between the central and the peripheral.”93
This further contributed to a lack of operational thought, what Shimon Naveh called an 
operational cognition, in U.S. conventional warfighting theory for much of the Cold War.
In the early 1980s, to correct this situation or perhaps work around it, U.S. military 
theorists and planners began substituting the phrase “the operational art of war” for the 
term “strategy” in writings on campaign and theater-level military planning.  The term 
was subsequently “adopted as the core subject at most military institutes of higher 
learning.”94  Operational art, in American parlance, focused on the orchestration of 
combined arms conventional forces, although operations were still envisioned to occur on 
a nuclear battlefield.  During the latter years of the Cold War, operational art received 
increasing attention.  The traditional language of nuclear strategy remained supreme.  
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Still, military planners seemingly recognized a need for lexical innovation (e.g., doctrine, 
concepts, training) as conventional force developments – like those discussed in the 
following chapters – set the stage for a thirty-year transformation in American military 
thought.  As the Cold War ended, moreover, important aspects of operational art 
ascended to the forefront of defense discourse as the United States forged a new national 
military strategy.  
A final theme emerging from the above discussion of the narrative of nuclear 
strategy involved the sustained quest for deterrence stability, which led to greater 
complexity in terms of technology, operational planning, and the political exigencies of 
dissuading nuclear-backed aggression.  A greater scope, breadth, and depth of issues 
were folded into the larger umbrella concept of strategic nuclear deterrence as the 
fundamental tenets of flexible response guided American military thought and defense 
spending in the 1970s and 1980s.  This, in turn, reinforced the tightening of complex 
systems, a process that further evolved systems engineering and systems integration as 
key skills in defense planning and operations.  
And these skills were fundamentally about managing information about 
organizations, their internal elements, their connections internally and with the 
environment, and with how multiple parts of a system or organization come together and 
interact with other systems and the environment.  Underneath these skills was a largely 
unsung, yet mounting appreciation for what Vannevar Bush imagined as a data-rich 
information tool that facilitated the development of associations and links.  By the end of 
the nuclear strategy dominated period of U.S. grand strategy, in which military 
effectiveness was defined in largely abstract deterrence frameworks, the information 
revolution was slowly gaining prominence as a social-cultural force.  The age of electro-
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mechanical machines was ending, underwritten in part by the information technology 
fashioned to make nuclear targeting more precise and nuclear strikes more efficient, to 
make intelligence about enemy capabilities and intentions more insightful and timely, and 
to assure secure, dependable communications with globally dispersed nuclear forces in 
the even of a Soviet attack.  As the business of nuclear deterrence became more complex, 
and as conventional warfighting in Europe became a more pressing strategic issue, 
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4.  The Formative Period:  Evolving Strategic Realities and Operational Challenges 
We now turn from an overview of the narrative of nuclear strategy to a review of the 
antecedents to the American RMA.  The story begins with one of the key themes of 
chapter 3: the lack of focus on conventional force modernization.  This chapter also 
begins to develop an argument that the American RMA reflected a turn away from the 
dominant narrative of nuclear strategy in defense policy and military thought.  Changes in 
American military doctrine and defense planning in the 1970s and early 1980s, discussed 
in this chapter and the next, are more clearly understood from the perspective of the 
background information related in chapter 3.  They are more noticeable from the 
perspective of overturned threads of military thought and doctrine.
For much of the 1970s American units in Europe were anything but combat 
effective.  Scant force modernization occurred during the decade of involvement in 
Southeast Asia.  American equipment staged in Europe to defend NATO was poorly 
maintained.  Allies openly questioned the U.S. commitment to a conventional defense.  
Contributing to European perceptions was the April 1970 introduction of the Mansfield 
Resolution in the Senate and subsequent, similar resolutions.  Although not adopted, the 
Mansfield Resolution called for a unilateral deployment of U.S. troops from Europe to 
Vietnam – without consultation with Allies.  
Deterrence credibility problems mounted. Would NATO use theater nuclear 
weapons on Soviet troops already pushing into Allied territory?  Would conventional 
forces be modernized in accordance with the flexible response doctrine?    Post-Vietnam
U.S. foreign policy behavior did not resolve Allied concerns. 
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During the Nixon and Ford administrations, events pointed to U.S. retrenchment or 
at least reluctance to involve U.S. military forces in regional conflict.  When Saigon fell 
in 1975, Ford was unable to secure military and economic aid for the struggling South 
Vietnamese.  Later that year, Congress passed the Clark amendment limiting military and 
economic aid to pro-Western forces fighting Soviet-backed communists in Angola.  
Jimmy Carter assumed the presidency in 1977 with the intent of resurrecting détente 
to restore stability in Europe, re-focusing American foreign policy on humanitarian 
concerns, and downplaying the influence of nuclear weapons in world affairs.  His 
reluctance to engage abroad militarily reflected personal beliefs as well as the national 
mood.  Promoting human rights resonated with a post-Watergate public wanting ethics 
and morality re-centered in national policy making.   Rejecting Machiavellian virtues 
ascribed to statesmen (which prescribed to princes a different moral code than citizens 
followed), Carter seemingly believed that foreign policy should follow the same 
principles and codes of conduct expected at home.
Notable achievements included the Camp David accord, normalized relations with 
China, an un-ratified Strategic Arms Limitations (SALT) II treaty, and a general increase 
in awareness of human rights issues.  On balance, Carter foreign policy foundered on the 
critical issue of improving relations with the Soviets.  In fact, his repeated attacks against 
the Soviet human rights record and pursuit of a Washington-Beijing axis of cooperation 
increased Moscow’s recalcitrance.1
Carter’s foreign policy was also criticized for being overly cautious.  Facing Soviet 
conventional aggression and given the relative weakness of flexible response, analysts 
feared that NATO was vulnerable to “salami tactics” whereby Soviet conventional forces 
would be used to achieve limited gains in Europe, the Persian Gulf, and in the third 
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world.  His September 1977 decision to release control of the Panama Canal to by the end 
of the century drew sharp criticism from conservatives.  
At the end of the decade, funding increased for nuclear and conventional weapons 
modernization.  Intelligence and information systems became more important.  After 
successive approaches to moderating the threat of nuclear holocaust, in the late 1970s, as 
a post-Vietnam Defense Department struggled to rebuild its image with the American 
people and its credibility with Congress, conventional innovation returned as a strategic 
imperative. Conventional readiness was elevated to a strategic concern, setting the stage 
for significant military innovations.  The history of conventional military forces, which 
had already taken sharp turns in the twentieth century with the introduction of air power, 
mechanized armor, and wireless command, control, and communications, took an 
altogether different turn.  A legacy of late 1970s was a reinvigorated research and 
development program to leverage the power of the emerging microchip-driven 
information revolution to resolve strategic and operational challenges.
Perhaps more importantly for later discussions, the road toward the ‘knowledge 
warrior’ of the 2000s began in the late 1970s.  Retired Air Force Lieutenant General 
James Clapper was the Chief of Air Force Intelligence during the Gulf War, director of 
the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) in the early 1990s and, after several years in 
industry, returned to government in 2001 as the civilian director of the National Imagery 
and Mapping Agency (NIMA).  NIMA was renamed the National Geospatial-Intelligence 
Agency (NGA) in November 2003.  For his significant restructuring and modernization 
initiatives at DIA and NGA, he is widely viewed a “change agent” in the intelligence 
community.  
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Like many peers who rose to senior leadership positions as Cold War security challenges 
were replaced by new ones, Clapper’s career spans the thirty-year transformation in U.S. 
military capabilities.
Commissioned in 1963, Clapper served two tours in Southeast Asia during the 
Vietnam conflict.  First as a watch officer and air defense analyst assigned to the 2nd Air 
Division (later 7th Air Force) at the Tan Son Nhut Air Base in South Vietnam from 1965-
1966 and then as the commander of a Thailand-based signals intelligence unit from 1970-
1971.2 Considering early 1970s intelligence support to military operations, Clapper 
remembers intelligence analysis being important to mission planning but primarily 
viewed as a support activity.  Because of this, Clapper recalled his tours in Southeast 
Asia as years of “frustration.”  Intelligence was not recognized as a “main player” in the 
fight.  Bombing accuracies were “awful,” targeting accuracies “inconsistent,” and 
exploitation times to feed commanders information from the battlefield “dismal.”3 He 
recalls that what today would be termed operational intelligence was basically “history” 
by the time it was exploited and disseminated, useless to pilots on missions over enemy 
territory.  
For example, a signals intelligence site in Da Nang would intercept and translate 
North Vietnamese communications about U.S. aircraft and then pass that information via 
high frequency Morse code to watch stations.  This information was plotted as accurately 
as possible on a board using grease pencils.  After analyzing the plots, reports would go 
out over a sixty-word per minute Teletype machines to combat units.  Frustration derived 
from the slowness of the process relative to the potential utility of the information to 
pilots if communicated immediately.  Noteworthy here is the fact that signals intelligence 
was considered by many to be the most effective of the intelligence disciplines in 
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Vietnam, consistently yielding greater insight into enemy activities than human 
intelligence or imagery intelligence.  Imagery intelligence – then termed photo-
reconnaissance, also failed to live up to its potential in the triple-canopy jungle.  Even 
with infrared sensors to detect Vietcong activity at night, film could not be processed and 
analyzed quickly enough to effect current operations. 
In today’s parlance, the information was not “actionable.”  Many of the innovations 
undertaken in the 1970s aimed to correct this problem, laying the foundation for a key 
enabler of 1990s RMA-related visions of future warfighting capabilities (e.g., 
information superiority, dominant battlespace awareness, decision superiority, persistent 
surveillance, strategic preemption).   Much of the story of the emergence of the American 
RMA is tied to the problem of gaining and being able to act on intelligence.  Strategic 
and operational warning drove Cold War intelligence activities and, in the 1980s, 
information technology was increasingly applied solve specific operational challenges.
Chapter Overview
The history of American defense policy during the Cold War is often told by 
chronologically outlining the waxing and waning of defining ideas or concepts:  atoms 
for peace, open skies, massive retaliation, flexible response, détente, entente, various 
“doctrines” (e.g., Nixon, Carter, Reagan) and so on.  Frequently, the characterizing idea 
or concept represents a complex strategy or policy that retains historic significance 
because of its influence on subordinate defense planning and force structure decisions.  
One motivation for this study of the origins of the American RMA  is the very lack of 
scholarly attention given to the organizing ideas and concepts influencing the formation 
and maturation of the RMA in the late 1970s and early 1980s.  In a period replete with 
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acronyms and nicknames, the relatively straightforward “offset strategy” concept 
discussed below and in chapter 5 has gone relatively unnoticed.
Planning requirements in the 1970s impelled what defense analyst and national
security scholar Kenneth Allard arguably understated as the “dawning of the modern era 
in command and control.”4  The formative period of the RMA was also an important 
period in the twentieth century’s computer information revolution, which engendered (or
made more feasible) a wide and varied array of operational and organizational 
innovations.  Given the significance and pervasiveness of shifts in military thought and 
defense planning, one might more accurately associate the 1970s as the dawning of all 
aspects of modern command, control, communication, computers, intelligence, 
surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR), including space-based systems.  
Many of these developments were undertaken with the aim of integrating the 
battlefield to tighten the relationship between conventional defense and nuclear 
deterrence.  The Army developed new doctrine, training regimes, and technology 
enabling it to seize and maintain the initiative in a highly dynamic and intense battlefield 
environment; the Army also adapted to new strategic and operational realities demanding 
that it pursue the ability to fight outnumbered and win without employing nuclear 
weapons.  Among the most important developments during this period was the 
emergence of near-real time intelligence systems.  
The sections below briefly review historical and conceptual material.  Immediately 
below, the evolution of the term “RMA” in Soviet military theory is documented.  When 
it was applied to U.S. forces, the term, which had special meaning in Soviet military 
thought, was meant to evoke elements of a decades-long discourse on multifaceted 
changes in strategy and warfare.  Concepts and arguments from Soviet military literature 
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continued to influence U.S. defense discourse after the 1991 Gulf War.  Reviewing the 
evolution of the Soviet nuclear RMA provides an important backdrop for understanding 
military developments in the last decade of the Cold War.  In fact, Soviet observers 
actually provided the initial historical argument in the 1980s that U.S. forces were 
exhibiting revolutionary capabilities.  
The remainder of the chapter focuses on developments largely reacting to the Soviet 
threat and operational challenges in Europe.  Successive sections sketch the post-Vietnam 
strategic landscape of the mid-1970s, the October 1973 War, the evolution of air power, 
technology development, Army doctrinal changes, and domestic developments leading to 
a reversal in defense spending.  Such changes crystallized within a larger conceptual 
framework geared toward “extending” the battlefield, a framework that reflected 
widespread anticipation of new “deep strike” capabilities.  
The Soviet Nuclear RMA: On the Strategic and Operational Threat
Soviet military planners adapted doctrine and force structure to counter U.S. and 
NATO flexible response strategy in the mid- and late 1960s, adaptations that created new 
strategic and operational challenges for the U.S.  An Office of Technology Assessment 
study concludes that after Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev’s 1964 ouster and the 1967 
adoption of flexible response by NATO, “the Soviets began to consider the possibility of 
a war remaining conventional.”5  Many believed that NATO’s adoption of flexible 
response by NATO was an admission that nuclear deterrence had lost its credibility.  As 
statesmen learned when and where nuclear weapons truly influenced the course of 
conflict resolution and diplomacy, the implied threat of nuclear escalation seemed less 
applicable.    
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What Soviet military theorists labeled a decades-long nuclear RMA provides an 
interesting backdrop to consider the strategic context in which U.S. military planners 
sought post-Vietnam revitalization.    
Soviet military analyst Joseph Douglass concludes that the nuclear revolution thesis 
was “an accepted precept” among Soviet military theorists by the early 1960s6; another 
analyst concluded that revolutionary changes derived from “fundamental, qualitative 
changes in the means of armed conflict, of methods of combat actions, in the organization 
of troops,” and in military “training and education.”7  Within the construct of the 
unfolding nuclear RMA, Soviet planners reconsidered the importance of the initial period 
of war, eventually codifying a complex, formulaic system of doctrinal templates designed 
to expedite battlefield decisions.  
Initial thinking on the nuclear RMA was described in the so-called “Special 
Collection” of documents passed to the West by British-directed spy Oleg Penkovsky.8
Compiled in 1958, a year before the creation of the Soviet Strategic Rocket Forces, it 
discussed “the impact of nuclear-tipped rockets on military science.”9   Khrushchev 
concluded in 1960 “that nuclear weapons made huge infantry and tank armies redundant” 
and, along with other changes, mandated that ground forces be “slashed.”10  Emphasizing 
rocket forces briefly delayed both ground force modernization and the further refinement 
of military thought.  Khrushchev went as far as abolishing the “chief of the ground 
forces” position in September 1964, a month before his ouster.  
After several years of inattention to conventional forces, Soviet theorists and 
planners returned to the core themes of mechanization, maneuver, deep battle, and 
combined arms attacks in the mid-1960s almost as if the Khrushchev period hadn’t 
occurred.  The Soviet nuclear arsenal matured thanks to years of strategic rocket forces 
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largess while conventional warfare was again recognized as a crucial adjunct to the 
ongoing nuclear RMA.    
In his Race to the Swift: Thoughts of Twenty-First Century Warfare, perhaps the best 
single volume capturing changes in military thought at end of the Cold War, Richard 
Simpkin outlines four phases of Soviet military thought associated with the revolutionary 
impact of nuclear weapons, phases really capturing the evolution of Soviet “deep 
operations” theory into the nuclear era.11
During the first phase of the nuclear RMA – which extended to roughly 1967 –
planners assumed any conflict would lead to nuclear escalation.  No consensus emerged 
on the operational role for ground forces on the nuclear battlefield.  Many assumed that 
nuclear weapons would obliterate enemy forces, obviating the need for large armies.  
Others considered conventional forces useful only for “mopping up” after nuclear 
exchanges.  Still others emphasized enormous tank formations rolling through areas after 
their “preparation” with nuclear and chemical attacks.  Kimberly Martin Zisk concludes 
that, although debate continued on the impact of nuclear weapons on operations after 
Stalin’s 1953 death, Moscow tended “to view nuclear weapons as support forces for the 
ground troops, not independent strike forces that obviated the need for armies.”12
Robert A. Doughty captures the early stages of phase one: “the Soviets shifted from 
a primary focus on continental land warfare to a focus on global nuclear warfare.  
Military leaders believed that the revolution in military affairs compelled complete 
revisions in strategy, tactics, and force structure.  Red Army commanders modified their 
thinking about the conduct of ground operations in the nuclear age and emphasized 
dispersion, mobility, high operating tempos, and multiple attacks on broad axes.”13
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Noteworthy was the degree to which Soviet planners adopted a vision of future 
conflict that integrated nuclear and conventional operations on the same battlefield.  The 
nuclear RMA construct conditioned commanders to accept the integration of non-nuclear 
forces, operationally and doctrinally, into military affairs, leading to the “rapid 
development and mass introduction of nuclear weapons, missiles, and radio electronic 
means among the troops as well as the significant improvement of other types of 
armament and combat equipment.”14 Doctrinal and operational integration of “new 
weapons in all categories of the armed forces” impelled “radical changes in the methods 
of conducting warfare” and a “review of the established principles of the art of war.”15
While U.S. planners held similar views, Soviet planning seemed more sensitive to 
conventional operations. Only in the late 1970s would the U.S. focus greater attention 
and resources on an “integrated” battlefield.
The second phase of the Soviet nuclear RMA began in 1967, the same year that 
NATO adopted flexible response; it was also the year that Soviet ground forces were 
returned to a status of falling under a separate command.  Michael MccGwire sees the 
1967-1968 period as “a watershed in Soviet defense policy.”16  The essential change was 
a switch from believing any world war would lead to nuclear “strikes against the 
homelands of the two superpowers” to believing “that a world war might be waged with 
conventional weapons” without nuclear escalation.17
One benchmark in Soviet military history remains Operation Dnieper, a 1967 
training exercise named for the river across which massed armored forces rehearsed 
river-bridging missions.  In his The Soviet High Command, 1967 -1989, Dale Herspring 
contrasts Dnieper with the 1965 “October Storm” and the 1966 “Vlatva” exercises.  
“Whereas both previous exercises had included a conventional phase, each had quickly 
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escalated to the use of nuclear weapons.  This time, the exercise was entirely 
conventional.”18
Distinguishing the new phase, then, was a focus on conventional planning – even a 
“grudging admission” among rocket force proponents “that conventional weapons might 
be used” without the nuclear preparation occurring first.19  What factors contributed to 
this shift?  In their study of Soviet conventional warfare, Douglass and Hoeber suggest 
four: reactions to “U.S./NATO strategy shifts, recognition of the need to conduct non-
nuclear operations at the unit and subunit level, recognition of the need to be able to fight 
non-nuclear wars, and recognition of potential problems involved in starting an operation 
with a mass nuclear strike.”20  This reaffirmed central tenets in Soviet strategic culture, 
that “ground forces are what, in the end, are used to implement the Soviet offensive 
strategy.”21
According to a 28 April 1972 CIA intelligence memorandum entitled “Soviet 
Defense Policy, 1962-72,” during phase two of the nuclear RMA “the Soviet view of war 
in Europe had undergone a significant change” reflecting a belief “that the initial period 
of a war with NATO could be fought without the use of nuclear weapons.”22  The CIA 
also concluded that “Soviet acceptance of a possible non-nuclear phase of hostilities [led] 
to some changes in force structure.”23
A motorized rifle division was added to each tank army.  Among the new weapons 
systems introduced were “five new tactical air defense systems, five artillery systems, 
three new tracked combat vehicles, and improved tactical engineering and logistics 
systems.”24  BMP1 armored infantry fighting vehicles, the first mass-produced modern 
armored vehicle since World War II, would speed infantry forces into battle alongside 
new T-72 main battle tanks.  BMP1 armament included Sagger anti-tank missiles and a 
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new anti-tank gun.  Anti- tank weapons became ubiquitous.  “Division artillery,” analysts 
discovered, “increased by about 50 percent” – and they were self-propelled.  Mechanized 
forces became much more capable in terms of bringing fire support to bear on a fluid 
battlefield.25
Soviet military planners also concluded from “‘detailed analysis of possible ways to 
resolve problems of modern offensive operations” that ground forces must pursue the 
“fullest possible use of the airspace.”26  Airborne (air-deliverable) versions of the BMP 
and other armored vehicles were fielded. The ZSU-23 air defense system, with its four 
23mm cannons, was the most sophisticated in the world.  Russian divisions advanced 
within a “bubble” of protective air defense systems, including ZSU-23s for low altitudes 
and a suite of surface to air missiles (SAMs) for higher ones.  This required interlocking 
air defense radar, warning, and fire control.     
It was during this period Zisk argues, when U.S. defense planners were focused on 
Vietnam, “that the Soviet General Staff began to implement its infamous ‘conventional 
option.’ Fully developed by the late 1970s, it held that Soviet conventional weapons 
would be used to destroy NATO theater nuclear weapons before they could be used, and 
thus secure victory. . .without the use of nuclear weapons.”27  Because the poor state of 
NATO conventional forces would require escalation to nuclear weapons, “it might indeed 
make sense for the Soviets to try to make them as useless as possible as soon as possible, 
and to try to accomplish as much as possible before they came into play.”28  Additional 
political and military problems for U.S. planners followed.  To borrow from Stephen 
Ambrose, the “Soviets now had two trumps, the bomb and the Red Army, to NATO’s” 
reliance on nuclear defenses.29
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During the second and third phases of the nuclear RMA, Soviet military theorists 
invigorated their study of the historical elements of Soviet operational art and discussed 
the idea of a conventional “theater-strategic offensive.”  Incidentally, Soviet analysts 
evoked this same term to characterize U.S. forces in the Gulf War a decade later.  For 
U.S. and NATO analysts, the theater-strategic offensive and other developments seemed 
“propelled by the hope that Soviet conventional forces could in fact control NATO’s 
wartime decision-making” by delimiting nuclear defense and retaliation options.30
Soviet thinking about flexible response was as much about a strategy aiming for 
mutual restraint concerning the use of force as it was about signaling a deterrence 
strategy based on progressively more “punishing” military options ending with all-out 
nuclear war.  NATO was not the only target of Soviet deterrence policies.  Soviet 
planners were also concerned with China, an important consideration after a new military 
theater of operations was created in response to rising Chinese military strength in the 
1970s and to Sino-Soviet border clashes.  Articulating a preference for nonnuclear war 
also reflected Moscow’s reaction to China’s testing of nuclear weapons and U.S. 
diplomatic efforts to court Beijing.  
The third phase involved the further adaptation of Soviet deep operations theory and 
a more capable offensive capability.  As President Carter would tell the 1977 North 
Atlantic Summit Meeting in London, his first year in office and roughly the period 
marking the transition to the third phase of the Soviet nuclear RMA, 
The threat of facing the Alliance has grown steadily in recent years.  The 
Soviet Union has achieved essential strategic nuclear equivalence.  Its 
theater nuclear forces have been strengthened.  The Warsaw Pact’s 
conventional forces in Europe emphasize an offensive posture.  These 
forces are much stronger than needed for any defense purposes.  Since 
1965, new ground and air weapons have been introduced in most 
categories: self-propelled artillery, movable tactical missiles, mobile air 
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defense guns, armored personnel carriers, tactical aircraft, and tanks.  
The Pact’s build-up continues undiminished.31
That year more than 120,000 Soviet troops deployed into Eastern Europe during a one-
week exercise as part of a normal troop rotation, increasing fears that an unwarned attack 
might occur.  
Among the important strategic developments during this period was the public 
revelation by Defense Secretary Harold Brown on the twentieth anniversary of Sputnik 
that Soviets had “an operational capability that could be used against some satellites” –
the era of space warfare had begun.32  Soviet conventional capabilities threatened to 
undermine the existing deterrence regime on which European stability rested; it also 
provided additional impetus for U.S. military innovation.  
The fourth and final phase of the Soviet nuclear RMA matured in the 1980s.  An 
Operations Maneuver Group (OMG) increased the conventional threat to NATO in the 
early 1980s.  This phase also witnessed the evolution of vertical envelopment as an 
adjunct to deep operations theory: the introduction of hellebore assault brigades that 
further expanded the battlefield.  The fourth phase is discussed in chapter 5.
Framing the Post-Vietnam Strategic Context
Vietnam was, of course, the crystallizing event of the period for U.S. national 
security, perhaps of the entire post-World War II era. Weighing heavily on the America’s 
collective consciousness, it was a conflict George McGovern characterized as America’s 
“second civil war,” one he rightly predicted would be fought “for the rest of our lives.”33
President Lyndon Johnson famously decried it as “that bitch of a war.”  It was a 
168
tumultuous experience for an Army that had struggled to define its place in the nuclear 
world without losing touch with core aspects of its organizational identity.  
The January 1973 Paris Peace Settlement ended President Richard M. Nixon’s first 
week in office and the U.S. military presence in Vietnam.  The agreement was among a 
number of coterminous events that closed one chapter in the history of U.S. defense 
planning and opened another.  
Other noteworthy events contributing to the evolving strategic context were: the rise 
of international terrorism associated with radicalism in the Middle East after the 1972 
Munich Olympics; Nixon’s 1972 visit to China; OPEC’s oil embargo; the 1972 signing 
of the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT) treaty recognizing strategic parity 
between the U.S. and USSR; the 1972 signing of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty 
[the United States withdrew from it in 2002 – another aspect of the thirty-year 
transformation]; Moscow’s 1972 agreement to participate in the Mutual and Balanced 
Force Reduction (MBFR) talks and Washington’s agreement to join the Conference on 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE); increasing American concern with
communist parties gaining power in Western Europe, including in NATO members 
Spain, Portugal, and Italy; and the 1974 announcement of a New International Economic 
Order in conjunction with the ascent of a non-aligned movement in the United Nations –
both reacting to North-South economic disparity.
Additionally, Henry Kissinger dubbed 1973 as “the year of Europe,” a signal that the 
Nixon administration was refocusing on the primary axis of East-West tension.  At the 
Moscow summit a year earlier the United States and Russia agreed on the essential pillar 
of détente: that neither side would strive for a unilateral nuclear advantage over the other.  
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Ambiguity and divergent expectations about the meaning of détente limited its 
longevity.  U.S. observers understood détente to involve both the curtailment of the arms 
race and constraints on Soviet expansionism.  In a classic Hegelian interpretation evoking 
the paradoxical nature of dialectical materialism, Moscow viewed détente as including 
opposing elements of peaceful and competitive co-existence.  For Moscow, détente 
created opportunities for gaining advantages over the West in some areas while 
recognizing that nuclear parity limited opportunities for advantage in strategic nuclear 
arsenals.  Soviet expert R. Craig Nation concludes that, after Willy Brandt, leader of 
West Germany’s center-left governing coalition, initiated his Ostpolitik or “political 
opening to the East” policy, “Moscow’s hope was to use détente as a complement to 
Ostpolitik in order to reinforce its hegemonic status” in Eastern Europe.34  Secretary of 
Defense James Schlesinger lamented détente’s fundamental flaw in 1976: “If détente 
means everything,” including opportunities for Moscow to legitimize its control of Pact 
nations, “it means virtually nothing.”35
While Nixon sought peace with honor in Vietnam, and as the second phase in the 
Soviet nuclear RMA unfolded, the stark reality of Soviet conventional capabilities 
troubled U.S. defense planners.  Zisk aptly summarizes their underlying concern: “if 
conventional weapons destroyed NATO’s theater nuclear forces, they could remove a 
step in the NATO escalation ladder, and thereby prevent nuclear use entirely.”36
Nuclear strategy drove conventional warfighting innovations on both sides of the 
Iron Curtain. For some, the likelihood of a nonnuclear attack was inversely related to the 
perceived credibility of the overall U.S. extended deterrent.  As the credibility of nuclear 
deterrence suffered, some argued that the potential for an opportunistic Soviet 
conventional attack, even if for limited gains, increased.  Additionally, the argument for 
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assured nuclear escalation waned as the political viability of anything sounding like 
“massive retaliation” decreased.  For these and other reasons, conventional readiness 
issues ascended in importance as the U.S. extricated itself from Vietnam.  
The 1976 Defense Science Board Summer Study of potential technological solutions 
to the conventional threat in Europe documents evolving thoughts on conventional 
modernization.  “It concluded that some of the technologies, or achievable modifications 
of them, could be integrated into a feasible fighting system that could effectively counter 
the second echelon of a Warsaw Pact attack.”37
Vietnam exacted the greatest toll on the Army in terms of delaying modernization 
efforts.  The Air Force and Navy “developed, or were in the process of developing, new 
aircraft, new air-to-air missile weaponry in the air defense arena, and with dramatic new 
technologies were beginning to extend their reach into space.”38  As General Haig 
observed, the relative lack of attention given to forces in Europe “tended to breed a 
garrison mentality” that had a negative influence on readiness, one that was “especially 
marked among our ground echelons” which, “unlike their air and naval brethren” did not 
“routinely function in an environment of high operational intensity.”39
The outlook for Army modernization changed following Soviet Premier Leonid 
Brezhnev’s Tula speech.  Delivered days before Carter assumed office, it signaled a 
change in Soviet declared nuclear policy.  Its essence was a no first use declaration 
combined with a plea that NATO proclaim a similar policy.  If NATO did so, the 
credibility of the Alliance’s nuclear deterrent would be weakened.  Moscow’s strategic 
objective, here and in other foreign policy overtures, was to create or intensify as many 
axes of disagreement within NATO as possible.  First use was already a contentious issue 
during the mid-1970s as political opposition, including peace movements, mounted.    
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NATO planners quickly criticized the sincerity of the Tula line when the Soviet’s 
modernized their theater nuclear arsenal significantly with the introduction of the SS-20 
mobile intermediate range ballistic missile (IRBM) missile.  The SS-20, deployed in 
1977, was much superior to the missiles it replaced in virtually every measure of IRBM 
capability: reliability, survivability, range, accuracy, and the time required to fire, move 
positions, and reload.  It was the first Soviet IRBM armed with multiple warheads 
(multiple warheads per rocket).  The SS-20’s mobility wrought changes in U.S. 
counterforce targeting capabilities by adding the requirement to be able to find and 
destroy Soviet mobile missiles, which meant retargeting bombers and missiles in flight.  
Further modernization plans suggested that more new missiles would be introduced in the 
1970s.40
This spurred NATO to plan for the deployment of U.S. Tomahawk ground-launched 
cruise missiles (GLCMs) and Pershing 2 intermediate range ballistic missiles.  Cruise 
missiles and Pershing were both so-called long-range tactical nuclear forces (LRTNF) 
because they had ranges between 3,000 and 5,500 miles. Some, like West Germany’s 
Helmut Schmidt, viewed the new U.S. systems as crucial for NATO deterrence because 
their deployment signaled continued U.S. commitment to a nuclear defense of NATO.  In 
the mid-1970s, in the aftermath of Vietnam, many feared that the American nuclear 
deterrent would be “decoupled” from Europe, leaving Western Europe susceptible to 
Soviet nuclear blackmail or destine to be annihilated by theater nuclear exchanges that 
left the American and Soviet heartlands free of direct nuclear strikes.  Such views were 
reinforced during the second round of Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT II).  
The initial plan placed 96 cruise missiles in Germany, 160 in Britain, 112 in Italy, 48 
in Netherlands, and another 48 in Belgium.  West Germany would also host 108 
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Pershings, the highly accurate, high-speed missiles with a 1,000 mile range that could 
reach targets in seven or eight minutes from launch.  
East-West relations continued to decline, muddying the arms control negotiations 
that embodied the fading spirit of détente.  Political pressure to find alternatives to 
nuclear deterrence intensified.  Mass political demonstrations erupted against the 
deployments across Western Europe.  Nikolai Ogarkov was appointed chief of the Soviet 
General Staff, bringing changes in Soviet doctrine and force structure that shifted the 
balance of power in Central Europe.  As Jacob Kipp concludes, developments in Europe, 
leadership changes inside the Kremlin, Soviet activities in the third world, and a growing 
Soviet global naval presence fostered “a political climate conducive to efforts to raise the 
theater-nuclear threshold through the improvement of conventional forces.”41  Raising the 
threshold remained a prominent theme in U.S. national security planning throughout the 
late 1970s and early 1980s.  
Conventional force modernization activities subsequently received newfound 
support.  Shortly after Carter assumed office, NATO members agreed to a new long-term 
defense program (LTDP).  Formally adopted in May 1978, the LTDP evolved into a 
fifteen-year modernization plan addressing ten mission areas.  Only one concerned 
nuclear forces (Pershing II and cruise missiles).  Others included air defense; anti-
submarine warfare; anti-armored capabilities; advanced air-delivered munitions; 
command, control, and communications advances; improved reserve readiness and 
mobilization; and electronic warfare.  Allies also agreed to increase annual defense 
spending and to the joint development of airborne early-warning aircraft.  Pursuit of 
advanced conventional capabilities was reinforced in the 1978 NATO Summit 
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communiqué, which highlighted the risk of a Soviet attack with minimal warning and 
related need for rapid reinforcement after hostilities commenced.
Force Modernization Ills and Expectations for Strategic Effectiveness
All of this changed the pace and scope of the Army’s post-Vietnam revitalization.  In 
a recent history of the U.S. Army’s armor branch, former General Don Starry summarizes 
the planning environment during the 1970s. “It was an era characterized by the expanded 
threat in Europe, a growing threat of conflict in the Third World (especially the Middle 
East), increasing worldwide economic interdependence, greater difficulty articulating 
political goals for the planners who designed military activities to achieve them, and 
intrusive and abrasive media probing into all aspects of military operations.”42
Strategic and operational challenges impelling reforms were similar in concept to 
those prompting debate over flexible response in the 1960s; in the late 1970s they became 
more intractable.  Planning challenges became more diffuse; strategic objectives in 
European and peripheral regions became more tightly coupled; technology reduced the 
warning time to react to crises abroad.
Other issues included long-standing equipment shortfalls; poor training programs; a 
paucity of doctrinal adaptation to battlefield challenges; critical recruitment and retention 
problems; and disputed responsibilities for air mobility and the development of tactical 
missiles.  Such problems existed before troops began flowing into Vietnam.  As America 
withdrew from Southeast Asia, “funds available for Army general-purpose procurement” 
in 1973 “ were about two-thirds of the last pre-Vietnam year in terms of equivalent 
purchasing power.”43
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Army Chief of Staff General Creighton W. Abrams focused Army planning on 
Europe, including efforts to integrate new weapons systems to meet the Soviet Red 
Army.  Another decision prevented the Army from deploying to fight a major campaign 
without the Army Reserve and National Guard.  Dubbed the “Golden Handshake” within 
the Pentagon, the “Total Force” concept allowed Abrams to increase the number of Army 
divisions from thirteen to sixteen without requiring new recruits.  By transferring support 
functions into the Reserve and Guard Abrams shifted active duty manpower into new 
combat divisions.  The Total Force concept would eventually force all of the Services to 
rethink the role of reservists in military activities.  Army reserve requirements remain 
particularly high, witnessed by the number of soldiers called to active duty in the 2000s 
to simultaneously fight a global war against terrorism and remove Saddam Hussein from 
power in Iraq.  
Among the problems facing post-Vietnam Army leadership was what to do with 
soldiers inducted under Lyndon Johnson’s Project 100,000.  Part of the Great Society 
program, it brought some 300,000 underprivileged and unemployed recruits into the 
military by lowering minimum standards for intelligence and physical health. Many were 
illiterate.  Post-Vietnam studies revealed Project 100,000 inductees were killed in action 
at nearly twice the rate of other combat soldiers.  By 1973 many had progressed into the 
non-commissioned officer ranks, entrusted with leading and training the backbone of the 
Army, its soldiers.  Army leaders had further cause for concern.  To bolster recruitment, 
defense officials mandated that a quarter of the Army’s recruits be high-school dropouts.  
Personnel challenges included rampant drug use, the ending of the draft (which placed 
additional burden on recruiters), and racial tensions that frequently spurned bloodletting 
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in the barracks.  Compounding recruitment woes, retention suffered across the Army as 
re-enlistment rates declined.  
Overshadowing the problems besetting Army leaders included what might be 
diagnosed as organizational schizophrenia, especially concerning the future of 
warfighting doctrine.  Was it an army preparing for low intensity conflicts or for nuclear 
battlefields and armored warfare in Europe?  The answer would be the latter, a decision 
that left low intensity conflict training somewhat in limbo until the early 1980s when, in 
the wake of the failed attempt to rescue Americans held hostage in Iran, resources and 
leadership attention were devoted to building a special operations capability to prosecute 
regional conflicts and fight terrorism.  In the aftermath of Vietnam, funding for low 
intensity conflict, an inaptly named level of warfare given the intensity of fighting 
involved, was politically untenable.
Former Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), retired Army Lieutenant 
General Pat Hughes was a platoon leader with the 9th Infantry Division in the Mekong 
Delta (1969) and advisor to a provisional reconnaissance unit in the Phoenix Program 
(1971-1972).  Vietnam, he contends, forced a generation of military leaders to 
contemplate the utter “finality” of combat.  
This warrants elaboration.  Military thought during much of the early Cold War was 
wrapped in a highly abstract cloak of nuclear targeting.  Calculations of blast effects, 
radiation, and overpressure were the work of civilian technicians adding scientific detail 
to the work of other civilian theorists – the political scientists and economists shaping 
deterrence theory.  A defense discourse centered on abstract nuclear warfare issues left 
tacticians and planners ill prepared for unconventional war in Vietnam.  Militarily, 
politically, operationally, it was unlike the two world wars of liberation or the inaptly 
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named Korean “police action.”  Especially at the tactical level, where the battlefield 
climate of chaos and destruction imparted a vivid, deeply personal appreciation for the 
non-linearity of even meticulously planned operations, respect for the finality of war led 
post-Vietnam Army officers to profess that they would never allow another Vietnam to 
occur.  
Quite simply, as Hughes recalls, they had to go to war to win – a conviction that 
students of today’s American military forces are likely to have a tough time 
understanding.  Indeed, it is difficult to relate the historic importance of a generation of 
military leaders concerned that they might not go into battle with the political backing 
and resources to win.  In other words, it is difficult to convey how this shaped the Army’s 
post-war planning or how it influenced the behavior and views of officers like Hughes 
later charged with strategic planning, technology development, and doctrine writing.44
Similar thinking motivated Collin Powell to pen what became known as the “Powell 
Doctrine” in the early 1990s. 
Attitudes about preparing for war changed more quickly than did the mix of 
resources available to do so.  “In the anti-military orgy spawned by Vietnam,” Henry 
Kissinger recalls, “to have challenged the overwhelming Congressional sentiment for 
‘domestic priorities’ was almost an exercise in futility, pouring salt on the open wounds 
of the Vietnam debate.”45  The immediate post-Vietnam political situation worsened 
longstanding readiness issues, resulting in another inauspicious post-war situation for 
Army planners.  The Vietnam War had cost upwards of three-and-a-half billion dollars, 
sapping funds from modernization and other readiness areas.  High rates of inflation 
throughout the 1970s made matters worse because the buying power of defense dollars 
declined.  Weapons systems were also more complex and more costly, leading to what 
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defense economists termed cost growth.  As weapons grew more complex, their per unit 
cost increased.  
Resolving conventional readiness and modernization issues was made more difficult 
by the Nixon’s administration’s approach to defense planning, which in turn was 
muddied by post-Watergate political problems.  John Lewis Gaddis summarizes Nixon’s 
approach to defense planning as “consisting of (1) the appeasement of Congress, with a 
view to defusing as much as possible growing anti-military sentiment there, and (2) 
negotiations with the Russians aimed at restricting as much as possible their own military 
buildup, without constraining in any significant way comparable measures the United 
States might choose to take once the furor over Vietnam had died down.”46
Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird spearheaded Congressional appeasement.  A 
former Congressman reportedly skilled in “bureaucratic gamesmanship,” Laird’s chief 
mission was “forcing the American military to adapt to a harsher post-Vietnam 
environment without significant loss of either morale or capabilities.”47  Noteworthy 
here, given the press of conventional issues and declining defense spending, was that he 
sought “several new strategic weapons systems – the B-1 bomber, the Trident submarine, 
the cruise missile – but only at the price of a substantial reduction in conventional 
forces.”48  Not until the end of the decade would conventional issues receive 
Congressional support. For the time being, as Kissinger relates, the plan was, quite 
simply, to focus on preserving the “sinews” of American strength, in this case the pillars 
of nuclear deterrence.49
Subsequently, nuclear weapons modernization was funded while overall military 
spending decreased “at an annual rate of 4.5 percent between 1970s and 1975”; this 
severely limited “the capacity of the United States to project conventional military 
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power.”50  Even at mid-decade, “long after trends in Soviet military spending had become 
too obvious to ignore,” the defense budget was cut an additional seven billion dollars” as 
strategic nuclear programs received additional funding.51
Because of resource issues, Laird’s prioritization of future weapons systems, and the 
general political climate, the post-Vietnam Army remained hard-pressed to meet new 
expectations for a more robust conventional deterrent.  For Haig, such expectations 
reflected NATO’s search for “a balanced military posture in which the deterrent value of 
each component – conventional, theater nuclear, and strategic nuclear – is magnified by 
its relation to the other two.”52  If the conventional deterrent continued to decline, the 
theater and strategic nuclear deterrence would be weakened.  Senator Sam Nunn was 
among those supporting increased defense spending.  Addressing the “cockpit of Soviet-
American confrontation” in Central Europe, he argued in 1976 that, “after twenty-seven 
years of collective investment on an unparalleled scale, it is still questionable whether the
United States and its European allies could muster the sufficient military might in time to 
defeat a determined conventional Warsaw Pact invasion of Western Europe.”53
By the end of the decade, as discussed below, U.S. grand strategy evolved in ways 
that emphasized conventional measures of strategic effectiveness.  In other words, 
conventional warfare in Europe was re-centered in U.S. grand strategy.  Secretary of 
Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s Fiscal Year 1978 Posture Statement to Congress argued that, 
“‘the burden of deterrence has once again fallen on the conventional forces.’”54  Quite 
simply, the Army was expected to respond to new strategic realities and operational 
missions – and soon thereafter began receiving additional resources to do so.    
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Evolution in Air Power 
Reflecting broad strategic realities, as the Army’s fundamental mission of deterring 
Soviet attack was reinforced, the Air Force focused more attention on tactical missions. 
As chapter 3 related, the U.S. post-World War II defense planning environment was 
characterized by demobilization, occupation duties, fixation with the atomic bomb, 
economic re-conversion to peacetime production, general issues associated with the 1947 
creation of a Department of Defense, and specific issues concerning the creation of a 
Department of the Air Force.  In this environment, ground force modernization stagnated.  
Air power, the sole means of delivering atomic weapons, emerged as a strategic priority 
for defense spending and, with the creation of an independent air service, the Air Force’s 
disproportionate share of resources and access to the executive branch and Congressional 
leadership aggravated Service infighting.  
The evolution of U.S. air power theory and doctrine is a study in organizational 
theory.  More appropriately, it is a study in organizational culture.  Among the cultural 
factors addressed in this study is the newfound support for close air support and 
nonnuclear ground attack missions.  
As stated above, the strategic nuclear mission drove Air Force technology, doctrine, 
and operational readiness for much of the early Cold War.  This reflected priorities 
during decades in which defense discourse was dominated by a nuclear-centric narrative 
of military thought.  Reflecting national security strategy, Air Force doctrine in the 1950s 
focused on nuclear strike despite the importance of theater conventional missions during 
the Korean War.  Operational necessity for reliable long-range strategic nuclear strike 
and pursuit of safer, more advanced commercial airliners underwrote a number of 
developments during the 1950s.  Fuselages became more aerodynamic, propulsion and 
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new materials technologies helped push them to supersonic speeds.  Thermonuclear 
(hydrogen) weapons provided them with unparalleled destructive power, renewing 
arguments airpower theorists had made since the 1920s that airpower could be singularly 
decisive in war.  In part because conventional airpower was not decisive in Korea, and 
despite the importance of close air support missions, conventional missions were 
neglected.  New long-range bombers armed with thermonuclear weapons trumped 
fighters in the pursuit of Giulio Douhet’s and Billy Mitchell’s visions for decisive 
airpower.  Reinforcing theory was the practical matter of resources.    
The emerging nuclear stalemate in the strategic domain, combined with 
technological and operational developments, would lead to a reemphasis on tactical air 
power in the 1970s.  This is one of the evolutionary processes contributing to the 
emergence of a context ripe for further innovation in the 1980s.  Widespread debates over 
the relative merits of ICBMs and strategic bombers also revisited questions about the 
Army and Navy’s strategic missions, which complicated the Air Force’s internal decision 
making concerning the right mix of strategic bombers and close air support aircraft.    
Among the benchmarks sowing the seeds for Air Force collaboration in executing 
AirLand Battle doctrine remains the 1971 publication of revised Air Force Manual 1-1, 
United States Air Force Basic Doctrine.55  It posited that nonnuclear conflicts, including 
regional wars involving Soviet clients, required “sufficient general purpose forces 
capable of rapid deployment and sustained operations.”56  Going beyond earlier flexible 
response discussions, 1-1 stated that all elements of the Air Force “are responsible for 
conducting and supporting special operations.”57
The Air Force was shifting from its insular focus on strategic nuclear missions, a 
shift driven by changes in the strategic environment and in the expectations placed on the 
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organization concerning regional conflicts.  Although long-range strategic bombing and 
nuclear strategy continued to dominate the Air Force’s heart and soul, important 
leadership and planning changes occurred.  Missiles, including innovative theater systems 
engineered for greater accuracy, more agile re-targeting, and lower yields became more 
important to strategic planners.  Associated innovations occurred in the domains of 
command and control, intelligence, interoperability, satellite positioning and navigation, 
stealth capabilities to defeat enemy air defenses, and electronic warfare support. 
The Navstar Global Positioning System (GPS), a key technology in the American 
RMA , was conceived in 1973, building on previous navigation systems such as the long 
range navigation (NORAN) and Transit systems.  Transit, used by Navy Polaris 
submarines in the 1960s, was made available to the public in 1967 and its satellites given 
the name “Navsat.”  Navstar’s first phase, from 1973-1979, involved the procurement of 
satellites and exploration of user interfaces.  Ground navigation equipment was tested in 
1977 using airborne signals.  In 1978, an Altas rocket carried the first GPS Block-I 
satellite into space.  Three subsequent 1978 launches delivered the world’s first three-
dimensional global positioning capability.  Four additional satellites were launched from 
1979 through 1985, completing phase two of the GPS program.  Prototype GPS receivers 
began using live satellite data in 1982.  Although used extensively thereafter, the defense 
department did not announce the initial operational capability of GPS until December 
1993.  Navstar GPS reached full operational capability in 1995 with twenty-four Block-II 
satellites on orbit.  Noteworthy here is the fact that advocacy for GPS came from the 
Office of the Secretary of Defense and senior civilian leaders, not the military services.58
Envisioned roles for precision strike, the need for electronic countermeasures and 
warfare capabilities, air mobility, and airlift issues all contributed to changes in Air Force 
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planning.  “Within the air force,” military aviation historian Richard Gross reports, the 
Strategic Air Command’s (SAC) “share of the budget and force structure declined 
significantly while its tactical forces gained in relative importance.”59  Air power had to 
deter conflict at all levels of warfare.  This was a difficult proposition given the state of 
tactical air forces.  The Tactical Air Command (TAC) suffered from readiness problems 
in the early 1970s.  “On any given day,” James Kitfield reports, “half of the planes in 
TAC’s $25 billion inventory were not combat ready because of some malfunction, and 
220 aircraft were outright ‘hanger queens,’ unable to fly for at least three weeks for lack 
of spare parts or maintenance.”60  Ben Lambeth identifies “aircrew proficiency, 
equipment performance, and concepts of operations” as additional of concern addressed 
in the 1970s.61
New training approaches striving for ever-greater realism, munitions improvements, 
and other developments transformed American Air Power by the late 1980s – a 
transformation that was in large part centered on the conventional threat in Europe.  Of 
note was the Air Force’s adoption of successful, realistic training techniques previously 
incorporated into the Navy’s successful “Top Gun” program, the U.S. Navy Postgraduate 
Course in Fighter Weapons established in 1968.  In 1978, the Air Force inaugurated its 
own realistic training program, highlighted by the “Red Flag” exercises held at Nellis Air 
Force Base.       
By the early 1980s, Gross found that “there were no longer any bomber generals in 
senior Air Staff positions.”62  Force structure shifts paralleled staffing changes.  During 
the 1970s, the number of medium bombers assigned strategic missions increased from 4 
to 60; heavy bombers decreased from 465 to 316.  The number of medium bombers 
assigned to tactical support missions leaped from 26 to 264.  If force posture reflects 
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doctrine and planning, it appears that Air Force did indeed undertake a transition in its 
operational focus during the 1970s, at least concerning the bombers that were the 
founding rationale for a separate service in the late 1940s.  But an important distinction 
remained between tactical missions and “strategic” ones, the latter being more important 
in terms of the organization’s founding identity.  It wasn’t until the mid- 1980s that B-52 
strategic bomber crews throughout the Department began training in earnest for 
conventional warfare.63  By the late 1990s, it would dominate training as well as 
encourage new pathways for research and development. 
A concurrent process was working in the background.  According to Institute for 
Defense Analyses scholar Richard Van Atta, some within the Air Force “quietly focused 
on an emerging ‘grand challenge’ in the 1970s , the ability to strike any target, any where 
in the world, day or night, with precision.”64  Among others, this led to additional 
research and development in targeting and navigation. 
Targeting and navigation advances for global strike were possible because of the 
investments made in nuclear planning and delivery systems.  Among them were global 
geodetic grids for long-range targeting, navigation and positioning. Because the earth is 
not perfectly round, accurately delivering a missile across hemispheres required a 
coordinate system referenced to the planet’s center and adjusted to local anomalies.  
Navigation technologies, including a ring-laser gyroscope, microelectronics and 
miniaturization, electronic warfare, and attempts to achieve theater situation awareness 
were also developed.  Some of these capabilities were developed to support interdiction 
of Soviet ground forces with tactical nuclear weapons.  Crucial technologies and 
operational concepts would further evolve to support advanced conventional capabilities.  
184
It was during the 1970s that the seeds of “strategic nonnuclear” campaigns were 
sown.  Ground forces support mission became more important, bringing new airborne 
surveillance and warning aircraft capable of supporting conventional warfare.  The first 
production version of the E-3 Sentry Air Force Airborne Warning and Control System 
(AWACS) was delivered in 1975 for testing and evaluation and entered operational 
service in 1977 with the 552nd Airborne Warning and Control Wing, Tinker Air Force 
Base, Oklahoma.65  During Air Force demonstration flights in Europe, E-3 operators 
discovered that autobahn traffic was being picked up on radar, fueling interest in a 
ground moving target indicator (GMTI) capability in addition to tracking aircraft.  
Building on ongoing efforts to develop a long-range synthetic aperture radar for the high-
altitude TR-1 surveillance aircraft, an Air Force-Defense Advanced Research Project 
Agency (DARPA) partnership was formed to modify the TR-1 sensor for a GMTI 
aircraft.  The initiative, the Tactical Air Weapons Direction System (TAWDS) was later 
renamed PAVE MOVER, evolved into a project to both identify and track mobile ground 
targets and attack the moving targets with missiles.  PAVE MOVER would later become 
a key component of Assault Beaker, discussed in chapter 5.
The long-term benefits of nuclear-focused developments were, of course, not evident 
to Army planners in the 1950s and 1960s.  The stark reality was that the Air Force 
continued to receive a disproportionate share of defense spending until the early 1960s.  
In the aftermath of Vietnam and the 1973 Yom Kippur War, as discussed below, the 
Air Force revisited the issues of air defense and air superiority, which derived from 
concerns about both Soviet conventional thrusts to seize or disrupt NATO nuclear 
command and control systems and newfound emphasis on the strategic importance of air 
support to the conventional defense of NATO’s western flank.  Achieving greater 
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coordination of the air battle underpinned the development of the AWACS.  In time, as 
officers from different operational backgrounds populated the Air Staff, technologies 
developed to support nuclear strikes were adapted to support tactical, nonnuclear 
missions.  
No survey of air power developments during the formative period of the American 
RMA  would be complete without mentioning attacks on two bridges, the Paul Doumer 
and the Thanh Hoa.66  These were key bridges for the North Vietnamese, although their 
destruction was really more important for the message Nixon wanted to send to Hanoi: 
that the U.S. could successfully strike at important command, control, and logistics 
targets.  So, while the bridges were not crucial even in the overall war effort, they are 
storied events in the history of precision bombing.  Among the previous attempts to 
destroy the bridges was a 1965 attack on the Thanh Hoa where over one hundred sorties 
dropped some five hundred 750 pound bombs.  Repeated attacks failed to destroy the 
bridges. Ten planes had been lost.  In April 1972 twelve F-4 Phantoms, eight carrying 
two 1000lb each and four flying cover to protect them, disabled the Thanh Hoa.  A month 
later the western span of the bridge was pounded off its supporting beams and rendered 
unusable.  No planes were lost in either attack.  The Paul Doumer was rendered unusable 
in successive attacks the same month.  
Why mention the bridges?  Two different types of highly accurate, innovative bombs 
guided by small fins in their tails and propelled by gravity destroyed them.  The first was 
an electro-optically guided high-explosive bomb with a small television camera mounted 
in its nose that transmitted an image to a weapons officer.  After selecting an aim point 
and locking it into a computer, the bomb guided itself to the target (assuming the 
guidance system kept its lock) while the plane departed the target area.  It was a “fire and 
186
forget” weapon.  The second was a Paveway laser-guided bomb.  Instead of a camera, its 
nose contained a sensor designed to lock onto a low-powered laser beam “illuminating” 
the target.  Both Paveways involved placing conversion kits on regular bombs, adding 
guidance packages, fins, and other upgrades.
Noteworthy in the Vietnam bridge attacks was the ratio of attack to supporting 
aircraft.  As George and Meredith Friedman conclude, from the mid-1960s to the early 
1970s, the “percentage of attack aircraft had shifted from 91 percent to 37 percent; in 
fact, the bulk of the aircraft that flew missions in 1972 were intended to protect the 
attackers.”67  In addition to suggesting the emergence of technology able to achieve a 
long-time “one bomb, one target” vision for conventional strikes, the 8th Tactical Fighter 
Wing demonstrated a number of new capabilities in Vietnam: laser-guided precision 
strike, electro-optically guided precision strike, successful night missions.   A new family 
of weapons entered the arsenal, albeit slowly.
Additional funding for precision munitions development competed against Executive 
Branch priorities following Vietnam, which emphasized nuclear forces.  The Air Force 
managed to keep a trickle of research and development funding flowing, doing little to 
convince overseers of their relative effectiveness and importance.  Criticism aside, the 
Air Force did move money from other programs to fund Paveway II.  It “had folding 
wings so that more could be carried by strike aircraft, structural improvements, and 
improved guidance ability; it eventually went into service with over thirty nations.”68
Paveway II successfully passed through its development and testing phases and its 
manufacturer, Texas Instruments, was asked to manufacture 7,800 conversion kits in 
1976.  That same year the Air Force initiated a Paveway III development program to 
compensate for significant drawbacks.  Most importantly, it had to be dropped from 
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medium altitudes, within enemy air defense weapons ranges. Paveway III was indeed an 
improvement.  Designated the GBU-24, it used “on-board autopilot stabilization so that 
the bomb could ‘cruise’ toward the target, a scanning seeker to find the spot of laser light 
illuminating the target” and had “the ability to be dropped outside the target ‘basket’” so 
it could “maneuver itself inside it.”69
Another important development in the post-Vietnam period was the beginning of the 
Air Force’s transition from air power doctrine to thinking in terms of aerospace doctrine.  
In addition to its long-standing role in National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) satellite 
reconnaissance systems, the 1970s witnessed important developments in space power.  
Digital, global communications and navigation capabilities were pursed by all of the 
Services, with the Air Force coming to play the largest role in U.S. military space (with 
the Navy a close second).  At mid-decade, the Air Force launched two MIT Lincoln 
Laboratory experimental satellites (LES-1 and -2).  Whereas previous communications 
satellites had relayed signals between points on the ground, they added a “crosslink” 
capability enabling both ultra high frequency (UHF) and extremely high frequency (EHF) 
signals between LES vehicles.  Not only did this mean unprecedented communications 
capability over some three quarters of the earth, but EHF operated at a staggering 38 
gigahertz:  a much higher transmission rate difficult to jam.70  Based on a number of 
advances in satellite communications, in 1979 the Army embarked on multiyear program 
to procure hundreds of mobile satellite terminals.  In the early 1980s, and as GPS and 
other technologies were deployed, Army-Air Force cooperation to leverage emerging 
space capabilities led to important command and control advances that further linked air 
and ground power on the conventional battlefield.  By the 2000s, distinct views of ground 
and air operations would give way to discussions of a single “battlespace.” 
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The October War and Planning for War in Europe
The October 1973 Arab-Israeli War, referred to as the Yom Kippur War because it 
coincided with this Jewish holiday, fostered multidimensional shifts in U.S. defense 
planning and military thought.  According to Army historian Richard Swain the war 
“came as a shock to the Army because it pitted three mechanized armies looking much 
like those facing each other in Europe in a series of battles that suggested a revolution in 
military affairs had occurred while the Army was preoccupied with Vietnam.”71  Combat 
attrition was staggering.  Arab and Israeli armies lost more armor and artillery than the 
U.S. Army had deployed in Europe.  Planners were stunned by the high rate of munitions 
expenditures among the belligerents, calling into question the adequacy of basic 
inventories and strategic reserves.  Once NATO forces depleted their reserves, nuclear 
weapons were the only recourse.  
Preoccupied in Southeast Asia, the Army had failed to adopt new technology, adapt 
doctrine, and modernize training.  Studies of the war suggested the stark realities of 
armored warfare among forces with new precision guided munitions and air defense 
systems. Analysis of battles along the Golan Heights and across the barren Sinai 
influenced U.S. defense planning and U.S. Army Doctrine.  
Writing in October 1973 – only ten months after the Paris Peace Agreement –
analyst M. W. Hoag was among a growing number of defense insiders pondering the 
question of how new weapons might change the conventional balance in Europe.  Hoag 
and many of his contemporaries focused more of their analytic activities on conventional 
issues, a trend that exploded in the wake of the October 1973 War and as the 1975 MBFR 
talks began.  Among the questions driving defense analysis, Would new technology and 
doctrine render traditional concepts of massed armored warfare irrelevant?   Perhaps 
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unwittingly, arguments made during this period, many of which were obscured during the 
Vietnam conflict, would solidify into a conceptual and technological bridgehead from 
which important innovations would move forward.    
Implications for U.S. air power emerged from analyses of Soviet-produced 
integrated air defense systems employed by the North Vietnamese against U.S. aircraft in 
Southwest Asia and by Arab forces against Israeli aircraft in the Yom Kippur War.  
These systems called into question NATO ability to deter Soviet forces or defeat them 
with existing theater nuclear weapons and available aircraft.  At the time, blunting Soviet 
attacks with tactical nuclear weapons required successful U.S. Air Force penetration into 
Soviet airspace.  Nuclear artillery and rockets, arguably, were not yet fully up to the task 
of delivering a knockout nuclear punch.  Accuracy, command and control, range, and 
reliability issues remained.  
New air defense systems created additional problems for the Army.  Tactical air 
superiority was crucial.  For some, the advent of advanced air defense systems questioned 
the Air Force’s commitment to gaining tactical air superiority and providing close air 
support.  A number of U.S. aircraft were dual-use, meaning that the same aircraft and 
pilots responsible for delivering nuclear strikes were also assigned conventional missions 
including, in some cases, ground support ones.  Because few believed commanders 
would risk their nuclear strike capability to Soviet air defenses, pragmatic planners 
questioned whether the Air Force would risk losing their dual use aircraft to provide close 
air support.  If they failed at the nuclear mission when the time came, their decades-long 
commitment to nuclear strike would be jeopardized, something that the Air Force simply 
could not allow.  In the end, some posited, the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe 
(SACEUR) would hold back dual-capable aircraft during the opening phases of war.  
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Among those making this argument was Alian C. Ethoven, a professor, defense industry 
leader, and senior defense department official in multiple positions throughout the 1960s.  
In a 1975 Foreign Affairs essay, he contended that “SACEUR will not want to risk losing 
his nuclear attack aircraft in a conventional war” and “will be strongly tempted to hold 
them out of the conventional battle and make them, in effect, specialized nuclear 
forces.”72
Although not all analysts agreed with such arguments, they served to organize debate 
and discussion about air support to ground forces.  Defense analyst Steven Canby stated 
the underlying concern in 1973.  Because “a large share of NATO’s air forces are still 
fully committed to a dated Quick Reaction Alert nuclear role,” and because “of the 
demands of air cover and other missions” supporting nuclear missions, “only a fraction of 
the remainder are available for ground support.”73  The issue of countering Soviet aircraft 
evolved.  Field Marshall Sir Michael Carver would argue in 1976 that developments in 
Soviet tactical aviation required NATO “to consider more seriously than we have done 
since 1942 the anti-aircraft defense, organic and inorganic, on our land forces.”74  The 
result?  As chapter 5 discusses, Army-Air Force cooperation received increased attention. 
Another problem highlighted by the 1973 War concerned the PGMs mentioned 
above.  According to James Jay Carafano, data on PGMS “did not suggest that smart 
weapons proved decisive in combat.”75  Nonetheless, the potential existed to help the 
Army resolve worsening operational challenges.  
Until the early 1970s, the high-velocity main gun on a tank was the only viable 
battlefield anti-tank weapon.  And battle tanks were the coin of the realm in conventional 
force planning.  Perceptions of both defensive and offensive conventional capabilities 
rested on analysis of manpower and battle tank numbers. Alternatives for defeating tanks 
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were awkward to employ, inaccurate, packed too little punch, had too short a range, or, as 
in the case of jeep-mounted recoilless rifles, had noticeable back-blasts exposing the crew 
to enemy fire.  Leaving aside the issue of weather and terrain differences between the 
Sinai Desert and Central Europe, the Yom Kippur War suggested – without empirical 
data – that inexpensive, man-portable, accurate tank-killers seemingly rendered U.S. 
armor vulnerable to Soviet infantry forces.  If tanks were no longer required to kill tanks, 
then American armor could be engaged by other Soviet weapons systems while the tanks 
pushed forward to assault command and control facilities.  Even tactical nuclear weapon 
cantonment and staging bases were at risk.   
Tactical problems associated with Soviet PGMs fueled debate over their effect on the 
correlation of forces in Central Europe.  U.S. forces armed with similar weapons systems, 
including surveillance and targeting sub-systems more suitable to weather and visibility 
conditions in Europe (not an issue in the Sinai), might blunt Soviet armor more 
effectively.  This appealed to enthusiasts seeking to strengthen the defensive and 
retaliatory capabilities of U.S. forces without increasing manpower or battle tank 
deployments.  Perhaps they offered alternatives to early use of tactical nuclear weapons –
a possibility on the minds of many U.S. and NATO planners. In 1975, the same year the 
first Sentry was delivered for testing and evaluation, weapons experts testified before 
Congress on the potential of precision munitions.  Suggesting that new technology 
enabled “substitution of small weapons for larger ones,” Henry S. Rowen surmised that 
“for many missions it may be possible for nonnuclear warheads to be substituted for 
nuclear ones” with the net effect of enhancing deterrence.76  Similar arguments were 
being made among defense analysts with knowledge of precision munitions.  Although 
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slower to develop, thinking about the application of such munitions in the context of a
conventional ground war led some to postulate that air power could be decisive alone. 
The Yom Kippur War also “added new momentum” to existing Army-Air Force 
initiatives “to adopt a more joint approach to airland combat” and pursue “a set of 
complementary capabilities that any potential enemy would find difficult to match.”77
Accordingly, in June 1975 a Joint Army/Air Force Studies Group formed at Nellis Air 
Force Base and, a month later, an Air-Land Forces Application Directorate (ALFA) was 
created at another base in Langley, VA.  Similar activities developed throughout the 
decade, including a 1979 Joint Second Echelon Interdiction Study that ALFA oversaw.  
Their legacy included a 1983 Memorandum of Understanding on Joint USA/USAF 
Efforts for the Enhancement of Joint Employment of the AirLand Battle Doctrine. 
Less noted, but perhaps historically more notable, was another technological turn.  In 
addition to touting the potential of PGMs and air defense systems to alter the balance in 
Europe, 1973 serves as something of a benchmark in electronic warfare.   The Yom 
Kippur War highlighted the value of electronic warfare and influenced the 1976-77 
creation of tactically focused Combat Electronic Warfare and Intelligence (CEWI) 
battalions at Fort Hood, Texas.  Defense analyst Ken Allard views CEWI “as a rather 
daring innovation that originally incorporated sections for ground surveillance (battlefield 
radars and ground sensors), electronic warfare, operations security, imagery intelligence, 
and interrogation.”78 The CEWI “all-source production section” was an important 
development, leading to multi-intelligence fusion capabilities in later decades.  Its “sole 
mission was the integration and production of tactical intelligence.”79 Among the 
electronic warfare initiatives discussed in chapter 5 was the Precision Location Strike 
System (PLSS), later renamed the Coherent Emitter Location Testbed (CELT).  CELT 
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was the first near-real time, automated system to provide precision location of enemy 
communications emissions. 
Electronic warfare was among the six “basic issues” NATO military planners 
identified in the early 1970s as critical for the modernization of the Alliance’s 
conventional posture.  Others were aircraft shelters to protect against surprise attack; anti-
armor weapons; war reserve stocks to provide logistics depth to bolster a potential 
defense; mobile air defense to protect ground forces in light of Soviet frontal aviation 
advances; and advanced air-delivered munitions to improve interdiction.80
Following the 1973 War, General Abrams ordered intensive studies of all aspects of 
the conflict.  One conclusion resonated with an army considering conflict with the 
quantitatively and qualitatively superior Soviet Red Army.  The Israelis were able to fight 
outnumbered and win because they possessed superior tactical doctrine and practiced 
better training.  Vietnam had already highlighted flaws in the Army Training Plan (ATP).  
Following the World War II model, training approaches focused on the concept of 
growing the small standing army using waves of conscripts taught on the basic skills 
required to join a line unit.  Training occurred as an initial, small part of a longer 
mobilization period.  Company-level training and, depending on the division and mission, 
higher-level group training supplemented initial mobilization training.  Training was 
uneven. There were no established standards for company and division training.  
Revising Army Doctrine  
The Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) was created on 1 July 1973.  
Headquartered at Fort Monroe, Virginia, Abrams assigned TRADOC with responsibility 
for all individual Army training and all Army schools (West Point excluded) were placed 
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under its supervision.  TRADOC assumed responsibility for understanding and 
developing new approaches to warfare, shape force structure, and evolve doctrine.  
The organization directed to revamp post-Vietnam training had barely unfurled its 
command flags when the Yom Kippur War shocked Army leadership with the 
implications of anti-tank and air defense technologies for war in Europe.  
Lt. Gen. William E. DePuy was tapped to be the first TRADOC commander.  
DePuy’s role in setting the stage for an overhaul of Army training and for establishing 
new possibilities for doctrinal innovation can be likened to wiping the slate clean for new 
thinking.  If significant or major innovations are associated with the creation of 
innovation streams, meaning the institutionalization of innovation and disruptive 
thinking, then the work of TRADOC leadership in the 1970s surely amounts to one 
within the Army.  
Earlier, the Army decided to pursue five weapons systems considered key to its long-
term force modernization objectives.  The so-called “big five” included a new main battle 
tank, an armored infantry fighting vehicle able to support the tank on the battlefield, an 
attack helicopter, an assault helicopter able to carry troops, and an air defense system.  
DePuy was a key figure in the decision before it became his job at TRADOC to figure 
out how to organize and train with the “big five.”  
TRADOC’s Special Readiness Study Group, headed by Major General Morris J. 
Brady, visited the battlefields of the Yom Kippur War and gleaned some one-hundred 
and sixty-two Army-specific issues for consideration.  Three overarching conclusions 
emerged.  “First, the battlefield environment was far more lethal than ever before.  
Second, fighting demanded a highly trained and integrated combat arms team.  Third, 
tactical training could make the difference between success and failure.”81
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Thinking about the future of war was, as the above discussion suggests, influenced 
by a number of factors.  New technology, studies of the Yom Kippur War, the reality of 
recruitment challenges, expectations that conventional forces could bolster deterrence, 
and the need to create a new generation of leaders conditioned to think they could fight 
and win shaped DePuy’s views of Army reform.  DePuy’s success can be attributed to his 
envious position of being a leader of other impassioned, visionary leaders, all cast from 
the same common sense mold and driven by the belief that reform was a strategic 
imperative.  
A generation of notable Army leaders gravitated to the challenge of rebuilding Army 
doctrine from the ground up. Among them was Brig. Gen Paul Gorman, another 
TRADOC founding father, who radically changed the foundation of Army training.  
Standards and skill qualification evaluations were overhauled.  Gorman supervised the 
revision of all Army training literature.  Reflecting on the lack of realistic training 
environments, especially in Europe where political concerns severely limited live-fire 
exercises and large-scale maneuvers, Gorman fought for what became the National 
Training Center (NTC) in the desert at Fort Irwin, California.  (George Patton had once 
recommended the same area for armor training.)  A dedicated space large enough to 
exercise with modern weapons at realistic ranges also offered the ability for combined 
air-ground training. Instrumentation to document training in high-tempo scenarios 
improved the learning process.  Lasers and other technological means were eventually 
adapted to increase the reality of training for the muddy boots soldiers and, equally 
important, newly commissioned, not-yet-muddied platoon leaders.  
Reflecting back on the Army’s turn from the rice paddies of Southeast Asia to the 
plains of Europe in 1973, General Don Starry (Ret.), who succeeded DePuy as the head 
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of TRADOC, remembers that “the Soviets had been very busy while [the Army] was 
preoccupied with Vietnam” and had “embraced the notion that they could fight and win 
at the operational level of war with or without nuclear weapons.  Their preferred solution: 
without.”82  Even if Soviet forces had in fact adapted their thinking on nuclear weapons, 
NATO’s doctrine of flexible response and U.S. declaratory policy concerning nuclear 
weapons use assumed that NATO would employ tactical nuclear weapons to stop a 
Soviet conventional assault.  Based on command assignments in Europe, Starry did not 
believe the decision to use tactical nukes could be made in time to prevent Soviet 
armored forces from racing across the west German plains into NATO territory.  Similar 
sentiments abounded, giving rise to debate among policy makers and students of security 
over Soviet capabilities and intentions.  Bipartisan concern swirled over the reliability of 
U.S. and NATO warning systems to uncover any signs of impending attack.  
TRADOC spearheaded the creation and evolution of a new capstone warfighting 
doctrine, field manual (FM) 100-5, Operations, published in 1976 and revised in 1982 
and 1986 (revisions are discussed in chapter 5).  
The promise of new technology informed doctrinal innovation. Innovations in 
conventional doctrine and strategy, thereafter, would combine surveillance, targeting, and 
guidance systems at greater levels of sophistication and at greater battlefield depths, a 
trend that persists today.  Additionally, the drive toward precision, accuracy, and 
increased timeliness emerging from 1970s operational challenges would evolve into the 
“rapid dominance” and “rapid decisive operations” schools of thought in the early 2000s.  
Doctrine would serve as an aid to integrate new technology and operational concepts.
Among the new concepts was standoff precision strike enabling Army units to 
identify, track, target, and destroy moving targets before they were in a direct line of fire. 
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Army R&D efforts included the helicopter-mounted Stand Off Target Acquisition System 
(SOTAS), an airborne targeting system similar in concept and operations to the Air 
Force’s E-3.  The Lance nuclear missile was adapted to the General Support Rocket 
System, a non-nuclear long-range precision strike system that evolved into the Multiple 
Rocket Launcher System (MRLS) successfully used in the 1991 Gulf War.  Precision 
strike required precision munitions.  Among the initiatives addressing the Soviet 
conventional forces threat were the Air Force’s wide area anti-armor (WAAM) project 
and the Army’s Terminally Guided Sub-Munition (TGSM) designed for rocket systems 
and artillery.
One of the core tenets of the 1976 manual, which espoused an Active Defense 
doctrine, and indeed a precept ingrained in Starry’s vision for the Army throughout the 
decade, was the importance of the initiative in battle over virtually all other factors, 
including sheer numbers.  His thoughts on this issue were shaped by detailed studies of 
some thousand battles involving numerically uneven forces.  Some argued that smaller 
forces fighting outnumbered (with a 6:1 disadvantage) could be successful by seizing and 
maintained the initiative throughout the battle, something that required advanced 
technology and new organizational constructs.83
Richard Swain explains the underlying argument.  Active Defense was premised on 
“an imperative to see deep to find the following echelon, move fast to concentrate forces, 
strike quickly before the enemy could break the defense, and finish the fight before the 
second echelon closed with the defenders.”84  Strict adherence to the principle of 
“economy of force” was required along with the ability to absorb an attack, channel it, 
and then launch superior counter-attacks at key moments against weaknesses.  For the 
countless U.S. military theorists rediscovering Clausewitz in the early 1980s, this 
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reflected the Prussian’s concept of a “culminating point.” It would take years for the 
underlying logic to be reflected in a coherent deep battle framework in which targeting 
capabilities, long-range fires, and electronic warfare restored initiative to Army maneuver 
units.
The 1976 manual was criticized almost immediately upon publication.  Early 
criticism came from Congressional staffer William Lind in an Armed Forces Journal
article.  His systematic critique of the inner workings of Active Defense was damning.  
Among the important points Lind raised was the doctrine’s glaring lack of attention to 
wining the “second battle,” or defeating echelons of Soviet forces after stopping the first 
one.85  Others soon joined Lind, resulting in a wide and varied assault. One historian 
described it as “the most read and most attacked doctrinal statement in the history of 
written doctrine in the U.S. Army.”86  Criticism addressed the core concepts, overall 
process, and virtually all aspects of the doctrinal precepts espoused.  A constructive, 
albeit heated debate ensued.  Main lines of dissent included the feasibility of advanced 
technology as a solution, the proper Army division and corps structure for achieving 
agility, the efficacy of different defensive postures (e.g., forward defense versus a defense 
in depth), and the optimal mix of armored and light infantry forces.  Interlocutors all had 
the same objective: fixing shortcomings in American military doctrine. 
In pushing for new thinking, Lind worked closely with then Air Force Lieutenant 
Colonel John R. Boyd.  Boyd is most remembered for his Observation-Orientation-
Decision-Action (OODA) Loop construct, part of a larger theory of conflict that has 
indirectly profoundly changed how the U.S. military thinks about warfighting.  In his 
book on Boyd’s contributions to fighter tactics, airplane design, and warfare theory, 
Grant Hammond concluded that Boyd “helped set the stage for a complete revision of 
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U.S. Army doctrine” and “helped the Marine Corps to embrace maneuver warfare.87
Hammond sums up the views of others in stating that “Boyd’s hundreds of ‘Patterns of 
Conflict’ briefings around the Pentagon and throughout the U.S. military had prepared 
the ground for a different approach to war fighting for the American military.”88
Boyd and Lind, who many claim knew more about the history of warfare than 
anyone else in the Pentagon, shaped the intellectual core of what Senator Gary Hart, on 
whose staff Lind served, termed the military reform movement.  The reform movement 
included several thrusts.  In addition to doctrine related to Central Europe, the reform 
movement would influence the evolution of a maneuver-based Marine Corps warfighting 
doctrine, designs for the F-16 and A-10 aircraft, how new weapon systems were tested 
and evaluated, and the defense planning and budgeting process.  Several members of the 
movement achieved national status as their fights against outmoded thinking and 
bureaucratic ineptness received national media attention.  From the late 1970s through 
roughly 1984, the reform movement elevated defense planning, readiness, and doctrinal 
issues to a front-page debate. Although it did not receive the same level of attention as 
later issues such as defense planning and budgeting problems, Active Defense was one of 
their targets.
Developed out of war games designed to explore alternatives for a defense of NATO 
that Starry participated in as Commandant of the Command and General Staff School – in 
collaboration with DePuy, Active Defense was poorly understood even among those 
assigned to teach it.  Unclear articulation of precepts left readers questioning how to 
implement the doctrine, leading to a 1978 manual on implementation and execution. 
Starry himself found it difficult to teach Active Defense to his staff when he served as 
Commander of V Corps in Europe from February 1976 through June 1977.  
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While commanding V Corps, he encountered an institutional malaise that seemed to 
discourage commanders from pursuing innovations in training and other factors that 
might bolster preparations for combat.  Few subordinate maneuver commanders were 
familiar with the terrain they were to defend, a deficiency he sought to overcome by 
leading intensive staff rides across NATO’s Central European front.  How could 
commanders seize and gain the initiative when defending NATO Allies if they didn’t 
know the terrain?  How could new leaders be educated to successfully operate at the 
operational level of warfare, where successfully leading corps-level units required a 
deeper understanding of the principles of warfare and the art of command?  Drawing on 
his tour in Europe, Starry would lead an effort to address these and other questions when 
he assumed command of TRADOC. 
To their credit, senior leaders welcomed debate, perhaps recognizing FM 100-5’s
flaws or its status as an interim step; however hesitantly, at the very least it encouraged 
dialogue on the future of the Army.  It stands as a transitional document in the evolution 
of military thought during the late 1970s, one that spawned “some of the richest for 
professional dialogue in the U.S. Army’s history.”89  In 1979, even as Army Chief of 
Staff Edward C. “Shy” Meyer directed Starry to revise the manual, Meyer noted that the 
manual wrought “profound and widespread dialogue across the entire spectrum of basic 
tactical doctrine” and “caused people to think aloud for a change.”90
DARPA and the Offset Strategy
An often overlooked but crucial event occurred in 1973 at the start of the formative 
period of the American RMA :  Malcolm S. Currie was appointed the Director of Defense 
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for Research and Engineering (DDR&E) and the Defense Advanced Research Project 
Agency (DARPA) was directed to address the Soviet conventional threat. 
Founded as the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) in 1958 and renamed
in 1972, DARPA’s work influenced the course of force modernization and military 
thought in areas as diverse as precision strike, sensor development, battlefield 
visualization, and automated targeting.  In 1974, for example, DARPA sponsored a 
workshop “specifically aimed to create ‘a renaissance in conventional weapons 
technology and research.’”91  It led to new approaches for modeling the penetration of 
materials like armor by high-velocity weapons, leading to improvements in the M-1 tank 
main gun.
Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) researcher Richard Van Atta has led or 
participated in several studies documenting DARPA’s Cold War programs and 
accomplishments.  Many of the successful programs evolved roughly parallel to the 
necessity-based innovation framework discussed in chapter 2.  Of chief concern in the 
next chapter is Assault Breaker, begun in 1978.  Some background information is 
warranted.  Organizations exploring alternate approaches to meeting the Soviet threat 
turned to emerging technologies and organizational initiatives, including doctrine.   When 
the threat environment placed additional impetus on resolving strategic and operational 
challenges, what this chapter terms reconstituting flexible response to restore deterrence 
stability, political support for increased defense spending provided resources to fund 
research and development.  An innovation milieu emerged that was conducive to 
developing potentially disruptive technologies and systems.  Projects under DARPA’s 
purview during the Cold War contributed to technologies, weapons systems, sensors, and 
knowledge management capabilities underscoring U.S. military prominence in the 2000s.  
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The Agency also played an important role in the evolution of computing technology, 
including the Internet.  
Currie appointed George Heilmeier to head DARPA in 1974, charging him to 
energize DARPA to “harness emerging technology capabilities to address the challenge 
of Soviet military” advances and evolve leap-ahead technologies to offset Soviet 
superiority in Europe.92  Among the core technology thrusts Heilmeier established, which 
shaped DARPA’s efforts into the mid-1980s, were follow-on-forces attack with stand-off 
weapons and associated command and control capabilities; programs to bolster U.S. 
armor against enemy anti-armor weapons; develop U.S. anti-armor weapons; space-based 
infrared sensors; and stealth technology.  
These thrusts aligned DARPA’s future work with the nation’s pressing strategic and 
operational challenges, a shift that reflected the Agency’s core mission.  DARPA’s 
predecessor, ARPA, was, in fact, established in 1958 after the 1957 Soviet launching of 
the Sputnik satellite “to ensure that the United States would never be left behind in the 
area of new technology.”93  Through 1960 the focus remained on the “‘Presidential 
Issues’” of space; Ballistic Missile Defense. . .and nuclear test detection.”94  From 1960 
through 1965 missile defense and test detection work continued (accounting for some 70 
percent of the budget) alongside new focus areas supporting counter-insurgency warfare 
(reflecting the importance of the conflict in Vietnam) and on computer processing.  The 
decade 1966-1975 witnessed a relative lull in large-scale research activities specifically 
attuned to key strategic challenges – perhaps another externality of Vietnam.  
As the strategic import of conventional research and development returned, and with 
the reinvigoration of DARPA under new leadership, the agency turned to “‘high risk, 
high potential payoff’ work in the mid- and late-1970s, including computer research.95
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DARPA projects engendered “a fundamental revolution in integrated circuit design” that 
“had a major impact on computer technology.” 96  In the early 1980s, the Strategic 
Computing Initiative reflected the emerging recognition of computing and 
microelectronics as a primary area of national security.  
Areas of particular interest to this study are those involving interdiction of forces 
behind an enemy’s front lines.  DARPA’s rejuvenation and redirection reflected a post-
Vietnam wellspring in military technology development.  History of technology scholar 
Alex Roland notes that the “Army concluded from Vietnam that it needed not less 
technology but more.  It was not that smart weapons were bad; rather, they were not 
smart enough.”97 A vision for future warfare emerged.  In 1969, in the aftermath of the 
Tet Offensive as American support for the dampened, General William C. Westmoreland 
envisioned a future battlefield where “enemy forces will be located, tracked and targeted 
almost instantaneously through the use of data links, computer assisted intelligence 
evaluation, and automated fire control.”98  In language nearly indistinguishable from 
persistent surveillance arguments in the early 2000s, Westmoreland envisioned having 
“24 hour real or near real time surveillance of all types” and a force “built into and 
around an integrated areas control systems that exploits the advanced technology of 
communications, sensors, fire direction, and the required automatic data processing.”99
Computers, or digital processing power, were the key to achieving the vision.  A year 
later Congressional hearings on the “electronic battlefield” concluded that “the electronic 
or automated battlefield represented a whole series of technologies and programs that 
were combining to form a totally new American way of war.”100  Senator Barry 
Goldwater opined that battlefield information systems represented “the greatest step 
forward in warfare since gunpowder.”101
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Richard Swain notes that as the Army sought to revise its doctrine, training, and 
force structure after Vietnam, “the new mantra” would be General  DePuy’s similar 1974 
vision for the future: “What can be seen, can be hit.  What can be hit can be killed.”102
For current students of defense planning and military thought there is nothing profound in 
this.  Still, U.S. planners seeking conventional solutions to perceived strategic and 
operational challenges in Europe during the 1970s viewed increasingly tight, and 
effective, coupling of sensors with strike systems a watershed in military history.  
Testifying on the proposed budget, Currie told Congress that some forty percent of 
the planned Fiscal Year 1977 research and development funds – more than four billion 
dollars – would be devoted to tactical issues.  Investments, he argued, “reflected a 
transformation occurring in military technology” that would “change concepts and 
capabilities in command and control, mobility, armor/anti-armor, night fighting, massed 
firepower and the precision application of force at a distance.”103
Van Atta and Michael Lippitz argue that a broadly defined approach for leveraging 
emerging technology emerged by the end of the 1970s.  Directed at the R&D community, 
the approach was a defense strategy to “offset” Soviet numerical superiority in Europe.  
Jointly devised by Carter’s Secretary of Defense Harold Brown and Director of Defense 
Research & Engineering William Perry, who replaced Currie, the offset strategy 
consolidated an existing, theretofore diffuse base of support for technology and 
organizational innovations.  Perry recognized that integrating activities begun by Currie 
and DARPA director George Heilmeier could increase the operational, and strategic, 
effectiveness of U.S. conventional forces.  In his words, doing so provided “qualitative 
advantages to American forces to offset the quantitative advantage the Soviet forces 
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enjoyed” and later “achieved the status of a ‘revolution in military affairs.”104  Notably, 
Perry retained Heilmeier as the Director of DARPA.
Precision strike capabilities were at the heart of the vision for reconstituting flexible 
response.  In his 1978 testimony to the Senate Committee on Armed Services Perry 
outlined why precision strike advances offered the “‘greatest single potential for force 
multiplication’” to meet the Soviet threat in Europe:
Precision-guided weapons, I believe, have the potential for revolutionizing 
warfare.  More importantly, if we effectively exploit the lead we have in this 
field, we can greatly enhance our ability to deter war without having to 
compete tank for tank, missile for missile, with the Soviet Union. . . .In sum, 
the objective of our precision guided weapon systems to give us the 
following capabilities: to be able to see all high value targets on the 
battlefield at any time; to be able to make a direct hit on any targets we can 
see; and to be able to destroy any target we can hit.105
Perry’s testimony illuminates the essential vision of the “offset strategy,” a term that 
in hindsight appears somewhat pedestrian in its straightforwardness because it had none 
of the unique symbolism or notoriety of other Cold War terms.  Substantively, however, 
the offset strategy spawned a technology investment portfolio yielding unprecedented 
returns in both military and non-military applications.  Such results largely derived from 
computer and information technology components.  
Although not formalized as a defense department program in the same guise as 
flexible response or massive retaliation, the offset strategy nonetheless shaped 
modernization decisions in the late 1970s and became the de facto principle underlying 
the Reagan defense build-up in the early 1980s.   
The offset strategy was an early expression of  “systems of systems” thinking.  The 
vision?  A “synergistic application of improved technologies – electronic 
countermeasures, command and control (communications, data links, and networks), 
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stealth, embedded computers (microprocessors), and precision guidance (advanced 
sensors) – would allow the U.S. to overcome Soviet defenses and destroy Soviet tank 
legions.”106  The result?  Information technology made possible the integration of 
surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities with weapons systems.  Existing systems 
became more effective.  This was the pivot on which flexible response would be 
reconstituted.  It is also an early attempt at what complexity theorists would later discuss 
in terms of an emergent property.
A coalition for change cohered around the strategically focused offset strategy and 
built on operational visions espoused by Westmoreland, DePuy, Starry, and others.   
Leadership was a crucial factor.  In addition to believing that existing R&D programs 
could be merged to more effectively address the strategic challenge of raising the nuclear 
threshold in Europe, Perry also understood that developments in microchips and 
computer processing were creating new opportunities at an unprecedented pace. Again, 
the aim was to enable existing systems and capabilities through integration, multiplying 
their individual combat power.  In the 2000s, similar arguments cohered around the term 
‘horizontal integration.’  
After the offset strategy jelled as an overarching vision for U.S. defense planning in 
the late 1970s, the initial steps to implement it fell to technologists.  DARPA played a 
pivotal role.  Working closely with Service counterparts and drawing on the studies like 
the 1976 Defense Science Board summer study, the research and development 
community benefited from insights into crucial operational requirements.  Intelligence 
analysts informed the process from the beginning.  Indeed, the Deputy Director of 
DARPA’s Tactical Technology Office, Robert Moore, recalled that the office received 
“increasing amounts of information on the Soviet tank threats in Europe,” including 
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“regular intelligence briefings.”107  Areas of emphasis included standoff precision strike, 
stealth aircraft, and real-time command, control, communications, computers, 
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR).  By the mid-1980s, a combination 
of programs and initiatives – increasingly related in concept, doctrine, or operations –
cohered, leading to the “implementation of disruptive capabilities.”108
Once technology developers understood the overarching strategic challenge and 
potential solutions – even those years away from prototyping, they collectively attacked 
the underlying operational requirement to interdict and disrupt second echelon forces.  
For example, as early as 1975 Leland Strom, an expert on radar in Moore’s office, 
proposed “the concept of using an MTI (Moving Target Indicator ) radar to track a 
missile to a ground target (e.g., group of tanks), ‘close the loop’ to guide it to the target 
and use terminally guided submunitions for the endgame.”109  This was one of the 
projects Perry and others recognized as feasible for a larger system of systems to offset 
Soviet numerical superiority.
Another development warrants attention.  Integral to the offset strategy were changes 
in defense acquisition processes.  Brown acted to improve “a highly stereotyped system 
of acquisition that basically was conceived in reaction to our failures” to improve, 
relative to the Soviets, the U.S. ability “to translate available – and roughly comparable –
technology and productive capability into the most effective military posture.”110  To 
achieve this, a formal process for developing and coordinating “mission needs” was 
developed, with a Mission Element Need Statement required in addition to other 
requirement documents. Over time, as military forces were increasingly integrated with a 
joint warfare framework, mission needs evolved into mission capability packages. 
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On the Present Danger and National Security Planning
Several aspects of the national security decision king context warrant attention 
before leaving the 1970s.  No history of this period can overlook the profound shifts in 
American culture and attitudes that transpired during the decade.  In his acclaimed How 
We Got Here: The 1970s, David Frum discuses changes in the attitude of American 
citizens toward government that effected the context in which leaders in the executive 
and legislative branches approach defense policy.111  Early in the decade Americans 
seemingly lost faith, or at least what had been a blind trust, in the government.  No single 
event or action caused this, despite the importance some assign to Vietnam or Watergate 
as playing a determining role.  Indeed, as Frum argues, “Americans did not lost their faith 
in institutions because of the Watergate scandal; Watergate because a scandal because 
Americans were losing their faith in institutions.”112
Faith was not restored at the end of the decade; criticism of government activities 
continued.  An interesting reversal occurred in underlying opinions of defense spending, 
foreign policy, and intelligence activities.  Whereas the early 1970s brought frustration 
over the handling of Vietnam and arguments for reduced defense spending in light of 
detente, the end of the decade brought criticism of defense policy and intelligence for 
underestimating the threat.  Consider defense spending.  At mid-decade “18 percent of 
Americans said the country was spending “too little’ on defense; in 1978 the number 
jumped to 29 percent; “by 1980, an overwhelming 60 percent worried the country was 
spending ‘too little.’”113
What accounts for the change in public opinion?  Knowledge of international 
developments, including increased fears of Soviet aggression, account for part of the 
change.  More importantly, perhaps, was an explosion of domestic debate over Carter 
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foreign policy and defense decisions, a debate aggravated by successive crises, a poor 
economy, and the sense of national malaise mentioned above.   
Most pronounced were criticisms of Carter defense and foreign policy.  Arguments 
that U.S. defense spending was too low to preserve readiness mounted.  Bipartisan 
criticism of defense policy reached critical mass in 1977.  Internationally, relations would 
soon sour with the Soviet Union, Iran succumbed to revolution, American hostages were 
held in Tehran, Allies would balk at some defense planning decisions that seemed to 
weaken U.S. credibility in the defense of Europe, and perceptions of stability in the 
Persian Gulf declined after the Soviets invaded Afghanistan.  “The answer,” Gaddis 
found, “in terms both of international events and of what was necessary for him to retain 
domestic political support, was to subordinate all other foreign-policy considerations to 
the rebuilding of military power.”114  Important outcomes for this study included a 
reversal in the defense planning and the “Carter doctrine,” a commitment to defend 
American interests in the Middle East.  Both of these policy shifts were reinforced in the 
1980s.      
On foreign policy, voters had considered Carter’s relative inexperience in foreign 
affairs an asset.  Perhaps he would be less likely to entangle the U.S. in protracted 
conflicts – a concern at mid-decade.  Carter did enter office believing his administration 
could lessen the role military strength played in international affairs and, as Gaddis Smith 
concludes, “Carter and some of his advisers were readier than any of their predecessors to 
stare directly at the reality of nuclear weapons” and struggle with “the problems of the 
nuclear age.”115  Through 1977 and 1978, it seemed the approach might yield progress on
several fronts.   
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But trouble was brewing domestically and internationally.  1979 was a pivotal year.  
In September a large Soviet military presence (some 3,000 troops) was discovered in 
Cuba; a revolution in Iran led to the 4 November occupation of the American embassy in 
Tehran and seizure of fifty-three American hostages; Soviet expansionism in Africa 
continued; Soviet naval forces were more assertive globally; and in December Moscow 
sent troops into Afghanistan.  Closer to home, the self-proclaimed Marxist Maurice 
Bishop seized power in Grenada and a revolution occurred in Nicaragua, both setting in 
motion events that would spur U.S. military action in the 1980s.
In this context, domestic political forces originating earlier in the decade gained 
momentum, tapping changes in public opinion to mobilize support.  The Coalition for a 
Democratic Majority (CDM), a group formed in 1972 by conservative Washington 
senator Henry “Scoop” Jackson, lobbied more aggressively for “peace through strength” 
and a return to aggressive containment of Soviet expansionism.  Members included 
Senators Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Sam Nunn, and Charles Robb and representative Les 
Aspin.  Academics included Seymour Martin Lipset, Eugene Rostow, Roy Godson, 
Samuel Huntington, and Richard Pipes.  CDM members later formed the core of the 
“Reagan democrats” supporting increased defense spending in the 1980s.  
Aligned with CDM in the cause of promoting increased defense spending were a 
Washington, DC think tank, the American Enterprise Institute, and the Committee on the 
Present Danger (CPD).  The latter, among the most influential public advocacy groups of 
the Cold War, borrowed its name from a similar group formed in the 1950s to lobby the 
Truman administration for increased defense spending.  Initiated during a 1976 lunch 
attended by Nitze, the author of NSC-68, a press conference formally announced CPD’s 
existence just two days after Carter’s January 1977 inauguration.  Among its members 
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was Ronald Reagan, who brought more than thirty CPD associates into his 
administration. 
Intellectually, calls for increased U.S. defense spending and for intelligence reform 
were tightly coupled to arguments for conventional forces to reinforce deterrence stability 
in Europe.  As détente crumbled, European stability returned as a central point of 
discussion in domestic politics.  Again, perceived inconsistencies in Carter policy fueled 
criticism. 
Apparent contradictions in Carter’s foreign policy positions confused both Soviet 
leaders and more hawkish critics.  A pro-disarmament stance combined with pressuring 
NATO Allies to increase their forces.  He canceled the B-1 bomber, but initially pursued 
an advanced radiation (neutron) bomb – later cancelled, then approved cruise missiles, 
and accuracy and yield improvements for the Minuteman III missile.  The Carter 
Doctrine and a rapid deployment force seemed out of balance with arguments for 
nonintervention in the third world.  Interest in Moscow’s involvement in Middle East 
peace talks were followed by exclusion from the Camp Davis accord.  Of course, Soviet 
leaders were hardly amenable to achieving the full potential détente, preferring to accept 
cooperation on select issues relating to Central European stability that reinforced the 
status quo in Eastern Europe while seeking relative advantage elsewhere.  Attention to 
third world issues opened anew paths for East-West conflict.  By the end of the decade, 
an expansionist foreign policy led to increased Soviet involvement in Angola, Ethiopia, 
Southeast Asia, Afghanistan, and the Persian Gulf.  Soviet military capabilities in Europe 
steadily increased, leading to renewed discussions of NATO’s deterrence credibility and, 
domestically, a perception problem that undermined Carter’s re-election campaign.  
Critics also charged Carter with fumbling intelligence reporting on the Soviet threat.  
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During the formative period of the American RMA, students of national security affairs 
and military history received historically unprecedented insights into past wartime and 
combat intelligence successes.  For example, most of the public remained ignorant of the 
role of intelligence during World War II before the 1974 publication of F. W. 
Winterbotham’s The Ultra Secret.  Ultra was the code name given to intercepted and 
decrypted communications that had been encoded on an ENIGMA cipher machine, the 
design for which the British received from Polish operatives before the war.  An official 
ban on referencing Ultra was lifted in 1974, allowing Winterbotham to divulge 
previously classified information about British cryptography and the breaking of German 
high command codes.  From early in the war, the British had access to a large fraction of 
the radio communications between Hitler to his senior commanders and from senior 
leaders to their subordinates.  High command communications “reached British 
intelligence almost at the same time the messages arrives at their intended destination.”116
Fascination with such revelations created a public interest, even appetite, for insights into 
U.S. intelligence.  Meanwhile, public discussions – really criticism – of U.S. intelligence 
estimates on Soviet military capabilities and the role of the CIA in Vietnam increased 
awareness of the role of intelligence in foreign policy making.   
In the post-Vietnam political climate public criticism of the CIA was widespread, 
providing a ready-made platform notables and intellectuals found useful to leverage.  In 
the mid-1970s, moreover, congressional hearings on CIA covert operations opened the 
agency to further scrutiny while lowering its credibility in the eyes of many.  Leadership 
changes did not help – four different CIA directors served from 1973 through 1976, when 
George H. Bush assumed the reigns and approved what was known as the Team B 
exercise.  
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The activity was led by CDM Soviet Scholar Richard Pipes, administered out of 
CDM offices, and reinforced the formation of the CPD.  Few Cold War intelligence 
activities have received as much attention as this 1976 experiment to produce competitive 
analysis on the Soviet threat.  It consisted of three teams of non-government Soviet 
experts given access to classified information for the sole purpose of providing an 
alternate, or competitive, assessment of the same material government analysts used to 
produce national intelligence estimates, the capstone intelligence assessments produced 
by the U.S. intelligence community.   Teams studied, respectively, Warsaw Pact low-
altitude air defenses, the accuracy of Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles, and 
Moscow’s strategic policies and objectives.  Pipes chaired the third team, which received 
national attention.  Press leaks on Team B activities began days after the first meeting.
The origins and unfolding of the Team B experiment reflected the national climate.  
Apparently, its conceptual origins derived from archetypal Cold War strategist, and 
University of Chicago Professor Albert Wohlstetter’s 1974 criticism of CIA national 
intelligence estimates.  He claimed Soviet capabilities were underestimated.  Keegan 
posited in 1977 “that “the shocking fact about our intelligence community, with its 
thousands of able, competent, and dedicated people is, that for 25 years, it has 
consistently underestimated” the threat.117  After Reagan’s election, many of the Team B 
members, to turn a metaphor, became the A team in the new administration.  
Wohlstetter was also an early advocate for advanced conventional forces, arguing in 
a 1974 issue of the international affairs journal Orbis that increased accuracies made it 
“possible to use non-nuclear munitions in many circumstances where a desperate hope 
had formerly been pinned on using small nuclear weapons.”118  Noteworthy for this story 
of the American RMA is the conjoining of criticism of Carter defense and foreign policy, 
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revelations that Soviet force strength had been underestimated, public discussions of U.S. 
defense reform, and continued political antipathy to sole reliance on nuclear weapons.  
Among the issues reformers addressed were doctrinal and technological options to offset 
Soviet forces.  Advanced conventional weapons and new doctrine emerged as a likely, 
and less expensive, alternative.  
Pro-defense groups and other domestic influences on the Carter administration surely 
helped shape the foreign policy and defense planning reversals that defined his last year 
in office.  Military spending was roughly twice the level it was when he assumed office.  
Yet, Carter’s policies were not necessarily wrong as they were inflexible in the face of 
changing U.S. public opinion.  By the end of the decade, certainly as the hostage crisis 
chaffed the American psyche, and after defense policy debates highlighted threats to U.S. 
security, public opinion swung back in favor of higher defense spending.    
As the above discussion suggests, foreign policy and defense issues dominated the 
1980 presidential election.   Debate over the severity of the Soviet-U.S. military balance 
continued after the election.  Both the domestic political situation and worse case analysis 
of the balance of power warranted action.  “By this time,” one analyst concludes, “Soviet 
factories were busy spitting out an average of five fighter planes, eight tanks, eight 
artillery pieces, and at least one ICBM every day.”119  Concurrent with the steady stream 
of equipment flowing into the western-most Red Army units, equipment continued to 
flow to the third world where it threatened U.S. allies, security partners, and general 
stability.  
It was not just the numbers raising concerns.  Strategic relations seemed less certain, 
less stable.  “If one were to sum up developments in the Soviet army during 1977 and 
1978 in one word,” noted Soviet scholar Christopher Donnelly concluded, “it would be 
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sophistication.”120  Writing in Aviation Week and Space Technology, retired Major 
General George Keegan, Jr., former chief of Air Force intelligence, asserted that the U.S.  
“lacks the firepower, lacks the accuracy, and lacks the yields to overcome the enormous 
advantage in terms of neutralizing our retaliatory punch which the Soviets have 
engineered for themselves at great cost.”121
Another element of the domestic political environment concerned the likelihood that 
a crisis would lead to uncontrolled escalation.  With U.S. cruise missiles and Pershing II 
missiles deployed in Europe, some European leaders compared the strained East-West 
relationship and reciprocal military buildups to the pre-World War I environment.  
Misinterpretation could easily spark war, something that added a sense of impending 
crisis to an already heated domestic policy debate.
A New Context for Defense Planning 
Several notable national security documents signed during the last years of the Carter 
administration warrant mentioning – they reflect changes in the overall context of 
national security planning.  
November 1979 brought the first national-level security planning document on 
command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3I).  It promulgated national 
objectives for C3I, including a national telecommunications capability to preserve 
command of nuclear forces, a decision that supported some projects that supported 
research and development on antecedents to the internet.  A new continuity in 
government operations directive followed a year later.  March 1980 brought updated 
national guidance on mobilization, something that had not been done for nearly twenty 
years. That July, Carter signed Presidential Directive (PD) 59, shifting U.S. nuclear 
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employment policy to strategic military targets and mandating that the U.S. be able to 
fight a protracted nuclear war.  Adhering to PD 59 required further C3I advances, more 
flexible targeting, and new nuclear weapons
Carter also reprogrammed defense dollars to improve European readiness.  European 
manpower levels rose from some 300,000 troops in 1975 to 330,000 at the end of the
decade.  This renewed commitment to U.S. capabilities in Europe was reinforced by the 
Reagan administration.   In addition to increasing defense spending, in 1980 Carter 
authorized providing Afghani mujahidin with arms (including artillery), boycotted the
Moscow Olympics, imposed a grain embargo, and announced the Carter Doctrine 
(discussed below).  It is also important recognize that decisions about defense research 
and military innovation made during the formative years of the American RMA, during 
the Carter years, established the momentum and direction needed to make the Reagan 
years the maturation phase of the RMA.
Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance received increased attention among 
national security scholars in the 1970s, in part due to public debate about the validity of 
U.S. intelligence estimates, Congressional committees and investigations into intelligence 
operations, and after Ultra was revealed.  Revelations about Soviet nuclear and 
conventional capabilities coupled with perceptions of renewed Soviet aggression in the 
third world to increase attention to the issue of surprise attack.   Defense planners called 
for improved national and theater strategic warning.  Concern mounted over Soviet 
activities in the third world.  
Conventional wisdom held that any crisis outside of Europe would quickly escalate, 
leading to a global conflict. During the 1980s, subsequently, capabilities designed to 
monitor Soviet forces in Central Europe and detect signs of increased Soviet readiness 
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were focused on regional security issues.  Persian Gulf stability was particularly 
important, leading to force structure changes, new themes in defense planning, and 
revised doctrine.  
Concerns about Soviet power in the Gulf steadily increased after the British 
withdrew their military presence in the late 1960s and early 1970s.  Carter national 
security adviser Zibigniew Brzezinski coined the term “arc of crisis” in 1977 to describe 
the area from Africa to Southeast Asia.  The region contained some seventy-five percent 
of the world’s known oil reserves and supplied a quarter of U.S. oil imports.  Equally 
important from the perspective of global economic stability, which became a significant 
U.S. national security issue in the 1970s, Western Europe imported roughly seventy 
percent of its oil from the Persian Gulf region.  Japan was totally dependant.  By 1980, 
U.S. trade with the Pacific basin surpassed Europe, making the stability of Asian 
economies – heavily dependant on Persian Gulf oil – a security concern.
One of Carter’s last significant foreign policy initiatives committed the U.S. to 
defending the region.  The Soviet’s 1979 invasion of Afghanistan was not part of a Soviet 
plan to dominate the Gulf, and the terrain did not realistically support a drive into Iran. 
Still, for U.S. defense analysts the cognitive image of potential Soviet dominance of the 
region engendered concern that Afghanistan was a prelude to something more ominous.  
The situation in Iran contributed to fears of Persian Gulf instability.  Ending a thirty-
five year U.S.-Iranian relationship, the 1979 Iranian revolution meant the loss a critical 
U.S. intelligence facility that monitored, among other things, Soviet missile tests as part 
of the American effort to monitor and verify SALT.    Soon thereafter, the aircraft carrier 
USS Dwight D. Eisenhower would steam for 251 days into, around, and back from the 
region, the Navy’s longest deployment since World War II.
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With some 100,000 troops in Afghanistan and the potential for Iran to align with 
Moscow, keeping the Persian Gulf from out of the Soviet orbit became a priority.  The 
U.S. also began aiding Saddam Hussein who, in leading Iraq into war with Iran, became 
an important ally in the struggle to prevent further Soviet inroads into the region.  
Fears of Soviet expansionism into the Persian Gulf – by direct invasion, being 
welcomed by a regional client state, or through revolutionary proxies – seemed to leave 
the U.S. no recourse but developing the capability for timely and decisive military 
intervention.  The Carter Doctrine was in fact an attempt to signal U.S. willingness to 
intervene; it was containment applied outside of the European theater.  Carter directed the 
Defense Department to form a military force capable of responding to crises outside of 
Europe and the Korean Peninsula, until then the only other region military planners 
scrutinized for force modernization requirements.    The Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) 
was established in late 1979, the year that Saddam Hussein seized power, and renamed 
the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF) in March 1980.  
Subordinated to the U.S. Readiness Command and headquartered in a converted 
bunker at MacDill Air Base in Tamp, Florida, the RDJTF was chartered to prepare plans, 
engage in joint training activities, conduct exercises, and ready for deployments in areas 
were U.S. interests were threatened.  Within a year of its creation, the RDJTF would 
complete some ten training exercises.  
Other developments raised the specter of Soviet mischief in the Gulf.  Moscow’s ties 
to the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen evoked the threat of plans to coerce Gulf 
monarchies, including Saudi Arabia and Oman.  Concerns were fueled by a wave of 
coups, murder plots, and border skirmishes between North and South Yemen in 1978 and 
1979.  South Yemen formally signed a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with the 
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Soviet Union in October 1979. These fears were later reinforced by Soviet overtures to 
Iraq.  Iran also remained a concern.  The 1979 Iranian revolution removed one of the two 
pillars in the U.S. strategy for the region, which had rested on security arrangements with 
Iran and Saudi Arabia.  Although Moscow was as surprised as Washington by the 
revolution, and although the Ayatollah Khomeini marginalized and then crushed pro-
Soviet parties, fears of Soviet regional penetration aggravated the sense of American 
impotence in the Persian Gulf.  Arguments in favor of a military capability to respond to 
Soviet aggression in the Persian Gulf region continued into the 1980s.  
The Carter Doctrine, the name given to the policy of policing the Persian Gulf, 
signaled a reversal in the principle underlying the Nixon Doctrine of placing the burden 
of conventional defense on the nation attacked.  A number of conceptual, technological, 
and doctrinal threads in post-Cold War American defense planning co-evolved with U.S. 
planning for conflict in the Persian Gulf and its bordering states.  More importantly, 
perhaps, the Gulf War provided a sense of emancipation from lingering post-Vietnam 
doubts and instilled confidence in American visions for a post-Cold War era.
Among other factors, the Carter Doctrine and formation of the RDF increased the 
need for operational, organizational, and technological solutions to spatial and temporal 
challenges of global nonnuclear strategic conflict.  It remains another key event marking 
the transition from the formative period of the American RMA  to the maturation period.  
Whereas the Nixon Doctrine reinforced the longevity of containment as a policy, the 
Carter Doctrine removed uncertainty about American willingness to commit military 
power.  Reacting to the potential forced installation of a Marxist or even pro-Soviet 
government in the Persian Gulf, the Carter Doctrine signaled U.S. commitment to use 
military force to contain Soviet expansionism outside of Europe.  In this sense, the Carter 
220
Doctrine opposed the 1968 Brezhnev Doctrine.  Announced in the aftermath of the Soviet 
invasion of Czechoslovakia, it signaled Moscow’s commitment to using its military 
power to keep Marxist or pro-Marxist governments in power.      
The Carter Doctrine and the RDF added important new dimensions to defense 
planning activities as the formative period of the American RMA  ended.    More 
importantly, increased attention to Persian Gulf security focused defense planning on 
understanding the requirements for moving military forces into the region and sustaining 
combat power.  Because this required deploying troops from Europe, Allies decided in 
May 1980 to accept the idea of U.S. forces protecting NATO redeploying to the Middle 
East.  Of note to students of U.S. Middle East policy, this was the first NATO agreement 
to support what post-Cold War NATO planners term “out of area operations.”  
Additionally, in 1979, Brzezinski suggested that the RDF would be used 
preemptively “in those parts of the world where our vital interests might be engaged and 
were there are no permanently stationed American forces.’”122  “It is not necessary,” 
Secretary of Defense Harold Brown similarly stated, for us to await the firing of the first 
shot or the prior arrival of hostile forces.”123  Although it would be more than a decade 
before the RDF was able to deploy significant combat power “rapidly” to regions other 
than Europe, the concept of rapid deployments was an early manifestation of what current 
military thinkers term rapid decisive action, a concept that reinforces the image of 
preemptive strikes.  Important here is the RDF’s existence as an extension of U.S. grand 
strategy into strategically important regions to counter Soviet influence.  The commander 
of the RDF, for example, warned in 1984 against viewing the unit as an “intervention 
force,” stating at a conference that the RDF’s “job is deterrence.”124
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Chapter Conclusion 
The years spanning from 1973 through the submission of the fiscal year 1981 
defense budget were the formative period of the American RMA.  Trends and processes 
cohered into a national defense strategy closely connected to a technology strategy – both 
primarily focused on the Soviet threat to NATO and secondarily to the Persian Gulf.  
International terrorism became a third area of focus.  Presidential candidate Ronald 
Reagan exploited perceived shortcomings of Carter’s policies in each of these security 
arenas. 
Strategic, technological, political, economic, and other contextual factors evolved in 
a way that created an innovation milieu the Reagan administration would mature into 
capabilities altering the strategic effectiveness of conventional forces.  Innovations 
undertaken to improve nuclear targeting and delivery were adapted to conventional 
missions and, in time, further evolved into new areas of innovation.     
The end of the 1970s marked the transition from post-Vietnam malaise to national 
resurgence.  It was certainly a political turning point in terms of the electoral mood in the 
United States.  Into this environment walked presidential candidate Ronald Reagan, 
whose mannerisms and rhetoric resonated with a nation that wanted the national 
Christmas tree to shine again – Carter had kept it dark during the Iranian hostage crisis.  
Known to history as the “great communicator,” Reagan fully exploited new 
communications technology.  A staunch anti-communist who campaigned on a platform 
promising to restore American power overseas, Reagan’s vision included reducing the 
threat of nuclear war and ending Moscow’s occupation of Eastern Europe.  A number of 
policy initiatives emerged to blunt or roll back Soviet power on different dimensions 
(military, economic, political). 
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During the 1970s, as the threat from Soviet nuclear and conventional forces 
increased, attention retuned to flexible response, which remained NATO’s declared 
strategy, and on the credibility of NATO’s nuclear deterrent.  As the decade unfolded, 
national security planners pursued alternate paths for stabilizing deterrence.  Among them 
were arms control agreements, regional security cooperation forums, new tactical nuclear 
systems, surveillance and warning systems, improving war reserves and pre-positioning 
programs, and developing advanced conventional capabilities.  There was also greater 
realization in Washington that national security was tied to global economic affairs.  
Thinking about the linkages between economic security and military force, especially the 
role of presence, matured.   Post-Vietnam antipathies to funding modernization also 
waned.  Further elevating the attractiveness of conventional defense and retaliation 
options was sustained criticism of the logic of relying on nuclear weapons.  Finally, 
developments in technology led many to envision the production of advanced 
conventional capabilities, whereas only a decade earlier such capabilities were well 
beyond the realm of the possible.
Undersecretary of Defense for Research and Engineering from 1977-1981 William 
Perry was a chief architect of the strategy to use emerging technology to offset Soviet 
military advantages in Europe.  Reflecting in the aftermath of the 1991 Gulf War on what 
was presented here as the formative years of the American RMA, Perry concluded that 
during “the 1970s U.S. defense officials saw the opportunity to exploit the new 
developments in microelectronics and computers to great advantage in military 
applications.  The Defense Department conceived, developed, tested, produced and 
deployed the systems embodying the new technologies” and “ “developed the tactics for 
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using the new systems, and conducted extensive training with them, mostly under 
simulated field conditions.”125
As East-West relations soured and arms control negotiations stalled, the objective of 
restoring deterrence stability fixated on conventional deterrence. The formative phase of 
the American conventional warfighting RMA included a more complex and diversified 
approach to deterrence theorizing and military operations.  Complexity reached new 
levels in the 1970s when war planning, doctrine, and modernization decisions were 
increasingly attuned to notions of an integrated battlefield on which any number of 
conventional and nuclear operations might occur.  Historically, the offset strategy 
embodied the first theater and operational level U.S. innovation program to codify and 
pursue an information edge by linking systems within end-to-end information and 
decision-making architecture.  
Intelligence support to military operations evolved beyond mere support to strategic 
nuclear operations.  National intelligence systems previously attuned to strategic nuclear 
issues now addressed conventional force developments.  Strategic nuclear targeting 
support similarly migrated to aid conventional targeting.  Planning for theater nuclear 
strikes was supplemented by the need for theater conventional ones.  Strategic warfare 
was slowly defined in nonnuclear terms while maintaining the emphasis on time 
dominance and operations over greater distances.  Command, control, communications, 
intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance technologies developed for nuclear warfare 
were adapted to the theater conventional mission.  The successful diffusion of technology 
into organizations became more central to military planning.
Key weapon systems were beginning to be thought of a “system of systems” – a 
central concept in current military thought – for blunting or outright defeating 
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conventional Warsaw Pact attacks.  It is for this reason that retired Admiral Bill Owens 
and founding proponent of systems of systems thinking locates the origins of the 
American RMA  in the late 1970s.  Owens even suggests a year, 1977, when “key 
Pentagon officials . . . began to think in concert about the application of technology to 
military affairs.”126  Thinking about modernization changed in a fundamental way.  In 
previous eras technological modernization primarily focused on the capabilities of 
platforms.  Beginning in the mid-1970s, the emphasis began to shift to integrating 
platforms. 
Retired Lieutenant General (LTG) James C. King agrees that the late 1970s was an 
era of innovation, leading to significant capability increases in the 1980s.  King was 
successively the Director of Intelligence for the European Command and then the Joint 
Staff, retiring in 2001 after serving for three years as the Director of the National Imagery 
and Mapping Agency.  He participated in the Army’s post-Vietnam renewal after serving 
combat tours in Southeast Asia.    
By 1980, he argues, the mindset among commanders had changed.  LTG King 
recalls being the operations officer for an intelligence battalion in the Army’s 7th Corps 
deployed with the 3rd infantry division for a massive Return of Forces to Germany 
(Reforger) exercise in 1977.  Operational necessity encouraged innovation throughout the 
Army as commanders struggled to offset the Soviet’s numerical and perceived qualitative 
advantages in armor, helicopters, and artillery.  King remembers the strategic situation –
having to delay Soviet conventional forces for three weeks – as a prime motivator of 
innovation initiatives.127  Leaders were highly receptive to technological and 
organizational innovation.  If someone had an idea or technology, the Army would try it.  
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Integrating new technology into operations slowly emerged as a leadership 
characteristic.  The demonstration of technology in realistic training exercises was 
pursued aggressively, with senior leaders willing to insert new systems into operational 
units during exercises to assess their operational utility.  Soldiers began to understand the 
value of integrating new technologies and using information systems to link existing 
capabilities.  Rapid prototyping was encouraged.  Technology requirements were 
gathered and passed to organizations and technology testbeds, who then acted as 
executive agents for operational units in the development, testing, and fielding of new 
capabilities.  
Systems engineering and integration slowly emerged as an important component of 
military innovation at the theater level, just as they had at the strategic level with nuclear 
command and control decades earlier.  
An important system of systems legacy of the 1970s evolved from attempts to link 
modified ground-based radars and several airborne sensors to increase the situation 
awareness provided by the Joint Tactical Information Distribution System (JTIDS).  
These and other early joint information integration and fusion projects evolved into the 
common operating picture (COP) and geospatial awareness capabilities central to defense 
transformation in the 2000s.  Another benchmark supporting the characterization of this 
period as the formative stage in the American RMA was the 1977 flight of the Lockheed 
“Skunk Works” stealth technology demonstrator HAVE BLUE, leading to a contract for 
the F-117 Nighthawk.128
Characterizing shifts in defense planning at the end of the decade was a notable 
change in emphasis on the types of technologies suitable for returning American 
superiority.  Writing on the East-West military balance in a 1978 Foreign Affairs article, 
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Richard G. Head argued that the “combination of what may be increasing innovation with 
the continuity, steady quality growth, and high production rates of new and improved 
military systems indicates a technological trend in the balance of deployed military 
capability that is adverse for the United States.”129 What was different?  Arguments now 
called for conventional capabilities.   Alain Enthoven captured its essence in terms of the 
pressing strategic challenge of the time. “Our safety requires that if we really mean to 
maintain our nuclear guarantee as Europe’s last line of defense, we must have strong 
conventional forces a first line of defense.”130  Senator Nunn echoed his views: “As long 
as the United States maintained a pronounced nuclear superiority over the Soviet Union 
at both the strategic and tactical levels, we could effectively deter conventional 
aggression.  That superiority, however, has vanished, and with it the notion that NATO 
need not muster a credible conventional deterrent.”131
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5.  The Maturation Period: New Measures of Strategic Effectiveness
By 1980, the U.S. Army was undergoing revitalization in terms of force 
modernization, increased professionalism, and organizational focus on the primary 
strategic threat to U.S. security, Soviet forces in Central Europe.  Changes in how the 
U.S. pursued its grand strategy vis-à-vis the Soviet Union contributed to post-Vietnam 
renewal for all the Services as the Reagan administration increased defense spending.  
Although strategic affairs and programs such as the Strategic Missile Defense Initiative 
(dubbed Star Wars by a skeptical press) continued to dominate defense policy, the early 
1980s brought a more diverse discussion of strategic effectiveness that expanded well 
beyond the highly abstract discussions of nuclear deterrence.  After forty years of defense 
planning treating the notion of “strategic warfare” as being “synonymous with nuclear 
warfare,” two decades after Kennedy embraced flexible response, one decade after the 
U.S. left Vietnam, defense analyst Carl Builder noted in 1983 “a perceptible shifting of 
favor away from nuclear weapons, toward advanced conventional weaponry.”1
Emerging areas for security policy scholars in the early 1980s included conventional 
deterrence theories and cases studies that attempted to define conditions in which 
nonnuclear forces deterred attack.  Quantitative force correlation analyses modeled the 
different mixes of armor, infantry, aviation, and other forces to derive their strategic 
implications on deterrence relationships, readiness, and other factors.  These and other 
areas of studies were partly motivated by arguments that, over “the next decade or two,” 
emerging conventional warfighting capabilities – “nonnuclear weaponry” – could “and 
should be used in some of the major military roles” then “served by strategic nuclear 
forces.”2  In 1984, Marshal Nikolai V. Orgarkov posited that reconnaissance-strike 
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complexes along the lines of Assault Breaker could yield the effectiveness of tactical 
nuclear weapons.  
Foreshadowing one of the largely unspoken but nonetheless fundamental tenets of 
the post-Cold War RMA thesis, and notwithstanding the fact that nuclear strategy and 
strategic nuclear systems remained critical to national security strategy, conventional 
forces emerged from the shadow of nuclear theory to become a central factor in defense 
policy. This reflected the change in the mobilization of resources to achieve grand 
strategy, which Barry Posen defines in The Sources of Military Doctrine as “a political-
military, means-ends chain, a state’s theory about how it can best ‘cause’ security for 
itself.”3
A corresponding renaissance in military thought transpired, with military theorists 
and doctrine writers rediscovering maneuver warfare theory and combined operations.  
Ground warfare was the focal point of most new thinking about warfare.  It, more than 
other domains of combat, required cooperation among sea, air, land, and space forces. 
Strategic planning themes like rapid dominance, focused logistics, information 
superiority, and joint warfare gained prominence.  Doctrine was back in the hands of the 
warfighters. New training regimes and staff planning processes helped prepared 
commanders for the transition to war.  Light forces became more important strategically 
as planners contemplated the need to fight wars in several theaters simultaneously.
The Army established a High Technology Test Bed (HTTB) in June 1980 to work 
closely with the 9th Infantry Division, which would lead efforts to design, experiment 
with, and field new technology as well as attempt to develop new operational concepts.  
The HTTB developed concepts for light, agile, rapidly deployable units for regional 
crises.  Light infantry divisions were pursued in the early 1980s as planners responded to 
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requirements for flexible forces. Obtaining and sustaining the proper equipment called for 
in emerging concepts for light, agile forces was not viable given existing force 
modernization priorities.4
Civilian leadership mandated improvements in conventional early warning, increased 
readiness of European ground and air units, deep strike conventional forces, and more 
rapidly deployable forces able to check Soviet (or Soviet-backed) aggression outside of 
Europe.   Security challenges that were relatively “new” in the 1980s reinforced the quest 
to prevent surprise, to develop technological, organizational, and operational offsets to 
Soviet forces, to respond to instability or conflict in regions without U.S. bases, and to 
expedite U.S. responses to such crises with appropriate capabilities.  In Persian Gulf 
planning scenarios, projected munitions expenditure rates and the potential effect of 
precision weapons on the flat desert accentuated the need for timeliness and the ability to 
strike first at longer ranges with greater accuracy.  Securing oil fields and other geo-
strategic planning drivers levied a new requirement for light, agile, deployable forces 
with greater lethality but less mass.  The physical and psychological challenges posed by 
time and distance rallied planners and force developers; the challenge of compressing 
time and overcoming distance motivated research and development activities as much as 
the more tangible threat of Soviet armor.  Timeliness, deep strike, and precision, 
therefore, emerged as operational requirements for peripheral areas just as they had in the 
European theater.  
Associated with renewed attention to conventional force readiness was an under-
appreciated but powerful cognitive shift: planners expanded their thinking from merely 
deterring war to actually preparing to fight one.  
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During the early 1980s, furthermore, Army planners rewrote doctrine to reflect the 
more assertive and self-confident tone in U.S. grand strategy.   Led by the new Training 
and Doctrine Command, initiative and maneuver became central in Army warfighting 
doctrine. Increased professionalism and resurgent esprit de corps were evident.  
Army leaders also embraced innovation in the late 1970s.  Because it seemed 
unlikely that NATO would make a nuclear release decision quickly, and because Soviet 
planning aimed to flood NATO’s front with breakthrough-oriented armored attacks, 
Army units on the front line faced quick death or capture given existing weapons, tactics, 
and doctrine.  Preparing to actually fight – and perhaps win – a conventional conflict 
impelled new thinking about deep strike.  Planners reconsidered maneuver and 
interdiction.  Research and development pursuant to the offset strategy encouraged the 
aligning of new capabilities to conventional missions.  Early applications for distributed 
information technology included sophisticated, collaborative, realistic, and unparalleled 
training and simulation initiatives.  New thinking emerged about the role of conventional 
forces in theater and strategic-level planning.  An explosion in conventional deterrence 
literature is perhaps the most fundamental artifact of this thinking.
An overhaul of Army training significantly improved battlefield performance.  The 
National Training Center (NTC) at Fort Irwin, California was conceived to provide a 
level of realism dearly needed to prepare for the defense of Europe.  It remains the 
world’s most sophisticated armored warfare battle laboratory for experimenting with new 
concepts and weapons and for training unit commanders to think creatively.  NTC 
provided a testing ground for the “big five” conceived in the 1970s as the core weapons 
systems of the revitalized Army.  New systems included the M1 Abrams main battle tank, 
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M2 Bradley armored infantry fighting vehicle, AH-64 Apache combat helicopter, UH-60 
Blackhawk utility helicopter, and the Patriot air defense missile system.  
A traditional focus on weapons platforms, including airframes and missiles, began to 
give way to software and sophisticated electronics on them.  Systems engineering and 
integration capabilities evolved as key industry skills for winning the position of a 
“prime” contractor for new weapons systems.  Former Undersecretary of Defense for 
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics Jacques Gansler recalls that the 1980s brought 
increased “prime” awards to companies like IBM.  Traditional “platform” developers like 
Boeing won prime contracts for new weapons systems based on their systems integration 
skills and ability to oversee software development activities.5  Over time, avionics 
defined the capability as much as the platform itself, a reality that prolonged the service 
of airframes as they were refitted with more advanced electronics.  For ground systems, 
what mattered was less the vehicle than the fire control system and organic sensors.  
Although acquisition program management continued to focus on platforms and specific 
systems until well into the 1990s, by the early 1980s a key focus of management shifted 
to the integration of more sophisticated platform sub-components and the integration of 
the weapons system into the force.
By the mid-1980s, operational capabilities were being viewed as packages or 
bundles of organizational and technological capabilities to be integrated across time and 
through space to achieve effects.  Complex defense programs like the Polaris missile 
submarine and AWACS succeeded or failed based on the relationship between 
requirements generation, concepts of operation, information architectures, and systems 
integration processes.  Evolving thoughts on information as an enabler of success were 
key.  The practice of systems integration and its corollary system engineering, both 
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involved with the coordination and co-evolution of thousands of components and sub-
systems into a single enterprise, became a core competency of military innovation.  
During the 1980s, LTG King argues, that airborne reconnaissance and surveillance 
began its decades-long ascent as a primary enabler of operational success.  This is an area 
in which organizational impediments to change delayed the integration of a potentially 
beneficial capability, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV).  Israeli UAVs were used to great 
effect in the 1982 Bekka Valley operation in southern Lebanon.  Defense Secretary 
Casper Weinberger, learning about their abilities, directed immediate UAV research.  
DARPA had been doing UAV research for years, but found Services reluctant to support 
their integration into operations.  UAVs were used in the 1991 Gulf War, but it would 
take another decade, and successful combat use in Afghanistan and Iraq, before the 
Services pursued UAVs as an integral part of their strategic transformation plans.  
Noteworthy for his study is the fact that doing so involved resurrecting operational 
concepts, technology, and even UAV designs developed in the 1980s. 
Other developments in the 1980s set the stage for advances in intelligence support to 
military operations and the emergence of ISR capabilities trumpeted as “RMA-like” in 
the early 1990s.   Enriching the information available for targeting, moreover, yielded a 
decrease in target location error and an increase in geolocation accuracies for navigation.  
Better information for precision strike led to more effective weapons – even after missile 
components had reached design limits – because of decreased target location error, 
improved guidance systems, and more precise navigation.
Intelligence evolved from a combat support activity to the primary enabler of 
operations.   Improving intelligence capabilities, of course, was a central focus of 
technological and operational innovation.  A 1974 Army Intelligence Organization and 
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Stationing Study documented many of the problems plaguing intelligence in the early 
1970s.  An “indictment of the system that prevailed at the time,” the study “found that 
military intelligence units were not properly organized to support the tactical mission, 
and, indeed, were in most cases beyond the control of tactical commanders because of 
their strategic responsibilities.”6  Comparing his Vietnam experience to his tour as Chief 
of Air Force Intelligence during Desert Storm, Clapper believes the U.S. had progressed 
“light years” since Vietnam.  In fact, he recalls a sense of surprise, even awe, among 
some operators regarding the sophistication of intelligence support.   Quite simply, posits 
Clapper, automation, digital communications and intelligence exploitation, and 
computer-aided command and control available in the 1980s created opportunities for 
doctrinal change and operational innovation that were impossible just a decade earlier.
The maturation period of the American RMA was, arguably, the beginning of a 
process in which the intelligence discipline evolved from an often-marginalized staff or 
combat support function to a co-equal source of military effectiveness.  National 
intelligence agencies found themselves supporting military planning and operations in 
new issue-areas.  Soviet conventional readiness and near-real time monitoring of Soviet 
troop activities ascended on the national strategic intelligence priority list.  As the 1980s 
progressed, the intelligence community increased its exploitation of national intelligence 
capabilities to provide battlefield situational awareness.  Airborne capabilities improved 
dramatically.  A combined enterprise of all weather, day-night sensors became combat 
multipliers as much as they were strategic warning tools.  The U.S. subsequently 
perfected capabilities to identify, target, and strike fixed targets and forces whose 
movements (and probable courses of action) could be anticipated.  In the case of the 
latter, strikes were not necessarily targeting the moving forces as much as known, fixed 
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points along their path.  Post-Cold War military challenges have increased the 
fundamental time- and space-dominance problem in terms of hitting small, fleeting 
targets or learning about and destroying underground facilitates.    
Chapter Overview
This chapter discusses the maturation period of the American RMA, which began in 
1980 and concluded in 1986.  At the end of the maturation period, the Goldwater-
Nicholas Act created the conditions of revolution in joint warfighting capabilities and the 
1987 Cohen-Nunn Amendment mandated the creation of a U.S. Special Operations 
Command, an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity 
Conflict (SOLIC), and laid the foundations for revamping U.S. special forces.  This 
period also marked the beginning of the end of the Soviet Union with Mikhail 
Gorbachev’s 1985 ascension to power.
Goldwater-Nichols reinforced the continuing evolution of air-land-sea-space power 
integration. Special operational capabilities were especially valued in Reagan’s assault 
against Soviet influence.  Military support to counter-drug efforts reinforced this trend.     
Midway through this period a number of developments or processes had important 
implications for the evolution of U.S. forces.  DARPA launched a strategic computing 
initiative to pursue, among others, artificial intelligence.  Automated information fusion 
and decision tools were sought to accelerate fire control and other processes.  Associated 
developments explored in this chapter include: further Army doctrinal revisions; 
operational innovations derived from Army-Air Force cooperation; significant integration 
of information technology into military affairs; specific DARPA technology 
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demonstrations; and new policies and military capabilities to fight the emerging strategic 
threat of terrorism. 
Decisions to invigorate defense research and development efforts, integrate new 
technology into the Services, develop new doctrinal and operational constructs, and to 
pursue inter-Service cooperation agreements opened new possibilities for the 
effectiveness of U.S. conventional forces.  
Strategic Context
Political will, emboldened by popular support for a resurgent American defense 
capability, combined with strategic necessity to cultivate seeds of technological, 
operational, and organizational innovations sown during the formative period of the 
American RMA . Innovators worked closely with intelligence analysts to understand the 
Soviet threat and attune operational and technological innovations to meet it.  Measures 
of strategic effectiveness shifted for the military services in several historically important 
areas of warfighting, including special operations and counter-terrorism, logistics and 
mobility, target acquisition, tracking and weapon guidance, command and control, and 
joint warfighting.  American foreign policy turned from entrenchment to activism.  
Technology played a significant role, spawning what might be called a globalization of 
the offset strategy.    
Concerns that the worsening U.S.-Soviet relationship increased the threat of war 
were difficult to assuage.  In fact, they were amplified by widespread criticism of the CIA 
in the aftermath of the Team B exercise and charges of systemic underestimating of 
Soviet capabilities.  Well-publicized accounts of increased Soviet defense spending 
seemed more poignant psychologically in the aftermath of the failed hostage rescue 
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mission.  President Carter’s attempts to reassert American influence came too late to 
restore public confidence in his administration.  Defense spending increases and tougher 
foreign policy stance seemed to legitimate criticism of his earlier policies.  The decision 
to deploy cruise and Pershing II missiles to Europe, for example, reminded voters of his 
failed approach to the Soviet Union and sparked renewed political debate over nuclear 
weapons.  
Technology, always a matter of strategic import, became more significant in the 
calculus of power in the late 1970s and early 1980s.  Information technology reinforced 
this trend, as did several military conflicts fought outside of Europe in 1982.  
Britain and Argentina clashed over the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas for 
Argentina) in the South Atlantic; Israel invaded Lebanon to evict the Palestinian 
Liberation Organization; and, Iran and Iraq began an eight-year war.  In addition to 
reinforcing long- standing beliefs in the value of training and professionalism, and despite 
shortcomings of technology, each demonstrated the effectiveness of new weapons 
systems.  Advanced missiles, aircraft, targeting systems, and command and control 
networks were demonstrated as force multipliers.  Concurrently, the speed, accuracy, and 
lethality of advanced missiles reawakened concerns that surveillance and warning 
systems were inadequate.  Logistics were another area receiving newfound interest.    
Chapter 4 related that Harold Brown and William Perry’s offset strategy, a national 
policy reflecting of the importance of sustaining a technological edge, brought a broad 
“response to the then-perceived threat of an armored assault by the Warsaw Pact forces in 
central Europe.”7  Advanced weapons combat-tested in regional conflicts reinforced the 
underlying aims of the offset strategy.  This is not to say that new technology was a 
panacea or that military effectiveness immediately increased across all types of conflict.  
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Responses to the combined conventional and nuclear threat in Central Europe were 
multifaceted.  Arms control agreements and confidence-building initiatives were pursued, 
but treaty negotiations suffered as East-West tensions increased and détente waned.  
Force buildups were not an option given domestic political resistance in Allied nations.  
Yet, restoring deterrence stability and reducing the potential for war hinged on military 
readiness.  Initiatives addressed in this study launched to offset perceived U.S. military 
deficiencies included stealth airplanes, advanced precision munitions, doctrinal 
innovations, cruise missiles, and improved reconnaissance platforms.  Strategic nuclear 
systems were also developed.  Modernization of nuclear command and control became a 
strategic imperative.  Cutting decision-making timelines drove the application of new 
technology, including research into the distributed communications systems preceding 
the internet.  Planners believed that automating warning-to-launch processes would not 
only shorten decision making processes but also provide additional deterrence value by 
assuring a retaliation in the face of a surprise Soviet attack.  
Academics questioned whether the automated warning and expedited launch 
processes enacted on both sides of the Iron Curtain were contributing to deterrence or 
edging toward a doomsday scenario.  Automation warning-launch systems were 
characterized as a potentially more catastrophic, techno-political analog to World War I 
troop mobilization plans and political ineptitude.  Observers questioned whether the 
combination of algorithm-based early warning systems and rapid launch processes might 
lead to inadvertent nuclear war.  
In June 1983, a malfunctioning Soviet nuclear launch warning system reported an 
American attack.  According to one account, “because the duty officer of the day came 
from the algorithm department and could sense that the alert was inauthentic” the report 
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“was not relayed to the Politburo.”8  Contributing to Soviet-American tensions was the 
September 1983 Soviet downing of a Korean Air Lines passenger jet (among the two-
hundred and sixty nine dead were sixty-one Americans), and the November 1983 
deployment of Pershing II missiles to Europe.  Derek Leebaert relates that a classified 
1989 U.S. assessment of the 1983 “‘war scare’ is said to be terrifying.”9
Among the defining speeches of the era was a March 1983 appearance in Florida 
where Ronald Reagan condemned Soviet leaders for being a focus of evil.  Another came 
a few weeks later.  Convinced that the same scientists that invented nuclear weapons 
could improvise a defense against them, Reagan announced what later became the 
Strategic Defense Initiative.  Again, the impetus was protecting the United States from an 
‘evil empire.’  As early as 1978, five years before the Florida speech, Reagan warned that 
Moscow was “an evil influence throughout the world” working in “every one of the far-
flung trouble spots” to further “its own imperialistic ambitions” by “stirring a witches’ 
brew.”10
Reagan administration insider and economist Martin Anderson, described as “one of 
the few intellectuals in his entourage,” distilled Reagan’s views into six basic precepts 
that the President did not systematically articulate in any document but nonetheless 
pursued as a “‘grand strategy’”11:
• A belief that a U.S-Soviet nuclear war would have devastating 
consequences for both sides. 
• A commitment to the reduction of nuclear arms instead of a limitation 
of their increase or a freeze at current levels.
• A moral revulsion to the doctrine of mutually assured destruction 
(MAD) that had been our national nuclear weapons defense policy for 
some twenty years.
• A belief that the Soviet Union was ‘an implacable foe’ and the center 
of ‘an evil empire.’
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• A belief ‘that the productive power of the United States economy was 
vastly superior to the Soviet economy, that if we began a drive to 
upgrade the power and scope of our military forces, the Soviets would 
not be able to keep pace.’
• A skepticism about arms control treaties, based on a book that argued 
that nations keep their treat agreements only when it suits their 
interests to do so. 
Like Carter before him, Reagan sought to impel a Soviet turn toward openness and an 
improvement in the Soviet human rights record.  How Reagan set out to affect such 
changes in Soviet policy marked a clear break with his predecessor.  
This study does not question whether the Reagan administration indeed entered 
office with a coherent, policy-focused grand strategy.  Reagan himself was widely 
criticized for being ill equipped for complicated foreign policy decisions and few in his 
inner circle were considered veteran statesman.  On many issues, however, he appears to 
have been remarkably prescient.  As additional documents from this period are 
declassified, particularly those dealing with classified military technology and war 
planning, additional studies are warranted on this issue.  Important to this study were 
defense policy initiatives related to the Reagan administration’s quest to correct 
perceived Soviet military advantages.  
Critics of the Regan defense buildup argued that Soviet equipment remained less 
advanced than U.S. systems and maintained that force correlations overestimated Soviet 
capabilities.  Inattention to combat enablers like command philosophy, training, and troop 
morale diminished the Soviet’s relative combat power.  Nevertheless, the Soviet threat 
seemed more palpable in light of Soviet rhetoric, alarms sounded by U.S. defense 
intellectuals, the discovery of Soviet troops in Cuba, fears of Soviet- backed Cuban 
subversion throughout the Caribbean, Soviet-backed martial law in Poland along with 
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large ground and naval forces exercises, and increased nuclear alert levels.  Perception 
counts, a truism Reagan understood better than most. 
The conventional threat to stability seemed particularly grave in light of the 1981 
Polish crisis.  Robert Schulenberg directed the U.S. Army indications and warning office 
at the time.  Part of the European Command staff, he was among the limited number of 
intelligence analysts with access to highly classified intelligence information from all 
sources.  He recalls the winter 1981 crisis as an important catalyst for the modernization 
of strategic and theater intelligence and information capabilities.  Soviet military units 
practices radio silence, preventing U.S. signals intelligence assets from reporting on troop 
movements.  Because it was winter, days were shorter, limiting daylight needed to obtain 
electro-optical images of troop movements and locations.  Weather further degraded the 
availability of satellite images – electro-optical satellites cannot penetrate could cover.  
Because of this, Schulenberg recalls, U.S. commanders had “no idea” where Soviet 
troops were.  Divisions moved.  Some movements went undetected for days, even a 
week.12
In the aftermath of the crisis, Schulenberg several groups traveled Europe studying 
the information needs of those monitoring Soviet troop movements and informing leaders 
responsible for NATO mobilization decisions.  The most important outcome of the crisis 
from his perspective were decisions to develop theater day/night, all weather, near-real 
time intelligence collection capabilities to support military leaders.  The advent of digital 
communications technologies enabled new systems to provide information directly to 
analysts supporting decision makers.  
The same year, Soviet military capabilities were demonstrated in a series of military 
exercises.  Naval maneuvers along the Baltic coast included the largest Soviet 
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amphibious landing since World War II.  Analysts estimated that Soviet industry had 
produced nearly two hundred and fifty new intercontinental missiles since 1980.  Fighter 
aircraft production rates doubled in the early 1980s.  In 1981, the CIA estimated that 
Soviet annual military spending was roughly double U.S. spending in real terms.  A year 
later Soviet factories were producing “1,300 new fighters a year, about three to four times 
the fighter replacement rate of the U.S. Air Force” and an average of “a squadron a week 
and a wing a month.13 Defense analyst Ralph Sanders concluded that Soviet industry was 
turning out “about three times as many tanks and armored vehicles, twice as many 
tactical combat aircraft and military helicopters” by 1985. 14  For those concerned with 
Soviet naval developments, which threatened sea-borne reinforcement of NATO and 
became an important consideration for Persian Gulf contingencies, the Soviets also 
produced “four times as many attack submarines” and nearly “the same quantity of 
surface combatants.”15  Increased militarism in Soviet foreign policy seemed more than 
mere rhetoric in light of Soviet naval activity and additional posting of Soviet military 
advisors to client states.  New, mobile SS-20 missiles further threatened deterrence 
stability, spurring interest in controlling warhead and missile technology proliferation.   
Reagan sought some eight billion dollars in supplemental defense spending to 
augment the fiscal year 1981 defense budget.  Republicans controlled the Senate, a base 
used to gain wide congressional support for Reagan’s defense plan.  He subsequently 
asked for and received an eighteen billion supplemental for fiscal year 1982.  Defense 
spending more than doubled between 1981 and 1986.  A large share went to nonnuclear 
forces, dubbed general purpose by defense analysts.  Additional funds were directed to 
research and development of new weapons systems, procurement, and nuclear force 
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modernization.  Other decisions restored the B-1 bomber program, expedited deployment 
of the MX and Trident missiles, and increased conventional force spending.  .  
Reagan approved a number of National Security Decision Directives (NSDDs) 
mobilizing U.S. resources to support the rolling back Soviet influence, undermining its
political and economic strength, and aligning U.S. armed forces to engage communism 
across the globe.  By outlining the contours of the defense build-up and providing 
strategic justification for it, Carter’s one-and-a-half war scenario became a transition
strategy on which a dramatically more ambitious vision emerged.  Reagan Defense 
Secretary Casper Weinberger proclaimed a new planning scenario, later described as “a 
worldwide war” requirement requiring “concurrent reinforcement of Europe, 
deployments to south-west Asia and the Pacific, and support for other areas.”16  The U.S. 
needed to respond to Soviet aggression in all regions simultaneously.    
NSDD-75, an important document in the Cold War’s final chapters documents a 
reversal in the Carter administration’s approach.  Rather than accommodation or a 
rekindling of détente, Reagan sought to compel change in Soviet behavior through 
increased military spending, developing economic tools and sanctions, and questioning 
the legitimacy of the Soviet presence in Eastern Europe.  Another document signed in 
1983 formalized policies to raise costs of maintaining a Soviet sphere of influence, 
seeking to place additional strain on the faltering Soviet economy.  In May, NSDD-32 
called for “various efforts, including economic measures, to ‘neutralize efforts of the 
USSR to increase its influence.”17  NSDDs “laid out the institutional arrangements and 
component parts needed to push the Soviet Union to the wall” and “bring the struggle to 
an end on America’s terms.”18
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The U.S. would pursue qualitatively better weapons systems, leverage new 
technology, create a significantly more robust research and development agenda, and 
confront the Soviet Union politically and economically wherever Moscow sought to 
exercise its influence.  Strategic Missile Defense (Star Wars) and advanced precision 
munitions were among the programs pursued.  Soviet planners would respond, U.S. 
analysts predicted, by attempting to catch up technologically or simply increase their own 
force strength.  From the Middle East to South America to the Horn of Africa, the U.S. 
attempted to roll back Soviet influence, adding to the costs of maintaining an empire.  
Reagan’s ‘’full court press’” to bankrupt the Soviet economy included “denying [them] 
critical resources, hard currency earnings from oil and natural gas exports, and access to 
Western high technology.”19  Soviet defense spending as a share of Gross National 
Product increased from twelve percent in 1965 to, depending on assessment 
methodology, between seventeen and twenty-five percent in 1985.20
Reagan was not alone in his opposition to Soviet policies.  Margaret Thatcher 
became the Prime Minister of Britain in 1979 – some twenty months before Reagan 
assumed office in 1981.  A key ally in fighting communism, she had already earned the 
nickname “Iron Lady.”  One day after Reagan’s evil empire speech, the British leased the 
island of Diego Garcia to the United States.  Strategic bombers and warships could be 
based on the Indian Ocean island, better positioned to respond to a Soviet attack on 
American interests.  Francois Mitterrand became the President of France toward the end 
of Reagan’s first year in office and for a period displayed uncharacteristic French support 
for NATO.  Domestic political dynamics also helped soften Mitterand’s leftist leanings.  
Another conservative, Helmut Kohl, became Chancellor of West Germany in 1983.  He 
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approved the basing of Pershing Missiles, which began arriving at U.S. air bases in 
November 1983.  
Western leadership grew more conservative during the maturation period; Soviet 
leadership evolved in an opposite direction.  Yuri Andropov died in February 1982 at the 
age of eighty-four.  His replacement, tuberculosis-stricken Konstantin Chernenko, held 
power for fourteen months before his 10 March 1985 death.  A day later, Mikhail 
Gorbachev was elected General Secretary of the Communist Party and in July Eduard 
Shevardnadze succeeded Andrei Gromyko as Foreign Minister.  Gorbachev and 
Shevardnadze’s pursuit of “new thinking” in Soviet foreign affairs was noted at the 19-21 
November 1985 Geneva Summit, a turning point in U.S.-Soviet relations.  
It was the first summit in nearly a decade.  Reagan and Gorbachev agreed to 
accelerate disarmament talks.  The U.S. welcomed a Soviet consulate in New York and 
opened an American consulate in Kiev.  Their objective was facilitating cultural 
exchanges.  At the end of the summit Gorbachev uttered a sentence during a ninety 
minute press conference that, in hindsight, aptly describes the historical importance of his 
ascension to power: ‘The world has become a safer place.’ 
Gorbachev would publicly address one of the thorniest issues in this relationship a 
year later: Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.  Gorbachev’s opening speech to the 27th
Party Congress referred to Brezhnev’s tenure as “years of stagnation” and called 
Afghanistan a “bleeding wound.”  A second Reagan-Gorbachev summit in Reykjavik, 
Iceland on 10 October 1986 resulted in broad agreement on arms control issues.  Former 
Secretary of State George Shultz and British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher 
considered the summit a “turning point” in the Cold War’s end; former National Security 
Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski concludes that “it was at Reykjavik that the Cold War was 
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won.”21  In December 1987, Gorbachev visited Washington, DC and signed the 
Intermediate Nuclear Forces agreement.  A section below discusses the Gorbachev 
revolution and its influence on the strategic context in which RMA discourse evolved.    
Evolution of the Soviet Ground Threat in Europe
Chapter 4 discussed the evolution of the Soviet nuclear RMA up to the introduction 
of the Operational Maneuver Group (OMG), which became a source of much contention 
in the West as military analysts touted its destabilizing “shock” and “surprise” power.   
LTG King recalls that the OMG threat “drove” technology initiatives and operational 
innovations in the European Command.22 Understanding this critical aspect of U.S. threat 
perception and commensurate affects on defense planning provides insight into the 
emergence and evolution of the so-called RMA capabilities that won the 1991 Gulf War.
As chapter 4 related, the Soviet approach to ground combat involved multiple layers 
or echelons of combined arms formations successively pushing forward on the battlefield.  
Breakthroughs were exploited and reinforced using the momentum of second and third 
echelons.  Speed and direction provided velocity; velocity and mass provided combat 
power to achieve higher-order missions, including opening a salient to flow forces into 
the enemy rear.  By focusing the effort of second echelons – the “follow on forces” – on 
breakthrough and exploitation, second echelon commanders concerned themselves with 
forward movement rather than first echelon losses.  
Because second and third echelons were intended to exploit a breakthrough they 
generally remained in columns, or march formation, as long as possible to maximize 
flexibility, ease command and control, and reduce travel time maneuvering around enemy 
forces toward objectives.  Dispersion during this phase was difficult because it would 
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complicate command and control and delay the attack.  In the late 1970s, the Soviet 
approach further evolved with the introduction of independent maneuver elements to 
rapidly penetrate into enemy territory, mixing the lines to lessen the likelihood of a 
nuclear defense.   
The OMG was not merely a reinforcement of the second echelon.  Significantly 
more capable, it reflected a resurrection of the World War II idea of a mobile strike group 
seeking to create new opportunities for breakthroughs.  Such developments in Soviet 
forces impelled U.S. grand strategy changes concerning conventional readiness.  The 
importance of conventional readiness in deterrence stability calculations, Alliance 
relations, and overall assessments of U.S. military effectiveness, increased.     
Western analysts confirmed the existence and operational purpose of the OMG 
during the summer 1981 “Zapad” (Zapad-81) training exercise in Poland.23  Initial 
discussions of the OMG’s operational mission settled on the extension of the so- called 
“conventional option” mentioned in chapter 4: penetration of NATO lines to capture 
critical targets, disrupt command and control, and prevent the use of nuclear weapons. 
Presumably, the OMG would encompass an independent maneuver element, perhaps a 
reinforced division, tasked with breaking through a weak spot in enemy lines to drive 
deep into enemy territory.  Such a drive into the “operational depth” of enemy territory 
would disrupt command and control, facilitate the OMG’s seizure of critical terrain and 
river crossing sites and, more importantly, prevent the enemy from launching a nuclear 
attack on the OMG (since this would mean employing nuclear weapons on friendly 
territory).  Having achieved a penetration, the OMG would be followed by large armor 
formations.  NATO forces would be hit with successive waves of massed armored 
attacks.
255
Disagreements inhered about the nature of the threat and the likelihood of a Soviet 
attack.  A debate ensued over the historical uniqueness and credibility of the OMG threat 
to NATO forces.  Intent was the source of contention.  In the end, what mattered for this 
study of U.S. military innovation is that U.S. policy makers and Congressional leaders 
perceived the conventional build-up and Soviet operational innovations as a destabilizing 
threat that had to be countered. 
Analysts did agree that spatial and temporal factors favored the Warsaw Pact – a 
function of potential combat power generated over a relatively quick period and NATO’s 
lack of operational depth.   The OMG was perceived as a new threat to deterrence 
stability and rekindled fears of a surprise attack.  Among the disturbing aspects of the 
OMG was the implication that the Soviets could wield decisive conventional power to 
achieve strategic, theater objectives.  As air assault and helicopter capabilities emerged in 
exercises and were demonstrated in Afghanistan, it seemed that Soviet confidence was 
mounting in the conventional domain.
In this context, the strategic and operational aspects of preventing “surprise” were 
central to the maturation of the American RMA .  From a military perspective, the 
calculus of surprise derived from the perceived superiority of the Warsaw Pact’s mix of 
conventional and nuclear forces.  Space-time asymmetries heavily favored the Warsaw 
Pact:  it had more depth to mount an attack than NATO did to absorb and prepare 
defenses, enabling it to stage and flow troops forward faster.  
The fundamental problem for the defense of NATO, one recognized as early as 1973, 
was exacerbated.  A RAND analysis discerned “a single [U.S.] battalion might find 
themselves facing 100 to 120 advancing tanks over a 20-minute period” which, given the 
time required to coordinate defenses, left only two paths for defeating a Soviet attack: 
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either significantly raised the rounds fired per minute “or the number of minutes 
available” between echelons.24
Among the options selected for ameliorating the challenge for battalions facing a 
Soviet armored onslaught was pushing the defense “over 50 to 60” kilometers rather than 
the 5 to 8 prescribed in early 1970s planning documents.  Doing so would increase the 
number of minutes between echelons arriving at the front.  At the very least it would 
diminish their combat effectiveness.
Time compression issues resonated with a generation of defense planners whose 
formative years included Pearl Harbor and the 1950s surprise attack discussions.  A 
premium was placed on a commander’s ability to make decisions rapidly.  It is this, 
arguably, that prompted Simpkin’s title, Race to the Swift.  For SACUER Alexander 
Haig, “modernizing “conventional forces is our first priority – not because theater or 
strategic forces are any less important, but because our conventional force deficiencies 
are the most serious.  These deficiencies are exacerbated by trends which, if permitted to 
continue, portend a diminishing cushion of warning time.”25
On both sides of the Iron Curtain an affinity for automation deepened. Enthusiasm 
ensued to tightly couple reconnaissance and surveillance capabilities to long-range 
precision strike systems.  Leadership training emphasized pursuit of simultaneous 
operations throughout the depth and breadth of the battlefield.  Greater dynamism in all 
combat operations reinforced a belief that audacity in operational art was required to 
quickly win the opening battles of a war in Europe.  Evolutionary changes occurred 
within the combat arms.  At a systems level the overall capabilities of conventional forces 
increased significantly.  Dispersion coupled with greater lethality, at great depths and 
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with greater accuracy, placed additional emphasis on intelligence, surveillance, and 
command and control.  The volume and precision of fires increased.  
John Lewis Gaddis argues that, beginning in the 1960s and presumably continuing to 
the 1980s, “underlying all of these complexities, there was the increasing importance of 
psychology: the perception of power had become as important as power itself.”26
Perception counts – in numbers of missiles and their throw weight, in numbers of tanks, 
and in doctrine proscribing their use.  As technology became more important in the 
strategic calculus, perception also included the scope and sophistication of research and 
development (R&D) activities.  Indeed, the 1970s ended with R&D becoming a more 
pressing strategic necessity. 
Because Moscow “spent in real terms some $185 billion more on military R&D” 
between 1975 and 1985, U.S. defense analysts concluded that Soviet forces were “able to 
deploy one-and-one half or two generations of equipment, while the United States has 
been able to deploy equipment one generation old.”27   Jacques Gansler cogently stated 
the argument for U.S. R&D investment:  “Because technological superiority is a 
significant part of our military and economic national strategy – some say it is our 
national strategy in both areas – it is critically important to maintain our leadership 
position.”28
The Defense Science Board agreed there was “reason to be concerned,’” concluding 
“the U.S. lag behind the Soviets” in armored modernization was “‘a matter of national 
urgency’” requiring additional R&D.29 The next section brings the story of an important 
concept demonstration into our discussion of the American RMA’s preconditions, one 
that centered R&D activities at the center of visions of future warfare.
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The Assault Breaker Concept Demonstration
An important component of the U.S. R&D response to the Soviet threat in Europe 
was the 1977 decision to re-align Defense Advanced Research Project Agency’s 
(DARPA) activities.  Among the goals of doing so was pulling together several ongoing 
technology projects.  A primary objective for realigning investment: avoid surprise; the 
secondary one: create opportunities for the U.S. to achieve technological surprise should 
conflict occur.  Some forty percent of its R&D budget was invested in tactical warfare 
domains as part of the offset strategy.  The intent was to leverage emerging technology to 
foster significant change in the “concepts and capabilities in command and control, 
mobility, armor/anti-armor, night fighting, massed firepower, and the precision 
application of force at a distance.”30
Assault Breaker sought to offset Soviet conventional superiority and address a 
growing “realization that the timely use of tactical nuclear weapons to stop an attack in 
[Europe] was unrealistic.”31   It also drew upon a central trend in defense research and 
development: “developments in sensors, delivery systems and conventional munitions . . . 
had the potential to greatly mitigate or potentially negate the Soviet threat and do so 
without resort to the use of nuclear weapons.”32
The program aimed to test a larger concept envisioned in William Perry’s testimony, 
cited in chapter 4, to see all high value targets on the battlefield at any time; to be able to 
make a direct hit on any targets we can see; and to be able to destroy any target we can 
hit.  “The question to be answered,” Richard Van Atta concludes, “was whether the 
development is sensors, computing, communications, guidance, and munitions allowed 
for deep precision attack against hard, mobile targets.”33  Among the other elements of 
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the larger system for testing the concept, discussed below, was an attack coordination 
center able to fuse sensor and other data.   
Assault Breaker responded to a specific strategic and operational need, derived from 
a clearly defined Soviet threat for which existing research and development seemed well 
placed to resolve.  The response was organized around the maturation and integration of 
several technology projects, a task that brought systems engineering, systems integration, 
and information technology to the emerging vision for air-ground cooperation against 
Soviet follow-on echelons.  Figure 5-1 lists several mid- to late 1970s technology 
initiatives that supported the three-fold conventional modernization vision outlined in 
William Perry’s 1977 Congressional testimony.34
Many of the initiatives listed in figure 5-1 were later associated with the Assault Breaker 
concept demonstration; most matured in the 1980s; all were generally related to the 
See all high value targets on the battlefield at any time:
Make a direct hit on any target we can see:
Destroy any target we can hit:
Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) 
PAVE MOVER radar
Stand-Off Target Acquisition System (SOTAS) 
Remotely Piloted Vehicle (RPV) and mini-RPV
Unattended Ground Sensors
Army non-nuclear Lance missile and guidance advances
Army Patriot Missile
General Support Rocket System
Smart bombs
Rockeye bomb and bomblets
Wide Area Anti-Armor Munitions (WAAM)
 Terminally Guided Submunitions
Figure 5-1: Precision Strike Projects
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strategic challenge posed by Soviet conventional forces.  The project entailed a high 
degree of risk simply in terms of the systems integration challenges required to achieve a 
networked architecture of sensors and shooters.  Several sub-projects in the 
demonstration were themselves very challenging, making Assault Breaker an 
extraordinary effort.  
The essence of the Assault Breaker concept first appeared in several studies during 
the mid-1970s.  Among the important intellectual forerunners to Assault Breaker were 
defense consultant Joe Braddock’s classified studies providing detailed analyses of Soviet 
strategy, doctrine, and force structure.  He identified potential weaknesses and suggested 
how to exploit them.35  The 1976 Defense Science Board (DSB) Summer Study on 
conventional capabilities endorsed an earlier Lincoln Laboratory study on an Integrated 
Target Acquisition and Strike System (ITASS).  The DSB was also informed by defense 
industry proposals, an IDA Weapons System Evaluation Group “‘target engagement 
study,’” and Air Force-DARPA work that “indicated that the real-time targeting and 
missile guidance updates” required for attacking mobile targets “might be feasible.”36
Widespread support for linking together R&D activities ensued.  Assault Breaker moved 
forward as a program despite concerns that the overall effort entailed a high degree of 
risk due to its complexity, criticism that the program only integrated – not developed –
technology, and reluctance that the Services would resist the level of cooperation 
required.37
Drawing on projects listed above, incoming DARPA Director Robert Fossum 
formally created the Assault Breaker program in May 1978 after recognizing the potential 
to provide “a potentially step-level improvement in capabilities to redress the Soviet 
conventional threat.”38 Testing of key components began in fiscal years 1979 and 1980 
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with critical tests occurring in the early 1980s.  In late 1982, five terminally guided 
submunitions “made direct hits, one on each tank in a pattern of five stationary tanks.”39
Aspects of the concept demonstration evolved slowly over the following two 
decades, eventually becoming a key part of the defense transformation strategy in the 
early 2000s.  The concept demonstration engendered technological, operational, and 
organizational innovations that later cohered into a new core competency organized 
around the idea of long-range, stand-off, precision strike with terminally guided sub-
munitions.  It also reinforced arguments that a nonnuclear strategic option existed, what 
Soviet observers viewed as a conventional variant of a theater strategic offensive.  It was 
the progenitor of what Orgarkov termed the reconnaissance-strike complex.  
Assault Breaker was not a resounding success in many areas.  Some of the ambitious 
goals remained unrealized until the early 2000s – decades later then optimistic 
projections.  Although the concept itself was proven during the testing phase, and despite 
the maturity of the technology, the full range of capabilities embodied by Assault Breaker 
was not embraced by the Services.  Several factors impeded full development, including 
the Services protecting their own programs, a minimal level of joint integration, and the 
sheer complexity of the required enterprise – which carried additional risk.
The underlying concept matured as an ideal operational capability much quicker than 
did the sub-systems and cultural change within organizations. For example, information 
and data fusion capabilities initially considered for integration into the demonstration did 
not mature in time to be included.  DARPA projects did, however, demonstrate what 
computer information technology added to the offset strategy.  Key projects included the 
Battlefield Exploitation and Target Acquisition (BETA) initiative and the Coherent 
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Emitter Location Testbed (CELT).  Elements of these projects evolved into core elements 
of the American RMA .  
CELT, “the first automatic, near real-time system for precision location of 
communications emitters,” was demonstrated during NATO exercises from 1978 through 
the 1980s.40  Antecedents included 1960s initiatives to locate North Vietnamese 
electronic emissions, the Air Force-DARPA Emitter Location System (ELS) project in 
the mid 1970s, and a Precision Location Strike System.  Responding to increased 
concerns with Soviet conventional forces, ELS was renamed CELT in 1978 and focused 
on developing “automatic location and classification” of vast numbers of enemy 
“emitters expected on the European battlefield, with the accuracy required for targeting 
by standoff weapons.”41  After successfully demonstrating the ability to locate emitters 
and generate information for targeting, CELT technology and operational concepts would 
contribute to subsequent systems, including the Army’s Guardrail airborne sensor.     
Technologies like those being tested in CELT, others being fielded in AWACS, and 
the array of other ground and airborne sensors either in service already or under 
development to identify emitters and enemy targets, raised the question of how disparate 
information sources would be rendered intelligible for decisions.  BETA, created in 1977, 
responded to concerns about the absence of a “mechanism for correlating and fusing the 
extensive intelligence information being received from multiple sources.”42 Although 
there where some fifty studies on the subject, BETA was the first “systemic approach to 
develop and evaluate what “correlation and fusion would contribute” by demonstrating “a 
state-of-the-art, computer-based tactical data facility capable of dealing, in near real-time, 
with the large amounts of information on the modern battlefield.”43  A 1990 technical 
assessment of the state of data fusion reported that BETA demonstrated the potential for 
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automated exploitation and targeting “while providing a greater appreciation for the 
problems associated with data fusion.”  
Among the lessons applied to later systems included “the need for a disciplined 
systems engineering approach to future developments,” a conclusion that reinforced the 
emphasis on systems engineering and integration in conventional warfare.44  An 
associated development involved thinking about a sensor-to-shooter process derived from 
complimentary capabilities that were best imagined as interfaces and networks rather 
than individual platforms.
The Joint Tactical Information System (JTIDS) and Joint Tactical Fusion Program 
(JTFP) are other important systems in the maturation of the American RMA .  JTIDS 
provided a secure capability to move data around on the battlefield.  Less vulnerable to 
enemy jamming, it worked by spreading data transmissions over different frequencies.  
JTFP merged a secure communications capability with visualization tools able to 
represent the fusion of data.  Together they aimed to increase situation awareness by 
providing secure, jam-resistant near-real time information updates to commanders.
Assault Breaker is an unusual but important case for students of military innovation 
to consider.  It was among the Cold War’s most ambitious systems integration efforts.  In 
the end, it “accomplished unprecedented integration of radar, missile, and submunition 
technologies to demonstrate a capability to attack multiple tank targets using terminally 
guided submunitions released from a standoff ‘missile bus’ controlled by an airborne 
radar.”45  In doing so, “it represented a pioneering and ambitious effort by DARPA that 
successfully nested major programs within larger programs, and combined them in a 
coordinated way to achieve the overall objective.”46
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Another aspect of the Assault Breaker program worth mentioning was its 
management structure.  A joint program office addressed the often diverging interests of 
the Service sponsors.  Because of intersecting interests and assurances that unique 
organizational requirements would be preserved, Generals Don Starry, commander of the 
Army’s Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and William Creech, head of the 
Air Force Tactical Air Command, supported conceptual forerunners to the project.  Their 
support was crucial to the program’s creation.  In part, Army and Air Force support for 
Assault Breaker was forthcoming because they each maintained the integrity of Service-
specific technology programs.47 As Van Atta, Nunn, and Cook conclude, perhaps “even 
more important than the testing and developing of specific technologies is the conceptual 
breakthrough in getting the Services to work together across the barriers of roles and 
missions to attack the Warsaw Pact tank threat.”48   Important in terms of supporting the 
viability of long-term innovation processes, projects like Assault Breaker promoted 
experimental concepts and novel operational solutions to battlefield problems in ways 
that opened possibilities for organizational and operational change.  Discontinuous 
change in Service capabilities, measured in historical terms – the grist of RMA scholars, 
would take decades to emerge. 
Noteworthy is the fact that the first combat testing of the essential conceptual and 
technological elements of Assault Breaker occurred in the Persian Gulf, not on the plains 
of Central Europe.  During the Gulf War, for example, some thirty-two ATACMS were 
used in conjunction with J-STARS.   As Paul Nitze remarked about advanced 
conventional weapons developed for the defense of Europe, the “Gulf War offered a 
spectacular demonstration of the potential effectiveness of smart weapons used in a 
strategic role.”49  Technology alone does not render new, smarter weapons so effective 
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that their mere existence evokes discussions of an extant revolution in military affairs.  
How they are employed, the organizational and operational innovations that enable their 
effectiveness as part of a warfare being waged by distributed units acting in concert, is 
the more important dimension of “change” we must consider.
Military Thought and Doctrine
An emerging renaissance in American military theory involved the rediscovery of 
the campaign.  In the early 1980s, Luttwak lamented that “Anglo-Saxon military 
terminology” addressed “tactics (units, branch, and mixed) and of theater strategy as well 
as grand strategy, but includes no adequate term for the operational level of warfare” 
despite long-standing recognition of such a level of warfare in classic military thought.50
Arguably, this is one outcome of the dominant narrative of nuclear thought on U.S. 
strategic discourse.  As Ben Lambeth contends in his study of the transformation in 
American airpower from the 1970s through the 1990s, “U.S. defense leaders not only did 
not speak in these terms but also did not even think in them.”51  Central to the 
organizational and operational innovations underpinning the evolution of the American 
RMA  was the rediscovery of the campaign, the orchestration of theater military activities 
and planning for conventional warfare at the operational levels.  
The School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) opened in 1981 to give Army 
majors a better understanding of the operational level of war exemplifies this 
development.  SAMS remains fundamentally about operational art, teaching students 
about large unit operations and campaigns.  It is the world’s leading school for educating 
future officers about the complexities involved with achieving what a later discussion 
will call the ‘knowledge burden’ of warfare in the information age.
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The creation of SAMS coincided with an Army-wide turn toward the study of 
Clausewitz and Jomini, engendered in part by a U.S. Army War College-sponsored study 
on the strategic lessons from Vietnam. Colonel Harry Summers’ study, On Strategy: The 
Vietnam War in Context, drew heavily on Clausewitz’s military theory to frame the 
political-strategic factors of war and their relationship to the conduct of war.52  He 
documented a lack of appreciation for military theory and a blurring of the relationship 
between military and national strategy, in part a result of decades of over-emphasizing 
nuclear strategy.  Professional military journals were rife with discussions of Clausewitz, 
the principles of war, and the utility of operational art as a means to rethink planning for 
and prosecuting campaigns.   Debating the principles of warfare and their relevance 
became a common theme in military science, debates that continue today. 
Within the Army, rethinking military theory involved resurrecting maneuver warfare 
to resolve perceived problems with the applicability of Active Defense doctrine.  AirLand 
Battle, a term coined in 1981, replaced Active Defense as official Army doctrine in 
August 1982; a revised doctrine came in 1986.  The second iteration of AirLand Battle 
reinforced a new doctrinal emphasis on initiative, maneuver, and joint operations.  This, 
in turn, reflected changes in foreign policy and a new strategic outlook defined by a more 
assertive American military presence abroad.
During the debate over Active Defense doctrine at the end of the 1970s, then 
Lieutenant General Don Starry identified two additional problems to those mentioned in 
chapter 4.  The first concerned the insular drafting process used in 1976.  Not only did it 
exclude the preponderance of Army seniors, it did not involve mid-level leaders destine 
to implement the doctrine in future battles.  In July of 1977, Starry left Europe for Fort 
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Monroe, Virginia, earning his fourth star as the new TRADOC commander.  Soon 
thereafter, he changed the process to make it more receptive to input.  
He also distanced himself from the process to minimize criticism that the TRADOC 
commander’s own preferences were influencing the outcome.   He assigned drafting 
responsibility to Major General William R. Richardson, Commandant of the Command 
and General Staff School and commander of the Combined Arms Center at Fort 
Leavenworth, Kansas.  Richardson guided a handful of doctrine writers, among them 
then Major Leonard “Don” Holder and Lieutenant Colonels Huba Wass de Czega and 
Richmond B. Henriques.  Wass de Czega played a key role.  Son of a Hungarian writer 
who fled his homeland in 1956, he was a career light infantry officer that remains 
somewhat of a legend among military thinkers for his romanticism and penetrating mind.  
According to John Boyd biographer Robert Coram, Wass de Czega talked often to Boyd 
on the phone and reportedly drew on his theories of warfare in revising Army doctrine.53
Starry’s second problem was the criticism that the 1976 manual placed too much 
emphasis on the defensive.  During the drafting process, Starry and DePuy had 
recognized, but had no solution for, the problem of defeating successive echelons of 
Soviet forces.  This meant forward troops would be absorbing Soviet armor with little 
opportunity to transition from defense to attack.  Here, Richardson’s team “addressed 
Starry’s concerns about dealing with the second echelon of any Soviet or Soviet-like 
mechanized attack” and “reinvigorated the basic doctrine, making it more offensive” in 
nature.54  That is, the new doctrine emphasized initiative as one of the four tenets of the 
new doctrine.  Others included depth, agility, and synchronization.  
Developments in both Europe and the Persian Gulf challenged prevailing notions of 
firepower-based, attrition warfare.  New security requirements to deter conflict outside of 
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Europe and defend non-NATO security partners renewed criticism of the 1976 field 
manual, particularly its emphasis on defense.   What was different?  Two factors stand 
out.  First, the new doctrine pushed ground-air cooperation in new ways.  Second, the 
doctrine began pushing yet another turn toward “speed” within military history.  Now, 
speed involved leveraging information technology to expedite decision making over 
distributed forces, sustain required levels of lethality, and offset the loss of protection 
incurred by reducing mass.  Further doctrinal changes ensued based on both factors, with 
time-space compression and expanded, collaborative control over distributed forces 
reinforcing ground-air cooperation. 
Of note to students of RMAs, concepts from German tactical doctrine were 
incorporated.  The new doctrine also included levels of war (tactical, operational, 
strategic) to recognize the growing complexity of command and control relationships.  In 
doing so, it sought to amplify an advantage derived from differences in strategic culture.  
Among the most important differences manifested itself, in simple terms, as rigidity in 
operations (for the Soviets) versus relative flexibility (for the U.S.).  
The architects of AirLand Battle were aware of a weakness in Soviet military 
doctrine and war planning: a penchant to adhere to precisely scripted movement tables, a 
rigid command and control system that stifled initiative at local levels, and an educational 
system that failed to nurture a creative approach.  Railways and over-the-road heavy 
equipment movers brought men and equipment to the eastern end of nine mobility 
corridors running westward into NATO territory.  The echelon construct required 
adherence to detailed plans – down to regimental levels.  Commanders rehearsed battle 
plans to ensure their arrival at designated points at specific times.  Planning reflected a 
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‘scientific’ approach to combat.  New U.S. doctrine emphasized flexibility, seizing the 
initiative, and creating opportunities on the battlefield.  
Interestingly, both approaches found theoretical underpinnings in Clausewitz.  
Whereas the Soviet reading focused on the Prussian’s discussion of offensive-defensive 
balances, U.S. readings of On War emphasized creativity and flexibility.  American 
analysts considered the rigidity inherent in Soviet approaches to military doctrine an 
exploitable deficiency.  A brief detour from the historical narrative highlights an 
important aspect of ‘rigidity’ to the current generation of military scientists.  
Legacy systems forming the baseline of combat forces in the 2000s were considered 
extremely flexible two decades ago – in terms of their ability to discern Soviet readiness 
levels, identify and target Soviet echelons, and deliver ordinance to reference points in 
Central and Eastern Europe.  Soviet operational art and tactics were sufficiently well-
known to systems designers, who developed capabilities to monitor Soviet cantonment 
areas, warn of increased readiness levels, identify forces moving eastward toward NATO 
borders, and deliver munitions to preplanned strike zones – usually point along a mobility 
corridor.  NATO planners had studied the Soviet conventional forces attack problem for 
decades, evolving capabilities to disrupt, delay, and blunt attacks.  U.S. forces in the 
2000s must detect, identify, and strike small, fleeting or moving targets, almost anywhere 
on the globe, with great precision, inflicting minimal collateral damage, and within 
compressed decision-making timelines.  And the situation, the enemy, and the overall 
military mission is often different from that which the participating units train or their 
equipment was designed for.  
Global media coverage of the 1991 Gulf War also exposed the world to a new 
generation of theater persistent surveillance capabilities and strike weapons, including J-
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STARS and more advanced munitions, focused attention on U.S. space capabilities (e.g., 
communications, reconnaissance, GPS).  These and other systems created specifically to 
attack Soviet echelons at their moment of weakness were on the front pages of major 
newspapers across the globe.  Doctrine and operational practices were also reported.  Not 
only are the operational aspects of missions more complicated, adversaries from Somali 
warlords to Serbian generals to Osama Bin Laden know more about our capabilities and 
how to spoof or defeat them outright.  Although not a catastrophic problem against ill-
equipped and poorly led militaries, the problem remains that forces designed and 
equipped to fight a comparatively rigid adversary fare less well in more complex, limited-
war situations.  This argument is revisited in the study conclusion. 
The narrative returns to AirLand Battle doctrine, which required closer air and 
ground cooperation within the European theater.  Army and Air Force leaders began 
collaborating, at times reluctantly, on technology and operational concepts to restore 
maneuver to ground forces by cooperating on the defeat Soviet second echelons.  Army 
and Air Force leaders worked on policies and operational responsibilities for AirLand 
Battle implementation from November 1983 through March 1984.  Discussions resulted 
in the Army and Air Force Chiefs of Staff agreeing to the so-called “31 Initiatives” 
outlining Army-Air Force agreements on roles, missions, and collaboration; one of the 
areas addressed was cooperation on J-STARS development.  The 31 Initiatives built on 
an earlier 1981 agreement on offensive air support, which transferred limited planning 
authority over close air support, the tasking of strike aircraft for battlefield interdiction 
missions, and collection planning for airborne reconnaissance to ground force 
commanders.  Initially applying only to ground force commanders in Europe defending 
NATO, the 1981 agreement foreshadowed later joint tasking arrangements. 
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According to one account, AirLand Battle evolved from defense consultant Joe 
Braddock’s ability to identify “a pattern in the operations, exercises and planning of the 
Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact forces.  This called for particularly close coordination 
between the Air Force and the Army, to prevent the Warsaw Pact from being successful 
in the forward areas, primarily through firepower and maneuver, while at the same time 
being able to coordinate attacks on their rear areas that disrupted their capability to 
reinforce and influence the action in the forward area.”55
As Starry put it: “interdiction was the key to battlefield success.”56 That is, the 
importance of interdiction in creating opportunities for forward commanders to 
maneuver.  
By reducing the combat power of Soviet units through interdicting reinforcements, 
opportunities opened for commanders to transition from the defensive to an offensive 
position.  Important implications at the tactical level followed.  Commanders remained 
focused on the initiative.  Planning for combat sustained a sense of creativity.  Leaders –
and soldiers – knew their fate was not completely controlled by higher commands.  
Leaders, furthermore, were drilled to seek local situational awareness and at all levels 
develop options.  Indeed, the deliberate planning processes that evolved to guide combat 
operations preserved a sense of adaptability that Soviet processes precluded.  
Commanders remained focused on finding transition points, what Clausewitz dubbed a 
“culminating point,” to shift from the defense to an attack. 
Noteworthy here is the fact that this retention of initiative and adaptability persisted 
as the area of a commander’s combat influence increased.  AirLand Battle settled on a 
depth of 150 kilometers, largely because this is the depth Army and Air Force leaders 
agreed upon to both protect Air Force interdiction missions and allow the Army to 
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develop its own indirect fire weapons.  In addition to extending the area a corps 
commander would “influence” through deep attack to 150 kilometers (roughly 72 hours 
in Soviet doctrine), AirLand Battle also set the commanders area of interest – the area for 
ISR assets to provide information on – some 300 kilometers out (roughly 96 hours).  
Extending the area of influence and interest established new requirements for tactical 
reconnaissance, targeting, and strike planning.  Technology developments, including 
those that eased Clapper’s above mentioned sense of frustration, enabled new operational 
concepts as well as providing new solutions to Army-Air Force responsibility 
disagreements.  Among the key developments in this area was the Assault Breaker 
technology demonstration and subsequent advances in target acquisition, information 
fusion, geo-location, and computer-enabled (automated) fire support.  
Meanwhile, NATO adopted a strategy of Follow- On-Forces Attack (FOFA), the 
name given to a concept made public by Supreme Allied Commander, Europe 
(SACEUR) Bernard Rogers.  Rogers began thinking of the concept in 1979, around the 
same time that Army leaders decided to replace the widely criticized 1976 Active 
Defense doctrine.  
The Rogers plan differed from but complemented AirLand Battle. Both built on a 
multi-faceted view of integration and sought to achieve battlefield extension by carrying 
the defense of NATO forward into Warsaw Pact territory.  Similar in many respects, 
FOFA was an Alliance strategy to simultaneously disrupt and attack first and second 
echelons.  Like AirLand Battle, the issue of Soviet battlefield nuclear weapons and the 
political requirement to reduce escalation to theater nuclear use impelled doctrinal 
innovation.  Rogers, for example, assumed command of NATO forces at a time when the 
only viable counter to Warsaw pact forces was nuclear weapons.  Based on an 
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understanding of emerging technology, including the Assault Breaker demonstration 
program, he conceived of an ability to detect and respond to a Soviet attack with 
thousands of deep-strike missiles and rockets.  The impetus for FOFA was “reducing to a 
manageable ratio with conventional weapons the number of enemy forces arriving at” 
NATO’s forward defense lines, its “General Defense Position.”57  Observing the Zapid-
81 training exercise and thinking about the second echelon problem, Rogers believed that 
the OMG, second echelon forces, strategic reserves, and other targets should be targeted 
simultaneously.  
FOFA received widespread support.  A 1983 European Security Study group’s report 
entitled Strengthening Conventional Deterrence in Europe, known as the ESECS report, 
recommended a deep attack strategy calling for capabilities to attack some 300 kilometers 
beyond the forward line of NATO forces.  A second report noted that FOFA satisfied 
Allied requirements for a strong forward defense at the same time it created depth for 
defense.  The 1984 British Atlantic Committee’s report, Diminishing the Nuclear Threat, 
also reinforced existing arguments that advanced conventional capabilities, including 
target acquisition and strike capabilities, offered an effective alternative to nuclear 
weapons.58  The ESECS report, moreover, agreed with industry leaders and technology 
experts that the required conventional capabilities could be fielded in five years.  As 
envisioned in the offset strategy, technology enabled both the defense and the transition 
to attack.  
A key tenet of both AirLand Battle and FOFA was elongating periods between the 
echelons able to engage the front lines of U.S. forces.  If these periods could be increased, 
NATO forces could regroup, consolidate defenses, and even push forward.  Merely 
creating the windows was not enough.  Information from across the front had to be 
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gathered, analyzed, and exploited.  In knowledge management terms, information (the 
“know what”) had to be exploited to create knowledge (the “know how”) about new 
opportunities to succeed.  This required close cooperation between intelligence and 
operations staffs.   
Figure 5-2 depicts the effect of interdiction on enemy forces from Starry’s April 
1983 testimony to the House of Representatives Committee on Armed Services along 
with the perceived “window of opportunity” in which enemy forces would be degraded 
such that the U.S. could transition to the offensive.59  Richard M. Swain relates different 
headquarters’ time responsibilities: “The brigade was responsible for all forces within a 
distance of twelve hours of the forward line of troops, the division out to twenty-four 
hours, and the corps to seventy-two hours.”60  Instead of defining areas of responsibility 
in terms of distance, time became a more important planning factor for operations, 
technology development, and doctrinal approaches.
The conceptual and doctrinal implications of focusing on specific time windows are 
important.  Planning had to be more rigorous.  Paradoxically for some, but naturally for 
military planners, flexibility depended on it. Intelligence preparation of the battlefield 
(IPB) forced commanders and battle staffs to conduct detailed studies of terrain and 













This included preparing elevation data and automated location capabilities to rapidly 
emplace mortars and artillery for indirect fire support.   Flexible logistics capabilities 
were needed.  Dynamic air support became more important.  Maneuver was reinforced, 
spawning rediscovery of historical cases suitable for a computer-age maneuver theory. 
Because Allies and sister services were critical to ground forces, joint and coalition 
operations became more important as a planning issue. 
A premium was placed on simultaneously coordinating the close fight and 
prosecuting deep strikes.  Resolving theater strategic warning and rapid conventional 
defense-retaliation challenges became a strategic necessity because conventional 
deterrence and defense were tied to Alliance relations and to East-West deterrence 
stability.  The concept demonstrated in Assault Breaker was one alternative to resolve 
strategic and operational challenges.  It offered the means to coordinate ISR and ground-
launched precision strike.  Another alternative engendered the transition from mission-
and target-specific theater reconnaissance to theater all-weather, day-night continuous 
surveillance and targeting.  Programs like J-STARS, AWACS, BETA, CELT, and JTIDS 
envisioned an end-to-end, multi-faceted, persistent surveillance capability providing 
systematic coverage of the battlefield.  A third alternative was stealth.   
Airpower Developments
The 1976 Defense Science Board Summer Study on conventional capabilities 
preceding Assault Breaker argued that technology and operational needs inherent in the 
concept demonstration would fail without unprecedented advances in Army-Air Force 
cooperation. Others argued that levels of cooperation needed to implement AirLand 
Battle and FOFA would be impossible without additional technological solutions.  
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Solutions, that is, that enabled greater air-ground synergy and interoperability.  
Thereafter, drawing on widespread knowledge of the evolving computer technology 
revolution, a reciprocal relationship evolved between air-ground technology and joint 
doctrine.  Technological and operational innovation presented serious challenges for 
organizations with entrenched positions about roles and missions for deep strike.
Air Force planners viewed AirLand Battle suspiciously.  For many pilots, the 
emphasis on deep strike interdiction against Soviet armored forces threatened to turn their 
aircraft into flying artillery platforms to support ground troops, detracting from their 
independent strike mission and exposing them to enemy surface to air missiles (SAMs).  
Moreover, implementation of AirLand Battle would seemingly subordinate airpower to 
the corps main ground effort, with airpower capabilities treated as a supplement to other 
corps interdiction capabilities.  Many of these capabilities, including long-range missiles 
with terminally guided sub-munitions and land-based cruise missiles challenged 
traditional divisions of battlefield responsibility.  Army leadership went to great lengths 
to assuage Air Force critics that AirLand Battle treated ground and air power as co-equal 
elements of the overall effort.  Growing emphasis on Army deep strike missiles and 
Army attack helicopters, however, led many in the Air Force to remain skeptical.  
AirLand Battle innovations included new airborne intelligence capabilities endowing 
planners and pilots with information needed to be successful against operational-level 
targets.  ISR capabilities, indeed, were an artifact of deeper Army-Air Force clashes over 
deep strike roles and responsibilities, clashes exacerbated by AirLand Battle doctrine 
discussions. 
In the midst of an ensuing “free-swinging doctrinal debate,” Allard writes that Gen. 
John A Wickman, Jr., chief of staff of the Army, and Gen. Charles A. Gabriel, chief of 
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staff of the Air Force, found themselves united by long-standing personal friendship and 
remarkable similar viewpoints on the need for closer cooperation between the services 
they led.”61  A generation of inter-service rivalry colored discussions.  
Disagreements did not concern weapons systems or responsibilities as much as the 
fundamental challenge of extending agreement to cooperate operationally into actual 
operations – a challenge that continues into the 2000s despite significant progress.  Until 
the 1980s, integrating theater capabilities across Services received little serious attention.  
Each Service was allocated a mission area.  Lacking an overarching framework for joint 
operations, Army and Air Force leaders viewed their respective battlefield missions as 
taking priority.  When overlapping air operations occurred, airspace was partitioned or 
divided into corridors of operations for each Service.  Synergy at the theater level did not 
transpire.  By the mid-1980s this changed with the evolution of an operational 
perspective, what Shimon Naveh calls the emergence of an “operational cognition” in 
which U.S. military planners applied a systems approach to campaign planning and 
theater military activities within the context of AirLand Battle.62  The long-term 
importance of a systems approach to warfare and the emergence of operational cognition 
is revisited in chapter 6.  
Thinking about the implementation of AirLand Battle, the emergence of an 
operational level of war in military thought, renewed strategic attention to Central 
Europe, Army tactical aviation developments, concept demonstrations, and experiments 
were among the factors leading to increased Army-Air Force cooperation. Opposition to 
cooperation began to fade in the spring of 1981 when Starry and Creech agreed to 
concepts provided by a Joint Suppression of Enemy Air Defense (J-SEAD) project, 
leading to the first Army-Air Force agreement on jurisdiction for close air support and 
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interdiction.  Subsequent agreements provided arrangements for Air Force control of 
deep strikes using Army missiles and Army management of the prioritization of air 
strikes for battlefield interdiction. 
In mid-1983, Wickman and Gabriel “quietly put their staffs to work on a cooperative 
project to rationalize the planning and development of joint combat forces centered 
around the AirLand Battle model.”63  Jointness – or rather the lack of it – became the 
overarching defense readiness issue after the invasion of Grenada, discussed below.  
Communication and other interoperability issues received national media attention, 
suggesting that Reagan defense initiatives might be building a force unable to fight 
effectively.  As mentioned above, in May 1984 the Army and Air Force announced 
agreement on thirty-one initiatives, including air defense, suppression of enemy air 
defenses, and fusion of combat information.  Although sometimes a rancorous process, 
and despite failure to resolve important issues, this period was a turning point in the 
evolution of joint warfighting.  Operational and political exigencies, moreover, 
eventually brushed aside impediments to increase joint collaboration.   Air Force 
resistance to an Army deep strike role receded as the Air Force assumed new missions, 
including a lead role in space-based support to military operations – including the GPS, 
communications, and ground station enablers of deep strike.    
Although not perfect, Army-Air Force cooperation also improved during this period 
as Services revisited conventional war planning.  Both sought to dominate adversaries in 
all types of weather and at night, yielding a decisive American advantage by the end of 
the decade.  They also collaborated on plans to simultaneously defend and attack 
throughout the depth of the battlefield.  The close-in fight would be coordinated with 
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deep attack, creating opportunities to blunt a Soviet attack through interdiction and 
maneuver.  
Ben Lambeth’s The Transformation of American Air Power provides a 
comprehensive overview of American air power developments during the years between 
Vietnam and the 1991 Gulf War.   “The convergence of high technology with intensive 
training and determined strategy,” he posits, “bespoke a breakthrough in the strategic 
effectiveness of American air power after a promising start in World War II and more 
than three years of misuse in the Rolling Thunder bombing campaign against North 
Vietnam from 1965 to 1968.”64  Precision strike emerged as a critical competency for a 
generation of Air Force officers whose indoctrination into the military focused entirely on 
strategic, relatively indiscriminate, nuclear strikes with little thought to the strategy of 
wining a European conflict.  Pilots trained for a single, career-defining, apocalyptic 
sortie.
The term “sortie” denotes an operational flight, or combat mission, of a single 
aircraft on a specific mission.  During the maturation period of the American RMA  a 
reversal occurred in the sortie-to-kill ratio traditionally used to measure the effectiveness 
of airpower.  By 1986, for example, based on data from experiments and operation El 
Dorado Canyon, a single sortie delivering one precision-guided bomb had the 
effectiveness of eleven single sorties each dropping six dumb bombs.  This reversal 
helped change the perception of airpower within defense planning discourse.  Whereas 
previous eras framed airpower effectiveness in terms of the number of sorties required to 
destroy a target or accomplish a mission objective, at the end of the maturation period of 
the American RMA  planning considered the number of targets killed per each sortie.   
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This required timely location information on enemy forces.  For an Air Force coming 
to grips with the complexity and rapidity of operations, this called for richer information 
context over greater distances in less time.  Updated enemy situation data and geo-
positioning for weaponeering were two important developments during the 1980s that 
built on digital, softcopy information sharing and command and control advances in the 
late-1970s.  Specific information technologies contributing to increased military 
effectiveness for both air and ground forces included: digital imaging from spy satellites, 
analytic stereo-photogrammetry for targeting and other precision location missions, 
global positioning system applications, precision terminal guidance through scene-
matching correlation, high-bandwidth secure digital battlefield communications, 
automated information fusion and analysis, hardened (jam resistant) command and 
control, stealth planes, and cruise missiles.   
Organizational developments included more realistic training using digital terrain 
elevation data, closer integration of intelligence production and analysis with operations 
staffs, refined decision processes using near-real time dissemination of intelligence and 
cartography, increased joint warfighting, heightened Congressional involvement in
acquisition planning, and processes to consider the costs of information needed to make 
new weapons work as part of procurement decisions.65
An important benchmark in the evolution of battlefield situational awareness and 
precision strike occurred in late January 1991.  On January 29, a column of Iraqi armored 
forces moved from southeastern Kuwait and occupied Al Khafji, an abandoned coastal 
town in Saudi Arabia.  A second Iraqi armored force was detected the following day, 
apparently preparing to reinforce Al Khafji and use it as a stalwart to engage Allied 
forces in ground battles along the Saudi coast.  An E-8 Joint Surveillance Target Attack 
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Radar System (JSTARS) aircraft was diverted from its scud-hunting mission in eastern 
Iraq to support an air attack on the Iraqi armor.  The battle lasted roughly a day and a 
half, resulting in the destruction of some 600 armored vehicles (tanks, armored personnel 
carriers, and mobile artillery).  As Lambeth concludes, “the combination of real-time 
surveillance and precision attack capability that was exercised to such telling effect by air 
power against Iraqi ground forces at Al Khafji and afterward heralded a new relationship 
between air- and surface-delivered firepower in joint warfare.”66  “The real hero,” he 
posits, “was the E-8 JSTARS.”67
Brought into the Kuwait theater of operations only two days before the air war 
began, the E-8 was still in its development stage.  Recall that JSTARS traced its roots to 
1970s development projects, including the Air Force’s Pave Mover radar and the Army’s 
Stand Off Target Acquisition System (SOTAS) brought together into a single program 
office in 1982.  
E-8s were reportedly deployed based on the recommendation of Army Lieutenant 
General Fred Franks, commander of the VII Corps, who first experienced their 
operational capabilities during an exercise in Germany.  During the exercise (Operation 
Deep Strike), JSTARS detected and targeted a Canadian unit playing the role of a Soviet 
armored column, “achieving 51 ‘tank kills’ as a direct result” and impressing Franks so 
much that “he later raved about the capability to” General Norman Schwarzkopf.68
Lambeth’s affirmation of the E-8’s contribution was widely shared by others assessing 
American air power in Desert Storm: “JSTARS redefined the meaning of using real-time 
battlespace awareness to make the most of a casebook target-rich environment.”69
Another “hero” in the Gulf was the Global Positioning System (GPS), which the Air 
Force assumed responsibility for and evolved as a major boon to long-range precision 
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strike.  J-STARS and GPS in an AirLand Battle context engendered a shift in thinking 
about reconnaissance and surveillance in operational art.  
Related to ISR developments were those involving the other side of the “sensor-to-
shooter” vision for rapid deep strike. The Air Force reversed decades of inattention to 
munitions research and development.  
Vietnam and the October 1973 war demonstrated the efficiency of precision 
munitions compared to ‘dumb’ ones.  The success of the 8th Tactical Fighter Wing 
indicated the operational value of laser guided bombs and other innovations.  U.S. and 
NATO planners embraced precision weapons as a means to level the correlation of 
forces.  Still, the U.S. conventional arsenal stagnated.  Notwithstanding work on Paveway 
II and III, cruise missiles (discussed below), and other developments, the Air Force did 
not devote resources to munitions development until the domestic political situation, 
renewed concerns about the implications of a Soviet conventional attack, and questions 
about Air Force commitment to NATO conventional plans compelled new initiatives.  
A new Armament Division at Eglin Air Force Base, Florida produced a dozen new 
non-nuclear ground attack weapons in the 1980s.  Miniaturization, microchips, and more 
efficient sources of electro-mechanical power also improved conventional capabilities.  
Long-range precision strike advances included successive generations of the Paveway 
bombs.  The GBU-15, an improvement on the electro-optical bomb used in the bridge 
attacks mentioned in chapter 4, used television guidance to glide bombs from greater 
distances than available with laser guidance.  It entered service in 1984; an infrared 
guided warhead came in 1987.  GBU-15s enabled pilots or weapons officers to lock 
weapons onto their intended target prior to releasing them or simply guide them to the 
target.  Another development in precision weapons munitions came from the Navy, 
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which wanted more standoff capability. Using a modified Paveway II bomb with a rocket 
booster, the AGM-123 entered service in 1985.  It could be released dozens of miles 
away, guided via data link, and deliver its 1,000 pound warhead with astounding 
accuracy.  Paveway III entered service in 1986.
Another element of the U.S. airpower revolution warranting mention here is the 
evolution of cruise missiles, which also evolved to utilize GPS technology.  The key role 
cruise missiles play in the preponderance of post-Cold War U.S. military operations 
obscures their prolonged and uncertain development. 
 Air Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM) and Submarine Launched Cruise Missile 
(SLCM/Tomahawk) development remain case studies into innovation processes and the 
politics of weapons programs.  Cruise missiles had been developed since the 1950s, 
competing for leadership attention and R&D funding with ballistic missiles.  Navy cruise 
missile programs included the Regulus I and II.  Air Force programs included the 
Matador, Navaho, Snark, Mace, and Hound Dog.  Technological and organizational 
factors favored ballistic missiles.  Missiles were not only faster, rendering them less 
vulnerable to air defenses, they were more accurate and could carry a larger payload.  
And they were less of a threat to manned bombers, which in the 1950s remained the soul 
of the Air Force.  
Then the strategic context changed.  Arms control treaties helped shape the strategic 
landscape.  The May 1972 Strategic Arms Limitations Talk (SALT) I agreement did not 
limit cruise missiles.  The Soviets had them.  After Soviet advances in ballistic missiles 
threatened U.S. nuclear superiority, cruise missiles became an attractive option for 
maintaining parity.  Additionally, Soviet air defense improvements threatened manned 
bombers.  The 1973 Yom Kippur War demonstrated the capabilities of Soviet weapons 
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systems, including air defense innovations threatening an Air Force core competency: 
manned strategic bombing.  Low-flying cruise missiles could attack enemy air defenses.  
The bombers could then get through.  For this reason, some cruise missile developments 
were classified.
Existing technological developments helped.  Turbofan engines evolved in the 1960s 
out of an Advanced Research Project Agency initiative for a jet-powered backpack.  It 
yielded a low-cost engine used on the first massed-produced cruise missile.70  Another 
key development was Terrain Contour Mapping (TERCOM).  Patented in 1958, the 
technology enabling this navigation and guidance capability evolved through successive 
improvements in accuracy.  TERCOM works by loading a digital map into the cruise 
missile guidance computer along with the intended flight path.  An on-board altimeter 
compares the elevation of the terrain passing underneath with the digital map, computing 
speed and location.  Corrections can be sent to the missile in-route.  The guidance system 
“did not become feasible until advances in large-array microelectronics in the late 1960s 
permitted the storage of large amounts of data in small spaces with minimal power 
requirements.”71
In the end, according to Henry Levine, substantive cruise missile development 
occurred only in periods of strategic crisis, such as the fear of a Soviet first strike 
advantage, during which normal weapon development routines were disrupted.  This 
permitted extra-service organizations with interests in promoting cruise missiles and their 
associated technology to exercise important influence.  A new ‘action channel’ was 
momentarily created and exploited to achieve a reorientation of ongoing service-
sponsored programs.”72
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By the 1990s, after some forty years of development, the Tomahawk emerged as a 
key component in the U.S. military arsenal.  It evolved as a somewhat disruptive 
capability in terms of challenging long-standing Air Force antipathy to unmanned strike.  
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles suffered from similar organizational antipathy until the early 
2000s, when their utility was proven in Afghanistan and Iraq – leading to Air Force 
support for armed UAVs. 
Another airpower development critical to the story of the American RMA concerns 
stealth aircraft.  Where Assault Breaker involved the integration of a number 
technologies into a concept demonstration that informed subsequent systems and 
operational concepts, the development of the F-117 Nighthawk stealth aircraft was a 
highly compartmented development project resulting in a relatively rapid transition from 
an operational prototype to production and fielding.  
The Nighthawk evolved from programs initiated in the early 1970s to create 
airplanes able to penetrate enemy airspace undetected and without support aircraft.  It 
also evolved from the vision associated with precision munitions, including the Paveway 
I and II discussed above.  Despite minimal funding for precision munitions following 
Vietnam the benefits of a one target, one plane, one bomb approach drove the pursuit of 
efficiency in strategic bombing.  The Yom Kippur War, in which Israel lost an inordinate 
number of strike aircraft to surface to air missiles, and knowledge of sophisticated Soviet 
air defenses comprised of interleaved, multi-tier missile coverage, created a requirement 
for air-to-ground strike capable of evading Soviet air defenses.  The immaturity of 
ground-based long-range precision strike capable of neutralizing Soviet air defenses 
fueled enthusiasm for Stealth.  Air Force leadership, moreover, supported the DARPA 
program responsible for the F-117 only after being assured that it would not compromise 
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funding for the new F-16 strike fighter.73  This was a case in which the Air Force did not 
actively pursue an innovative new capabilities – the program was pushed by Dr. Currie, 
Director of Defense for Research and Engineering (DDR&E).
DARPA-sponsored studies led to two stealth programs defense analysts in the early 
2000s discussed as cornerstones of a new American way of war.  HAVE BLUE evolved 
into the Lockheed F-117; TACIT BLUE evolved into the Northrop B-2 stealth bomber.  
Motivations for both stemmed from U.S. losses incurred during the bombing of Hanoi in 
which some five percent of the B-52s were lost. Soviet air defenses were reported to 
extend to some 125,000 feet with overlapping radar coverage.  A very difficult 
penetration operation for tactical aircraft assigned to deliver conventional or tactical 
nuclear strikes on the ladder of escalation to theater and then global nuclear war.  This 
study focuses on the F-117, the stealth aircraft most commonly associated with the 
American RMA.
HAVE BLUE “was a quarter-scale proof-of-concept aircraft designed to test out 
industry concepts of ‘very-low-observable’ capabilities while meeting a set of defined 
operational requirements.”74  After successful test flights in 1979, and because of the 
priority the offset strategy placed on reducing Soviet advantages in Europe, the program 
was accelerated.  “The DARPA stealth program was immediately transitioned to a 
Service acquisition program with an aggressive initial operating capability (IOC) of only 
four years – foregoing the normal development and prototyping stage.”75  This was an 
important departure for acquisition programs. Initial delivery of F-117s occurred in 1982 
and fifty-nine were in service by the end of the decade.  Operational use came in 1988 
during Operation Urgent Fury: the capture of Panama strongman Manuel Noriega.   The 
targeting systems worked as planned, although the press reported that bombs dropped 
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from F-117s missed their targets because they stuck a field near military barracks – not 
realizing that field was the target.  Planners asked for the barracks to be left intact so they 
could be used later, asking instead that the F-117s shock the troops inside and disorient.  
Among the most important reasons for the success of the stealth programs was the 
creation of a special office in the Pentagon to manage and champion them.  Stealth 
exemplifies the evolution of thinking about operational time-space challenges posed by 
the Soviet threat in Central Europe and the need for civilian intervention to push 
innovation.  It also reflects the underlying strategic and operational necessity 
underwriting the offset strategy.  Its purpose was penetrating into the operational depth of 
Soviet territory as part of synchronized, simultaneous strategic and theater operations.  
Throughout thee above developments, the Air Force evolved a theater and tactical 
conventional roles for strategic bombers.  In the early 1980s, an internal debate ensued 
about the balance between strategic and tactical capabilities the Air Force needed to 
prevail in future conflicts.  By 1985, the Strategic Air Command’s B-52 squadrons were 
routinely training for conventional combat missions.  It was the era of the so-called 
‘fighter mafia,’ a cohort of fighter pilots and conventional force planners who argued for 
rethinking the core mission areas for Service resources.  In this sense, a key part of the 
conventional renaissance in American military thoughts was the return of a conventional 
warfare focus within the Air Force. This included a gradual ascension of conventional 
airpower theory.  
Evolving Security Concerns, New Military Missions 
European security was not the only area where Reagan reasserted American 
influence; nor was it the only source of strategic and operational challenges impelling 
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technological, operational, and organizational innovation.  By the end of the decade, the 
conventional capabilities discussed in the ESECS report for the defense of Europe would 
be discussed in terms of new military missions.  Two areas of concern to today’s students 
of U.S. security policy became more important in the early 1980s: Persian Gulf stability 
and fighting international terrorism.  
As Chapter 4 discussed, a succession of events heightened fears of Soviet expansion 
into the Persian Gulf during the 1970s, culminating in the December 1979 invasion of 
Afghanistan.  Some feared Soviet subversion in Pakistan or the use of Afghanistan to 
invade Iran.  Carter’s decision to increase aid to Pakistan following the invasion 
addressed the former concern, the Carter Doctrine the latter.  
The emergence of an American RMA is tied with U.S. involvement in the Persian 
Gulf in two ways.  First, RMA-associated weapons and concepts were battle-tested there 
in the early 1990s.  Second, the evolution of thinking about rapid deployments and rapid 
dominance were influenced by the need to plan for Gulf contingencies.  
Persian Gulf contingency planning complicated the national security planning 
process, adding new dimensions to the problem of returning deterrence stability to 
Europe and compounding force readiness issues.  Security commitments, training 
exercises, and forward staging of military equipment indicated a level of U.S. 
assertiveness not present in the immediate post-Vietnam years.
U.S. foreign policy scholar Cecil Crabb argues that Reagan Secretary of State 
Alexander Haig’s 1981 visit to the Persian Gulf marked an evolution in the strategic 
intent underpinning the Carter Doctrine.  It also marks a transition in U.S. security policy 
whereby American defense commitments began being extended to the Persian Gulf.
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Haig’s 1981 visit indicated an acceptance of the  “Carter Doctrine as an axiom of 
American diplomacy in the Middle East” and signaled that “Republican policy-makers 
accorded the preservation of Middle Eastern security from Soviet hegemony an even 
higher priority than their Democratic predecessors.”76
Underpinning Persian Gulf security concerns were links between oil prices and the 
global economy.  “If the industrial democracies are deprived of access to those 
resources,” Harold Brown argued in February 1980, “there would almost certainly be a 
worldwide economic collapse of the kind that hasn’t been seen for almost 50 years, 
probably worse.”77  During the last years of the Carter administration, CIA analysis 
predicted that Soviet oil production would experience a sharp downturn in the 1980s.  
The economic consequences of declining oil production would create enormous political 
pressure to seek alternate sources through military force, political coercion, or diplomacy 
– all to the detriment of U.S. interests.  Reagan administration officials feared that Soviet 
oil shortages would lead Moscow to seize oil fields or, more likely, coerce oil-producing 
states into selling oil for rubles (not convertible in the world market) or exchange oil for 
Soviet military equipment (leading to increased presence of Soviet military advisers).  
In response, Reagan proposed selling Saudi Arabia AWAC airplanes and extended 
the scope of the Carter doctrine by virtually guaranteeing Saudi security.  He also 
expanded the capabilities of the Rapid Deployment Force (RDF).  
New planning challenges emerged for the U.S. military, which had to attune RDJTF 
forces to different contingencies than required for a Central European conflict.  Yet no 
new military forces were created to support the RDJTF.  Mobility forces (sealift and 
airlift) were particularly lacking.  Insufficient combat forces were committed to provide 
the resources needed to project power into the region.  Decades of focus on nuclear 
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contingencies and planning for the reinforcement of NATO with heavy armor units 
created organizational and conceptual inertia that impeded new thinking about missions 
to protect oil fields in the Gulf.  Politically, furthermore, the post-Vietnam climate made 
planning for involvement in regional conflicts difficult. 
These impediments aside, projecting military power into the Persian Gulf region was 
no easy task.  The region was more than 6,000 air nautical miles and 8,000 sea nautical 
miles from the U.S. and the U.S. had few military bases from which to stage operations.  
As in Europe, the U.S. faced time-space asymmetries favoring Soviet forces.  Analysts 
concluded that the Soviets could place some “four airborne divisions, four surface-to-air 
missile units, and one motorized rifle regiment” within five days and an addition 
motorized rifle regiment “every 27-to-48 hours thereafter.”78
Logistics remained a concern for both the European and the RDJTF.  During the 
November 1981 “Bright Star” exercise it took some four days to transport four hundred 
men across the Atlantic.  Their military equipment had to be shipped in a West German 
freighter because of inadequate sealift.  It had to be chartered weeks in advance to ensure 
availability.  That summer defense planners simulated Soviet invasion of Iran to wargame 
and assess U.S. response capabilities.  The results confirmed logistics and mobility 
shortcomings.  Staging the required equipment would take six months.  Supporting the 
projected volume of fire missions complicated logistics planning.  Rates of fire during the 
1973 Yom Kippur War suggested that planned munitions stocks and reserves might be 
exhausted before re-supplies arrived. Then and now, modernizing logistics capabilities, 
including rapid air and sea transport, remain an important undercurrent in defense 
planning discussions.  Subsequent exercises reinforced the need for advanced 
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conventional forces fighting collaboratively with near-real time ISR coverage to identify 
targets.
Positive results did emerge from Bright Star.  For example, U.S. power projection 
into the region was demonstrated.  B-52 bombers flew non-stop from their North Dakota 
bases to the region, a mission repeated in numerous combat sorties in 1991 and the early 
2000s.  Military exercises occurred in Oman and the Sudan.  One result of Bright Star 
was an expansion of the POMCUS  (pre-positioned overseas material configured to unit 
sets) program to enable pre-positioning of three additional divisions by 1983 and three 
more by the end of the decade.  
Planning for regional contingencies received renewed impetus when Reagan 
transformed the RDJTF into the U.S. Central Command on 1 January 1983.  Its first 
commander was then Lieutenant General (LTG) Bob Kingston (part of the trio who 
helped develop the concept for Delta Force).  Central Command’s objective was “to 
disrupt at their outset the attacks of Soviet or Soviet-client forces, and control the 
battlefield environs for the time required to deploy U.S. reinforcements and resupply 
from distant points” into the theater.79  Although new technology and rapid logistics 
capabilities would help, the only real solution was to keep forces in the region and to 
prepare airstrips and support facilities for additional forces.   Some of those forces would 
have to be trained to fight “light,” leading to new force structure planning requirements.  
Apart from retaining the Marine Corps, light forces were not high on the post-
Vietnam planners priority list.  Even within the Marine Corps, the tendency was toward 
heavier forces able to engage Warsaw Pact armor.  Indeed, until the early 1980s, armored 
forces dominated thinking about future warfare.  Partly this reflected the principle 
planning challenge: defeating Soviet forces in Central Europe.  It also reflected beliefs 
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that light forces were too easily embroiled in regional conflicts.  Fears of another 
Vietnam induced planners to shy from promoting light infantry divisions during the mid-
1970s.   Security challenges in the 1980s, however, contributed to newfound interest in 
light forces. Army planners recognized the need to provide organizational and 
technological responses to increased involvement in low intensity conflict, peacekeeping, 
and nation building.  Chief of Staff General Edward C. “Shy” Meyer was among those 
arguing for light, mobile, lethal forces capable of reinforcing NATO but flexible enough 
to deploy quickly into other regions.  Greater acceptance of light forces, including both 
light mechanized forces and special operations forces, occurred in tandem with the 
awakening to an operational level of warfare.  Within a larger systems approach to 
warfighting in which campaign planning considered multiple operational strategies to 
disrupt the enemy, awareness developed about the potential for light forces and special 
operational capabilities to be used creatively to facilitate NATO maneuver. 
Terrorism, Special Operations, and New Security Challenges
No history of the thirty-year transformation in U.S. military thought and defense 
planning can overlook the story of how counter-terrorism and special operations forces 
evolved from marginalized units lacking political support to exemplars of the new style 
of American warfighting.  This section briefly reviews developments during the 
maturation period of the American RMA to document additional contextual, material, 
and intellectual elements anteceding the American RMA. The proclamation of a new 
American way of warfare in the early 2000s was in part based on the employment of 
military capabilities in Afghanistan and Iraq that evolved over several decades to fight 
terrorists and engage in other aspects of what is generally termed unconventional warfare 
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or low intensity conflict.  These capabilities evolved as part of the U.S. response to the 
larger Soviet threat to Europe.
Political violence was a growing source of instability for U.S. security planners in 
the 1980s.  A wave of terrorism in Turkey, for example, led to a military take-over in 
September 1980 and to increased concern among Turkey’s NATO allies that regional 
instability might undermine the Alliance.  More ominous for its long-term implications, 
the Muslim Brotherhood joined forces with secular groups in Syria and Egypt, creating 
new models of anti-Western opposition.  Global communications technology provided 
terrorists with access to new media outlets, gaining a larger audience for ideologically 
motivated violence.  Islamic militants opposing the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan were 
among the users of new communications technology, using it to attract waves of recruits 
who received their training in Pakistani religious schools and training camps.  Thousands 
of fighters flowed through these schools and camps where the struggle against Soviet 
invaders provided unity of purpose.
Terrorism was certainly not a completely “new” security concern in the 1980s.  What 
was different?  Terrorism in the 1960s and for most the 1970s was fairly localized in its 
manifestation of indiscriminate violence, only becoming ‘transnational’ terrorism at the 
end of the decade.  And while terrorist tactics were not necessarily new, the rise of state-
sponsored terrorism was.  So to was the increased number of indiscriminate attacks to 
cause mass casualties.  Terrorism also became more effective and lethal when states 
increased their training, equipping, and financial sponsorship.  During the 1980s, 
moreover, terrorist attacks in Europe increased along with the level of violence against 
civilians.    
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Terrorism ascended in prominence in U.S. national security policy following the 
Black September movement’s 1972 attack at the Munich Olympics.   It was an 
international concern already, due mainly to high-profile Palestinian hijackings.  A 
September 1970s hijacking, for example, helped spark a civil war in Jordan resulting in 
the expulsion of Palestinians from Jordan and regional instability.  U.S. efforts to 
coordinate national counterterrorist policy began in 1972 with the creation of a Cabinet 
Committee to Combat Terrorism.  
One historical benchmark in the emergence of a U.S. counter-terrorism force was a 
1975 meeting at Fort Bragg’s Special Warfare Center that included unconventional 
warfare experts Robert Kuperman, General Bob Kingston, and Colonel Charles 
Beckwith.  After dinner, they outlined what became the first U.S. dedicated counter-
terrorism unit in November 1977 when Carter directed Harold Brown to create Delta 
Force.   The impetus appears to be Carter’s desire to establish a U.S. capability similar to 
West German and Israeli counter-terrorist units, a decision made in the immediate 
aftermath of a West German counter-terrorist operation in Somalia.  Motivating the 
decision was a general increase in the audacity of terrorist operations.  One notable 
example was the 1975 operation involving a Palestinian group with Libyan sponsorship.  
It seized sixty hostages from OPEC headquarters in Vienna, releasing them after 
negotiating passage to Algeria and Libya. 
Lebanon marked a turn in U.S. efforts to combat terrorism.  Marines deployed to 
Beirut in September 1982 as peacekeepers with a multinational force to stabilize the 
central government and end nearly a decade of violent civil war.  The October 23, 1983 
bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut, Lebanon was the tipping point in U.S. 
planning to combat terrorism.   Only a month earlier terrorists attacked the American 
295
embassy.  The killing of 241 U.S. Marines in Beirut stirred U.S. action. After the 
American embassy in Kuwait was attacked in December 1983, planning began for 
retaliation.  Meanwhile, a wave of terrorist attacks around the world brought a new sense 
of American vulnerability, one that added to the lingering sense of helplessness felt 
during the Iranian hostage crises.  
Although Reagan did not retaliate immediately, the Beirut bombing shook the 
national security establishment.  NSDD-138 was signed on April 1984, endorsing 
“preemptive raids and retaliatory strikes” against sponsors of terrorism and terrorists 
themselves; it also “ordered twenty-six federal departments and agencies to develop plans 
for combating terrorism.”80
That same year there was a significant increase in the numbers of Arabs arriving in 
Pakistan and Afghanistan to join the Afghan Mujahideen, fighters waging a jihad or holy 
war against Soviet occupation.  The Taliban, drawing its name from the Arabic word for 
student, emerged as a unified group with a common core of intellectual thought based on 
shared experience in Pakistani refugee camps and madrassas (religious schools).   Two 
years later the Mujahideen defended the mountain village of Jadji from a Soviet attack.  
Osama Bin Laden participated in the operation, which lasted seven weeks and ended in 
Soviet withdrawal.  It is reported that Bin Laden took the AK-47 assault rifle he was later 
shown firing in globally televised videos from a dead Russian.  Following the battle of 
Jadji, “Saudi Arabian Airlines gave 75 percent discounts on flights to Peshawar to men 
going to join the Mujahideen.  At times, the Pakistani embassy in Riyadh was delivering 
up to 200 visas to the young recruits.”81
Libya, the leading supporter of terrorism in the early 1980s, became the focus of 
attention.  A 1985 Special National Intelligence Estimate concluded that Libyan 
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strongman Muammer al-Qaddafi was supporting terrorism or insurgency in some twenty-
five nations across the globe and backed opposition groups in a dozen others.82  Libya ran 
dozens of training camps.  Reagan acted on 15 April 1986 after Libya was judged 
responsible for the bombing of the La Belle discotheque in West Berlin, a nightclub U.S. 
soldiers frequented. In a strike code-named “El Dorado Canyon,” Air Force and Navy 
aircraft attacked Libyan terrorist training camps and other targets in Tripoli and 
Benghazi.  
Current students of U.S. national security will find many parallels in the case of 
Libyan support for international terrorism in the early 1980s and the situation in 
Afghanistan leading up to the 2001 attacks against the United States.  Although the al-
Qaeda terrorism network was a much different organization and had different underlying 
political objectives, discussions of preemption and retaliation among national security 
planners in the 2000s reflected similar discussions decades earlier.   Libya, moreover, 
was the first time since Vietnam that the U.S. had employed precision bombing.
Chapter Conclusion 
By the mid-1980s, the U.S. military had emerged from a decade of retrenchment.  
Prevailing in third world, low intensity conflicts returned as a mission area.  The strategic 
context had shifted, affecting change in the calculus of strategic effectiveness to include 
rolling back communism through covert action, training foreign militaries, and leading 
‘freedom fighters’ in their struggle against Soviet proxies.  Terrorism emerged as a 
strategic concern; some argued it would evolve into the most significant threat to U.S. 
national security.
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Congressional involvement induced some changes the Defense Department failed to 
embrace quickly.  For example, Congress mandated the formation of an Office of 
Conventional Initiatives within the Office of the Secretary of Defense to accelerate 
acquisition and fielding of new capabilities.  In the mid-1980s, the Packard Commission 
recommended a number of changes in the acquisition process to expedite weapons 
procurement.  In 1986, the Goldwater-Nichols Act mandating increased jointness was 
passed over the objections of senior military leaders.  The Strategic Computing Initiative 
and other computer programs were rescued in 1985 after they were targeted for 
elimination as a cost saving measure. Defense spending on information technology grew 
the industrial base and funded research and development activities continuing to bear 
operational benefits in the 2000s. 
It was in the early and mid-1980s that experiments and technology demonstrations 
confirmed the value of applying information technology.  Military planners realized that 
information technology offered solutions to time and distance challenges.  This was 
essence of the American RMA.  Put another way, this is what made the very idea of an 
emerging conventional warfare RMA believable to defense intellectuals: coping with 
time-space problems was an ubiquitous challenge.  It was the first post-World War II 
pursuit of conventional, offensively-minded time dominance concept of operations 
backed by technology.  
Military leaders paid particularly close attention to information technology 
developments during the period discussed above.  Major General Robert Scales, Jr. 
(retired), served in Vietnam as the commander of a field artillery battery with the 101st
Airborne division.  “After Vietnam,” Scales concludes, “the fortuitous development of 
revolutionary information and precision technologies gave the U.S. military a means to 
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overcome past inefficiencies,” giving rise to a “new American way of war” in the 
1980s.83  Its impetus included the “premise that technology could kill the enemy faster 
than the enemy could find the means to offset this overwhelming advantage in formation 
and precision.”84
Conventional warfighting capabilities became a more important factor in deterring 
Soviet aggression globally in the 1980s.  The conventional balance of power –
quantitatively and qualitatively – returned as a central issue in NATO defense planning 
discussions.  Some Allies continued to argue against force modernization plans or 
doctrine changes that might lead Soviet military analysts to conclude that NATO would 
demur from using its nuclear weapons early in a conflict.  In the U.S., more than the 
majority of NATO nations, conventional force modernization became a domestic 
political priority, especially following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the failed 
hostage rescue mission.  Emerging peripheral threats could not be addressed, or deterred, 
with the threat of nuclear weapons.  
The 1983 condemnation of nuclear war by the Catholic Bishops, who paradoxically 
did not outright condemn the building of nuclear weapons as long as they were used to 
deter war, added to long-standing discomfort with a defense posture based on global 
annihilation.  Senior defense department analyst and head of DoD’s Alternate Futures 
Project, Paul Herman, recognized in 1996 an “internalized” and “widespread revulsion” 
to “weapons whose main property is to kill or maim people (versus destroy their 
armaments)” among policy makers.85   Underlying this revulsion was, and remains, 
anxiety concerning the use of nuclear weapons in general, a cognitive tension wrought 
from the dissonance of simultaneously relying on these weapons for peace and security 
while morally rejecting their existence altogether.  This tension, as chapter 3 concluded, 
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rendered the narrative of nuclear strategy ineffective as the surrogate for U.S. grand 
strategy, which it ultimately became in the guise of deterrence.
AirLand Battle and FOFA sought to leverage technology and doctrine to increase the 
power of existing weapon systems and restore deterrence stability by providing a credible 
defense and retaliation alternative to first use of tactical nuclear weapons.  In addition to 
target acquisition, command and control, and guidance systems, new technology 
promised to improve overall warning of attack and to generally increase the accuracies of 
long-range strikes.  They also presupposed better coordination and collaboration between 
air and ground forces.  Army-Air Force cooperation ended some program duplication 
between the two services and enabled some “$1 billion in associated savings.”86
Some criticized AirLand Battle and FOFA for relying on immature and costly 
technologies.  Others contended that relying on deep strike instead of additional front-line 
defenses would leave forward forces vulnerable to OMG and other penetration units, 
opening opportunities for subsequent echelons.  Analysts concerned with Soviet reactions 
and potential escalation questioned how Soviet theater nuclear commanders would 
discriminate FOFA conventional missiles from nuclear ones.  FOFA was also criticized 
as further evidence that the U.S. wanted to lessen reliance on nuclear weapons, a 
potential weakening of the credibility of NATO’s nuclear deterrent.  Still, the operational 
ideas and a shift toward reliance on information systems marked a turn in thinking about 
warfare.
Although there were already “some seventy battlefield systems and subsystems in 
various stages of conversion to automation” before AirLand Battle Doctrine was adopted, 
the new FM 100-5 helped shape thinking about modernization and integration.  Drawing 
on the new doctrine, “the Army was eventually able to conceptualize a tactical command 
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and control architecture” for controlling maneuver and coordinating fires, automating 
some indirect support, and revising approaches to intelligence support (including 
electronic warfare).87  Planning strikes to battlefield depths of 150 to 300 kilometers 
galvanized new thinking about tightening intelligence, command and control, and fire 
support relationships.  Targeting at such ranges required near real time intelligence to be 
exploited and disseminated to commanders and fire support centers.   Subsequently, 
“commanders were now told unequivocally of their new responsibilities for the effective 
management” (though their [intelligence] officers) of the three major intelligence 
disciplines: human intelligence, signals intelligence, and imagery intelligence.  Making 
the three work together would allow the commander to “see” his adversary on the 
battlefield, to pinpoint the location of his main forces, and to engage them at long ranges, 
thereby reducing the numbers that would survive to attack American front-line units.”88
Extending the battlefield was a natural evolution of integration thinking within the 
Army and Air Force and reflected a refined understanding of the Soviet threat.  Analysis 
of Soviet military forces and operational art in the mid- and late 1970s and more 
sophisticated modeling of different defense strategies suggested that conventional deep 
strike utilizing sensors able to provide warning and targeting data, combined with 
precision delivery capabilities, could sufficiently relieve front-line troops from being 
overwhelmed by Soviet armored echelons.  General Starry reflected on the ‘extending the 
battlefield’ construct in a 1981 Military Review article, recalling that the evolving face of 
battle and the historical imperative of command, unit missions “were measured in time 
rather than distance.” 89
Deep attack was recognized as critical for winning close-in fights.  Noteworthy here 
is the relationship between U.S. Army discussions of deep strike and traditional Soviet 
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deep strike arguments extending back to the 1920s.  For early Soviet theorists, deep battle 
was a means of reclaiming the initiative and restoring maneuver on a static battlefield. In 
the 1940s and again in the 1970s, Soviet military theory focused on combined arms 
operational art involving division-size maneuver forces.  In the early 1980s, such thinking 
evolved into the OMG.  AirLand Battle mirrored many of the developments Soviet 
theorists and planners pursued within the last phases of the nuclear RMA.  It also 
engendered more sophisticated thinking about integration and extension.  
AirLand Battle proponents did not argue that deep strikes or interdiction could win 
battles or campaigns alone.  Rather, they contended that deep strike could shape the 
strength of enemy forces, impeding the enemy’s ability to control space and time during 
engagements along NATO’s front lines of defense.  Because Soviet mobilization routes 
and potential invasion paths were known, planners could prepare fire missions based on 
Soviet doctrine.  Time was a fundamental issue; resolving it required more than doctrinal 
changes.  This is as much an information management problem as a weapon systems one.
Long-range strike capabilities evolved slowly, with envisioned levels of Service 
integration coming only in the 1990s.  Assault Breaker was a successful concept 
demonstration despite Army-Air Force collaboration problems.  Services championed 
their own programs and technologies at the expense of collaboration, partly fearing the 
joint program would delay or disrupt their own. Some concluded that “any transition” of 
Assault Breaker technologies before their own programs were finished would mean 
competition “for scarce Service resources.”90
Regardless, the required operational concepts and doctrine did not yet exist to 
capitalize on new technology or implement the vision of joint air-land deep battle.  The 
DSB’s projection upon endorsing the concept proved correct:  success “would require an 
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unprecedented degree of interdependency” between the Army and Air Force.91
Organizational barriers to cooperation remained a major reason why Assault Breaker-like 
capabilities were realized only after the Soviet threat waned.
Despite setbacks, operational prototyping, exercises, and concept demonstrations 
emerged as important tools in the innovation process.  They facilitated new thinking, 
largely by enabling operational assessments of innovations by organizations envisioned 
to implement them.  Successful military innovation depends in part on proving something 
– confirming the value of a new or revised tactic, process, technology, weapon, or 
operational concept, experimenting with operational changes and new technologies, and 
demonstrating to skeptical observers the merits of “new” or at least unfamiliar 
capabilities.  Successful innovation is strongly correlated to the effectiveness of “gaming” 
exercises and their level of realism.  In many respects, the advent of the information 
revolution has made realistic gaming more feasible.  Not only has the increased number 
of information systems in force structure enabled their virtual representation, information 
technology enables more sophisticated simulations.
Advances in air-launched ground attack munitions and indirect fire weapons 
occurred with the perfection of guidance systems and a host of intelligence, surveillance, 
and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities.  Sensor-to-shooter capabilities became an 
operational reality.  Visions of future warfare shifted from discrete, stovepipe systems to 
integrated networks, a term gaining prominence in the 1980s.  Over the next two decades, 
the most difficult and important systems integration tasks would involve improving and 
integrating advanced ISR systems.  
Integration was an overarching theme in the maturation of the American RMA, an 
argument developed further in chapter 6.  It reflected increased acceptance of a systems 
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development and modernization imperative wrought from coupling mission effectiveness 
with applied information technology.  Such coupling has not been successful in every 
case.  Overall, however, it has sustained an American advantage over adversaries.  
Organizational integration to achieve operational synergy was part of this.  After a 
decade of consolidation and despite need for continued integration, the 1986 Goldwater-
Nicholas Act continues to be prove itself among the most important military reforms of 
the last century.  
An important “integration” development concerned what Barry Posen argued is 
fundamental to the military elements of grand strategy.  For him, grand strategy, “a chain 
of political ends and military means” measures effectiveness in terms of “the extent to 
which the ends and means are related to one another.”  “The ‘knitting together’ of 
political ends and means,” furthermore, is basically “political-military integration.”92
Whereas the degree of integration between political ends and military means was blurred 
by the treatment of nuclear strategy as the military means for achieving grand strategy, 
the resurgence of conventional strategy in the early 1980s realigned national security 
strategy with national military strategy.  Concepts and capabilities for extending the 
battlefield using long-range, information-enabled precision strike remained among the 
most important manifestations of tightened political-military integration. 
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6.  Back to the Future?  From RMA Thesis to Transformation Planning  
From roughly 1973 through the 2003 liberation of Iraq, a thirty-year transformation 
has played out in American military thought and defense planning.  This is not to imply 
that periods of transformation have clear beginnings and ends.  They are, like all 
historical partitions, references to the rise and fall of key ideas, technologies, social
outlooks, and ways of thinking about change from one period to the next.  Noteworthy 
here is the degree to which the last several decades evolved as an American-dominated 
period of change in military history that diverged from the narrative of nuclear strategy.  
Other historical periods bounding major changes in U.S. defense strategy during the last 
century include World War I through the early 1940s and the end of World War II 
through the mid-1970s.  
This study of military innovation and the origins of the American RMA began with 
an overview of the immediate post-World War II period, a time when U.S. defense 
strategy muddled toward an atomic-weapons dominated view of warfare.  In the 
aftermath of 1945 London Conference of Foreign Ministers, with the Grand Alliance 
disintegrating, as diplomats grappled to prevent an escalation of the emerging Cold War, 
and while statesmen struggled to understand the implications of the dawning nuclear era, 
Soviet and American ground forces proceeded along different evolutionary paths.  
Soviet strategists had no choice other than strengthening conventional warfighting 
capabilities until their own strategic bomber and rocket forces emerged in the 1960s.  
American ground forces were initially neglected or assigned low priority; subsequently 
mobilized for peripheral contingencies to the detriment of modernization in the European 
theater; and later considered a strategically viable solution to deterrence credibility 
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problems after the Soviets achieved nuclear parity.  Air-ground cooperation followed a 
similar path.  Despite important advances in conventional armed forces, nuclear arsenals 
became the linchpin of Cold War deterrence stability and the cornerstone of U.S. and 
Soviet grand strategy.  Sustained quests to achieve, preserve, or reclaim this idealized, yet 
abstract, stability relationship drove military strategy and defense planning for the 
remainder of the Cold War.  
U.S. military thought and defense strategy emphasized nuclear strategy and 
capabilities in a way that limited the evolution of conventional warfighting strategy and 
military thought.  Changes arose on the margins of nuclear strategy in the late 1970s and 
early 1980s after William Perry and Harold Brown articulated the offset strategy.
In the late 1970s, few defense analysts argued that envisioned conventional warfare 
capabilities would mature into a new, dominant form of strategic warfare.  None 
projected the marginalizing of nuclear doctrine in defense planning a decade after the 
Warsaw Pact dissolved without a shot fired.  Moreover, no mainstream analysts 
envisioned the emergence of national military strategy dominated by information 
superiority.  
On the other hand, did conjecture that proposed conventional systems, including 
organizational adaptations redressing long-standing Army-Air Force issues, might make 
it possible to operate on a “porous battlefield,” one without massed forces or linear battle 
lines, in a manner that did in fact render tactical nuclear weapons “redundant.”1  In doing 
so, policy makers and analysts built on early 1970s arguments that emerging technology 
opened new possibilities for the “dispersal of small ground combat units” possessing a 
level of effectiveness sufficient to resolve inherent “contradiction between massing for 
conventional combat” and dispersing for “a ‘nuclear-scared’ configuration.”2
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Drawing on the argument that the ability to merely defend against attack was not 
sufficient to create a deterrence relationship, conventional force initiatives aimed to both 
blunt an attack outright and enable accurate, rapidly prosecuted, conventional strikes 
deep into enemy territory.  Doctrinally and operationally, the offset strategy was 
manifested by “Deep Attack” concepts and reflected in the evolution of the U.S. Army’s 
successive doctrines, culminating in the 1986 iteration of AirLand Battle.  Advanced 
surveillance and reconnaissance systems were integrated with weapons systems to make 
them more effective against a potential Soviet attack into NATO territory and more 
flexible against other foes.  If accompanied by “improved posture and tactics, and 
improved night and low-visibility target acquisition and guidance systems,” analysts 
argued, “the contribution of these weapons systems to stopping a Pact ground offensive 
could be decisive[;] a prudent Pact commander would not assign to an offensive a high 
probability of success.”3
The technologically advanced weapons systems proposed to achieve the offset 
strategy were “largely conceived and developed during the 1970s…in response to the 
then-perceived threat of an armored assault by the Warsaw Pact forces in central 
Europe.”4  Writing on the future of military affairs and national strategy in the aftermath 
of the 1991 Gulf War, Perry argued that the offset strategy, which simply “sought to use 
technology as an equalizer or ‘force multiplier,’ was in fact “pursued consistently by five 
administrations during the 1970s and 1980s.”5  Former Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
International Security Affairs (1993-1996) Ashton Carter echoes Perry, arguing the after 
the offset strategy’s precepts were  “dramatically demonstrated during Operation Desert 
Storm” in 1991 they became “key to Washington’s way of waging war.”6
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Chapter Overview 
In the early 1990s, the offset strategy was globalized.  No longer aimed at offsetting 
the Soviet military threat, the underlying logic, using the power of information to 
synergistically link capabilities into a purposeful network, became the core of post-Cold 
War national security strategy as well as military strategy.  In regional conflicts, Perry 
contends that the offset strategy’s net effect was “the ability to win quickly, decisively, 
and with remarkably few casualties.”7  Put another way, the offset strategy’s weapons, 
doctrine, and operational art became the chief elements of a “dominance strategy” after 
the Soviet Union dissolved and Cold War systems designed for the plains of Europe were 
adapted to other missions.  
Information technology, operational concepts, and organizational developments 
associated with the offset strategy or its resulting weapons systems were adapted as 
central tenets of an RMA-related goal of achieving ‘dominant battlespace knowledge’ so 
that U.S. forces themselves can achieve ‘battlespace dominance.’  Achieving the force 
multiplier effect of information technology required innovations in situational awareness, 
inertial guidance, target location at night and in all types of weather, air defense 
suppression, precision guided munitions, and an operational approach to war planning.8
Related programs included the Joint Tactical Information Dissemination System (JTIDS), 
JSTARS, AWACS, GPS, new sensors for the U-2 and SR-71 reconnaissance planes, and 
automated precision targeting capabilities.
An evolutionary process can be traced to the early 1980s decision to develop a more 
integrated nuclear-conventional deterrent based on more robust conventional strike 
options.  Doctrinal revisions were encouraged in the early 1980s, force structure changes 
were legislated in the mid-1980s, rapid dominance concepts were adopted in the early 
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1990s, and refined views of preemption as a viable option crystallized in the late 1990s 
and early 2000s.  
In tying together major study themes, the sections below review developments 
related to the globalization of the offset strategy.  The section immediately below 
summarizes key developments addressed in chapters 4 and 5.  Another section reviews 
the digital computer information revolution to provide insights into the evolution of the 
new American way of warfare.
Information technology, as chapter 1 argued, suggested new possibilities for 
operational and organizational innovation.  Students of current transformation discourse 
will benefit from some discussion of the evolution of reliance on information technology 
terms, metaphors, and systems to link together a cacophony of disparate concepts and 
programs.  Subsequent sections review discursive aspects of post-Cold War American 
military thought and defense policy to suggest how conceptual and intellectual factors
shape strategic outlooks and organizational views of change.  
Additional sections explore how, and in some cases why, 1990s RMA discourse 
emerged as the central organizing principle of U.S. defense modernization discussions.  
For example, RMA language, rhetoric, and imagery best reflected, and helped analysts 
make sense of, the strategic environment that emerged in the immediate post-Cold War 
period.  Information-centric theoretical overtones resonated, albeit unevenly, both with 
the generation that implemented the offset strategy’s legacy programs (and doctrine) and 
the emerging generation of policy makers – the first to mature in an era of ubiquitous 
computing and wireless communications.  This generational intersection helped ensure 
the place of RMA language and imagery in a nascent defense reform debate in the mid-
1990s and further encouraged the ongoing lexical turn in American military thought.  
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Finally, the chapter returns to a study theme: the almost wholesale rejection of the 
dominant facets of U.S. Cold War strategic thought.  Nuclear weapons, nuclear strategy, 
calculations of deterrence stability, ideologically driven arms races, and the logic of 
mutually assured destruction all but disappeared from the public face of national security 
planning. 
Of course, nuclear weapons continue to be a central factor in international politics 
and remain the cornerstone of deterrence in U.S. grand strategy.  As discussed below, 
however, prevailing currents within U.S. military thought as well as policy developments 
reflected an additional turn away from the omnipresence of nuclear weapons and 
targeting issues in U.S. national security discussions.  
The 2002 Nuclear Posture Review, for example, brought a new, capabilities-based 
strategic triad composed of defenses, a responsive national infrastructure, and both 
nuclear and nonnuclear strategic strike.   Deterrence stability, it seems, has grown even 
more complex. The new strategic triad includes the traditional components of bombers, 
ICBMs, and SLBMs along with advanced intelligence, planning, and command and 
control capabilities.9  During the Cold War, platforms and weapons systems were the 
essence of the triad.  Now, information and knowledge management capabilities receive 
top billing.  Time will tell if funding and leadership support for information systems 
matches their importance in transformation arguments.
The Thirty-Year Transformation in Retrospect
Despite horrific conventional force readiness in the aftermath of Vietnam, nuclear 
warfighting issues continued to dominate American defense planning.  Military services 
were at their post-World War II nadir in terms of training, leadership, and 
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professionalism.  The political climate did not support conventional force modernization, 
nor were senior military and civilian leaders in a position to overhaul planning.  National 
security strategy remained pinned to the strategic nuclear triad of strategic bombers, 
extremely quiet submarines carrying submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and 
land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) housed in protected silos.  
Conventional forces in Europe were a “tripwire,” a symbolic representation of America’s 
commitments to Allies.  Although Soviet forces could easily overrun them, doing so 
would trip, or trigger, nuclear war.  
Successive crises abroad, a resurgent Soviet threat in the third world, and political 
pressure at home encouraged a tipping point in the late 1970s as Army and Air Force 
leadership grappled with the operational implications of Soviet precision anti-tank 
weapons and a layered, integrated air defense system.  Analysis of Soviet war plans and 
capabilities indicated that extending the battle into the Soviet follow-on echelons and the 
ability to penetrate air defenses would be crucial in the opening battles of any war in 
Europe.   Threats from more capable Soviet conventional forces resurfaced questions 
about the European offensive-defensive balance.  NATO’s conventional defenses seemed 
less viable, less able to defend against an attack.  Allies questioned the American 
commitment to NATO.
A set of strategic and operational challenges bounded defense strategy, warfighting 
vision, and operational requirements for U.S. armed forces, all of which related to the 
central theme of deterrence stability in Europe.  They all related to attempts to stabilize 
perceived East-West imbalances.  Raising the threshold for using nuclear weapons 
became a strategic priority
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American military innovation during the Cold War derived from three sources: 
attempts to correct or stabilize imbalances in the nuclear deterrence equation, challenges 
in peripheral regions that had the potential to escalate into U.S.-Soviet crises, and specific 
operational threats to NATO forces that had strategic implications for East-West stability.  
In the 1980s, security challenges in each area pointed toward advanced conventional 
forces.
In his The Pursuit of Power: Technology, Armed Force, and Society Since A.D. 
1000, historian William H. McNeill argues that this “competition between the USA and 
the USSR” during the late 1960s and 1970s “attained a new and enlarged scale” that 
reinforced the pursuit of “new technologies and new weapons.”10  This reinforced the 
quest for progressively better weapons systems. Especially prominent were Army and Air 
Force initiatives that, in part, responded to perceptions of weakness in their core 
conventional warfighting competencies. 
In this climate, civilian strategists and military officers – the latter sometimes called 
‘mavericks’ in innovation literature – set about transforming training, revising doctrine, 
and seeking greater integration of technology on the margins of the scramble for new 
strategic systems able to preserve the deterrence value of the triad.  Lacking a 
conventional defense and retaliation alternative, awakening to the post- Vietnam 
imperative for radical reform, and succumbing to political pressure at home and abroad to 
reduce reliance on nuclear deterrence, U.S. planners undertook a series of initiatives that 
coalesced into a significant increase in U.S. military effectiveness.  Post-Gulf War 
defense pundits characterized these advances as an American RMA.
A culture proclivity to leverage available technology was reinforced.  McNeill 
concludes that, as the East-West climate evolved, the pace and scope of research and 
318
development (R&D) efforts “mattered more than current capabilities.”11   Alex Roland 
sums up what has been a steadily more important feature of post-World War II American 
military planning: “[q]uality of arms replaced quantity as the desideratum of warfare.”12
The offset strategy, at its heart about qualitative advances in capabilities, aimed to raise 
the nuclear threshold in Europe at the same time it placed defense research and 
development on a path to create new weapons systems and operational.  
For the U.S., this included the application of systems integration skills to the vision 
of leveraging emerging information technology and information-enabled weapons to 
counter Soviet armored echelons. “Numbers,” as former deputy director of the Central 
Intelligence Agency Herbert Scoville found, did not “make much difference anymore; the 
real threat” was “new types of weapons."13   “Instead of assuming that the old weapon 
will serve,” Roland posits, planners “assume that the old weapon is obsolete, or at least 
obsolescent.”14  This seemed particularly true in the early 1980s as the maturation period 
began.  
In this study, “maturation” did not mean the realization of the full RMA but the 
maturing of a host of capabilities that, by the end of the decade, gelled into what 
observers discussed as an emergent RMA.  As one assessment of capabilities to 
implement Follow-On Forces Attack concluded in 1986, “the technologies of primary 
interest [were] relatively mature, and could result in fielded systems over approximately 
the next decade.”15  Indeed, this is what happened.  
Crucial during the years giving rise to the American RMA were visions for the 
future, including those articulated by prominent Generals William Westmoreland, 
William DePuy, and Don Starry.  Each emphasized information technologies as key to 
future performance on the battlefield.  Information technology became the fundamental 
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domain for such improvements, known as “force multiplying” initiatives.  In other words, 
information technology enabled new sources of combat power by linking together 
existing capabilities and adding important new ones.  In the language of more recent U.S. 
defense planners, this was an attempt to create new sources of power, a new competitive 
space.
The Ethernet, telecommunications deregulation, satellite communications, and other 
factors meant the period studied in chapter 5 was also the maturation period of the digital 
computer information revolution.   Expectations for technology shifted as the information 
revolution increased interdependence between technological and doctrinal change.  
Studies of the 1973 Yom Kippur War shaped visions for information technology and 
precision weapons.  Notable among them was Starry’s detailed analysis of armored 
battles and the effectiveness of anti-tank munitions.  Others assessed the implications of 
Soviet air defense systems, which downed some one hundred Israeli aircraft in eighteen 
days.  Comprehensive studies of Soviet armored and air defense capabilities, some of 
them sponsored by DARPA, identified vulnerabilities and recommended technological 
and operational alternatives to exploit them.  The 1976 Defense Science Board Summer 
Study on conventional capabilities set the stage for projects liked Assault Breaker which, 
in turn, demonstrated the inherent value of greater Army-Air Force cooperation.  
Revolutionary stealth fighters and bombers were developed to penetrate Soviet air 
defense systems.
Technology developments and organizational reforms reinforced one another as the 
reciprocal relationship between air-ground technology and joint doctrine crystallized.  A 
conceptual revolution occurred as additional attention was devoted to conventional 
warfighting.  An associated training revolution transpired.  These and other developments 
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both reflected and reinforced the rise in professionalism.   Expectations about the efficacy 
of new technology applied to solve operational challenges evolved.   Concept 
demonstrations and experiments provided evidence for the near- and long-term potential 
for new systems to resolve operational challenges.  
They also fueled debate, much of it focused on strategic plans for the defense of 
Europe and the overall viability of nuclear deterrence.  A tripwire mentality relying on 
nuclear deterrence no longer assuaged Allies fearful that, after theater nuclear weapons 
were employed on Allied territory to blunt a Soviet advance, a cease-fire negotiation 
would trade Allied territory to prevent global nuclear war.  
Conventional force modernization proponents were ready to offer alternatives to 
nuclear weapons when the strategic and operational needs to do so became an imperative.  
Discussions about the future of European security were paralleled by arguments for more 
a capable conventional deterrent in strategically important regions.  American grand 
strategy was infused with a renewed appreciation for the strategic and operational utility 
of conventional forces.  
Evolutionary threads in the larger history of twentieth century warfare converged in 
the late 1980s.  Like yeast rising, they gave form to a new American way of warfare, one 
that helped support a new national security strategy in the early 2000s.  Numerous 
developments contributed, including GPS, new sensors and intelligence capabilities, 
aerial refueling, night vision, a systems approach to warfighting, increased jointness, and 
the maturation of an all-volunteer, professionally trained – and led – force. Developments 
derived from numerous factors: changes in the strategic context, resulting changes in the 
calculus of strategic and operational necessity, technological developments involving the 
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information revolution, doctrinal changes, and general agreement on visions for an 
integrated, extended battlefield.    
What emerged from all of this?  Not merely a single sensing system: an entire new 
way of sensing, acting, and achieving on the battlefield by leveraging the power of 
information technology.  Indeed, a revolution occurred in battlespace awareness and 
operational decision-making.  
“To a much greater extent than ever before,” Douglas Macgregor observes, military 
commanders are “technologically positioned to influence action on the battlefield by 
directing global military resources to the points in time and space. . .critical to the 
campaign’s success.”16   Essential elements in doing so include: quickly and accurately 
visualizing the battlespace; identifying, geopositioning, and characterizing enemy forces; 
optimizing one’s own capabilities to strike the enemy with minimal casualties; efficiently
developing campaign plans; and, conducting long-range strikes with more precision, 
fewer forces, and greater lethality than any time in human history.
By the mid-1990s, the organizing power and widespread presence of RMA 
arguments, and the proliferation of RMA-associated terminology, influenced the major 
themes of defense modernization. These concepts emerged as likely threads of a new 
U.S. national security strategy and military strategy in the 1990s just and they seemed 
likely enablers of an RMA when the Office of Net Assessment studied perceived changes 
in warfare.  
The identification of conventional capabilities with a turn in the history of warfare, 
together with favorable disposition for any “newness” associated with the sudden end of 
the Cold War, further encouraged RMA thinking.  For a brief period, much talk ensued 
about a peace dividend.  Military manpower and material force structure declined, the 
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CIA closed a large number of their overseas stations, and debate ensued over the best 
way to stockpile thousands of nuclear warheads withdrawn from operational units.  
The Cold War’s rapid, bloodless end, the feeling of renewal and national pride in 
U.S. military forces after the Gulf War, and the removal of the threat of nuclear war 
contributed to contextual ripeness for an RMA discourse to take root.   Programmatic and 
conceptual elements discussed in chapters 4 and 5, demonstrated in the Gulf War, 
continued to provide the substance underlying the rhetoric.
The Spirit of the Age: Information Technology and Rapid Dominance 
Throughout history technology, doctrine, and operational innovations have been 
applied to offset an adversary’s qualitative or quantitative advantages.  Proclaiming an 
‘offset’ approach is therefore on the surface somewhat uninspiring and potentially 
ahistorical in terms of research on any particular era.  A contention of this study is that 
information technology and a systems view based on an American approach to systems 
integration made the offset strategy different from previous cases of technology applied 
to solve strategic challenges.
Information technology enabled a more symbiotic relationship among weapons 
system and platforms, on the one hand, and the resulting system-of-systems and its 
human operators on the other.  A unique co-evolutionary process inhered in which an 
emerging operational cognition among warfighters, a systems view of applying 
technology among planners, and a leadership vision for joint capabilities all reinforced 
pursuit of a core set of capabilities to resolve specific battlefield challenges.  Historically 
unprecedented changes resulted.  Building on capabilities conceived in responses to the 
Soviet threat to NATO, information technology is now being leveraged to conduct 
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complex, dispersed, rapid military operations at night supported by the near-ubiquitous 
application of GPS technology.
At the beginning of the formative period in the American RMA, as reported in the 
1974 Intelligence Organization and Stationing Study mentioned in chapter 4, ‘the 
integration of intelligence from all sources into a single product was largely a myth.” 17
Lieutenant General (retired) James Clapper’s “frustration” about the lack of “actionable 
intelligence” (discussed in chapter 4) was widespread.   Recognizing that organizational
changes and conceptual innovations are crucial to what this study terms the American 
RMA, Clapper nonetheless maintains that the advent of the computer information age in 
all of its dimensions drove innovations in intelligence, weapons development, and 
doctrine. Noteworthy is the fact that Vietnam was the first conflict in which military 
personnel were deployed with a specialty designation “computer specialist.”  Hundreds 
operated intelligence and communications equipment.  By the end of the 1980s, obtaining 
computer training and experience in the armed forces would be among the top recruiting 
draws and a critical readiness area.    
Some might interpret the centrality of information technology to the American 
approach to warfare as a case of where military strategy being determined by a larger 
techno-centric theme in American strategic culture.  On the surface, history supports this 
view.  For the U.S., seemingly more so than other nations, seeking technological answers 
to operational challenges reflected a cultural affinity for science and technology, for 
innovation, and a cyclical turn toward aggressive ideational approaches to conflict 
punctuated by periods of withdrawal, isolation, or retrenchment.  American strategic 
culture, more than most, copes with challenges to national interests by leveraging 
technology at hand or, when needed, creating the technology required.  It is this 
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entrepreneurial quality, the penchant for innovation, that partly defines the American 
spirit.  
It is easy to over-emphasize technology qua technology when discussing the 
antecedents to the American RMA or, more generally, when considering military 
innovation adoption and diffusion processes.  It is instructive, on this point, to consider 
Martin van Creveld’s admonition to those ascribing too much importance to technology 
itself.  For Van Creveld, “behind military technology there is hardware in general, and 
behind that there is technology as a certain kind of know-how, as a way of looking at the 
world and coping with its problems.”18
The offset strategy certainly reflects an American way of looking at the world and 
coping with its problems.  Part of this concerns the leveraging of available technology.  
Colin S. Gray found that “American preference for the use of machines in war lies rooted 
in the sparse people-to-space ratio of frontier America, and in the acute shortage of 
skilled artisans that lasted well into the nineteenth century.” 19 “American fascination 
with technology,” he contends, “resulted from conquering the wilderness” where the 
“relative absence of societal support on the frontier bred a pragmatism that translated into 
an engineering, problem-solving approach – an approach that at times has dismissed 
conditions as merely problems” to be solved only “by embracing machines.”20
Martin Gannon argues that, because the U.S. has “historically been ‘short’ on labor 
and ‘long’ on raw materials,” using “their abundant raw materials” required substituting 
“machinery and equipment for unskilled labor.”21  Gannon further contends that, for 
Americans, “the success of their highly mechanized industry in the late 1800s” reinforced 
“the power of machines and technology” which, once “proven to stimulate growth and 
success,” ensured that “their dependence on machines grew heavier.”22
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“Dependence on machines” is probably too strong.  Dependence has a negative 
connotation and understates the issue of what socio-economic and other attributes make 
the existence and use of machines more likely in some cultures.  More appropriate, 
perhaps, is an understanding of how available resources can be exploited to solve 
strategic and operational problems more efficiently, with less human cost, and in ways 
that minimize the strategic downside of demographic and geographic limitations.  
“Every culture,” Geoffrey Parker observes, eventually “develops its own way of 
war”; for John Keegan, culture remains “a prime determinant of the nature of warfare” 
across historical periods.23  Considering the post-World War II period, student of U.S. 
airpower Michael Sherry assigns culture a central role in determining the behavioral and 
material characteristics of warfare, observing that the defining components warfare are 
“generally the product of the political, cultural, and intellectual environment in which 
they worked.”24  Even Clausewitz, Christopher Bassford suggests, focused on cultural 
aspects of warfare.  According to Bassford, the Prussian concluded that “the nature of 
war” is ultimately “determined by a complex of social forces, by the ‘spirit of the age,’ 
rather than by the conscious desires of individuals or theorists.”25
American military strategy, while not dependent on machines or technology per se, 
nonetheless has co-evolved with strong links to the prevailing, dominant technologies in 
U.S. culture.  In many cases defense spending has driven important new technologies, 
including information technology.  America led the early decades of computer 
technology and was the first to bring its armed forces into the computer age.  U.S. 
military thought and defense planning remain inundated with language and concepts 
associated with computers and information technology.  Network centric, to take one 
example, represents the spirit of the age.
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One operational goal of the offset strategy was to quantitatively expedite, and 
qualitatively enhance, the knowledge cycle-times that embody operational decision-
making process so that NATO forces could defeat Soviet armored attacks as their 
echelons assembled for movement. Central to the information-enabled offset strategy 
were changes in the way leaders viewed the relationship between the cost of speed (how 
fast end-to-end information services can function) and the value of time (the premium 
placed on shorter decision- making cycles).  
This is a difficult concept to many to grasp; one derived from a fundamental aspect of 
the modern information age; one at the heart of ongoing changes in the art of war.  Space 
and time considerations drove the evolution of the Army’s FM 100-5 from Active 
Defense through two iterations of AirLand Battle.  A larger sociological trend 
underscored developments in military thought, what social scientist and postmodern 
theorist Paul Harvey terms “space-time compression.”  For him, “the time horizons of 
both private and public decision-making have shrunk, while satellite communications and 
declining transport costs have made it increasingly possible to spread those decisions 
immediately over an ever wider and variegated space.”26  The problem comes from the 
destabilizing effect this compression has cognitively and culturally, specifically its affect 
on “our capacity to grapple with the realities unfolding around us.”27
As military capabilities are increasingly designed for and used in rapid, distributed, 
complex actions, information technology both resolves and complicates time-space 
compression issues.  
When time is of the essence, the high cost of speed is moderated, especially if one 
treats the cost of systems, infrastructure, tools, and trained analysts as an opportunity cost 
in the larger realm of operational success.  As computerized, digital information 
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technology became a more important arbiter of military effectiveness during the 1980s, 
military planners began addressing the issue of information and knowledge velocity. The 
information revolution was the real, tangible side of the American RMA.  
Defense analysts recognized in the 1990s that the “historical limitation” on military 
capabilities “has been the length of time required to correlate and fuse data from a variety 
of sources, process it into information and communicate and display that information to 
intelligence analysts” and then provide actionable information to decision makers.28
The larger issue for U.S. national security was characterized Joseph S. Nye and William 
A. Owens in their influential 1996 Foreign Affairs article, “America’s Information 
Edge”:  
The one country that can best lead the information revolution will be 
more powerful than any other.  For the foreseeable future, that country 
is the United States.  America has apparent strength in military power 
and economic production.  Yet its more subtle comparative advantage 
is its ability to collect, process, act upon, and disseminate information, 
an edge that will almost certainly grow over the next decade.”29
Strategically, the information edge is “a force multiplier of American diplomacy” in the 
same fashion that the U.S. “offset strategy” of the 1970s used information to multiply the 
power of existing conventional forces to offset Soviet numerical advantages in Europe.  It 
is also the essence of the current way of looking at the world and coping with its 
problems, the spirit of the age in contemporary military thought.
The information edge benefits those able to collect, process, disseminate, and act 
upon information faster and better than others.  Widespread agreement that information 
technology could indeed multiply the power of existing weapons systems led to an 
understanding of information as a weapon in its own right.  This represented the natural 
progression of an overarching theme of integration coursing through late twentieth 
328
century military thought.  It is also a key part of the RMA that began in the 1970s and 
reached initial operational maturity in the late 1980s.
Trends originating or accelerated in the 1970s due to technological advances 
included “greater emphasis upon sensor systems. . .relative to the decreased emphasis 
upon firepower delivery systems”; highly evolved command, control, and 
communications (C3) systems; and precision weapons.30  Reflecting prevailing needs on 
the battlefield, such trends reinforced the need to collect, fuse, and make sense of 
information.  A simple mantra emerged among commanders:  Tell me where I am, where 
my buddies are, and where the enemy is.  Tell me these things all the time in time and 
with the tools to act decisively, and I will prevail – on the plains of Europe or in the 
desert.   
This was, of course, a wish of all combat leaders throughout military history.  In the 
1980s, however, it appeared as such capabilities were in reach because of the digital 
information revolution.  As the cost of computing power decreased, a “revolution in data 
processing and communications capabilities” reduced “ this entire series of activities to 
near real-time.”31
For Norman C. Davis, the digital revolution was “based primarily on significant 
technological advances that have increased our ability to collect vast quantities of precise 
data; to convert that data into intelligible information by removing extraneous ‘noise’; to 
rapidly and accurately transmit this large quantity of information; to convert this 
information through responsive, flexible processing to near-complete situation 
awareness; and, at the limit [of this awareness], to allow accurate predictions of the 
implications of decisions that may be made or actions that may be taken.”32 What Davis 
describes is an order of magnitude change in the way we collect, aggregate, analyze, 
329
store, retrieve, and exploit information.  When considered from the perspective of 
competition in the international system, it is Nye and Owen’s information edge.  
Many of the specific operational problems responsible for Clapper’s comment that 
the lack of operational intelligence’s utility to warfighters in the 1970s was “frustrating” 
were being resolved.  But new operational and tactical challenges continue to emerge, 
expectations continue to outpace capabilities, and knowledge dominance remains at the 
forefront of military effectiveness.  
Major General Robert Scales, Jr. (retired), who led the Army’s official post-conflict 
study of the 1991 Gulf War, observes that the war represented a transition “between two 
epochs: the fading machine age and the newly emerging information age.”33  Herein lies 
the underlying historical turn on which the RMA thesis drew its strength as an organizing 
construct for post-Cold War defense modernization discussions. It is also a major area of 
concern for defense transformation scholars in the 2000s, as many promising areas of 
sensing, supplying, communicating, and striking involve extremely small, self-
organizing, ‘smart’ avatars. 
Management guru Peter Drucker similarly argues that some three hundred years of 
“technology came to end after World War II. During those three centuries the model for 
technology was a mechanical one: the events that go on inside a star such as the sun.”34
The post-World War II era, he continues, brought a shift from mechanical models of 
technology to “biological processes” encompassing “the events inside an organism” 
where “processes are not organized around energy in the physicist’s meaning of the term.  
They are organized around information.”35 In his The Advent of the Algorithm, David 
Berlinski agrees with Drucker, opining that “great era of mathematical physics is now 
over.  The three-hundred-year effort to represent the material world in mathematical 
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terms has exhausted itself.”36  The idea of an algorithm may by as old as the logic of 
mathematics, but its realization as a valued tool of mathematics, logic, and computation 
would not come until the twentieth century.  “An algorithm is a scheme for the 
manipulation of symbols,” concludes Berlinski, and symbols “are instruments that 
convey information.”37
Important in an age of information plenty, the algorithm enables compression, 
extrapolation, and visualization.  It facilitates the manipulation of symbols representing 
the complex interplay of objects moving through space and time, two fundamental 
domains of warfare.  More importantly for the growing cadre of military analysts and 
theorists favoring networked, biological (e.g., swarming), and other new models to 
characterize information-dominated military operations, the algorithm enables new 
sources of power and new levels of effectiveness to be derived from information 
technology.
At the very heart of many advanced military capabilities are algorithms in the form 
of computer code, fusion techniques, and data models expressly designed to manipulate 
and display knowledge about the battlefield.  Visions for future battlefield situational 
awareness and automated targeting increasingly point towards smart software agents, 
self-learning and self-tasking sensor networks, automated dissemination of targeting data 
to weapons, and intuitive visualization and modeling tools that allow planners to 
dynamically simulate potential scenarios.  
Data fusion for situational awareness involves four basic elements.  First, different 
signals within spectra (e.g., various electronic waves, levels of thermal radiation) are 
fused into a single uniform signal that is greater than the sum of signals considered 
separately.  This provides greater sensory information to answer the question “is there 
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anything out there?”  Second, fusing of different spectra (e.g., thermal, electromagnetic) 
provides answers to the question “what are the characteristics of what is out there?”  A 
third factor is tracker correspondence, which provides insight into the location and 
movement of sensed objects.  Finally, advances in situation awareness allow information 
warriors to better determine intent.  
These four elements underscored early data fusion work during the maturation period 
of the American RMA that was first battle tested in the 1991 Gulf War.  Performance of 
all systems was by no means perfect.  Some capabilities, including JSTARS, were still in 
their prototyping phase.  Their use, nonetheless, demonstrated new potential for 
dominating the battlefield by leveraging the power of information.  
Through the 1990s and into the 2000s, expectations and requirements for 
information gathering, integration, exploitation, and dissemination capabilities expanded. 
During this time, language and visions associated with the RMA thesis continued to draw 
on terms, concepts, and capabilities from information technology and its application for 
knowledge management.  By the end of the decade, many argued that the rhetoric was 
outpacing reality, that the promise of information technology was not being fulfilled.  
Rethinking the RMA Thesis in Defense Policy Discourse
In the immediate post-Cold War period, observations of U.S. performance in the 
1991 Gulf War provided the initial foundation for American defense analysts’ arguments 
that a profound change in warfare had occurred.  Precision strike, ISR capabilities, and 
stealth were the exemplars of new capabilities underwriting the American RMA thesis 
discussed in chapter 1.  It was the interaction of these capabilities, their operational use 
within a maneuver-oriented doctrine, and the ability to fight throughout the depth and 
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breadth of the battlefield in near-real time that gave the pro-technology slant of the RMA 
thesis its staying power.  Present but muted in RMA discussions were the more critical 
advances in training, professionalism, and operational proficiency.
Discourse on a new American way of war, therefore, derived its immediate post-
Cold War empirical basis from perceived effectiveness of forces fighting a 100-hour war, 
and an enemy, that in many ways seemed similar to Soviet forces in Central Europe.  For 
sure, stark differences in terrain, weather conditions, the enemy (Iraqi rather than Soviet 
armor), the conduct of the battle, and the entire strategic situation inhered.  Analysts, 
including Soviet observers, however, believed U.S. long-range precision strike, stealth, 
space-based situational awareness, and global communications networks did indeed 
represent an advance in effectiveness worthy of a revolutionary descriptor.  
Soviet military analysts were not comparing themselves to the Iraqis.  As previous 
chapters noted, their comments addressed the ability of U.S. nonnuclear forces to exhibit 
the theater strike potential of tactical nuclear weapons, thereby replicating the 
effectiveness of the early nuclear RMA. For them, U.S. military performance in the 1991 
Gulf War verified nearly a decade of analyses of what they dubbed a new American 
reconnaissance-strike complex capable of a theater strategic offensive.  
Perry himself views the 1991 Gulf War as the first and only “test” of the systems 
built in the 1970s specifically to achieve the offset strategy.  Their success demonstrated 
that the much ballyhooed RMA of the 1990s was merely the offset strategy renamed.38
Defense analyst Ken Allard similarly argues “victory in the desert was the culmination of 
more than two decades of post-Vietnam renewal” and “the payoff for an investment 
strategy that had consciously sought to offset enemy strengths with technological 
expertise.”39 Noted strategic analyst Edward Luttwak does not state outright that the 
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American RMA is the offset strategy renamed. He does, however, suggest that Deep 
Attack aspects of the offset strategy, the core of the reconnaissance-strike system, 
represented the “concrete expressions” of the “RMA that occupied military bureaucrats 
on both sides of the Atlantic at the turn of the millennium.”40
Why the ascent of RMA language?  One reason is that defense intellectuals and 
analysts sought to escape decades of strategic thought dominated by nuclear targeting and 
deterrence theory.  The language of revolutionary change breathed life into what many 
considered benign neglect of conventional strategy and doctrine within national security 
strategy.  After living with the necessary evil of nuclear warfare – including a declarative 
first strike doctrine, the RMA thesis was at the very least liberating.  The American 
collective consciousness had always abhorred the threat of a non-proportional use of 
military force.  
Advanced convention forces were first used operationally to remove a tyrant from 
Kuwait and defend principles of international law.  Judicious, restrained use of precision 
strike reinforced an American sense of mission and leadership in the international 
community. A national sense of burden, of responsibility to the world, lost to a 
generation who matured in the Vietnam years, returned.  It was a fitting end to what was 
supposed to be the ‘American century.’    
RMA arguments, in this sense, also tapped aspects of American strategic culture, 
including an affinity for a progressive worldview.  They reinforced the sense of American 
dominance or at least superiority missing from the cultural psyche a decade earlier.  
Other factors encouraged the rapid ascent of ‘revolutionary’ references to U.S. 
military capabilities after the Gulf War, including a focus on the future.  A “post-ism” 
gestalt swept through academic and policy communities, with the new world order 
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described as post-Cold War, post-industrial, post-modern, post-positivist, post-nuclear, 
and post-communist.  Swirling in the cognitive landscape during this time, and adding to 
the sense that a watershed had occurred, were popular discussions of “the end of 
history,”41 and the irrelevance of Clausewitz’s theory of warfare.42  Anticipation mounted 
that additional epochal events would add to the so-called Velvet Revolution in Eastern 
Europe, the tearing down of the Berlin Wall, and the disintegration of the Soviet Union.
Additional revolutionary language came from business and management circles, at 
the time dominated by business process re-engineering theories that Defense management 
proponents fashioned into their own ‘revolution in business affairs’ to compliment the 
RMA.  
Bill Clinton’s 1992 election slogan “It’s the economy, stupid!” resonated with a 
public interested in economic growth.  Change management theorists pushed quick fix 
solutions that fed on an atmosphere supportive of sudden change.  Business process 
revolution approaches were characterized by a “change or die” philosophy, which 
became a mantra in boardrooms.  
Indeed, across government and industry, there was widespread acceptance of the idea 
of, if not an expectation for, rapid modernization and reform.  Drawing on, and later 
reinforcing, pro-change mindsets were a cadre of reformers seeking to revolutionize 
government processes and improve responsiveness to citizens.  Significant progress 
occurred in areas such as streamlining administrative processes, reducing paperwork 
requirements, and transitioning services to the private sector.43
Moore’s law, which holds that computer processing power doubles roughly every 
eighteen months, became something of a cognitive schema.   Information technology fed 
revolutionary fervor as the Internet and web applications surged.  E-business best 
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practices were instantiated in government with expectations for significant savings in 
process cycle time and the number of layers required to do business.  An 
institutionalization of a pro-innovation zeitgeist occurred.  The National Performance 
Review (NPR) was announced by the Clinton administration on March 3, 1993.  Later 
renamed the National Partnership for Reinventing Government, the NPR was among 
several initiatives reflecting the post-Cold War emphasis on making government more 
efficient by reengineering it.  
As reformers sought to reinvent government, institute performance measurement, 
and overhaul financial management practices, defense reformers aimed toward new 
organizational, fiscal, and administrative efficiencies.  A defense reform initiative was 
launched, base closures and re-alignment commissions recommended infrastructure cuts, 
intelligence and defense budgets were slashed, and nuclear weapons were withdrawn 
from most deployed military units. Themes associated with the dominant narrative of 
nuclear strategy (discussed in chapter 3) were downplayed. 
National security strategy was overhauled.  A new grand strategy, discussed in 
earlier chapters as how a nation essentially causes security for itself, was needed to 
reflect the new era.  Specific references to nuclear weapons or nuclear deterrence 
decreased.  Material and intellectual resources discussed in chapters 4 and 5 emerged at 
the center of defense planning and military thought. Substituting nonnuclear strategic 
strike for the nuclear deterrent in situations other than conflicts involving weapons of 
mass destruction also reinforced the attractiveness of operational art and campaign 
planning.  
From the perspective of the late 1970s, American military thought and defense 
discourse underwent a near complete revolution by the end of the 1990s.  Had they 
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possessed a window into the future, many defense analysts would find the terms, images, 
and ideas fundamentally different.  Only the group of thinkers and policy makers on the 
margins of mainstream defense planning in the late 1970s and early 1980s, including 
those involved in programs like Assault Breaker and in technology planning for Follow 
On Forces Attack, would recognize the future in terms of their visions and initial efforts 
to create a reconnaissance strike complex.  
One of the noteworthy developments during the 1990s was the emergence of 
information warfare as a distinct subset of war planning and operations at the strategic 
level.  Military education institutions made information warfare part of their curriculums.  
The National Defense University began offering classes the subject and created a School
of Information Warfare and Strategy.  In June of 1995, sixteen men and women 
graduated from the school as the nation’s first accredited “infowar” officers.  Meanwhile, 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff created an information warfare directorate.  Its special technical 
operations component would lead highly classified information warfare developments.  
On the defensive side of the security equation, a National Infrastructure Protection Center 
assessed and monitored the nation’s information, power, and other critical grids.  In 1998, 
Deputy Secretary of Defense John Hamre announced the creation of a Joint Task Force 
Commander for Computer Network Defense.  Information warfare was indeed an area of 
profound organizational change and intellectual activity.44
As the RMA thesis jelled among policy makers and defense analysts, its central 
themes were aggregated and projected into new, information-centric warfighting visions.  
Joint Vision 2010, for example, placed information superiority as the overarching enabler 
for four key future operational concepts: dominant maneuver, precision engagement, 
focused logistics, and full dimensional protection.   Time dominance, situation 
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awareness, and the ability to coordinate activities of distributed forces gained currency in 
these and later visions partly because their essential, operational capabilities were at 
hand.  Such factors dominated during debates over AirLand Battle and Follow On Force 
Attack and figured prominently in discussions of the Rapid Deployment Force.    
Despite the emergence of information warfare as a new area of military affairs and 
newfound interest in the ability of information technology to resolve strategic and 
operational challenges, few sought to place perceived, revolutionary increases in military 
capabilities in historical context.  Fewer looked at them from a Cold War, evolutionary 
perspective.  
When everyone else is speaking the language of revolutionary change, perhaps, 
peering into the future from the past offers at best a lackluster view.  As is argued below, 
this left defense reform and force modernization discussions without a clear sense of how 
important new combat capabilities and associated theories of success evolved.  
Vision documents failed to go beyond general themes in setting the objectives for 
change, leading Douglas Macgregor to posit that the 1990s witnessed “no progress” in 
realizing the promise of joint warfighting.  Joint Vision 2010 and Joint Vision 2020, 
capstone joint visions containing warfighting concepts meant to guide Service doctrine 
and modernization objectives, became “simply bumper stickers” that did “not prevent 
competing service requirements from dominating joint integration efforts.”45
Admiral Bill Owens (retired), Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from 1994 
to 1996, the period in which Joint Vision 2010 was coordinated and published, provides 
another perspective.  In terms of concepts and attempting to chart a vision for the future, 
this was indeed a time of significant change in how defense modernization was
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characterized.  During it, the RMA thesis ascended in American military thought.  Owens 
was among the most vocal advocates for change.  
Inside the Pentagon and in front of Legislative committees, Owens canvassed for 
integrating the large and in many cases impressive array of ISR and situational awareness 
systems being developed independently by the military services.  Although not entirely 
successful, his efforts helped lay the foundation for later acceptance of a network centric, 
integrated vision of how air, land, space, and sea assets could leverage their information 
systems to mutual advantage.  Among his legacies are a strengthened Joint Requirements 
Oversight Council (JROC) and more rigorous Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessment 
(JWCA) process,  more forward looking joint vision, and widespread buy-in to the 
argument that military planning should adopt a systems-of-systems approach.  
Reflecting on the pace and scope of force modernization changes in the 1990s, 
however, Owens later conceded that the “Pentagon was not really interested in pushing a 
revolution in military affairs, and few in other parts of the executive branch or in 
Congress were either.”46  “We changed the vocabulary” and “modified planning 
processes, established new planning instruments, and adjusted the style, stakes, and 
procedures in the planning process,” he recalls, but “we made less progress than we had 
hoped” in transforming “the future size, structure, and character of the U.S. military.”47
An old wine, new bottles syndrome inhered in many programs. 
Owens describes the underlying pathology.  Although much “rhetoric filled military 
journals and public pronouncements about ‘new eras,’ ‘peace dividends,’ and ‘military 
revolutions,’ the U.S. military was quite happy to avoid” significant change while 
defense leadership merely rode the post-Gulf War “crest of victory.”48
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Successive planning activities and documents record this lamentable reality.  The 
1993 Report of the Bottom-Up Review, the 1994 Nuclear Posture Review, the 1994 
commission on the roles and missions of the armed forces, and the 1997 Report of the 
Quadrennial Defense Review all failed at being “decisive in setting clear guidance” or 
establishing “a consensus for policy objectives.”49  “In each of these cases,” American
foreign policy scholar Janne Nolan concludes, “senior leaders, beginning with the 
president, proved reluctant to engage the issues directly or to provide leadership to guide 
the outcome.”50
Major defense planning documents, including the three cited above, drew heavily 
from Cold War assumptions in terms of the planning scenarios underscoring force 
structure decisions.  For example, a significant cross-border armored attack remained the 
chief planning scenario driving force allocation requirements despite the marked decline 
in the mechanized forces of potential enemies.  Planners framed regional instability and 
political violence as lesser, wholly included scenarios that forces designed for cross-
boarder contingencies could cope with.  
Political and fiscal realities were ill suited to furthering the innovation paths begun in 
earlier decades.  Modernization efforts were delayed, with funding directed to redressing 
critical readiness issues associated with successive military interventions abroad.  
Worsening the situation, recruitment and retention levels declined.  Services temporarily 
lowered aptitude standards, accepting category IV recruits (scoring the lowest on tests) at 
a time when the operational environment grew more complex and weapons systems more 
complicated to operate.  
For these and other reason, the 1990s is best considered a transition period in which 
leaders did not seize opportunities for defense transformation, a topic warranting further 
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study.  Important to this study are developments in how defense intellectuals used RMA 
terminology to define defense modernization as they struggled with an uncertain threat 
landscape.  
Even as the RMA thesis became ubiquitous in defense planning discourse and 
security studies, it failed to provide a policy-relevant framework to inform decision-
making.  It could not transition beyond sketching – in very broad strokes – the prominent 
features of change occurring in the history of warfare.   Nor did RMA theory, or even 
military innovation studies focused on the interwar period, provide the rich historical 
context required to understand specific antecedents to ongoing changes in warfare and 
their implications for grand strategy.  
Theory continued to focus on describing significant military change as policy 
analysts turned from grappling with the reality of change to the starker reality of 
declining defense budgets, increased operations tempo, and rising costs of weapons 
systems.  RMA works, meanwhile, focused on the interwar period.  A paradoxical 
situation emerged.  Students of defense policy sought a lexicon of defense modernization 
attuned to describing, not prescribing change at a time when vision documents pointed to 
gaps between rhetoric and funding for new systems.  
By the end of the decade, prominent public policy scholars would identify concerns 
about RMA works and the rapid incorporation of the RMA thesis into the official 
lexicon.  In 1997s, for example, Colin S. Gray called for “scholarly literature expressing 
deep skepticism about RMA concepts and [information] warfare” to balance a priori 
assumptions about assumed revolutionary changes in military affairs.51  He deemed RMA 
discussions a “Big American Defense Debate” that yielded “much more noise than 
illumination.”52
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 Defense analyst Michael O’Hanlon also expressed concern.  For sure, a general 
RMA thesis existed in U.S. defense discourse that reflected “current rhetoric and official 
documents as well as in a host of writings of independent scholars and strategists.”53
Overall, however, he concluded that the “RMA literature” of the 1990s failed to provide 
“a systemic assessment of where defense technology [was] headed.”54 Indeed, 
O’Hanlon’s 2000s Technological Change and the Future of Warfare opened with a 
chapter entitled “The So-Called Revolution in Military Affairs” that considered evidence 
for an existing American RMA was at best “inconclusive.”55
Military effectiveness scholars whose research did inform defense planning 
subsequently took aim at the broad discussion of the American RMA.  In assessing RMA
theory as a guide to understanding strategic history, Williamson Murray and MacGregor 
Knox conclude that “few works throw light on the concept’s past, help situate it or the 
phenomena it claims to describe within a sophisticated historical framework, or offer 
much guidance in understanding the potential magnitude and direction of changes in 
future warfare.”56  Their criticism reinforced previous concerns with the RMA thesis, 
including O’Hanlon’s.  
In sum, 1990s RMA literature devoted too little attention to the synergistic or 
additive aspects of seemingly disparate innovations in command and control, technology, 
doctrine, acquisition, and operational art that occurred during the 1970s and 1980s.57   It 
is for this reason, among others, that the end of the 1990s brought a transition from RMA 
references in defense planning discussions to transformation processes.  An additional 
development seems to be the mere loss of earlier affinity for revolutionary monikers as 
the post-Cold War era lost its halcyon quality.  Although the basic elements of the 
conventional warfighting RMA retained their currency (e.g., stealth, precision strike, 
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joint warfare, information dominance), analysts at the end of the decade seemingly 
recognized that a lack of significant departures from Cold War force structure questioned 
the appropriateness of RMA defense planning discourse.  The reason was not that defense 
intellectuals and military theorists rejected the premises of the RMA thesis or its many 
conceptual frameworks for thinking about military change.  Rather, the shift represented 
the degree to which the RMA thesis was insufficient to move beyond descriptions.  
This does not mean RMA discussions were altogether feckless.  As Gray argues, “the 
raising of the RMA flag mobilized a wide variety of perspectives and skills” and 
“enabled some long antecedent ideas and streams of analysis to play significantly in a 
contemporary debate.”58  Indeed, they set the stage for later policy discussions and 
provided much of the language used to frame a new transformation strategy. 
From RMA Thesis to Transformation Policy 
Important areas for advancing military effectiveness emerged during the 1990s as 
American military forces were tested in successive conflicts against weaker adversaries.  
Operation Allied Force in Kosovo, for example, engendered greater awareness that 
additional end-to-end intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities were 
needed. As information technology facilitated the compression of decision cycles and 
enriched situational awareness, new operational challenges exposed shortcomings in a 
key end-to-end process.  Specifically, the capacities available to sureveil the battlefield, 
detect enemy forces, assess their intent, target them, pass accurate coordinates, facilitate 
navigation of platforms and weapons, dynamically retarget if needed to ensure precision 
strike, and provide nearly immediate post-strike assessments.
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The relationship between the discursive (ideational) and material (existential) aspects 
of the American RMA thesis, including information technology, and early 2000s 
transformation activities is metaphorically one of a fulcrum and lever.  That is, 
transformation is being considered a way to leverage the RMA, or more accurately 
technologies and capabilities labeled RMA-like, to transform the Services. Partly this is 
reflects the widely held belief that we are witnessing an RMA.  As Andrew Krepinevich 
notes, the turn toward transformation is in fact a “product of the belief that you are in a 
period of military revolution.  Otherwise, why transform, especially if you’re the 
dominant military.”59  The pivot around which this leverage is exerted is a nexus of 
information technologies and decision support capabilities at the core of significant 
changes in warfare over the last three decades.  
To continue the metaphor, if information (or knowledge) management advances 
represent the pivot for leveraging RMA technologies and concepts, the actual work, or 
energy, used in the process consists of innovation with those capabilities across the 
Services, combat support agencies, combatant commands, and other Defense Department 
support activities.  Greater appreciation for the decades-long processes and inherent 
difficulties of applying information technology to military problems encouraged the 
change from RMA discussions to transformation discourse.  
The term ‘transformation’ was present but not centered within 1990s defense policy 
discourse.  References to transformation during much of the decade appeared primarily 
within RMA discussions about historically profound changes in military history or leaps 
in the effectiveness of one or more combat arms.  
Now, “transformation” refers to defense transformation strategy and visions 
associated with the George W. Bush administration’s attempts to remake U.S. armed 
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forces in the model of a lighter, more agile, information-enabled precision force wielding 
greater lethality over greater distances in less time.  ‘Transformation’ became shorthand 
for policies and processes to bring about long-term shifts in strategic effectiveness while 
waging a global war on terrorism. 
The shift in the discourse of defense policy is more than merely semantic.  Labels 
and ideology are important in policy making.  Perception matters in planning. Discourse 
counts in terms of shaping expectations.  Indeed, discourse remains an important area of 
study for students of national security affairs.  
“As determinants of what can and cannot be thought,” Karen Litfin argues, 
“discourses delimit the range of policy options, thereby functioning as precursors to 
policy outcomes. . . .The supreme power is the power to delineate the boundaries of 
thought – an attribute not so much of specific agents as it is of discursive practices.”60
Labels, concepts, and ideas influence how people think about the world and conditions 
behavior within it.  
Paul N. Edwards concludes in The Closed World: Computers and the Politics of 
Discourse in Cold War America, that the realm of “discourse goes beyond speech acts to 
refer to the entire field of significant or meaningful practices: those social interactions –
material, institutional, and linguistic – through which reality is interpreted and 
constructed for us and with which human knowledge is produced and reproduced.”61
And as Ronnie Lipschutz observes, “Winning the right to define security provides not 
just access to resources but also the authority to articulate new definitions and discourses 
of security.”62
As the case of the RMA thesis suggests, the discourse of national security shapes
how defense policy issues are conceptualized and, ultimately, the lenses through which 
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planners sketch the contours of grand strategy.  As stated above, transformation 
terminology is being used to condition views of defense policy in the George W. Bush 
administration as being progressive or about forward-leaning change.  The term’s ascent 
in defense planning discourse was facilitated by a number of widely cited sources, some 
warranting mention here because they provide some insights into how defense planning 
discourse evolved.  
Among the earliest and most notable was Martin Van Creveld’s 1991 The 
Transformation of War, a book length essay on the changing nature of warfare and what 
such changes suggested for the future of modern armed forces.63  Assigned reading for 
military officers, the key aspects of Van Creveld’s arguments incorporated into RMA 
discussions addressed the changing face of warfare.  But his thesis, that Clausewitz’s 
theories no longer applied, and that armies postured to fight other nation states would be 
useless in the coming era of terrorism and civil wars, was difficult for many military 
leaders to accept.  
Why mention it?  In a tragic turn of events, lessons for defense policy embedded in 
Van Creveld’s 1991 treatise on the end of traditional, mass-army warfare would go 
largely unheeded by the Army deployed to build a new Iraq. His thesis bears revisiting in 
light of events of the past decade and the seemingly prescient arguments about the 
changing nature of warfare, the end of the mass mobilization army, and shifts in the 
social and political undercurrents on which soldiers would choose to bear arms.  
Among the benchmarks in the shift toward transformation dialogue was the 1997 
National Defense Panel report “Transforming Defense – National Security in the 21st
Century.”  Reflecting a larger questioning of the pace and scope of defense 
modernization, it represented an evolution in thinking among defense interlocutors about 
346
the pace and scope of defense modernization.  Around this time, defense analysts and 
military theorists began addressing the issue of defense transformation and called for a 
renewed planning debate.  Public discussion of force readiness and reactions to ballistic 
missile proliferation contributed. 
The 1998 Department of Defense Annual Report to the President and the Congress, 
through which the Secretary of Defense communicates the status of defense readiness and 
planning, is a second document marking the shift from RMA language to transformation 
processes.64  Previous annual reports contained rather pedestrian discussions of RMAs as 
historical phenomena or construct to conceptualize historic changes in the nature or war.  
In 1998, of the five main sections, one addressed Service transformation and another 
Department-wide transformation.  Additional text was devoted to “New Operational 
Concepts” and “Implementation” needs, including experimentations, demonstrations, and 
other activities encompassing a larger strategy of transformation.65
Subsequent annual reports would address transformation strategy in lieu of RMA 
chapters.  This represented the socialization of ‘transformation’ as a term of art within 
defense planning and policy circles and the realization that something more prescriptive 
than existing RMA language was needed.  
Another benchmark was the September 1999 Defense Science Board (DSB) report 
entitled “DoD Warfighting Transformation.”  The report defined transformation as “a 
process that seeks fundamental change in how an enterprise conducts its business” in 
pursuit of “discontinuous change in the nation’s capabilities to conduct” military 
operations. 66  Departing from the deterministic and exogenous view of organizational 
change inherent in some RMA discussions, transformation was defined as a “self-
inflicted” process seeking “very big change.”67
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It is noteworthy that, unlike studies earlier in the decade, the report did not begin 
with assumptions about an ongoing or imminent RMA, choosing instead to focus on 
transformational aspects of U.S. defense modernization that address issues of military 
effectiveness.  Presumably, had the same report been commissioned two years earlier, the 
title and tone of the report would have reflected the centrality of the RMA thesis in 
official and scholarly thinking about defense modernization.  
Among the few muted references to RMAs was the recognition that “very big 
change” was “sometimes characterized by the term revolution in military affairs.”68
Apparently, rather than accepting the passivity of an “RMA-is-certain” approach, the 
DSB articulated a view of defense reform and modernization that sought an alternative to 
RMA-associated rhetoric.  
Instead of questing after immediate, revolutionary reforms, transformation was 
characterized as “defining and implementing a vision of the future different from the one 
embedded, if only implicitly, in DoD’s current plans and programs.”69
The DSB, moreover, “did not find much sense of urgency” for significant changes in 
Service warfighting capabilities in the documents addressing force modernization.  Their 
report concluded that “the focus and effort needed” to transform was being 
underestimated.70  Although the DSB is not an official voice of U.S. defense policy, its 
views and arguments often anticipate policy decisions by defining the major issues of the 
day and recommending solutions.  Frequently, as was the case in Assault Breaker, a DSB 
study will shape the parameters of an argument and provide the initial recommendations 
leading to discussion and ultimately a decision. In this case, the DSB’s conclusions about 
transformation directly informed the defense policy debate during the 2000 election.    
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Additional discussion is warranted on the “lack of a sense of urgency” comment.  
Despite concerted efforts within the Office of the Secretary of Defense to push 
modernization, the Clinton administration did not make transformation a priority in terms 
of leadership attention, a willingness to expend political capital to influence Service 
decisions, or a clear vision for change conjoined with ‘sticks’ to induce compliance.  This 
left the military services to define their own visions without an overarching mandate to 
change – or to integrate.  Defense transformation did not seem to be getting any traction.  
The pace of operations did not help, a fact the Joint Chiefs made clear in September 
1998 Congressional testimony by highlighting inconsistencies between policy objectives 
for change and resources available.  Because defense budgets did not increase, this meant 
less funding for new procurements and modernization.  The future was mortgaged to pay 
for current operations, a reality that was also true in the intelligence community. 
Agencies watched their budgets decline as the appetite for intelligence exploded.  
Department of Defense planning guidance for 1994 and 1995, moreover, anticipated 
savings of some twenty-five billion dollars from cutting force structure and reducing 
support infrastructure.  The General Accounting Office “blasted these assumptions” in 
1996, arguing “‘there is no significant infrastructure savings.’”71  Modernization funding 
continued to suffer, leading analysts to conclude in 1998 that “defense procurement” was 
“down by more than 70 percent since its high point in the mid-1980s” and “billions 
below the requirements to recapitalize America’s defense forces.”72
An absence of urgency for transformation in part reflected the lack of a compelling 
political reason to embrace it.  Voters were not concerned about the level of defense 
spending.  One 1995 survey “revealed that 73 percent of Americans polled believed there 
were no threats for which the U.S. military was unprepared”; 53 percent believed the U.S. 
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was spending too much on defense; less than 10 percent rated defense as an important 
issue.73  Defense issues did not factor into either party’s 1996 convention speeches.  
Without political support for changing the direction of defense modernization, and 
absent an existing or projected threat, Services lacked motivation and sufficient 
assurances required to initiate their own, internal changes.  Admitting that any funded 
weapons system or program was irrelevant risked losing both the system and the funds 
for it.  In this political context and associated fiscal situation, protecting existing 
resources meant recasting old programs as transformational.   
Complicating matters, the climate of reform and fascination with ‘reengineering’ in 
Washington gave the appearance that much was already changing.  Champions of the 
status quo continued to use the 1991 Gulf War to rationalize organizational structure and 
technology prioritization.  This was still the case in September 1999 when then 
presidential candidate George W. Bush evoked the term transformation in a speech on 
defense issues at the Citadel military academy in South Carolina. 
The pace and scope of U.S. defense modernization was scrutinized during and after 
the 2000 election.  Writing in 2004, Eliot Cohen recounted the essence of the ensuing 
criticism.  Strategically, American defense strategy was too wedded to “a Cold War-
derived understanding of military power” and failed to “focus on the challenges of the 
new century: homeland defense, a rising China, and what can only be termed ‘imperial 
policing.’”74  Even after a decade of an RMAized defense discourse and numerous 
visions for future warfighting, technology development and procurement processes 
adhered to “Cold War paths,” leaving “systems suited for a war in Europe with the 
defunct Soviet Union rather than hardware optimized for” emerging threats.75  Former 
defense official Ashton Carter urged the incoming Bush administration to transform 
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defense and to revamp research and development.  The U.S., he argued, was “not fully 
exploiting or staying abreast of the information revolution.”76
Despite a renaissance in American military thought, and perhaps because new 
thinking was not affecting change evenly across mission areas or quickly enough within 
Services, Cohen noted “a sense of intellectual and doctrinal stagnation” among some 
military leaders.77  For these and other reasons, Cohen posits, emerging transformation 
discourse represented “more than politics or the quest for novelty”: defense reform was in 
need of an overhaul.78
Additional concerns surfaced about joint experimentation and operational 
prototyping, two primary routes for integrating new technology into operations.  
Secretary of Defense Bill Cohen and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Hugh 
Shelton had attempted to bolster experimentation in October 1999.  Their creation of a 
Joint Forces Command, which incorporated the U.S. Atlantic Command, was intended to 
transform joint warfighting capabilities and champion long-term innovation.     
Progress remaking the armed forces continued to draw criticism from across the 
political spectrum in the early 2000s.  The Army’s modernization plan for the 21st
century, dubbed the “Army Transformation Strategy,” was criticized for being more 
about process and theory than substantive change in force structure.  According to 
Andrew Bacevich, furthermore, although transformation across the Defense Department 
portended something novel or new, in reality transformation discussions indicated that 
“the debate over military reform” in the post-Cold War era “had come full circle” back to 
the early 1990s.79
No prominent changes occurred during the Bush administration’s first year in office.  
Critics resorted to citing Bush’s own campaign speeches lamenting that the American 
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military was “still organized more for Cold War threats than for the challenges of the new 
century – for industrial-age operations, rather than information age battles.”80  They 
asked when he would live up his promise to correct what he called the “the last seven 
years” of “inertia and idle talk.”81  The Bush administration adopted a strategic approach, 
preferring to study the issues before acting.  
Soon after assuming office in 2001, the administration convened several panels and 
commissioned numerous studies to chart a new course for U.S. defense modernization.  
Of note is the reinvigoration of the role assigned to Andrew Marshall and the Office of 
Net Assessment after the office’s participation in defense planning was marginalized 
during the Clinton administration.  Marshall was tasked to rethink, re-look, and revitalize 
efforts to modernize the U.S. military.  Ostensibly, Marshall returned to first instincts, in 
this case the approach taken in the early 1990s when the idea of an MTR (and then RMA) 
took root among defense planners. Managed by the Office of Net Assessment, the panels 
and studies revisited many of the issues, arguments, and innovation discussions of the 
previous decade’s RMA debate.  These studies benefited from a decade of thinking about 
changes in how warfare should be waged in the information age.  
Many argued for lighter, more lethal forces able to befuddle opponents with rapid 
dominance.  Heavy, armored forces would not be needed if units were enabled by 
information technology.  Superior knowledge-to-action capabilities would wrap troops in 
a protective layer of information. 
Operationally, the Army gained what would be invaluable operational experience in 
regional conflicts during the 1990s.  Somalia offered a lesson in the stark reality of urban 
combat against an enemy that could not be distinguished from the civilian population.  It 
was an enemy aided by radical Islamists teaching local militiamen to down American 
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helicopters with rocket propelled grenades, a tactic battle-tested against Russian forces in 
Afghanistan a decade earlier.  
Meanwhile, the Air Force employed precision strike capabilities during the 1990s in 
diverse combat environments.  Doing so exposed inherent limitations of systems and 
targeting processes conceived for the battlefields of Cold War Europe.  Operation Allied 
Force in Kosovo exposed apparent shortcomings in heavy lift, logistics, and intelligence 
support to military operations.  Failure to find Serbian armor in Kosovo, or to prosecute 
timely attacks after they were located, revealed gaps in the ‘kill chain’ that questioned the 
effectiveness of precision air strikes.  Apparent shortcomings in intelligence support to 
military operations questioned progress achieving information dominance.  This was 
predictable given the lack of funds for intelligence modernization and the strategic 
approach to intelligence support inherited from the Cold War.  
The United States has traditionally relied on a ‘surge’ approach to intelligence 
support to national security.  The theory of surge intelligence support assumes that 
sustaining a baseline of collection coverage, analytic capabilities, and other assets will 
sufficiently inform policy and action across the range of known threats and identify 
emergent issues or concerns in time to shift resources and meet crisis needs.  Practically, 
the approach assumes technical and human resources allocated to sustaining ‘readiness’ 
are fungible: they can be temporarily reallocated to meet emergent needs. An alignment 
is therefore assumed between investments to create a baseline surge capability, including 
a knowledge base to monitor, report, and inform on a range of issues, and the anticipated 
needs during a surge.  
A decades-long learning curve about intelligence requirements co-evolved with a 
surge strategy and set of planning practices that helped win the Cold War.  The learning 
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curve included understanding of risks associated with shifting resources during times of 
surge. Issues and crises warranting intelligence surge were expected to relate to an 
overarching security regime with a known, relatively stable set of ‘strategic’ challenges.  
Periodic miscues and failures to anticipate occurred.  They were infrequent and usually 
linked to an existing issue or threat.  The surge strategy assumed resources could be re-
aligned without placing national security at risk.   
Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities developed to counter 
Soviet armored forces were essentially a sophisticated collection enterprise to detect war 
preparations.  Systems and analytic processes scrutinized troop cantonment areas, 
submarine pens, rail yards, munitions plants, and the daily behavior of Soviet leaders and 
generals to behavior of out specific indications of larger activities suggesting 
mobilization.  They did not immediately transfer to new operational situations.82
Drawing on assessments of military operations in the 1990s and recognition of 
intelligence shortcomings, a Transformation Study Group report was provided to 
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld in late April 2001.  By then, it appeared a new 
process of transformation was being institutionalized.  The Transformation Study Group 
described the process as facilitating “changes in the concepts, organization, process, 
technology application and equipment through which significant gains in operational 
effectiveness, operating efficiencies and/or cost reductions are achieved.”83  As stated 
above, however, the administration delayed significant changes in defense programs 
pending a more thorough strategic planning process and consideration of risks involved.  
Much uncertainty remained in terms of where and how fast defense transformation would 
proceed.  
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Defense planning discourse and military thought continued to evolve away from 
Cold War formulas and strategy.  Visions for smaller, more lethal, information-enabled 
forces solidified.  But students of military change remained without military innovation 
frameworks structured in a way that lessons could be synthesized from past RMAs, or for 
that matter from specific innovation cases, to inform defense transformation decisions 
within the organizations ultimately responsible for their success.
Defense transformation discussions were themselves transformed by the September 
2001 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon and, subsequently, by 
the global war against terrorism.  Indeed, in a November 1 Washington Post op-ed 
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld referred to the attacks on American as “a wake up 
call” that created a “new sense of urgency” for modernizing and transforming the armed 
forces.  The bottom line: “Transformation cannot wait.”84  Similarly, then Undersecretary 
of Defense for Acquisition and Technology Pete Aldridge viewed the war on terrorism as 
creating  “a springboard to transformation” and as stimulating the impetus to overcome 
the “status quo.”85
The war on terrorism actually accelerated and refined an emphasis on transformation 
processes and policies that began, albeit slowly, in the late 1990s and was used by the 
Bush campaign to criticize the Clinton administration.  The war on terrorism wrought 
greater sensitivity to military innovation and other processes aiming to increase military 
effectiveness and, subsequently, homeland security.86  The promise of increased defense 
spending conjoined with this renewed sense of urgency to open a window of opportunity 
for overcoming cultural, organizational, and philosophical barriers to significant change.  
It helped forge an organizational and political context, a milieu, supportive of innovation.  
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Expectations for change increased as a wartime footing provided a context for lowering 
bureaucratic barriers to innovation.  
In the December 2001 Department of Defense Annual Report to the President and 
the Congress, talk of transformation assumed the tone of a strategic imperative.  The 
language of the report implied an accelerated pace and broadened scope, although the 
administration announced it would delay making significant programmatic changes until 
all the newly commissioned transformation studies were completed, fully analyzed, and 
utilized to inform a new defense transformation strategy.  Underlying the report was a 
clear message: the global war on terrorism would not delay transformation.  
Discussions of transformation objectives revealed some confusion over the pace and 
scope of transformation activities.  How much change would be attempted at once?   As 
Rumsfeld related in his December 2001 annual report, the Department intended to 
transform “a portion of the force” to “serve as a vanguard and signal of the changes to 
come.”87  Among the vanguard models cited was the German experience building a force 
able to implement the so-called blitzkrieg tactical doctrine of rapid, combined arms 
mechanized maneuver and attack.  
Reawakened interest in military innovation studies refocused attention on factors 
associated with the rise and diffusion of innovations.  Additional thought was given to 
strategic planning processes and frameworks to manage change.  Drawing on business 
management literature, policy discussions increasingly referenced the need for a mix of 
innovations, including discontinuous, transformational advances in military effectiveness.    
The Bush administration used the change in strategic context to move forward with 
plans conceived prior to 9.11 with less public political opposition than they faced in early 
2001.  Among the planning documents drafted prior to the terrorist attacks was the new 
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Quadrennial Defense Review, which placed transformation at the center of U.S. defense 
planning. Drawing in part on the above mentioned DSB report on transformation, which 
called for a transformation cadre to champion reform, an Office of Force Transformation 
(OFT) was formed to encourage discovery and invention, to help formulate prototyping 
activities, and to expedite the delivery of new capabilities and technologies to deployed 
forces.  OFT Director Vice Admiral (Retired) Arthur Cebrowski described the objective 
of transformation as fielding “new sources of power” that “yield profound increases in 
competitive advantage.”88
The resulting climate for innovation was thus much different in the mid-2000s than it 
was at the end of the 1990s.  Defense spending increased, defense policy decisions were 
firmly in the hands of the Executive Branch, profound shifts were underway in the fabric 
of national security, and intelligence budgets increased dramatically.  A new Department 
of Homeland Security and increased cooperation between law enforcement and 
intelligence agencies created new paths for integration.  DARPA realized in a fourteen 
percent funding increase in fiscal year 2002 and an additional nineteen percent increase 
(to 432 million dollars) a year later.  During this period, the program responsible for 
bringing new technologies into operation using Advanced Concepts Technology 
Demonstrations realized a sixty-five percent increase (to seventy-nine million dollars).89
Joint Forces Command changed its focus to participate in many more experiments, 
looking to find promising new capabilities and practices, rather than focusing on one or 
two large, overly scripted exercises per year.
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Chapter Conclusion 
“The study of rapid and radical military change,” military historian John A. Lynn 
noted in 2001, “currently enjoys a vogue among historians, social scientists, and even 
national security types.”90  Writing on the issue of military innovation, and after 
surveying studies taking “innovation and transformation as their theme,” Lynn opines 
that the study of military innovation “remains theory-poor.”91  Lynn surfaces an argument 
reinforcing my own concern about the contribution RMA works made to understanding 
military change during the 1990s and the need for policy-relevant military innovation 
frameworks.   This concern was heightened in summer 2004 as the U.S. struggled to 
defeat Iraqi insurgents. 
  Those seeking insights into military innovation behavior are likely to find the 
period of the early and mid 1990s unsatisfactory.  Instead, they find a period replete with 
rhetoric about change that already occurred but little explanation of how these changes 
came about, and why. It is also a period defined by missed opportunities to extend and 
refine RMA studies into a framework for thinking through innovation decisions 
regardless of whether contributing studies characterize findings as applying to only one 
innovation type (e.g., peacetime, wartime, or technological innovation). 
A window appears to be opening for security studies scholars to provide case studies 
and theoretical tools to policy makers interested in understanding military innovation 
management and the characteristics associated with planning increases in military
effectiveness. 
The George W. Bush administration empowered a more activist civilian leadership 
in the Pentagon to first understand the pace and scope of defense transformation and then 
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accelerate and expand it.  Transformation initiatives refocused attention on strategic 
management of defense modernization, including the need for new operational 
constructs, different priorities for force structure evolution, strategic planning, and 
governance of department-wide implementation processes.  Willing to challenge military 
leadership on their priorities for funding and overall defense modernization plans, the 
administration continued to focus on transformation throughout operations Enduring 
Freedom (Afghanistan), Iraqi Freedom, and the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT).  
Defense spending increased significantly to support military operations as well as to 
fund transformation in the military services.  Experiments and prototyping were 
encouraged.  A formal roadmap process was established to guide modernization efforts.  
Pursuit of new technology was eased by revision of acquisition rules.  The intelligence 
community’s military and civilian components received historically unprecedented 
increases in funding.  
Yet to be fully addressed are the strategic management questions driving the 1991 
Office of Net Assessment study of post-Cold War military change mentioned in chapter 
1.  Specifically, the “how to” questions regarding identifying and successfully diffusing 
innovations to increases military effectiveness deserve additional consideration.  The 
Office of Force Transformation is attempting to address these questions, but few scholars 
have stepped up to the task of helping.  Fewer have offered analytic efforts to keep the 
underlying premises honest.
Future historians may in fact denote a single American RMA that began in the early 
1970s, matured in the 1980s, and achieved its full potential in the 2000s.  Many of the 
advances demonstrated in Afghanistan, Iraq, and more generally in the war on terrorism 
were extensions of the capabilities developed or conceived during the innovation period 
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studied in chapters 4 and 5.  Others are what chapter 2 labels “converging innovations” 
that brought existing capabilities to bear on new problems or that concerned the 
combination of capabilities to address a specific operational challenge.  
This is not to say that all of the capabilities existing in the early 2000s are 
refinements to or realizations of early innovations or innovative concepts.  Indeed, an 
underlying argument of the study, one revisited in the concluding chapter, is that the early 
2000s represents a transition period from one period of transformation to another.  
Still, a thirty-year transformation that began in 1973 seems to coming to a close in 
the aftermath of the operational Iraqi Freedom.  The initiation of a new defense 
transformation process by the early 2000s was a recognition that the concepts, 
technologies, and operational constructs that matured in the 1980s (e.g., space and mobile 
electronics, communications, weapons guidance) had been fully incorporated into the 
Services, providing a foundation to pursue further innovation.  The 2000s also seems to 
be pointing to a new period in military affairs, one that is likely to be characterized by 
beam weapons, bio-warfare, robots, persistent surveillance, nanotechnology, new sources 
of power (e.g., hydrogen fuel cells), and much more lethal small units controlling stand-
off, unmanned precision arsenals.  Algorithms, interfaces, and automation, important to 
the emergence of the American RMA, are also likely to become more influential in terms 
of shaping capabilities and the pace of both decisions and behavior.
For sure, a number of developments anticipated in several decades imply significant 
change.  Robotics, rail or coil guns using electro-magnetic energy to fire munitions rather 
than chemical explosions, nano- and biotechnology technology, radio frequency 
weapons, new composite materials, space transportation, and automated global precision 
strike capabilities suggest the potential for significantly different ways and means of 
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warfare.  None of these are prominent in Service transformation plans to achieve current 
visions for future Joint warfare.  Candidates might be the Navy’s arsenal ship, Air Force 
unmanned combat aerial vehicles, the Army’s information-enabled Stryker brigades, and 
battlespace knowledge management systems.  Under the definition of disruptive change 
presented in chapter 2, however, none of these represent new measures of effectiveness 
or the replacement of a traditional combat arm.
If there is a big bet, an attempt at a new measure of military effectiveness, it lies in 
the interaction effects of systems knitted, or networked together with profound visions for 
knowledge management.  The cornerstone of this networked force is information 
technology and the combination of organizational, operational, and doctrinal factors.  
Important for current students of defense transformation is the role ascribed to 
innovation in the gestation and blossoming of revolutions in military affairs.  Similarly, 
the current situation calls for studies that address innovation diffusion and adoption 
factors (and impediments to them).  Lamentably, specific discussions of innovation 
processes and behavior continue to receive a paucity of attention among security studies 
and defense transformation scholars.   
Informing policy requires theoretical frameworks that facilitate the structured 
assessment of innovation processes and the myriad factors influencing innovation 
behavior.  This was indeed an objective of this study, which aimed to relate important 
innovation activities anteceding the American RMA.  
Some final comments on discourse are warranted.  The French poet and philosopher, 
Paul Valéry, considering the widespread use of the terms classicism and romanticism
among late nineteenth century scholars and philosophers, lamented that, “One cannot get 
drunk, one cannot quench one’s thirst, with labels on bottles.”92 Valéry decried the use of 
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descriptive labels to summarize entire systems of thought and generalize eras rich in art 
and prose.  English dean of letters Isaiah Berlin countered this view.  Despite the merits 
of Valéry’s underlying argument, he demurred that, “unless we do use some 
generalizations it is impossible to trace the course of human history.” 93
What is important, pace Valéry, and taking license with his metaphor, is accurate 
labeling on the bottles and an understanding of what the bottle holds in store for 
unsuspecting imbibers.  The reductionism inherent in labels and generalizations carries 
complex ideas and narratives through space and time, endowing discussions and 
communications with compressed or truncated information and knowledge.  Interlocutors 
engaging in discussions using terms, ideas, and concepts are assumed to share common 
understanding of the underlying ideas, images, and meaning of terms.  This includes 
shared understanding of causality: some events, processes, or conditions give rise to 
others.  Inherent is the assumption that the tip of the iceberg, the acronym or term 
representing a phenomenon or historical process, accurately conveys the contours of what 
lies hidden from view.  One problem with current transformation discussions, arguably, is 
the lack of insight into innovation processes and theories.
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Paul Valéry’s concern with labels seems appropriate, if not quixotic, when 
juxtaposed with the seemingly obsessive fascination with labels and terms in 
contemporary American military thought and defense policy studies.  This study 
addressed the term RMA, which in the mid 1990s seemingly became a synecdoche for 
the future of American military forces.  In the 2000s, the term transformation seems 
destine to remain the umbrella term for multifaceted initiatives to build upon U.S. 
military capabilities.  
The centering of RMA concepts, language, and imagery within post- Cold War 
defense discourse signaled what this study terms a lexical turn in American military 
thought.  Lexical turn refers to rhetorical innovation, entrepreneurial behavior, and 
systemic re-visioning of the language, imagery, and philosophy encompassing U.S. 
military and defense planning discourse.  By investigating the origins of the 1990s lexical 
turn in American military thought, and by exploring the origins of actual military 
capabilities, the above chapters placed current U.S. defense transformation initiatives in 
historical perspective.  
The chief attribute of this lexical turn stems from the decreased role of nuclear 
weapons in international security, reflected in the de-emphasis on nuclear deterrence and 
nuclear targeting in the narrative of U.S. defense policy.  Nuclear deterrence, although 
still an important part of national security policy, no longer dominates military thought 
and strategy.  
As nuclear deterrence became less prominent in public discussions of political-
military policy, conventional warfighting doctrine experienced something of an 
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intellectual renaissance.  Fueled by conventional adjuncts to nuclear deterrence strategy 
conceived in the 1970s to raise the nuclear threshold, this renaissance in conventional 
military thought evolved in the 1980s around a core set of concepts and capabilities.  As 
these concepts and capabilities ascended in importance on the margins of strategic 
nuclear thought, they came to define new doctrine and warfighting visions.  
Encompassing the centerpiece of the American RMA thesis, many of these doctrines and 
visions now define the core aspects of U.S. defense transformation strategy.
Where did RMA concepts, doctrine, and technology come from?  RMA-associated 
visions for the future of warfare were products of a thirty-year transformation in the U.S. 
armed forces that began in the early 1970s, matured in the 1980s, and emerged as a 
dominant form of warfare in successive post-Cold War conflicts.  Whereas important 
changes in the discourse of defense planning represented a lexical turn, the actual 
capabilities supporting RMA language and its associated visions are part of a decades-
long co-evolutionary process that reached its apogee in the early 2000s.  
Throughout the study, the offset strategy was presented as an important element of 
the strategic vision from which a number of conceptual, organizational, and technological 
initiatives evolved.  It remains a central part of the history of the American RMA, as do 
the conditions that led to its promulgation.  Consider former Secretary of Defense 
William Perry’s testimony, which illustrates the importance attached to precision strike as 
an enabler of revolutionary change in military affairs during the formative years of the 
American RMA:
Precision guided weapons, I believe, have the potential of revolutionizing 
warfare.  More importantly, if we effectively exploit the lead we have in 
this field, we can greatly enhance our ability to deter war without having 
to compete tank for tank, missile for missile with the Soviet Union.  We 
370
will effectively shift the competition to a technological area where we 
have a fundamental long-term advantage.”1
The new American style of warfare is indeed a legacy of the offset strategy.  As Perry 
later argued, the capabilities identified as an RMA derived from the larger systems of 
systems made up of many “links” responsible for overall effectiveness.2
Such thinking reinforced key aspects of the thirty-year transformation: a shift from 
platforms to integration across platforms, the focus on networking, recognition that 
overall military capabilities should be imagined as nonlinear, open systems, and greater 
acceptance of complexity theory into military thought.
The emerging era of U.S. defense transformation is building on developments 
explored above.  It will also move into new areas of technology, additional organizational 
changes, and new operational concepts.   New capabilities will integrate laser weapons, 
biotechnology, automated global information enterprises, hydrogen power, the ability to 
dwell over targets (e.g., endurance UAVs; high-flying airships), combat in space, city-
crippling denial of service attacks on critical information services, and robots or 
semiautonomous ‘thinking’ machines able to self-organize and ‘swarm.’  Despite these 
and other changes, much continuity will remain from this period to the next.  
Lamentably, the majority of U.S. defense transformation discussions, and perhaps 
more importantly scholars and policy makers concerned with military innovation, remain 
uninformed about the origins of, and decisions leading to, the so-called new American 
way of warfare that transformation aims to reinforce.  
Why the relative lack of attention the offset strategy and associated developments in 
histories of U.S. military thought and defense planning?  The reason, arguably, is directly 
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related to the lack of interest in innovation processes and strategies during the heyday of 
the American RMA thesis.
Several factors contributed to lack of direction attention to the offset strategy and its 
chief policy adjuncts.  Nuclear warfighting developments, including the development of 
key weapons systems like the B-2 bomber, the MX missile, and the Star Wars missile 
defense program dominated defense planning.  Many of the offset strategy’s underlying 
thrusts appeared on the margins of these debates because they involved conventional 
warfare, including research and development programs that were sufficiently novel in 
their technology or operational employment to fall outside mainstream channels.  Despite 
growing interest in the possibility of nonnuclear strategic strike and widespread 
discussion of AirLand Battle and Follow On Forces Attack, both popular and official 
defense planning discussions remained focused on strategic nuclear issues.  Conventional 
force reduction negotiations were eclipsed by theater missile treaties, Reagan-Gorbachev 
summits on nuclear disarmament, and Reagan’s proposed nuclear missile shield.   
Stealth, key aspects of Assault Breaker, and the most innovative precision strike 
capabilities evolved as classified programs.  Knowledge of their existence entered the 
mainstream after the RMA thesis had already taken hold of defense discourse, perhaps 
rendering their intrinsic characteristics less extraordinary in the post-Cold War, post-Gulf 
War rush to label American forces “revolutionary.”  And because the concepts 
demonstrated in Assault Breaker took longer than initially planned to materialize, many 
overlooked its importance in shaping visions for future capabilities.  The long-term 
evolution of a vision for a future AirLand force structure was lost in the focus on specific 
technologies.  
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Additionally, the information technology components of the offset strategy were no 
longer profound from the perspective of late 1980s analysts.  By that time, information 
technology and personal computers were well on their way to ubiquity.  Few considered 
the origins of the internet, research and development on microchips, and other aspects of 
the computer revolution within the context of Cold War military developments that 
created the preconditions to the American RMA.  
Historical accounts of post-Cold War defense modernization are only now 
addressing initiatives associated with the offset strategy or other long-term development 
processes.  Grand strategy shifts in the early 1980s provided the technologies, doctrines, 
and organizational constructs underwriting the George W. Bush administration’s national 
security concepts for preemption and precision strike in the 2000s.  The above chapters 
addressed part of the evolution of Cold War military capabilities underwriting the new 
American way of war.  This conclusion addresses the future of military innovation 
studies for political scientists seeking to inform policy.
Two primary sections follow: a review of significant factors from chapters 3 through 
5 from the perspective of the innovation framework presented in chapter 2; and, final 
thoughts on innovation theory, including thoughts on how the innovation milieu 
framework might be utilized by current students of U.S. military innovation.  The 
framework for conceptualizing innovation is revisited to review select aspect of 
necessity, opportunity, and the innovation milieu.  Doing so reinforces the argument that 
military innovation studies require understanding antecedent conditions and events 
shaping the overall ripeness of the innovation milieu.   Such understanding informs 
assessments of the origins of significant changes in effectiveness and understanding how 
innovations themselves alter or otherwise influence military affairs.  
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Revisiting Necessity and the Framework for Conceptualizing Innovation
Earlier chapters discussed strategic and operational necessity as a key factor in the 
emergence of significant military innovations, meaning they had the potential to change 
the character of warfare or fundamentally challenge the core competency of a military 
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Figure 7-1: Framework for Conceptualizing Innovation
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Underlying the framework is a belief that context is the key to understanding innovation 
behavior and outcomes.  This study does not suggest that one framework fits every study 
or case.  Not every element from previous chapters is addressed.  Some are emphasized 
because they appear more relevant to students of military innovation interested in 
applying innovation theory to the study of defense transformation. 
The framework suggests one way to consider the interaction effects of the full 
complement of influences on military innovations, their diffusion and adoption, and their 
effect on military effectiveness.  This includes the primary elements of innovation 
systems, processes, and actors that exist in specific moments within specific 
organizational settings.  
The Security Environment
Contextual factors define the general boundaries and the inherent potential of an 
innovation milieu.   Understanding contextual elements of the larger social, 
technological, economic, and political environment places decisions, processes, events, 
and behavior in perspective.    Elements include threats (capabilities and intentions), 
associated requirements emerging from analysis of the gaps between threats and available 
means to meet them, the nature of operations envisioned in future battles, and the 
approach taken to managing uncertainty.  The interpretation of the current and future 
security environment in terms of the construction of necessity is another contextual 
component warranting scrutiny.  
Necessity, an ancient concept in preparations for warfare from Homer to Thucydides 
to Gibbon to the present, fuels military innovation.  It derives from challenges and 
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emboldens opportunity.  Cold War developments linked to necessity included the Polaris 
submarine launched ballistic missile, spy satellites, stealth aircraft, deep strike doctrine, 
and the realignment of DARPA’s focus to conventional warfare.  Each was also 
concerned with managing uncertainty in terms of mitigating against the risk of a Soviet 
attack.         
Of course, understanding the effect of necessity on defense planning is much easier 
with the benefit of hindsight.  Organizations, or more accurately individuals and cohorts 
responsible for decisions within them, do not always accurately identify or characterize 
the essence of a strategic or operational necessity.  
Necessity need not be extant at the time of the innovation in the form of an 
immediate threat or challenge.  Analysts may perceive a decline in capabilities or what 
management theorists call an anticipated burning bridge.  That is, developments in 
foreign militaries or a shift in the strategic environment that renders one’s capabilities 
less relevant or effective.  Examples from chapters 4 and 5 included accurate Soviet 
surface-to-air missiles and antiaircraft radar that threatened to weaken the effectiveness 
of airpower.  This impelled the development of radiation-seeking missiles and stealth 
aircraft to penetrate air defenses and attack command and control sites, air defense radars, 
and other targets.  
Important contributions to U.S. understanding of the Soviet threat included Defense 
Science Board studies, intelligence analysis, and the industry study led by Joe Braddock, 
which provided a detailed argument for defeating Soviet armored echelons.  Of course, 
intelligence reports often overestimated Soviet military prowess.  Still, intelligence 
analysis of Soviet potential military capabilities did seem to accurately portray Soviet 
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plans, potential battlefield performance, and weaknesses the U.S. could exploit with long-
range precision strike and other initiatives linked to the offset strategy.   
Assessments of enemy capabilities were most helpful to technology development 
and doctrinal innovation when they provided specific insights into tactical challenges and 
potential enemy weaknesses.
The components of the long-range precision strike enterprise proposed and 
demonstrated by Assault Breaker were based on a specific tactical problem from which 
requirements and new approach to operations followed.  Delay in achieving the 
underlying vision reflected organizational and political challenges, not technological 
ones.  A lesson for later programs was the need to link constituencies within each military 
organization to concept demonstrations and their outcome, finding Service champions for 
experiments, building partnerships when translating requirements into operational 
prototypes, and ensuring that champions for new capabilities clearly advocated the 
benefits.  Today, processes for demonstrating a new capability are embodied in 
prototyping activities, experiments, and advanced concept technology demonstrations.  
The fundamental objective is sustaining warfighter advocacy based on their operational 
needs and commit to operationally testing new capabilities.
Many of the innovations anteceding the American RMA aimed to satisfy specific 
requirements related to a relatively narrow, yet related, set of strategic and operational 
threats.   In an environment of nuclear parity, worsening East-West relations, and 
pressure at home and abroad to raise the nuclear threshold, stealth technology, precision 
strike, maneuver doctrine, and closer cooperation between air and ground forces offered 
operational solutions to strategic and operational problems in the European theater.  
Information technology promised to solve command and control, navigation, and 
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coordination challenges.  It presented options for managing uncertainty and facilitated 
steps toward cross-Services integration without threatening organizational autonomy. 
Uncertainty about the future must factor into studies of military innovation.    The 
central question is one of risk: what are the consequences of incorrectly identifying future 
requirements?  Uncertainty falls into two categories.  There are so-called known 
unknowns, the possible futures one has identified as potential scenarios from which 
planning proceeds.  Assessing the scenarios, in other words, provides a probability 
estimate of each scenario occurring along with risk mitigation steps to purse in case a 
different, more threatening scenario develops. More difficult are what risk management 
theorists call residual uncertainty, or the possible futures that are unknown unknowns.  
Operational or tactical surprise is often avoidable from correct reading of known 
uncertainties.  Strategic and technological surprise, which frequently compounds 
operational surprise, is more likely when organizations have not identified the full range 
of likely futures.  They are more likely when there is a high level of residual uncertainty.
The degree of uncertainty about adversary capabilities and intentions determines the 
degree and nature of risk inherent in choosing one course of development over another.  
Frequently, as was the case for advanced surveillance, targeting, and strike capabilities, 
the need for innovation often derives from a realization that existing capabilities cannot 
guarantee success.  Making informed decisions about risk requires some definition of 
success and failure.  
Concerning uncertainty, the most important historical risk is a strategic surprise 
leading to national capitulation.  A more likely threat to U.S. security involves 
technological and operational surprise, the most frequent surprises punctuating military 
history.  Technological and operational surprise can be devastating, militarily and 
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politically, at the regional level.  Their occurrence often reflects faltering threat 
perception or bad decision-making.  Even if threats are accurately perceived, 
organizations often make wrong investment decisions even after an operational 
requirement is documented.  Competing solutions arise to solve specific operational 
problems.  
Expectations and the degree of uncertainty about the future influence the degree of, 
focus on, and intended outcome for innovation activities.  Expectations are also 
fundamentally constructed on perceptions, attitudes, and the cognitive lenses through 
which information about the world is interpreted.  From the perspective of understanding 
innovation behavior, the construction of these perceptions and expectations forms an 
important part of the context in which “change” initiatives are embedded.
But innovations are often blocked or delayed for political, cultural, or other reasons.  
Failure to innovate was not a primary concern of this study, although examples were 
mentioned.  Support for unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and precision munitions 
evolved slowly within the Air Force despite operational demonstrations of their potential.  
The F-117 Stealth aircraft was not accepted by the Air Force until the Chief of Staff had 
assurances it would not affect funding for other aircraft.  Many initially balked at the 
Army’s decision to adopt a maneuver-oriented approach along with increased reliance on 
air ground cooperation.  Few senior military officer embraced jointness.      
The global positioning system (GPS) is perhaps the most interesting example given 
its revolutionary influence on military effectiveness.  Initiated in 1973, GPS suffered 
through proposed budget cuts, survived several attempts to kill the program altogether, 
and achieved initial operational status only after years of delay following the Challenger 
space shuttle disaster.  After failing to receive support from the Services, civilians in the 
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Office of the Secretary of Defense rescued the program in the early 1980s over the 
objections of senior military officers.  Even after initial capabilities became available in 
1991, many military leaders questioned its usefulness.  By the end of the decade, GPS 
was critical across the spectrum of military activities.  
Given failures to innovate, tt is important to clarify that merely understanding the 
security environment does not guarantee successful innovation.  Nor does it yield 
understanding of specific innovation processes and outcomes.  It does, however, provide 
a critical first step for those attempting to enact change and for those studying innovation 
behavior.  Both involve comparing perceived threats and opportunities for meeting them 
with defense plans, training regimes, force structure, doctrine, and other indicators of 
future battlefield behavior.  A point for scholars and practitioners: because this process is 
human, it is flawed.  For this reason, any innovation framework must consider the social 
aspects of innovation diffusion and adoption within organizations.
Requirements are operational capabilities, expressed as needs, that organizations 
deem critical for success on the battlefield.  They can include logistics support 
requirements, intelligence or information needs for decision-making, or even capability 
descriptions to guide technology research and development or doctrinal change.  
Requirements generation, gathering, aggregation into capabilities areas, and translation 
into new research and development initiatives works best when operators define the 
specific capabilities required based on specific knowledge of the enemy or a specific 
tactical problem.  Innovations frequently evolve from a recognition that requirements 
cannot be met with current or projected capabilities, when more efficient, more optimal, 
new capabilities are socialized by advocates of a new approach, or when new missions or 
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core competencies suggest altogether different means to achieve the underlying 
operational need.   
A capabilities approach emerged from extending the battlefield discussions and 
NATO’s planning for Follow On Forces Attack.  A 1986 U.S. Office of Technology 
Assessment report, Technologies for NATO’s Follow-On Forces Attack Concept, argued 
“systems should be considered not individually, but as complete packages to support 
specific operational concepts.”3  Not procuring or adequately integrating into forces any 
one of the required sub-elements “could greatly reduce the value of investments in the 
others.”4   Then Deputy Director of Defense Research and Engineering Frank Kendall, 
furthermore, argued in 1992 that FOFA evolved into a Joint Precision Interdiction 
capability, “taking the emphasis off of the non-existent Warsaw Pact threat and placing it 
on multiple theaters and on critical military targets, including targets at greater 
operational depths.”5  Critical aspects included and integrated sensor system, precision 
geolocation and visualization tools, and near-time intelligence reporting.  
Perceptions of Innovation Attributes
Perceptions of innovation are shaped by assessments of the security environment as 
well as existing beliefs, biases, and views of military capabilities.  They influence the 
discourse of innovation by shaping how people think about new ideas.  How leaders 
discuss innovations, position them on meeting agendas, and associate them with strategic 
objectives all influence how others in the organization react to them.  
Among the prominent undercurrents from previous chapters were the adoption of a 
systems approach to warfighting and a capabilities approach to force modernization.  
These reflected perceptions of the general direction and type of innovation required.  The 
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former spawned operational art, the latter an approach to defense planning that gradually 
built on the idea of mission needs statements and the total cost of mission execution.
In addition to pulling ideas, technology, and operational concepts, the core set of 
strategic and operational threats driving European security assessments in the 1970s and 
1980s provided an organizing framework to channel organizational creativity.  Multiple 
sources of invention and innovation existed.  By the end of the 1980s, a fairly well 
defined process for technology push and pull ensured that new technologies were at least 
known to the respective Services.  
Military leaders think about and train for battle by first understanding the security 
environment and its essential threat characteristics and then attuning warfighting concepts 
and tactics to meet them.  Social scientists would call the underlying process of 
understanding a theories of warfare or warfighting – the ordering of different variables 
involved in combat that are causally related to success.  Innovation leading to significant 
increases in military effectiveness are partly derived from a similar process.  That is, they 
involve a realization that some previously unknown variable, thrown into the mix, 
changes the outcome of battle or the underlying theory of success. 
For this reason, an important element in changing perceptions of military 
effectiveness is the efficacy, strategic viability, and operational reliability of research and 
development and innovation ‘demonstration’ activities.  It is not enough to develop 
technology or rethink doctrine.  They must be tested, proven in realistic exercises, 
debated, and competed against the status quo.  Without an opportunity to prove their 
potential, planners are hard pressed to recommend a new, potentially risky program that 
disrupts existing, incremental development work.  
382
Expectations, restating the point, are important.  Expectations about future 
capabilities cascade down and through organizations, conditioning views of behavior, 
performance, and all manner of priorities – from procurement, to research and 
development, to training and even recruitment.  All of this influences how different 
communities of practice, either operational or applied science, initially develop options 
for the degree and types of innovation required to address threats, bridge gaps in 
capabilities, and invest in new capabilities to reduce risk.  Expectations also represent the 
bias civilian and military leaders have about theories for achieving victory.  They are not 
easy to change.  
During most of the Cold War, for example, the U.S. military trained and equipped 
for scenarios involving Soviet attacks into NATO territory along several mobility 
corridors.  They also planned for a North Korean attack into South Korea.  Public 
servants and military officers spent entire careers planning for a handful of scenarios, 
each of which had a highly evolved theory for victory.  The capabilities pursued in the 
1970s after Soviet technology demonstrated in the Middle East focused efforts on the 
potential for precision strike to shift the balance of power in Europe.  As long-range 
precision strike capabilities were integrated into U.S. forces they initially gained 
acceptance because they aimed to replicate the effects of small nuclear weapons on 
Soviet armored echelons.  Despite barriers to acceptance, AirLand Battle and joint 
operations to coordinate the execution of Deep Attack gained acceptance.  In the early 
1980s, programs like Assault Breaker and Stealth were developed specifically to alter the 
calculus of success.  Their essential operational characteristics where eventually adopted 
after demonstration of their operational merits.  In time, the essential differences inherent 
in maneuver warfare, stealth, precision attack, information warfare, and other 
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developments challenged ingrained notions of victory.  Among the most important 
change involved the gradual ascension of intelligence and situation awareness from a 
marginalized support function to the primary enabler of victory.
Despite delays developing and fielding associated technology, the very existence of 
these programs and knowledge of experiments did affect perceptions and expectations. 
Three turning points in expectations about the type of military capabilities required for 
the evolving security environment occurred in the late 1970s.  First, strategic and 
operational requirements for theater nuclear targeting led to the Presidential Directive 59 
in July 1980, which called for a range of capabilities supporting dynamic nuclear 
targeting, including distributed, security communications and in-route retargeting.  
Further refinements in precision location, dynamic targeting and retargeting, the tighter 
coupling of command, control, communications, intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance suggested new opportunities for nonnuclear theater strike.  A second shift 
involved Soviet force structure and doctrinal changes, which surfaced concerns about 
increased operational tempos and the spillover of superpower competition into peripheral 
regions, most importantly the Persian Gulf.   Expectations for campaign planning evolved 
as domestic and international pressure mounted to raise the nuclear threshold.  The rapid 
deployment approach to regional conflict encouraged additional changes in U.S. force 
structure, support for nonnuclear long-range strike, and the diversification of associated 
planning, training, and doctrine.  Military responses to aggression required lethal strikes 
with smaller forces wielding weapon systems capable of greater precision.    
Another shift in expectations involved warfare itself, or more accurately new 
definitions of success.  In the early 1980s, planners considered possibilities for prevailing 
in a future European conflict as well as reversing nearly decades of reluctance to engage 
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militarily abroad.  Partly this reflected responses to the evolving Soviet threat and the 
recognition that military capabilities were needed for new regional missions.  The attack 
on Libya, the first combat use of precision munitions since Vietnam and the prototype 
counter-attack in the current global war against terrorism, was the culmination of years of 
shifting expectations about military force.  These changes, among others discussed in 
chapters 4 and 5, involved changing views of technology, especially the value of 
information technology.
The above framework includes both internal and external expectations as factors to 
be included in the contextual domain of perceived innovation attributes.  They are 
elements of the cognitive context.  Innovations are nested within organizations 
themselves embedded in larger organizations, themselves in larger social-political 
contexts, and so on.  Internal and external expectations are among the most important for 
military innovation scholars to understand.  Difficult to empirically document, 
expectations nonetheless play a large role in how innovations diffuse within and across 
organizations.  
Internal expectations apply to organizations that will actually implement the 
innovation, external expectations to those organizations, leaders, and other entities for 
which support is required to successfully diffuse the innovation.  Expectations about a 
potential NATO-Warsaw Pact war were for decades driven by a belief that any future war 
would involve nuclear weapons.  Conventional operations on nuclear battlefields were 
expected to be minor in scale, with NATO having to resort to theater nuclear weapons 
early in the conflict.  The Air Force corporately held very low expectations for long-
range conventional precision strike or, for that matter, for precision munitions, until 
facing external pressure from Congress and others.  Much of this changed in the late 
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1970s and early 1980s.  New exercise and training initiatives, some linked to concept 
demonstrations and prototyping activities – Assault Breaker was one of them – helped 
leaders and decision makers visualize the potential of new capabilities.  
Along the way, the Army refocused its efforts on indirect fire missions, maneuver, 
and expediting the flow of data from theater surveillance assets to decision makers.  
Noteworthy is the fact that none of the Army’s “big five” weapons systems were indirect 
fire systems.  Key systems on which the Army assumed its post-Vietnam future rested 
included the M1 Abrams main battle tank, M2 Bradley armored infantry fighting vehicle, 
AH-64 Apache combat helicopter, UH-60 Blackhawk utility helicopter, and the Patriot 
air defense missile system.  Each was in fact critical, but by the early 1980s it was clear 
that defeating Soviet armored forces required additional systems, including multiple 
launched rockets systems and tactical missiles with submunitions.  Long-range precision 
strike emerged as a competency the Army had to master to succeed at its larger ground 
combat mission.  Some concepts called for delivering thousands of precision munitions in 
opening battle.  
Succeeding at ground attack missions required theater intelligence capabilities able 
to “see” forward some 300 kilometers into enemy territory.  This required reliance on 
both national technical means (satellites) to monitor readiness and indications of war 
preparations, develop target reference points, and generate maps.  Airborne capabilities 
were needed to provide more responsive intelligence, targeting data with within much 
shorter operational timelines, and to identify the current status, direction, and speed of 
enemy forces moving toward NATO front lines.  
During the Cold War, a spectrum of ISR systems evolved to improve national 
security decision-making by also enhancing strategic military capabilities.  From the 
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earliest days of the American RMA, end-to-end intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities were a priority and viewed as the fundamental enabler 
of success.  Over time, especially after the 1981 Polish crisis, an imperative was placed 
on better warning and crisis monitoring capabilities.  Increasing concern about the 
combat capabilities of Operational Maneuver Groups made moving target ground 
surveillance radars and dynamic retargeting systems more important.  Intelligence co-
evolved with military capabilities, gradually overcoming traditional bias as a secondary 
factor in operations.  By the end of the Cold War, thanks in large part to the integration of 
digital information technology into intelligence processes, intelligence support activities 
began to overcome criticism that its ability to inform battlefield decision making always 
lagged behind doctrine and operational concepts.  
Military innovation scholars will need to adopt a more balanced approach to 
understanding the origins and evolution of current ISR capabilities if they hope to inform 
defense policy in the 2000s.  This requires greater attention to innovation in intelligence 
operations, processes, and policies to assure that military and civilian, foreign and 
domestic ISR requirements are understood and met.  In the emerging round of national 
security transformation decisions and funding prioritizations, the tendency will 
undoubtedly be to continue the trend found in defense reform decisions – to pursue 
advances in surveillance and monitoring capabilities (e.g., the drive for “persistence 
surveillance”) without overhauling or bolstering the intelligence functions that turn such 
capabilities into a strategic advantage.  Additional sensing does not equate to more 
insight.  Particular attention must be paid to leveraging the most important strategic asset 
in the ISR domain – the analysts. 
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Enablers 
Another aspect of context factoring into military innovation studies are what is best 
termed enablers.  Other names for them?  Catalysts, facilitators, or influence paths.  From 
one perspective, they are resources to leverage.  From another, they represent the linkages 
between the security environment, perceptions of that environment, and specific 
organizational factors or influences on innovation decisions. For innovation champions 
within specific organizations, they are enablers because their disposition in relationship to 
a specific innovation or change proposal is a barometer for how well the external context 
supports their work within the boundaries of the organization.  For this reason, innovation 
champions often seek to effect change in the external domain concurrent with activities 
within their organization.  
Resources are not limited to fiscal concerns.  Vision and leadership, the mix of 
available talent, the prioritization of development initiatives, and views of technology are 
all “resources” from the perspective of their ability to influence the innovation milieu.  
Vision and leadership are the most important factors for enabling large-scale innovation.  
Strategic communications and an ability to engender cultural change are two attributes 
required to succeed.  Both are core competencies for change managers.  In the order of 
importance for innovation, funding is certainly a close second in terms of enabling 
factors.  
Getting strategy right is critical to innovation, as are the twin pillars on which a good 
strategy is conceived and implemented: vision and leadership.    “With the offset strategy 
as a guide,” William Perry worked to focus “the attention and support of high-level DoD 
decision makers, Service chiefs and Congress to speed several important technologies 
from concept to implementation.6   Visions of future warfighting thereafter built on the 
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key thrusts of situational awareness capabilities for intelligence gathering, target 
identification, navigation, precision strike, and expedited logistics.    
Perry’s support for innovative approaches to technology continued throughout his 
government service.  Later, as Secretary of Defense in the first Clinton Administration, 
Perry would team with Director of Central Intelligence John Deutch, and Vice Chairman 
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Vice Admiral William Owens to form the National Imagery 
and Mapping Agency (NIMA) in 1986 (renamed the National Geospatial-Intelligence 
Agency, NGA, in 2003).  
A controversial decision at the time, NGA’s successful integration of national 
imagery intelligence capabilities with defense mapping and charting services provided 
many of the crucial targeting, navigation, and precision strike innovations demonstrated 
in operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom.  In some ways, NGA’s integration of 
information technologies and analytic expertise to provide geospatial intelligence 
represents the evolution of core aspects of the offset strategy and the realization of 
Perry’s precision strike vision on a global basis.  
Vision and leadership were also important enablers for the Army in the years 
immediately following Vietnam.  Army and Air Force leaders agreed on the vision of 
AirLand Battle, expending organizational capital in the process.   Vision was provided by 
the most senior leaders down to combat leaders in the field pushing innovation at the 
tactical level.  The Reagan administration’s defense buildup and National Security 
Decision Directives to bankrupt the Soviet Union reflected the president’s “belief that the 
Cold War was not a set of problems to be fixed, but a situation to be ended.”7  Reagan’s 
vision solidified into policies that prepared the road to Reykjavik and helped bring the 
Cold War to a peaceful resolution.  
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An earlier example of vision impelling military innovation was the offset strategy 
and its range of initiatives.  Assault Breaker, with its integration of intelligence, targeting, 
information dissemination, weapons platforms, command and control, and munitions 
systems was a defining “force package” of the era, one that encouraged further thinking 
about long-range precision strike.  Most of the weapons systems developed since the 
1970s have relied on some information “brains” to work, a continuation of the underlying 
strategy.  
Cruise missiles required terrain contour following maps. Stealth materials and 
technology were possible only because Cray supercomputers were available. Stealth 
combat operations required sophisticated mission planning and execution tools for route 
selection and optimizing the low radar cross section.  Precision bombs required 
geospatial terrain models, including elevation data.  Navigation, maneuver, targeting, and 
precision strike required GPS.  By the late 1990s acquisition processes would address 
total information costs for new weapons systems in detail, pressing military services to 
identify information requirements earlier in the acquisition cycle.  
Programs are traditionally managed by balancing adherence to the schedule 
coordinating sub-component delivery, integration, and testing, the performance 
characteristics of the overall system or platform, and the overall system or program cost –
including initial transition to service.  Risk assessments are performed during the process 
to identify and prevent schedule slips, degradations of performance, and the myriad 
exigencies leading to cost overruns.  Rarely are systems on time, within budget, and as 
capable as initially specified.  Frequently, one of the three program management elements 
is considered more important.  A particular performance threshold, for example, may be 
critical, with additional funding and time provided to overcome technological or systems 
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integration challenges.  Cost constrained programs, on the other hand, tend to focus on 
the bottom line rather than maturing capabilities or meeting a specific deadline.   They 
stabilize cost by shaving performance parameters or extending the schedule so costs are 
addressed over more fiscal planning years.
Significant innovations aiming to fundamentally alter the effectiveness of military 
organizations usually require a more flexible approach to the balancing of cost, schedule, 
and performance.  In wartime, schedule is usually the most important, with cost less of a 
concern if the innovation has strategic importance.  In other times, cost is considered the 
most important, especially when the battlefield effectiveness of a significant innovation is 
relatively uncertain.  
Funding alignment is an important indicator of what organizations consider both 
important and what leaders thing is possible in terms of changing the calculus of military 
effectiveness.  In the early 1970s, for example, the allocation of defense dollars to new 
strategic nuclear systems indicated not only what defense planners considered a key 
requirement for national security but also what Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird 
considered possible given the political situation.  
Increased defense spending at the end of the decade was a key contextual enabler for 
DARPA activities.  Indeed, DARPA’s budget nearly doubled from 1977 through 1981.  
DARPA realigned its activities to solve operational challenges posed by Soviet 
conventional forces in large part because of shifts in the security environment, greater 
willingness to support advanced technology development, visions for how technology 
could be applied, the empowerment of leaders with specific agendas, and recognition that 
funding needed to be aligned with strategic objectives for raising the nuclear threshold.
391
Talent mix is another aspect of the contextual environment military innovation 
scholars should consider.  Organizations cannot develop and diffuse significant 
innovations without some measure of diversity in its talent base.  Internal and external 
expectations influence the evolution of skill sets within societies and security regimes, 
creating guild-like cohorts whose self worth and value is directly related to views of 
current and future technology, the degree and type of innovations perceived as beneficial, 
and approaches to risk.  An important development during the maturation period of the 
American RMA was the rise of information technologies on the margins of traditional 
military occupation specialties and, over time, the migration of almost every occupation 
specialty into the information technology domain.  
Increased professionalism, a factor related to talent mix, underwrote the American 
RMA.  Major General (MG) Stan McChrystal was the Deputy Director of Operations, 
Joint Chiefs of Staff during Operation Iraqi Freedom and assumed Commander of the 
Joint Special Operations Command in October 2003.  He contends that the return of 
professionalism to the Army – indeed to all of the Services, in the late 1970s and through 
the 1980s – is the most important antecedent to what observers dubbed an RMA in the 
1990s.  Arguing that the true revolution was one in training and education, MG 
McChrystal concludes that any leaps in strategic effectiveness associated with American 
forces at the end of the Cold War derived from a culture valuing learning and the 
development of leaders.  American troops now demonstrate a penchant for innovation in 
the field – the institutionalization of innovation.  The ability to harness technology, using 
it to offset strategic and operational challenges, to innovate organizationally and 
operationally: these are the foundations of the American RMA for McChrystal, hallmarks 
of a modern professional force.  
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Where MG McChrystal correlates military professionalism with innovation, retired 
Admiral Bill Owens sees professionalism as “synonymous with military effectiveness.”8
Innovation in the planning for and conduct of warfare is in fact a key enable of increased 
effectiveness.  After decades of relative stagnation, a return to a culture of innovation 
occurred in the late 1970s.9
Another dimension of talent mix is the breadth of skills within an organization folded 
into the innovation consolidation and diffusion process.  Beginning in the late 1970s, 
significant military innovations involved systems integration, spawning several lines of 
planning and operational processes on which current transformation activities rest.  
Systems engineering, discussed below, emerged as a skill to facilitate intra- organizational 
planning as well as help organizations develop requirements and plans based on 
externally driven requirements.   
Flexibility in the planning process is critical.  Leaders activity promoted innovation 
in the late 1970s to a much greater degree of self-determination than their immediate 
predecessors. They fostered greater appreciation for the value of doing things differently 
and, as the Soviet threat became politically more pronounced, they accepted a greater 
degree of flexibility in designing solutions to operational challenges.  
Things were broken, they needed fixing – or at least this is what a new generation of 
military and civilian leaders believed.  They shared a larger vision for offsetting Soviet 
advantages without relying on nuclear weapons.  More importantly, they realized a 
critical need for organizational renewal and concerted efforts to instill pride, confidence, 
and a sense of purpose among the ranks.   From the perspective of post-World War II 
American military thought, these same leaders advocated new approaches to warfighting 
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and promoted greater imitative among junior commissioned officers and senior enlisted 
service members.  
It took at least a decade for an air-ground maneuver doctrine, the operationalization 
of air-ground cooperation, and information-enabled weapons systems to evolve into a 
new, joint approach to warfighting.  The cultural sensitivity and operational outlook 
required to implement the envisioned dynamic, integrated, rapid-dominance style of 
warfare continues to mature  Doctrine, technology, and organizational innovations, 
moreover, retain their currency in part because they evolved in an organizational context 
that favored initiative and operational flexibility.  The fungibllity of  information 
technology and ‘how-to’ knowledge about its applications was increasingly embedded in 
institutional practices and cognitive schemas.    
Then, as now, planners design flexibility into future operational capabilities because 
of the uncertainty present in the security environment.  Operational flexibility did not 
manifest itself until the late 1990s – when planners in the 1980s had projected that 
precision nonnuclear strike, intelligence capabilities, and maneuver doctrine would 
coalesce into a Follow On Forces Attack capacity.  The end of the Cold War delayed the 
schedule and new operational requirements shifted the orientation of further 
developments.  Essential characteristics, including precision strike, Stealth, and time-
critical targeting remained at the center of military doctrine.   
Operational flexibility seems even more accepted in the 2000s than it was during the 
late 1970s and 1980s.  Then, flexibility and agility increased in defense policymaking, 
research and development, and doctrinal change – but flexibility in operations paled in 
comparison to the 2000s.  Now, it appears that the U.S. is pursing greater flexibility in 
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military activities, but it is not clear that the strategic planning environment reinforces 
creativity and risk taking to the degree present in the early 1980s.          
Despite continued emphasis on operational flexibility, it is not clear that the 
anticipated degree of planning flexibility matured in the 1990s as force structure and 
defense budgets declined.  In many ways, much of the flexibility and adaptability 
inherent in the Department of the Army’s planning succumbed to process rigidity at the 
same time that operational flexibility manifested itself.  
Organizational Factors
The security environment, perceived innovation attributes, and enabling 
characteristics are closely linked to organizational factors.  In the real world, of course, 
these analytic distinctions fade.  Perceptions of the security environment, for example, 
are part of a larger overlapping flow of influences that are unconstrained by what scholars 
label behavioral, interpersonal, or structural boundaries.  Scholars reduce the complex 
milieu of agency and structural conditions into frameworks to facilitate analysis and 
render judgments.  Part of the reason for the innovation milieu construct, therefore, is to 
focus on both the deconstruction (and reduction) of reality into piece parts to facilitate 
military innovation studies and orient military innovation studies away from frameworks 
that privilege only parts of the larger milieu, claiming that only one sector or set of 
factors is important.
Not all of the organizational factors involved in the emergence of the American 
RMA can be summarized here.  Students of military innovation must continue to press 
for understanding of the formal and informal structural constructs that cohere in the form 
of organizational factors.  They remain important contextual influences shaping how 
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organizations defined and redefined missions and operating procedures in response to 
both international and domestic influences.  And they condition innovation diffusion and 
adoption processes through which new ideas, technology, and operational approaches 
emerge, prove themselves, and displace established practices. 
The military’s 1970s training revolution reflected a shift in organizational priorities 
in the aftermath of Vietnam.  Closely related were doctrinal shifts, some specifically 
aiming to integrate new technology and weapons systems.    The Army’s creation of the 
Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), for example, stemmed from recognition 
among senior leaders that doctrine and tactics required reinvention to push new 
procedures as well as integrate new technology.  Subsequent Army and Air Force 
decisions to cooperate reflected organizational acceptance of relationships required to 
both meet the operational threat and facilitate development of envisioned weapons 
systems.  The Army needed Air Force acceptance for long range, deep strike missiles and 
cooperation in the targeting mission.  The Air Force, on the other hand, needed Army 
anti-aircraft support to attrit Soviet tactical aviation and to suppress enemy air defense 
with long-range fires.
Both services needed research and development assistance to bring new technologies 
to the fight.  Malcolm S. Currie’s 1973 decision to reorient the Defense Advanced 
Research Project Agency (DARPA) reflected a national focus on pursuing technologies 
to resolve strategic and operational challenges.  Across Stealth, Assault Breaker, and 
information technology projects, DARPA worked closely with the Services to understand 
how new doctrine and technology could be applied to operational problems in ways 
yielding new measures of strategic effectiveness.  
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Students of military innovation should also consider how, and to what degree the 
security environment, perceptions of innovation, and enabling resources influence 
organizational plans and expectations.  Military innovations introduced into organizations 
for experimentation and then adoption tend toward path dependency in terms of evolving 
in relationship to their initial operational purpose.  Organizationally, it is difficult for 
innovation champions to achieve buy-in for new ideas or capabilities that diverge from 
established practices without processes for discovering organizational benefits and 
proving them in realistic experiments.  This was certainly true for maneuver warfare 
doctrine, Stealth, and Assault Breaker.  Each of these evolved within military 
organizations only after proponents successfully argued their utility for mitigating, or 
reducing, risk posed by Soviet capabilities such as the Operational Maneuver Group and 
a very capable, integrated air defense network.  Only after the domestic political context 
changed to support conventional warfare innovations, moreover, would such arguments 
make headway.  
Throughout, integration emerged as a more important theme in U.S. military thought 
and defense planning.  A key part of the offset strategy, integration initially concerned 
concepts, changes in strategic doctrine, and new conventional initiatives aiming to 
strengthen the relationship between nuclear and nonnuclear forces.  
In addition to largely overlooking the evolution of the offset strategy, histories of 
advanced U.S. conventional forces sometimes overlook the origins of arguments for an 
integrated deep strike, rapid dominance approach.  Only recently have analysts turned to 
the integration of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities with 
organizational and doctrinal innovations.  
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Tightening and adapting the relationship between operations and intelligence 
emerged as an integration theme in the early 1980s.   This included ISR capabilities 
developed specifically to raise the nuclear threshold in Europe by strengthening the 
deterrence relationship between conventional and theater nuclear weapons.  By the end of 
the 1980s, this relationship matured such that Soviet observers viewed U.S. conventional 
forces as capable of “strategic theater” operations.  U.S. military planners began using the 
term strategic nonnuclear strategic strike.  This trend was reinforced in the late 1990s as 
operations demanded more precise geopositioning.  A 1998 Defense Intelligence Agency 
report, for example, concluded “that precision strike weapons demand precise 
intelligence” and the ability “to operate effectively in the high-tempo, complex, and more 
lethal battlefields of the future.”10
This study does not assess the myriad advances in satellite communications and 
other space-based capabilities that occurred over the past three decades.  It is important, 
nonetheless, to note that the American RMA relied in large part on the communications, 
geo-positioning, surveillance, and guidance systems that exploit the coverage, 
perspective, timeliness, and access over denied areas gained by locating capabilities in 
space. 
Among the benchmarks was the 1980 launch of Intelsat 5, an American 
communications satellite able to simultaneously relay two color television signals and 
some twelve thousand telephone calls.  Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003 was made 
possible in part because the U.S. leased large amounts of bandwidth from commercial 
space telecommunications providers.  Integrating space with other domains of operations 
remains an organizational priority among all the Services and a key source of operational 
innovation.     
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Another form of integration brought together the combat arms (armor, infantry, 
artillery, aviation), capabilities for joint command and control, shared pursuit of common 
weapons systems, and mutually supportive doctrine.  Such organizational issues were 
perhaps the most important and far-reaching of the proliferating integration thrusts that 
continues to be a primary axis of defense transformation in the 2000s.  
The most important integration theme concerned information systems.  Indeed, 
information technology figured prominently in successive visions for addressing strategic 
and operational challenges over that last three decades.  The promise of information 
technology was increasingly linked to operational approaches to deter, defeat, and now 
dominate adversaries.  Washington Post reporter Vernon Loeb observed in December 
2002 that, “It took years, and increasingly impressive proof on the battlefield, before 
these inspirations were recognized for what they were – a new way of fighting that would 
change the calculations of war and peace in unprecedented, and still uncertain ways.”11
Integration-focused concept demonstrations like Assault Breaker were essential for 
gaining insights into cumulative, some would say emergent, outcomes from combining 
warfighting capabilities with information technology.  It is not surprising that the primary 
architect of the offset strategy, former Secretary of Defense William J. Perry, was an 
engineer with experience integrating systems when he directed defense research and 
engineering in the late 1970s.  Indeed, Perry was instrumental in the development of an 
important signals intelligence satellite system in the 1960s that fundamentally altered the 
effectiveness of U.S. collection against a range of sensitive targets for several decades.  
He was also a systems integrator who understood the travails of large project 
management.  Systems engineering (SE) and integration (SI) capabilities are key socio-
technical enablers of the shift in military effectiveness associated with the end-to-end 
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precision strike capabilities, including intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 
systems.  They represent an important organizational approach to delivering effective 
military capabilities; they are unsung organizational factors, reflective of a larger 
approach to problem solving, that helped the U.S. win the Cold War.  
As chapter 1 briefly discussed, SE and SI practices emerged and were perfected in 
large-scale, complex systems for strategic missile defenses and nuclear command and 
control.  SE, in particular, evolved as a distinct socio-technical approach to problem 
solving that more closely linked mission needs and warfighting requirements to research 
and development, program planning, and capability insertion than at any other time in 
military history.  Nuclear launch warning networks and associated nuclear command and 
control systems evolved in response to specific needs to identify an enemy nuclear 
missile launch and rapidly set in motion a U.S. retaliation.  This was the heart of 
deterrence.  Over time, the cornerstone of deterrence became not the individual weapons 
platforms and guidance systems but the network that linked intelligence and surveillance 
capabilities with nuclear weapons release processes facilitating assured retaliatory strikes.
  In an era dominated by a systems of systems approach to modernizing and 
transforming the armed forces, one defined by sophisticated information systems and 
their interfaces, systems engineering and integration have became even more important.  
Indeed, SE/SI skills are central to managing the knowledge burden, a term applied to the 
process of creating and maintaining large information enterprises operating in complex 
environments bordering on chaos.  These skills are fundamentally management ones, a 
conclusion Thomas Hughes deduced from study of large-scale systems engineering 
projects.  In large, technologically complex integration processes, “management has 
presented more difficult challenges than research and development.”12
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Experience managing large-scale systems engineering and integration problems 
shaped approaches first to information technology research and development and then to 
applying information technology to battlefield problems.  All aspects of defense strategy 
have been affected, including the venerable strategic triad of bombers, intercontinental 
ballistic missiles (ICBMs), and submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs).  The new 
triad is specifically depicted as including command, control, communications, and 
intelligence as the central enabler of deterrence – not specific weapons or platforms.
Revisiting the Innovation Milieu
Widespread support for conventional modernization emerged during the mid- to late-
1970s.  Planners recognized that current NATO modernization efforts were not sufficient 
to counter Soviet advances.  After years of negotiations, diplomatic initiatives proved 
unsuccessful in moderating what the West perceived as Soviet foreign policy 
adventurism coupled with increased defense spending.  Economic conditions improved, 
especially in the U.S., dampening domestic opposition to defense spending.  
Underlying all of this was an important organizational development in the U.S. 
Army.  Paralleling the quest for renewed innovation in DARPA and other research and 
development arenas, and reflective of the approach to innovation pursued by Generals 
DePuy, Starry, and Gorman, senior Army leadership on the front lines in Europe 
encouraged innovation at all levels.  A mix of innovation activities ensued.  
Chapter 2 argued that military innovation theory is primary focused on significant 
innovations that alter the course of military history.  Often they focus on what might be 
called the “big bets.”   Qualifying as a big bet, or true ‘game changing’ development, 
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requires a fundamental shift in the core competencies or missions of an organization that 
allows one to dominate an adversary.  They often change the character of warfare.  
A handful of discontinuous innovations emerged within operational sectors during 
the maturation period of the American RMA.   Stealth was in many ways one of these.  
Like many innovations its evolution was uncertain. The Air Force accepted fielding of F-
117s only on the condition that other programs, including a new air superiority fighter, 
would not lose funding.  Organizationally, therefore, the Air Force did not bet on Stealth 
to secure victory.  
Nor did Assault Breaker lead to any big bet investments.  Neither the Army nor the 
Air Force choose to commit resources to field the elements of the demonstration even 
after it successfully tested critical capabilities.  Instead, the Services allocated resources 
to their own, similar programs to prevent losing funding or having their programs tied to 
a joint initiative. 
Organizationally, rather than a series of big bets, the U.S. seems to have pursued 
significant military innovations that encouraged discontinuous change in specific
domains of operations.  Alone, none was intended to revolutionize warfare.  Instead, they 
were considered key innovations at the operational level of warfare that, properly utilized 
in concert during a campaign, could exploit known vulnerabilities in Soviet forces and 
doctrine.  As an integrated enterprise, planners intended innovations to enhance overall 
capabilities, increase U.S. military effectiveness against Soviet forces, and yield new 
measures of military effectiveness.  
From the perspective of a wired, network centric approach, the promise of leveraging 
information technology as a force multiplier represented a big bet.  For decades, risks 
inherent in ‘betting’ operational success on the promise of information technology led to 
402
a cautious investment strategy.  As the costs of information technology declined, the 
underlying argument of the offset strategy was more feasible.  Operations in the 1990s 
demonstrated information sharing and knowledge management shortfalls.  Arguments for 
increased spending on information systems were more tenable, something reflected in 
changes in investments and reprioritization of key systems.  In the early 2000s, the Army 
altered its transformation strategy, opting for a lighter, more mobile combat brigade over 
heavier units.  Instead of armor, combat forces would be wrapped in a protective layer of 
information systems enabling the avoidance of enemy fire while bringing rapid, decisive 
combat power to bear anywhere on the battlefield.  
Services did not necessarily place faith in information technology until after it was 
proven in battle. Information systems were not funded at a level suggesting that 
organizations considered them the arbiters of victory.  Few senior leaders placed their 
weapons systems at risk by moving funds into information sectors.  The lack of full 
funding for Assault Breaker, Service reluctance to push GPS, delays developing joint 
doctrine, and other decisions suggest that innovation is not an isolated variable.  
Extraneous factors are involved.  The contextual and organizational factors, therefore, are 
not directly influencing the mix of innovations.  
In terms of thinking through frameworks for conceptualizing innovation, this adds a 
degree of contingency and uncertainty more reflective of reality than a deterministic 
model possess.  Using the idea of a milieu, or a point of point or coordinate in space and 
time, evokes the image of the core organizational processes scholars are interested in 
studying in light of multifaceted, often indirect, influences external to the organization.  
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Chapter 2 suggested three questions an innovation framework should help scholars 
and policy practitioners address to help identify innovation diffusion and adoption 
processes within a specific organizational context.    
• Does the acceptance and diffusion of the innovation require incremental 
or discontinuous shifts in the organization?  
• Do the required policy, organizational, technological, or other types of 
changes required lead to the sustaining of current policies or 
technologies (adapting or extending them) or their disruption?13
• Does change promote a convergence of the old and new or a 
divergence?  
The questions assume knowledge of, or access to knowledge about, relevant contextual 
and organizational factors.  The innovation milieu construct can be further decomposed 
to inform scholarly assessments of innovation cases and suggest additional insights into 
strategic policy making.  Figure 7-2 (which also appeared in chapter 2) is a recommended 
first step.  
Figure 7-2 is not proposed as a framework for thinking about types of organizational 
behavior; nor is it proposed as a model inclusive of all innovation cases.  Adaptive 
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change falls in the lower left-hand corner while “big bets” indicative of major military 
innovations aiming to engender transformation fall in the opposite corner.  
The intent of asking the above three questions if to identify characteristics of 
innovations within their organizational context as well as think about socialization and 
diffusion capacities needed to achieve adoption.  By working through them, one can 
attempt to locate the innovation along the range of difficulty (line A in figure 7-2) and 
then pursue activities (line B) to decrease or mitigate the risk of failure.  The intent, over 
time, is to change the organization so new missions or capabilities are accepted as 
mainstream or at least considered as central to the achievement of the mission.  They then 
become part of new overall capability level from which additional adaptations on the 
original innovation are pursued.  
This is a critical part of the innovation diffusion and adoption process.  As father of 
modern economics Alfred Marshall concluded, innovations rarely achieve their full 
potential until “many minor improvements and subsidiary discoveries have gathered 
themselves around it.”14
Additional analysis must be done to identify what types of risk mitigation and 
organizational change activities will address concerns about why a particular innovation 
is difficult to institutionalize.  Experiments, prototyping, and incubation activities can be 
structured and pursued in business units or operational areas most conducive to the 
particular technological, operational, or organizational innovation.  This includes 
identifying the strategic or operational necessity for the innovation and pursuing diffusion 
or insertion in ways most conducive to their acceptance.  It also requires assessments of 
what, if any, additional innovations (new capabilities, ideas, operational concepts) are
needed to enable the core innovation.  
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Underscoring the above operational view of the innovation milieu is a belief that 
military innovation is a social process in which technological, operational, and 
organizational elements conjoin in a specific context.  
Many approach defense transformation planning from the perspective of technology 
invention.  Research and development to produce new technology, for example, is 
equated to military innovation.  Like other areas of innovation, however, technological 
innovation is a fundamentally social behavior involving diffusion and adoption processes.  
For Harvey Brooks, it is “sociotechnical rather than technical,” an argument that extends 
to other areas, including the management domain.15  Because “managerial revolutions are 
becoming an increasingly important aspect of technology,” he continues, management, 
“insofar as it can be described by fully specified rules, is thus a technology.”16
Why bring this up?  Current defense transformation strategy appears to be pursuing a 
mix of technology innovation and diffusion processes as well as fostering management 
capabilities to support, lead, and execute transformation plans.  Within defense agencies 
and the armed forces, much of this involves business process innovation, particularly 
those involving knowledge management and information technology.  This is a 
profoundly social area of innovation that, although technology intensive, is fundamentally 
about organizational cultures and workforce communication.  
Informing Defense Transformation 
Ten years after the 1991 Gulf War, in the aftermath of operations Enduring Freedom 
(Afghanistan) and Iraqi Freedom, there is much talk about a new American way of 
warfare – one with strong resemblance to the original RMA thesis.  Consider the vision 
embedded in the 2003 defense transformation strategy: “an enhanced forward deterrent 
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posture through the integration of new combinations of immediately employable forward 
stationed and deployed forces; globally available reconnaissance, strike, and command 
and control (C2) assets; information operations capabilities; and rapidly deployable, 
highly lethal, and sustainable forces that may come from outside a theater of 
operations.”17  Contributing aspects included the technologies and concepts central to the 
offset strategy, the rise of operational art and a systems approach to warfare, and the 
evolution of rapid deployment planning.  Another area of continuity is increasing 
importance assigned to systems integration across all domains of national security 
decision-making, including the information and intelligence arenas.  
The task for military planners and strategists is, arguably, to build on past successes 
and develop appropriate capabilities (technological, organizational, and operational) to 
meet future threats.  An issue not addressed above is whether current transformation 
planners and military theorists are taking the U.S. military in the right direction.  Are U.S. 
forces being prepared to fight and win future conflicts?  What are the right investments to 
make to prevail in future conflicts?  Such questions, likely to dominate the 2004 
presidential election, are beyond the scope of this study.  
The fundamental issues for current students and practitioners of defense 
transformation involve the diffusion, adoption, and sustained adaptation of innovations.  
Technology development is not the main concern.  Issues associated with the 
management and oversight of strategic planning and implementation processes, including 
strategic communications and leadership attention to cultural change, are the chief 
impediments.  Accordingly, the continued evolution of management capabilities within 
the armed forces, along with application of emerging cross-organization integration 
approaches, are both critical to leveraging knowledge management capabilities.  
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In this area, defense transformation strategists can learn from the first generation of 
innovators to exploit the computer information revolution.  Many of the same issues and 
organizational challenges to the diffusion and adoption of critical innovations persist.
Military innovation studies are not considered a primary field in political science, 
history, or international relations sub-fields like security studies.  Partly this is because no 
single academic discipline can legitimately claim a comparative advantage in the 
underlying methods, data, or explanatory power when their methods are applied to a 
fundamental question:  What behavior, processes, and antecedent factors lead to 
significant leaps in military capabilities and seemingly revolutionary jumps in military 
effectiveness?  
Military affairs span across disciplines: military history, autobiography, psychology, 
theory building case studies of political-military decision making, arms proliferation,
political-economic studies of war making potential, international relations theories 
derived from correlates of war databases, action-reaction phenomena, and so on.  This is 
a mixed blessing for scholars and decision makers looking for empirically derived
insights into military innovation phenomena. Since the study and practice of military 
change management necessarily involves understanding multifaceted contextual 
elements, a cross-disciplinary approach is needed.  This seems particularly true when 
considering the strategic aspects of military change management and relationships 
between strategic and operational necessity and innovation activities. 
In their survey of the military effectiveness of nine military organizations in the early 
twentieth century, Williamson Murray and Allan Millet found that “nations that got their 
strategy right were able to repair tactical and operational deficiencies in their military 
organizations.  But nations that got the strategy wrong, no matter how effective their 
408
military organizations on the battlefield, always lost.”18  The very issue of an “innovation 
strategy” as part of an overall defense transformation strategy is difficult for many to 
comprehend.  
One reason military history is replete with failed transformations and failures to 
adapt military organizations is that leaders simply got the strategy wrong.  Other times 
the strategy is not implemented correctly.  Increasing the overall strategic effectiveness of 
U.S. national security processes will remain an elusive goal without a more 
comprehensive national strategy for innovation.  Although pieces of this strategy exist in 
the form of national security plans, defense transformation visions, and homeland 
security reforms, no unifying study of the evolving strategic context for innovation has 
begun.  For the still disparate arms of U.S. national security, this leaves organizations 
without a clear template to priorities innovation activities relative to current and future 
needs.  
Defense transformation is fundamentally a strategic planning and execution process. 
There is no lack of strategic planning approaches suitable to the task.  Critical is 
designing and faithfully implementing a strategic plan that aligns resources to achieve the 
optimal capabilities for the situation.  When this calls for successfully adopting disruptive 
or a significantly different technology or doctrine, the strategy must address diffusion and 
adoption processes.  
Most strategic change efforts requiring the introduction of a new order of business or 
a capability alien to the organizational culture fail not always because the strategy is 
wrong.  They fail because the process does not address barriers to diffusion and the 
implementation of plans are too inflexible in the face of disparate organizational 
exigencies, including deliberate attempts to block change.  
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This is where innovation studies and frameworks are useful, something businesses 
are discovering after a decade of re-engineering and process revolution models 
insensitive to end-to-end aspects of innovation.  Compared with RMA-associated defense 
modernization policies in the early 1990s, initiatives associated with official defense 
transformation strategy in the 2000s reflect greater sensitivity to factors identified in 
strategic innovation literature as critical for successful change management.  These 
include cultural change, strategic communication, the identification of risk associated 
with change, and the importance of winning the battle of perception – which includes 
managing expectations.   
Allan Millet cogently defines the utility of military innovation studies for policy 
makers.  “Knowing how and why innovation flourished or lagged,” he contends, “is an 
essential step toward understanding the enduring dynamics of military innovation and the 
challenges of military reform.”19  Similarly, political scientist Stephen Peter Rosen 
intended his Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military to inform 
military reform in the 1990s, offering “conclusions about the role of resources, 
intelligence, and civilian control in military innovation.”20
Among the benefits of exploring defense transformation through a lens attuned to 
innovation is the ability to tap existing insights in the historical, sociological, economic, 
technical, and organizational aspects of innovations processes and outcomes.  From this 
perspective, historical RMA works become a source of data for innovation studies.  
Focus differs.  The former yields understanding of levels and types of large-scale military 
change and associated effects on battlefield performance; the latter yields understanding 
of the multi-faceted initiatives and circumstances that enabled change in the first place.  
410
One addresses revolutionary change in military history from one period to the next; the
other studies the intricacies of bringing such changes to fruition. 
Adoption, the institutionalization of innovation as it diffuses, “represents a departure 
from standard practice” for an organization, often occurring when ideas challenging core 
practices and established concepts are, at least partially, assimilated and incorporated into 
an organization’s activities.21  This process is difficult to enact and fundamentally not
deterministic, rife with what organizational theorists describe as “inherent tensions that 
must be accommodated.”22  Success or failure, therefore, usually hinges on how these 
tensions are resolved.  Indeed, how leaders and organizations go about introducing, 
diffusing, and institutionalizing innovations is, perhaps, the most critical part of the 
innovation process.  Most military innovation studies, like similar works in management 
sciences, aim to organize and synthesize information about the causal relationships 
among innovations themselves, processes organizations use to adopt them, and the 
outcomes produced.   
A RAND Corporation study on predicting military innovation suggests one route to 
including technology issues within an overall framework of military innovation.  In 
focusing on technology integration, what others discuss as diffusion processes, Jeffrey A. 
Isaacson, Christopher Layne, and John Arquilla operationalize the following definition in 
their analysis of factors useful for predicting future military innovations.  “For a specific
military, innovation is manifested by the development of new warfighting concepts 
and/or new means of integrating technology.  New means of integrating technology 
might include revised doctrine, tactics, training, or support.”23
This study was primarily interested in those military innovations involving 
discontinuous or disruptive change altering an organization’s core missions, tasks, or 
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capabilities in a way that shifts how an organization defines and achieves strategic and 
operational objectives.  Regardless of the historical data, theories, or methodological bent 
pursued, military innovation studies seeking to inform policy must provide policy makers 
with some framework consisting of structural interfaces, insights into human behavior, 
and contextual factors influencing both.    
John Lewis Gaddis concludes that, “studying the past has a way of introducing 
humility – a first stage toward gaining detachment – because it suggests the continuity of 
the problems we confront, and the unoriginality of most of our solutions for them.  It is a 
good way of putting things in perspective, of stepping back to take in a wider view.”24
True enough.  Such perspective is important on many levels.  In addition to infusing 
additional background information into the continuously evolving discussion of the 
American RMA, historical perspective on the antecedents to current technologies and 
operational concepts provides a sense of historical continuity into ongoing defense 
transformation decisions.  It demonstrates how much has not changed in terms of visions 
for future warfighting capabilities at the same time as suggesting paths of divergence 
demonstrated in recent conflicts.  This is where military innovation studies offer to fill an 
important niche in policy analysis.  
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